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WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED 
AT  PARIS 


WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED 
AT  PARIS 

THE  STORY  OF  THE   PEACE  CONFERENCE,  1918-1919 

BY  AMERICAN   DELEGATES 


EDITED    BY 

EDWARD  MANDELL  HOUSE 

UNITED    STATES    COMMISSIONER    PLENIPOTENTIAKY 

AND 

CHARLES   SEYMOUR,  Litt.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  HISTORY  IN  YALE  UNIVERSITY 


WITH    MAPS 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1921 


Copyright.  1921,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  May,  1921 


THE    SCRIBNER    PRESS 


IN  EXPLANATION 

When  the  Academy  of  Music  in  Philadelphia  was  taken 
under  lease,  in  the  autumn  of  1920,  for  a  term  of  years 
by  a  group  of  pubhc-spirited  citizens,  it  was  for  the  pur- 
pose of  acquiring  the  building  so  as  to  dedicate  it  to  the 
public  good.  Its  sixty-three  years  of  service  had  given 
the  Academy  a  wonderful  history  in  which  every  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  since  Franklin  Pierce  had 
figured:  practically  every  great  orator,  artist,  and  dis- 
tinguished publicist  in  the  United  States  and  every 
illustrious  visitor  from  foreign  lands  had  appeared  on 
its  stage. 

It  was  determined  to  recreate  the  Foyer  in  the  build- 
ing into  a  beautiful  auditorium  of  intimate  size  which 
would  serve  as  a  Public  Forum.  In  discussing  this  proj- 
ect with  Colonel  Edward  M.  House,  he  expressed  his 
conviction  that  the  time  had  come  to  tell  the  American 
pubhc,  for  the  first  time,  the  inside  story  of  the  Peace 
Conference  at  Paris.  It  was  decided  that  instead  of 
following  the  customary  method  of  publishing  the  ma- 
terial, it  should  be  first  spoken  in  a  series  of  talks  to  be 
given  in  the  Academy  Foyer  and  thus  the  idea  of  dedi- 
cating the  room  as  a  public  forum  would  be  launched. 
Fifteen  of  the  most  salient  subjects  of  the  Conference 
were  selected,  and  fifteen  of  the  most  authoritative 
speakers  chosen,  and  a  series  of  fifteen  weekly  talks 
explaining  "What  Really  Happened  at  Paris"  was 
announced.  Tickets  were  sold  only  for  the  entire  series, 
and  when  the  first  talk  was  delivered  every  seat  in  the 
auditorium  was  sold  to  the  most  intellectually  distin- 
guished audience  ever  brought  together  in  Philadelphia. 

The  series  was  given  under  the  auspices  of  The  Phila- 
delphia Public  Ledger,  and  it  was  arranged  that  each 
talk  should  be  sent  out  in  advance  of  delivery  to  the 


vi  IN   EXPLANATION 

subscribing  newspapers  of  the  United  States  and  Europe 
of  its  syndicate  for  simultaneous  publication  the  morning 
after  its  delivery  in  the  Academy  Foyer.  By  this  method, 
the  word  spoken  in  Philadelphia  reached,  the  following 
morning,  a  world  audience. 

On  Friday  evening,  December  lo,  1920,  the  first  talk 
was  delivered  and  the  series  was  continued  for  fifteen 
consecutive  weeks.  Each  talk  was  limited  to  one  hour; 
and  was  followed  by  a  half-hour  questionnaire,  giving 
those  in  the  audience  who  desired  the  opportunity  to  ask 
any  relevant  question  not  covered  in  the  speaker's  talk. 
Each  talk  began  promptly  at  half  after  eight  o'clock, 
when  the  doors  were  closed  and  no  late-comers  were 
admitted,  insuring  uninterrupted  attention  for  the 
speakers.  By  this  method  the  sessions  never  exceeded, 
in  time,  an  hour  and  a  half. 

The  talks  were  successful  from  the  first.  No  series  of 
such  length  on  one  subject  extending  for  fifteen  weeks 
had  ever  been  attempted  in  Philadelphia,  and  some  mis- 
givings were  felt  as  to  the  sustaining  public  interest;  the 
result  proved  that  never  in  the  history  of  Philadelphia 
had  a  series  been  given  in  which  not  only  had  the  interest 
been  sustained,  but  had  constantly  deepened. 

Edward  W.  Bok 

President 
The  Academy  oj  Music  Corporation. 

Philadelphia,  March,  192 1. 


FOREWORD 

The  voice  of  the  United  States  during  the  memorable 
Conference  at  Paris  in  19 18-19  finds  its  first  compre- 
hensive and  authoritative  expression  within  these  pages. 
Here  is  told,  by  those  who  sat  in  conference  day  by  day 
with  the  heads  of  states,  the  story  of  the  negotiations 
which  brought  about  the  Peace  with  the  Central  Empires. 
Here  are  the  facts  and  not  the  rumors  and  gossip  picked 
up  like  crumbs  from  a  bountiful  table,  and  which  many 
put  into  books  in  order  to  meet  the  hunger  for  informa- 
tion concerning  one  of  the  momentous  events  in  history. 

The  final  decisions  rested  with  others,  but  these  de- 
cisions were  largely  based  upon  facts  and  opinions  fur- 
nished by  those  who  tell  the  story  of  **What  Really 
Happened  at  Paris."  The  narrators  do  not  always  agree 
as  to  the  value  of  the  results,  nor  in  their  estimates  of 
the  men  who  brought  them  about,  but  this  lends  an 
interest  to  the  account  which  it  could  not  otherwise 
have. 

There  were  great  and  complex  characters  at  this 
gathering  of  the  world's  foremost  men,  and  there  is  a 
wide  difference  of  opinion  as  to  their  purposes  and  their 
mental  and  temperamental  equipments.  Statesmen,  sol- 
diers, men  of  the  sea,  artists,  financiers,  and  writers  of 
all  kinds  and  sorts  touched  elbows  with  one  another. 
The  settlements  to  be  made  were  interwoven  with  every 


vHJ  FOREWORD 

human  interest,  and  brought  the  best  from  every  land 
to  participate  in  or  advise  as  to  the  fmal  adjustment. 

There  were  some  who  towered  above  their  fellows,  and 
these  became  centres  of  groups  from  which  policies  and 
opinions  radiated.  Wilson,  Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George, 
Orlando,  Paderewski,  Venizelos,  Smuts,  Makino,  and 
Wellington  Koo  were  among  the  statesmen  having  dis- 
tinct and  enthusiastic  followers.  Clemenceau  stands 
out  the  clearest-cut  figure  of  them  all.  No  doubt  or 
mystery  surrounds  him.  He  fought  in  peace  as  he  fought 
in  war,  openly,  intelligently,  and  courageously  for  his 
beloved  France.  No  one  in  that  notable  gathering  had 
so  well  within  grasp  the  gift  of  accomphshment.  He 
inspired  the  affection  of  many — the  admiration  of  all. 

Paderewski  and  Wilson  had  about  them  something  of 
romance  and  spirituality  lacking  in  others.  The  one  had 
gathered  together  the  fragments  of  a  broken  kingdom  and 
had  moulded  it  into  a  virile  and  Kberty-Ioving  republic. 
He  came  as  the  spokesman  of  an  ancient  people  whose 
wrongs 'and  sorrows  had  stirred  the  sympathies  of  an 
entire  world.  This  artist,  patriot,  and  statesman  awak- 
ened the  Congress  to  do  justice  to  his  native  land,  and 
sought  its  help  to  make  a  great  dream  true.  His  fervored 
eloquence  brought  about  the  renascence  of  Poland,  and 
added  new  lustre  to  a  famous  name. 

Wilson,  on  the  other  hand,  had  aroused  the  conscience 
and  aspirations  of  mankind,  and  when  he  stood  at  the 
peak  of  his  influence  and  power,  there  was  never  a  more 
commanding   figure,   for   he   was   then   the   spokesman 


r 


FOREWORD  i  ix 

of  the  moral  and  spiritual  forces  of  the  world.  His  work 
at  Paris  was  tireless  and  unselfish,  and  it  was  not  until 
he  returned  to  America  to  render  an  account  of  his 
stewardship  that  disaster  overtook  him,  and  wrecked  the 
structure  built  in  co-operation  with  our  aUies  with  such 
painstaking  care. 

Until  Wilson  went  to  Europe  he  did  not  know  how  deep 
and  terrible  were  her  wounds,  or  how  close  they  came  to 
us.  Until  he  could  see  for  himself  he  could  not  realize 
how  a  torn  and  distracted  Continent  was  seeking  help 
from  the  only  source  from  which  help  could  come.  If 
there  was  ever  need  for  a  "Good  Samaritan"  surely 
the  time  was  then.  He  voiced  the  unselfish  and  coura- 
geous spirit  of  America,  and  our  hearts  quickened  as  the 
pent-up  emotions  of  many  peoples  broke  forth  to  do 
him  and  our  country  homage. 

But  that  day  is  gone,  gone  in  that  hour  when  we  left 
our  task  unfinished.  It  was  a  volte  face  for  which  we 
have  dearly  paid  in  the  world's  esteem.  If  our  gallant 
dead  who  lie  beside  their  comrades  in  the  fields  of  France 
had  done  likewise  at  Chateau-Thierry  and  the  Argonne, 
we  could  not  have  reached  our  high  estate.  Never 
before  has  a  nation  tossed  aside  so  great  a  heritage  so 
lightly. 

But  even  now  there  springs  to  life  the  faith  that  we 
may  yet  recover  something  of  what  we  have  lost,  and  if 
this  book  can  add  to  this  purpose  it  will  meet  the  hopes 
and  expectations  of  its  authors. 

Edward  M.  House. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

In  Explanation  by  Edward  W.  Bok    ....        v 

Foreword  by  Edward  Mandell  House     ...      vii 

I.     Preparations  for  Peace i 

SIDNEY    EDWARD   MEZES 

(College  of  the  City  of  New  York)  Chief  of  Territorial  Sec- 
tion, American  Peace  Commission. 

II.    The  Atmosphere  and  Organization  of  the  Peace 

Conference Ji 

CLIVE    DAY 

(Yale  University)  Chief  of  the  Balkan  Division,  American 

Peace  Commission. 

III.  The  New  Boundaries  of  Germany       ....       37 

CHARLES  homer  HASKINS 

(Harvard  University)  Chief  of  Division  of  Western  Europe, 

American  Peace  Commission. 

IV.  Poland 67 

ROBERT   HOWARD   LORD 

(Harvard   University)   Chief  of   Polish   Division,   American 
Peace  Commission. 

V.     The  End  of  an  Empire:  Remnants  of  Austria- 
Hungary        87 

charles  seymour 

(Yale    University)    Chief    of    Austro-Hungarian    Division, 
American  Peace  Commission. 

VI.       FlUME   AND   THE   ADRIATIC    PROBLEM 112 

DOUGLAS   WILSON   JOHNSON 

(Columbia   University)    Chief  of   Division  on   Boundaries, 
American  Peace  Commission. 

VII.     Constantinople  and  the  Balkans 140 

ISAIAH  bowman 

(American  Geographical  Society)  Chief  Territorial  Adviser, 
American  Peace  Commission. 
xl 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAcr 

VIII.     The  Armenian  Problem  and  the  Disruption  of 

Turkey 176 

william  linn  westermann 

(Cornell  University)  Chief  of  Near  Eastern  Division,  Ameri- 
can Peace  Commission. 

IX.     The   Protection  of  Minorities  and  Natives  in 

Transferred  Territories 32^ 

MANLEY    OTTMER    HUDSON 

(Harvard  University)  Legal  Adviser,  American  Peace  Com- 
mission. 

X.     The  Trial  of  the  Kaiser 231 

JAMES    BROWN    SCOTT  ' 

Legal  Adviser,  American  Peace  Commission. 

XI.     Reparations 259 

THOMAS   WILLIAM    LAMONT 

Economic  Adviser,  American  Peace  Commission. 

XII.     The  Economic  Settlement 291 

ALLYN    ABBOTT   YOUNG 

(Harvard  University)   Economic  Adviser,  American   Peace 

Commission. 

XIII.     The  Labor  Clauses  of  the  Treaty      ....     319 

SAMUEL   GOMPERS 

Chairman  Commission  of  International  Labor  Legislation, 
Paris  Peace  Conference. 


XIV.     The  Economic  Administration  During  the  Armi- 
stice     

herbert  hoover 
Director-General  of  Relief. 


336 


XV.     The  Atlantic  Fleet  in  the  Great  War         .      .     348 

HENRY   THOMAS    MAYO 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet. 

XVI.     The  Problem  of  Disarmament  ....     370 


TASKER   HOWARD    BLISS 

Military  Representative  of  the  United  States  on  the  Supreme 
War  Council  and  Commissioner  Plenipotentiary  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference. 


CONTENTS  xill 


PAGE 


XVII.     The  Making  of  the  League  of  Nations  .     .     .     398 

DAVID   HUNTER   MILLER 

Legal  Adviser,  American  Peace  Commission. 

XVIII.    The  Versailles  Peace  in  Retrospect  ....     425 

EDWARD   MANDELL   HOUSE 

Representative  of  the  United  States  on  the  Armistice  Com- 
mission. Commissioner  Plenipotentiary  at  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference. 

APPENDIX 

STENOGRAPHIC    NOTES    OF    QUESTIONS   ASKED   AND   ANSWERS 
GIVEN   AFTER   THE    LECTURES    IN    PHILADELPHIA 

III.  THE   NEW    BOUNDARIES   OF   GERMANY •     4^ 

IV.  POLAND 449 

V.      THE  END  OF  AN  EMPIRE!     REMNANTS  OF  AUSTRIA-HUN- 
GARY      452 

VI.       FIUME    AND   THE    ADRIATIC    PROBLEM 457 

VII.       CONSTANTINOPLE   AND   THE    BALKANS .46 1 


VIII.      THE     ARMENIAN     PROBLEM     AND     THE     DISRUPTION     OF 

TURKEY 465 

IX.      THE     PROTECTION     OF     MINORITIES     AND     NATIVES     IN 

TRANSFERRED    TERRITORIES 4^9 

X.      THE   TRIAL   OF   THE    KAISER 475 

XI.       REPARATIONS ^^Sl, 

xiii.    the  labor  clauses  of  the  treaty 4^5^ 

xv.    the  atlantic  fleet  in  the  great  war  ....  49o 

xvi.    the  problem  of  disarmament 495 

xv^ii.    the  making  of  the  league  of  nations       .     .     .  504 

Index 5^9 


LIST  OF   MAPS 

PAGE 

Germany — Showing  the  New  Boundaries  and  the  Dispositions 

of  Territory  Made  by  the  Peace  Conference       .      .      50  and  5 1 

Poland — Showing  Arrangements  and  Dispositions  of  Territory 

Made  by  the  Peace  Conference 76 

Map  Showing  the  Dispositions  of  the  Territories  of  the  Former 

Austrian  Empire  by  the  Peace  Conference         .      .      .      •      104 

The  Balkan  Countries,  Showing  the  Changes  Determined  by 

the  Peace  Conference io7 

Map  Showing  the  Dispositions  Made  by  the  Peace  Conference 

of  the  Territories  of  the  Former  Turkish  Empire  .      .      .      199 


I 

PREPARATIONS  FOR  PEACE 
by  sidney  edward  mezes 

The  Inquiry 

In  September,  1917,  five  months  after  the  United 
States  entered  the  war,  Colonel  House,  at  the  request  of 
President  Wilson,  began  to  gather  a  body  of  experts  to 
collect  and  collate  data  that  might  be  needed  eventually 
at  the  Peace  Conference.  The  President  felt  that  the 
United  States  was  especially  in  need  of  such  specialists 
at  the  Conference  because  of  its  traditional  policy  of 
isolation  and  the  consequent  lack,  in  its  governmen- 
tal departments,  of  a  personnel  thoroughly  conversant, 
through  intimate  contact,  with  the  inter-relations  and 
internal  composition  of  the  European  and  Asiatic  powers 
and  their  various  dependencies.  It  was  the  desire  of  the 
President  that  this  work  of  preparation  should  be  carried 
forward  with  as  little  pubhcity  as  possible  (hence  the  un- 
informing  name),  in  order  that  premature  expectations  of 
peace  should  not  be  excited  and  thus,  to  however  shght 
a  degree,  slow  down  the  war-making  activities  of  the 
nation. 

Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller,  of  the  New  York  bar,  was 
made  treasurer  of  The  Inquiry,  and  early  in  191 8  Mr. 
Walter  Lippmann,  previously  of  the  editorial  staff  of 
the  New  Republic,  was  named  secretary.  Headquarters 
were  set  up  in  the  home  of  the  American  Geographical 
Society,  in  New  York,  by  courtesy  of  its  board  of  trustees. 


2   WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Throughout  the  existence  of  Tfie  Inquiry  it  was  under 
the  supervision  of  Colonel  House,  and  was  in  close  touch 
with  the  Department  of  State  and  the  President. 

The  first  practical  contribution  of  The  Inquiry  to  the 
problems  of  peace  was  made  early  in  191 8,  when  the 
President,  through  Colonel  House,  asked  for  a  report  on 
the  main  outlines  of  an  equitable  settlement.  This 
report,  prepared  by  the  director,  treasurer,  and  secre- 
tary, was  the  basis  from  which  the  President  started  in 
formulating  his  Fourteen  Points,  which  were  later  incor- 
porated in  the  armistice  conditions  imposed  on  Ger- 
many. This  step  on  the  part  of  the  President  fore- 
shadowed his  practice  at  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris, 
where  the  staff  of  The  Inquiry,  there  known  as  the  ter- 
ritorial and  economic  section  of  the  American  Commis- 
sion to  Negotiate  Peace,  was  called  on  for  similar  and 
also  for  more  detailed  and  responsible  assistance  through- 
out the  sessions  of  the  Conference. 

Two  main  tasks  confronted  The  Inquiry,  the  delimita- 
tion of  its  field  of  work  and  the  selection  and  training  of 
its  personnel.  The  United  States  had  had  no  part  in  a 
general  peace  conference,  and  both  tasks  were  new  to  us. 
Moreover,  while  it  was  clear  that  the  Conference  would 
have  to  deal  with  settlements  involving  a  large  part  of 
the  world,  what  issues  would  be  dealt  with  in  various 
regions,  and  what  regions  would  be  excluded  from  con- 
sideration was  far  from  clear.  And  the  isolation  of  the 
United  States  and  its  lack  of  intimate  interest  in  and 
touch  with  other  countries,  especially  in  the  eastern 
hemisphere,  left  our  government  without  any  accumula- 
tion of  information  and  with  too  small  and  scattered  a 
trained  personnel  to  deal  with  such  information  as  might 
be  gathered.     Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  and,  to  a 


PREPARATIONS  FOR   PEACE  3 

lesser  extent,  Italy  had  maintained  close  relations,  as 
their  interests  required,  with  other  European  countries, 
with  the  Turkish  Empire,  with  colonial  Africa,  with  the 
Far  East,  and  with  the  Pacific  Islands.  Their  foreign 
and  colonial  services  were  made  up  of  permanent  em- 
ployees who  had  lived  in  these  regions,  come  in  contact 
with  their  officials  and  leading  men,  and  in  many  cases 
made  reports  on  these  lands  and  the  peoples  inhabiting 
them.  Moreover,  travellers,  traders,  and  scientists  were 
also  available,  and  were  intimately  acquainted  with  those 
lands  and  their  peoples  from  personal  observation  and 
investigation,  and  could  correct  the  second-hand  evi- 
dence of  books  and  published  reports  by  first-hand 
knowledge  of  eye-witnesses.  No  such  resources  were  at 
our  command  in  this  country.  It  was  only  recently  that 
our  diplomatic  and  consular  services  had  been  organized 
on  a  permanent  basis  with  secure  tenure,  and  the  incum- 
bents in  these  services  had  dealt  chiefly  with  govern- 
ments and  with  business  agencies,  and  had  little  training 
or  interest  in  questions  of  geography,  history,  ethnology, 
economics,  strategy,  etc.,  that  would  be  the  chief  con- 
siderations at  the  Peace  Conference.  And  few  of  these 
regions  had  been  visited  more  than  casually,  or  studied 
with  any  thoroughness  by  American  travellers,  traders, 
or  scientists. 

It  was  natural,  under  these  circumstances,  and  in 
view  of  the  uncertainties  regarding  the  questions  that 
would  be  decided  at  the  Peace  Conference,  that  some 
groping  in  the  dark  and  sOme  unnecessary  work  should 
have  been  undertaken.  It  may  be  interesting  and  eluci- 
dating to  give  a  few  instances  in  point. 

Would  South  American  questions  be  dealt  with  by  the 
Conference?    It  seemed  improbable,  but  was  not  impos- 


4      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

sible,  and  if  they  should  be  included  in  the  settlement 
the  United  States  would  be  expected  to  take  a  leading 
part  in  their  consideration.  A  careful  study  was  there- 
fore made  of  all  South  American  boundary  disputes,  of 
South  American  history,  and  of  the  land,  the  people, 
and  the  economic  resources  and  organization  of  South 
America.  None  of  this  material  was  used  at  the  Peace 
Conference,  though  it  has  been  and  will  be  of  value  to 
the  Department  of  State. 

Would  Russian  questions  be  dealt  with  by  the  Con- 
ference? It  was  impossible  to  tell,  but  it  seemed  not 
improbable  during  the  first  half  of  191 8.  A  systematic 
study  of  Russia,  especially  along  its  western  borders,  was 
therefore  made — a  study  of  agriculture,  industry,  rail- 
ways, political  habits  and  customs,  racial  affihations,  and 
the  like.  Aside  from  the  training  the  staff  received  from 
such  work,  the  material  collected  and  the  conclusions 
drawn  from  it  were  of  little  use  at  the  Conference,  for 
Russia  was  not  then  and  is  not  yet  ripe  for  settlement. 

Would  Africa  and  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  come  up 
for  consideration?  There  we  seemed  to  be  on  safe 
ground.  Undoubtedly  they  would,  and  much  data  were 
collected  for  these  regions — their  geography,  the  simple 
tribal  organizations  of  their  backward  peoples,  their 
products  and  the  value  of  these  products  to  the  great 
powers,  the  customs  of  the  natives,  the  history  of  the 
dealings  of  European  nations  with  them,  and  much  else 
that,  it  was  thought,  might  be  helpful.  As  it  turned 
out,  these  regions  were  considered  by  the  Conference,  but 
the  consideration  was  along  such  general  lines  of  political 
expediency  and  practicality  that  the  detailed  data  col- 
lected had  little  bearing  on  the  decisions  reached. 

As  a  final  illustration,  mention  may  be  made  of  maps. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  PEACE  5 

Base  maps  were  constructed  for  the  whole  of  Europe  and 
the  Near  East,  and  for  various  sections  of  the  continent 
that  would  surely  be  involved  in  the  settlements  of  the 
Conference.  In  volume  this  was  one  of  the  largest  under- 
takings of  The  Inquiry,  and  it  had  educative  value  for 
its  staff,  aiding,  as  it  did,  toward  an  understanding  of  the 
most  contentious  regions  the  Conference  had  to  consider. 
But  at  the  Conference  these  maps  were  hardly  used  at 
all.  Some  of  the  cases  containing  them  were  not  opened. 
The  world  series  of  milHonth  maps  proved  to  be  sufficient 
for  all  needs.  They  constituted  a  sort  of  international 
currency,  readily  accessible,  familiar  to  all  participants, 
and  inexpensive. 

But  the  bulk  of  the  work  of  The  Inquiry  dealt  with 
Mittel  Europa,  indeed,  with  the  distracted  areas  of  Cen- 
tral Europe  and  the  Near  East  on  either  side  of  the 
much-heralded  Hamburg-Bagdad  Railway,  stretching 
from  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic  to  the  Persian  Gulf 
and  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  the  data  gathered  proved  to 
be  indispensable  when  the  Conference  met.  And  as  the 
spring  and  summer  of  191 8  advanced,  the  exact  nature 
of  the  data  required  grew  clear.  It  became  evident, 
namely,  that  many  kinds  of  information  bearing  on  the 
drawing  of  boundary-lines  would  be  needed,  and  that  no 
information  that  did  not  bear  on  such  settlements,  ex- 
cepting general  economic  information  that  would  be 
needed  in  drafting  the  economic  clauses  of  the  treaty, 
would  be  of  any  value.  In  August,  therefore,  the  staff 
of  The  Inquiry  was  asked  to  confine  its  consideration  to 
such  data,  and  soon  thereafter  the  work  clarified  and 
definite  objectives  were  estabhshed.  Only  the  regions 
along  or  adjacent  to  probable  boundary-lines  were  now 
studied.    Others  could  be  dismissed  from  consideration. 


6   WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

By  the  middle  of  October  tentative  boundaries  for  the 
whole  of  Mittel  Europa  had  been  worked  out,  and  in 
November  these  were  sent  to  Colonel  House,  who  was 
then  in  Paris,  representing  our  government  in  the  armi- 
stice negotiations  and  the  arrangements  for  the  Peace 
Conference  that  followed.  In  January,  19 19,  a  "Black 
Book,"  illustrated  by  maps,  was  prepared  for  our  pleni- 
potentiaries, laying  down  and  discussing  revised  boun- 
daries; and  in  February,  after  conferences  with  our  col- 
leagues of  other  delegations,  a  "Red  Book,"  with  further 
revision,  was  made  ready  for  them.  With  this  report 
The  Inquiry,  renamed  the  Territorial  Section  of  the 
Peace  Conference,  practically  dissolved  as  an  organiza- 
tion, although  most  of  its  members  continued  to  render 
service  as  individuals  for  some  months  longer. 

As  to  personnel,  the  problem  proved  to  be  less  diffi- 
cult than  at  first  it  threatened  to  be.  Policies  would,  of 
course,  be  determined,  and  the  culminating  negotiations 
conducted  by  our  plenipotentiaries.  The  Inquiry  staff 
would  thus  be  limited  to  the  role  of  gathering  and  evalu- 
ating facts,  and  of  digesting  them  for  prompt  and  handy 
use.  Work  of  such  detail  could  not  be  expected  of 
statesmen  and  diplomats,  nor  would  they  have  been 
competent  for  it.  The  need  was  for  men  expert  in 
research.  Consequently  the  staff  was  in  the  main  re- 
cruited from  strong  universities  and  colleges  but  also 
from  among  former  officials,  lawyers,  and  business  men. 
The  studies  that  were  made  during  the  winter,  spring, 
and  autumn  of  19 18  in  the  geography,  history,  eco- 
nomic resources,  political  organization  and  affihations, 
and  ethnic  and  cultural  characteristics  of  the  peoples  and 
territories  in  Europe,  Africa,  Asia,  and  the  islands  of  the 
Pacific,  served  as  tests  for  the  selection  and  elimination 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  PEACE  7 

of  workers;  the  men  making  these  studies  and  reporting 
thereon  were  under  constant  observation,  and  as  a  result 
the  best  fitted  among  them  emerged  and  were  put  in 
charge  of  various  subdivisions  of  the  work  and  assigned 
groups  of  assistants.  As  a  consequence,  by  the  fall  of 
191 8  The  Inquiry  was  thus  organized: 

Director,  Dr.  S.  E.  Mezes;  College  of  the  City  of  New  York. 
ChieJ  Territorial  Specialist,  Dr.  Isaiah  Bowman;  American  Geo- 
graphical Society.^ 
Regional  Specialists: 

For  the  northwestern  frontiers — Dr.  Charles  H.  Raskins;  Har- 
vard University. 
For  Poland  and  Russia— Dr.  R.  H.  Lord;  Harvard  University. 
For  Austria-Hungary— Dr.  Charles  Seymour;  Yale  University. 
For  Itahan  boundaries— Dr.  W.  E.  Lunt;  Haverford  College. 
For  the  Balkans— Dr.  Clive  Day;  Yale  University. 
For  Western  Asia — Dr.  W.  L.  Westermann;  University  of  Wis- 
consin. 
For  the  Far  East— Capt.  S.  K.  Hornbeck,  U.  S.  A. 
For  Colonial  Problems— Mr.  George  L.  Beer,  formerly  of  Colum- 
bia University. 
Economic  Specialist,  Dr.  A.  A.  Young;  Cornell  University. 
Librarian  and  Specialist  in  History,  Dr.  James  T.  Shotwell;  Co- 
lumbia University. 
Specialist  in  Boundary  Geography,  Maj.  Douglas  Johnson;  Colum- 
bia University. 
Chief  Cartographer,  Prof.  Mark  Jefferson;  State  Normal  College, 
Ypsilanti,  Michigan. 

Besides  The  Inquiry  proper,  and  affiliated  with  al- 
though distinct  from  it,  were  the  experts  in  international 
law,  Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller  and  Major  James  Brown 
Scott. 

This  body  of  men  proceeded  to  Paris  at  the  opening 
of  December,  19 18,  except  Mr.  Miller,  who  had  gone  in 

1  Dr.  Bowman  was  named  executive  officer  in  the  summer  of  1918,  after  Mr. 
Walter  Lippmann  resigned  as  secretary  to  undertake  intelligence  work  for  the 
army  in  France. 


8   WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

October.  In  Paris  they  assisted  the  commissioners  pleni- 
potentiary with  data  and  recommendations,  and  them- 
selves served  on  commissions  dealing  with  three  types  of 
problems:  First,  territorial;  second,  economic  questions 
and  reparation;  third,  international  law  and  the  League 
of  Nations,  as  is  told  more  fully  in  later  chapters. 

As  it  turned  out,  the  staff  of  The  Inquiry  were  con- 
cerned in  Paris,  as  members  of  commissions,  with  deli- 
cate questions  of  policy,  and  it  may  be  noted  that  the 
decisions  which  they  had  a  part  in  negotiating  were  only 
in  the  rarest  instances  modified  by  the  supreme  council. 

Armistice  Negotiations  ^ 

When,  early  in  October,  191 8,  Bulgaria's  armies  crum- 
bled and  she  sued  for  peace,  competent  observers  knew 
that  the  greatest  of  wars  was  ending,  and  the  longed-for 
peace  was  at  last  in  sight.  Austria-Hungary,  opened  to 
attack  from  south  and  east,  distracted  by  dissension, 
torn  apart  by  revolt,  could  not  long  stand.  Germany, 
too,  must  fall.  The  time  and  manner  of  her  overthrow 
she  might,  within  limits,  elect.  She  might  hold  out  to 
the  last,  and  fight  until  spring — at  the  cost  of  frightful 
casualties  and  sacrifices  for  herself  and  for  her  enemies. 
But  fall  she  must.  The  gamble  for  world  dominion  was 
lost. 

President  Wilson  acted  at  once,  and  within  a  week 
Colonel  House  was  on  his  way  to  France  to  represent  our 
government   in  the  culminating  armistice  negotiations. 

He  reached  Paris  barely  in  time  to  take  part  in  settling 
the   conditions   to   be   imposed   upon   Austria-Hungary^ 

^  Among  other  data,  the  writer  has  examined  evidence  made  available  by 
Colonel  House,  who  vouches  for  the  facts  stated,  but  is  not  responsible  for  the 
views  expressed. 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE  9 

which  in  the  meantime  had  apphed  to  the  ItaHan  com- 
mander, General  Diaz,  for  an  armistice.  These  condi- 
tions were  very  severe.  As  in  the  case  of  Bulgaria, 
which  had  also  applied  through  military  channels,  they 
amounted  to  unconditional  surrender,  even  to  the  point 
of  allowing  AHied  troops  to  occupy  the  country  and  use 
it  for  mihtary  operations.  Germany  could  be  attacked 
from  the  south. 

In  this  instance  Colonel  House  did  not  ask  that  the 
President's  Fourteen  Points  or  other  policies  be  accepted 
in  the  armistice,  largely  because  that  point  which  affected 
Austria-Hungary,  number  ten,  no  longer  apphed;  it  was 
not  autonomy,  but  independence  of  Austria  and  Hungary, 
that  the  north  and  south  Slavs,  Rumanians,  and  Italians 
demanded,  indeed  were  already  asserting.  The  American 
representative  did  insist,  however,  in  harmony  with  our 
government's  policy,  upon  engagements  to  furnish  food 
and  other  succor  designed  to  alleviate  the  misery  of  the 
misguided  peoples  within  the  falhng  monarchy. 

But  a  greater  decision  was  pending.  On  October  5, 
the  new  Chancellor  of  Germany,  Prince  Maximihan  of 
Baden,  speaking  for  the  German  Government,  requested 
President  Wilson  to  "take  in  hand  the  restoration  of 
peace"  and  accepted  as  a  basis  the  "program  set  forth 
in  the  President's  message  of  January  8,  191 8,  and  in  his 
later  pronouncements."  But  the  President  would  not 
undertake  the  task  until  he  was  assured  that  the  German 
Government  accepted  the  very  terms  laid  down  in  his 
message  and  addresses,  leaving  for  discussion  only  practi- 
cal details  of  their  apphcation,  and  that  it  was  ready  to 
evacuate  occupied  territories,  and  to  abstain  during  the 
process  from  "acts  of  inhumanity,  spohation,  and  desola- 
tion" on  sea  and  on  land.     He  warned  Germany  that 


10     WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  armistice  terms  must  give  "absolutely  satisfactory 
safeguards  and  guarantees  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
present  military  supremacy  ...  in  the  field  "  of  our  armies 
and  those  of  our  associates,  and  further,  failing  to  re- 
ceive satisfactory  proofs  of  the  democracy  and  the  per- 
manence of  the  German  Government,  he  wrote:  "If  it 
[the  government  of  the  United  States]  must  deal  with  the 
mihtary  masters  and  the  monarchical  autocrats  of  Ger- 
many now,  or  if  it  is  likely  to  have  to  deal  with  them  later 
in  regard  to  the  international  obligations  of  the  German 
Empire,  it  must  demand,  not  peace  negotiations,  but 
surrender." 

With  the  situation  thus  clarified.  President  Wilson 
communicated  the  correspondence  to  the  Allies,  and  re- 
ferred the  German  Government  to  Marshal  Foch. 

It  is  in  this  setting  that  the  Versailles  Conference, 
intrusted  with  the  heavy  responsibility  of  exacting  from 
Germany  the  amplest  hostages  for  good  behavior,  or 
continuing  the  war,  must  be  pictured.  The  personnel 
is  interesting — Clemenceau  already  acclaimed  Pere  de  la 
Victoire,  the  grim  Tiger,  sparing  of  words,  ominous  in 
his  deep  silences,  hard  and  cynical  save  only  in  his  devo- 
tion to  France;  Lloyd  George,  most  sensitively  repre- 
sentative and  nimble-minded  of  the  world's  greater  states- 
men, who  had  organized  disjointed  Britain,  and  firmly 
taught  her  the  hardest  lesson  for  British  heads,  how,  in 
place  of  muddling  through,  to  employ  foresight  and  pre- 
arrangement;  Orlando,  learned,  eloquent  and  warm- 
hearted, who  had  led  Italy  to  triumph  after  and  in  spite 
of  Caporetto;  and  House,  skilled  negotiator,  experienced 
and  sagacious,  speaking  for  the  strongest  and  most 
idealistic  nation,  the  well-trusted  representative  of  its 
powerful  President,  who  stood  forth  the  first  man  in  the 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE  ii 

long  annals  of  history  to  be  spontaneously  accepted  as 
their  leader  by  men  of  all  nations. 

These  men  had  met  in  conference  before;  notably,  a 
year  earlier,  when  the  Allies  were  facing  their  darkest 
hour,  these  same  conferees  had  effected  a  co-ordination 
of  the  four  nations'  war-making  activities,  without  which 
a  stern  armistice  could  not  have  been  imposed  upon 
Germany  in  191 8.  The  four  usually  met  in  the  morning 
at  American  headquarters,  78  rue  de  FUniversite,  Paris, 
while  in  the  afternoon  formal  conferences  were  held  at 
Versailles,  in  the  quarters  of  the  Supreme  War  Council, 
where  other  notables  met  with  them,  Balfour,  Milner, 
Sonnino,  Venizelos,  among  others,  and,  at  times,  the 
mihtary  and  naval  chiefs  as  advisers. 

In  asking  an  armistice  of  President  Wilson  and  the 
Allies,  and  in  accepting  his  conditions,  Germany  admitted 
that  she  had  lost  the  war.  But,  as  secure  safeguards 
against  a  recurrence  of  indescribable  horrors  and  world- 
wide disorganization,  and  as  a  decent  approach  to  repair 
of  countless  damages  wantonly  inflicted — how  much  could 
be  exacted  from  Germany  in  these  respects?  Victory 
for  her  had  been  all  but  in  sight  in  May  and  June.  Then 
her  fall  from  this  place  of  high  hope  had  been  swift  and 
stunning.  Her  people  and  her  leaders  were  in  an  ugly 
mood.  Would  they  pursue  Realpolitik,  accepting  the 
inevitable  now  and  saving  what  they  could  from  the 
wreck;  or,  desperate,  ruthless  to  the  last,  would  they, 
if  they  thought  the  terms  impossibly  humiliating  and 
severe,  elect  to  endure  a  time  longer,  on  a  desperate 
gambler's  chance,  and  with  this  certainty,  at  least,  that 
their  enemies  too  must  continue  to  pay  in  effort,  suffering, 
and  sacrifice  of  lives,  or  else  soften  their  conditions. 

It  is  easy  to  answer  such  questions  now,  but  it  was  hard 


12     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

to  answer  them  then.     I  can  do  no  better  than  to  quote 
Colonel  House's  description  of  the  situation. 

"There  came  into  our  counsels  at  different  times  the  mihtary  and 
naval  chiefs  who  had  directed  the  Allied  forces  to  victory.  Foch, 
Petain,  Haig,  Pershing,  BHss,  Benson,  Wemyss,  and  their  hke,  and 
we  made  careful  assessments  of  their  views  and  advice.  We  were 
confronted  by  a  situation  full  of  possibihties  for  harm,  full  of  poten- 
tiality for  good.  It  was  our  task  to  weigh  carefully  these  military 
and  naval  opinions  and  accept  the  responsibihty  for  decisions. 

"The  outstanding  problem  was  to  have  the  terms  cover  what  must 
be  practically  unconditional  surrender  without  imperiling  peace 
itself.  The  mihtary  spirit  in  the  United  States  was  at  its  height  dur- 
ing this  period,  and  this  feehng  could  not  be  ignored.  With  the 
Entente,  the  situation  was  quite  different.  They  were  war-worn 
and  war-weary.  They  had  been  bled  white.  Germany  was  retreat- 
ing in  an  orderly  fashion  and  no  one  could  say  with  certainty  that 
she  would  not  be  able  to  shorten  her  line  and  hold  it  for  months.  If 
she  had  done  this  and  we  had  failed  to  make  peace  when  she  had 
accepted  the  President's  terms  there  would  have  been  a  political 
revolution  in  every  AHied  country  save  the  United  States.  The 
people  would  almost  of  certainty  have  overthrown  the  existing  gov- 
ernments and  would  have  placed  in  power  ministers  instructed  to 
reopen  peace  negotiations  with  Germany  upon  the  basis  of  the  Presi- 
dent's fourteen  points,  and  with  the  offer  of  more  moderate  armistice 
conditions. 

"This  was  all  known  to  us  in  Paris,  and  it  was  as  dehcate  and  dan- 
gerous a  situation  as  was  ever  given  to  a  group  of  diplomats  to  solve. 
As  it  was,  the  European  mihtary  and  naval  advisers  were  satisfied, 
and  the  outcome  was  the  ending  of  the  world  war."  ^ 

Captain  Paul  Mantoux,  then,  and  later  at  the  Peace 
Conference,  official  interpreter,  a  man  with  a  memory  of 
extraordinary  fidelity,  throws  important  light  on  the 
views  of  Marshal  Foch,  in  a  letter  of  July  6,  1920,  to 
Colonel  House,  from  which  I  quote  in  part: 

"You  asked  him  this  question,  'Will  you  tell  us.  Marshal,  solely 
from  a  military  point  of  view  and  apart  from  any  other  consideration, 

1  The  Public  Ledger,  November  ii,  1920. 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   PEACE  13 

whether  you  would  prefer  the  Germans  to  reject  or  sign  the  armistice 
as  outlined  here?* 

"Marshal  Foch's  answer  was:  'Fighting  means  struggHng  for 
certain  results  (on  ne  fait  la  guerre  que  pour  ses  resultats) :  if  the 
Germans  now  sign  an  armistice  under  the  general  conditions  we  have 
just  determined,  those  results  are  in  our  possession.  This  being 
achieved,  no  man  has  the  right  to  cause  another  drop  of  blood  to 
be  shed.'  .  .  . 

"One  of  the  prime  ministers,  I  think  it  was  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
asked  him  what  would  happen  if  the  Germans  refused  to  sign  and 
how  long  it  would  take  to  drive  them  back  across  the  Rhine.  He 
answered,  opening  both  arms,  a  familiar  gesture  with  him,  'Maybe 
four  or  five  months — who  knows?' 

"He  never  alluded  to  a  final  blow  in  the  next  few  days  when  he 
brought  from  Versailles  his  draft  of  the  military  terms  of  the  armistice 
convention.  He  simply  said  this:  'The  terms  your  military  advisers 
are  agreed  upon  are  those  we  should  be  in  a  position  to  enforce  after 
the  success  of  our  next  operation.'  .  .  . 

"Neither  the  soldiers  nor  statesmen  knew  then  all  we  have  learned 
since  about  the  condition  of  Germany  and  of  the  German  army. 
Our  losses,  which  were  so  great  at  the  end  of  four  years  of  hostilities, 
had  become  particularly  heavy  during  the  weeks  of  intense  and  con- 
tinuous fighting  and  marked  the  last  stage  of  the  war.  Apart  from 
purely  mifitary  considerations,  there  was  in  the  minds  of  the  states- 
men a  strong  feeling  that  the  populations,  after  showing  themselves 
ready  to  accept  every  sacrifice  for  a  just  cause,  would  never  forgive 
their  leaders  if  they  thought  the  fighting  had  been  prolonged  beyond 
the  hmits  of  necessity." 

In  conclusion,  a  word  on  the  political  clauses  of  the 
armistice.  That  the  Entente  finally  accepted  President 
Wilson's  Fourteen  Points  with  one  addition  and  one  sub- 
traction, both  by  the  British,  is  known:  how  they  were 
induced  to  accept  and  incorporate  them  in  the  armistice 
must  be  told  elsewhere.  The  addition  was  a  requirement 
that  Germany  make  reparation  for  damage  done  to  the 
civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and  their  property  by 
the  aggression  of  Germany  at  sea  and  from  the  air,  and 
not  on  land  only;   and  this  Germany  was  notified  that 


14     WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

President  Wilson  accepted.  The  subtraction  reserved 
decision  on  point  two,  dealing  with  the  freedom  of  the 
seas,  on  the  ground  that  the  phrase  "the  freedom  of  the 
seas"  is  open  to  various  interpretations,  some  of  which 
could  not  be  accepted. 

In  sum,  the  armistice  agreement,  concluding  the  World 
War,  that  took  effect  on  the  stroke  of  the  eleventh  hour 
of  the  eleventh  day  of  the  eleventh  month  of  nineteen 
hundred  and  eighteen,  constituted  a  substantial  basis 
for  a  peace  of  justice  and  of  healing. 


II 

THE  ATMOSPHERE  AND  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE 

PEACE   CONFERENCE 

\ 

BY  CLIVE  DAY 

As  soon  as  the  armistice  had  put  an  end  to  open  war 
and  brought  peace  in  sight,  people  naturally  began  to 
speculate  on  the  manner  in  which  the  terms  of  peace  would 
be  drawn.  The  average  citizen  assumed  an  august  as- 
sembly, a  sort  of  ParHament  of  the  World,  which  would 
announce  the  bases  of  a  just  and  lasting  settlement: 
amended  territorial  frontiers,  reparation  of  damages, 
and  a  revised  code  of  international  law.  The  Allies  were 
united  in  purpose,  and  were  now  at  last  in  a  position  to 
translate  into  fact  the  ideals  which  would  make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy. 

Over  against  this  vague  forecast  of  the  man  in  the 
street  it  is  interesting  to  set  the  picture  of  the  Conference 
which  has  been  drawn  after  the  event  by  some  of  its 
critics.  They  picture  a  melodrama.  Here  in  the  gloom 
meet  the  three  leading  actors  who  determine  the  whole 
action  of  the  play.  Other  figures  make  their  entrances 
and  exits,  but  serve  merely  as  foils  to  set  off  the  three 
great  characters.  These  are  heroic  figures,  great  in  their 
abilities  and  ambitions,  but  great  also  in  their  human 
weaknesses.  The  audience  cannot  hear  their  voices, 
which  are  so  low  that  they  do  not  carry  across  the  foot- 
lights, but  it  follows  the  course  of  the  plot  by  their  ac- 
tions. In  the  last  scene  the  critic  conceives  force  and 
guile  prevailing  over  the  weaknesses  of  the  character  who 

15 


i6     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

should  have  been  the  hero  of  the  play — evil  triumphing 
over  ineffective  virtue.  The  spectator  has  been  assisting 
at  a  tragedy. 

Between  the  two  accounts  of  the  Conference  sketched 
above,  the  reader  must  make  his  choice  according  to  his 
taste  in  fiction.  They  are  both  products  of  the  imagina- 
tion, and  are  equally  valueless  for  an  understanding  of 
what  actually  happened  at  Paris.  The  form  of  the  Con- 
ference was  greatly  affected,  without  question,  by  the 
demand  of  the  public  for  the  spectacular.  Each  little 
country  that  had  associated  itself  with  the  Allies  against 
the  Central  Powers,  demanded  a  place  for  its  representa- 
tives in  a  scene  adequate  in  dignity  and  impressiveness 
to  the  World  War.  Persons  skilled  in  such  matters 
arranged  halls  at  palaces  on  the  Quai  d'Orsay  and  else- 
where with  trappings  that  satisfied  the  senses;  pictures 
wxre  painted;  the  cinematograph  was  allowed  to  ap- 
proach the  fringe  of  the  assembhes.  All  this  part  of  the 
Conference,  designed  for  show,  formed  a  protective  shell, 
within  which  the  vital  parts  of  the  organization  could 
function  with  no  regard  to  appearance,  and  with  no  dis- 
traction from  serious  business. 

The  responsible  directors  of  the  Powers  at  war  with 
Germany  had  realized  from  the  beginning  that  a  study  of 
the  terms  of  peace  could  not  profitably  be  made  in  a  de- 
bating society.  Some  of  the  Powers,  for  example  those 
of  Central  America,  had  made  contributions  so  shght 
and  had  interests  so  little  affected,  that  they  would  cer- 
tainly not  be  asked  to  share  in  the  preliminary  dehbera- 
tions.  Some  of  the  great  Powers  as  certainly  must  be 
included.  At  what  point  was  the  line  to  be  drawn?  It 
could  readily  be  seen  that  France,  England,  Italy,  and 
the  United   States  would   recognize  no  superior.     Was 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  17 

Belgium  or  Serbia  or  Japan  to  be  grouped  with  them 
above  the  others?  The  decision  finally  announced  by  the 
four  major  Powers,  that  they  would  choose  but  one  addi- 
tional associate,  Japan,  inevitably  gave  rise  to  heart- 
burnings, and  had  a  material  effect  on  the  terms  of  settle- 
ment. It  recognized  the  practical  political  influence  of 
Japan  and  neglected  such  ideal  measures  as  are  expressed 
in  national  spirit  and  sacrifice.  At  least  it  allowed  the 
Conference  to  proceed.  Two  months  had  passed  since 
the  armistice  was  signed,  and  the  American  delegation 
had  already  been  waiting  a  month  for  the  beginning  of 
organized  business. 

The  organ  of  the  Conference  thus  established  by  in- 
formal negotiation  of  the  great  Powers  was  termed  the 
Council,  and  followed  the  model  of  the  Supreme  Inter- 
allied War  Council  that  had  been  acting  on  matters  of 
military  policy  at  Versailles  during  the  last  part  of  the 
war.  Two  representatives  of  each  of  the  five  great  Pow- 
ers, normally  the  premier  and  the  foreign  minister,  com- 
posed the  body  and  hence  it  came  to  be  known  as  the 
Council  of  Ten.  For  more  than  two  months  (January 
13  to  March  25),  the  Council  was  recognized  as  the  official 
source  of  authority  of  the  Conference.  It  called  the 
Plenary  Assembly  into  being,  regulated  the  activities, 
and  when  it  saw  fit  reviev/ed  the  action  of  that  body.  It 
created  commissions  to  study  special  subjects  in  detail 
and  prepare  them  for  the  consideration  of  the  Conference. 
It  had  to  face  the  questions  of  fact  and  policy  that  rose 
constantly  in  central  and  eastern  Europe. 

As  was  to  be  anticipated,  the  Council  was  a  somewhat 
formal  body.  It  conducted  itself  with  the  ceremony  and 
solemnity  which  the  world  would  expect  of  such  a  gather- 
ing.    It  had  a  meeting-place  worthy  of  its  dignity,  in 


i8     WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

the  study  of  the  French  foreign  minister  in  the  palace  on 
the  Quai  d'Orsay.  Double  doors  on  the  side  of  entrance 
prevented  the  escape  of  any  sound;  high  windows  on  the 
opposite  side  looked  out  on  a  formal  lawn,  often  drenched 
with  rain  or  covered  with  snow.  Within,  all  was  luxurious 
comfort.  At  one  end  of  the  room,  with  his  back  to  an 
open  fire  of  great  logs,  sat  the  presiding  officer,  Clemen- 
ceau,  and  near  him  his  colleague  Pichon;  ranged  at  little 
tables  on  their  right  and  facing  them  were  the  other 
delegates;  on  their  left  were  secretaries  and  a  place  where 
might  be  stationed  officials  or  representatives  who  had  to 
address  the  Council.  A  second  row  of  chairs  about  the 
room  gave  a  place  in  the  background  for  special  secre- 
taries of  the  different  Powers,  and  for  experts  who  might 
thus  be  readily  consulted  by  their  principals.  Altogether 
there  might  be  thirty  individuals,  more  or  less,  in  the 
room. 

Much  of  the  business  which  occupied  the  attention  of 
the  Council  was  formal  in  character.  The  smaller  states, 
excluded  from  its  deliberations,  demanded  at  least  the 
opportunity  to  present  to  it  their  claims,  and  many  hear- 
ings were  granted  to  their  representatives.  Every  one 
knew  that  the  arguments  and  facts  which  they  stated 
would  soon  be  printed,  and  would  be  turned  over  for 
study  to  speciahsts,  who  would  sift  them  critically  and 
so  prepare  them  for  the  consideration  of  the  principal 
representatives.  Every  one  recognized  the  extravagance 
and  unreahty  of  many  of  the  nationafist  demands.  To 
ilKistrate  the  artificiahty  of  these  proceedings  may  be  cited 
the  occasion  on  which  the  claims  of  Albania  to  national 
independence  were  put  before  the  Council.  The  Al- 
banians are  a  people  apart,  who  for  centuries  have  Kved 
a  free  fife  in  their  wild  country,  and  to  the  present  day 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  19 

have  preserved  the  virtues  and  defects  of  a  primitive 
population.  Their  spokesman  before  the  Council  was  a 
broken-down  old  Turk  who  had  no  interest  in  Albania, 
who  enjoyed  no  respect  or  following  there,  who  got  his 
place  at  Paris  because  he  was  willing  to  sacrifice  the 
aspirations  of  the  Albanians  to  the  ambitions  of  Italy 
to  extend  her  power  across  the  Adriatic.  He  read 
from  a  manuscript  which  had  doubtless  been  prepared 
for  him,  and  with  the  contents  of  which  he  was  certainly 
not  familiar,  for  he  stopped  long  at  every  page  until  he 
could  find  the  continuation  of  his  sentence  on  the  next. 
The  reading  was  Hfeless,  it  seemed  interminable.  "How 
much  longer  is  this  going  on?"  asked  one  of  the  American 
plenipotentiaries,  very  audibly,  of  the  interpreter.  And 
all  this  took  place  while  almost  hourly  reports  were  com- 
ing in  of  war,  famine,  and  pestilence  in  stricken  Europe, 
and  while  the  people  of  northern  Albania  itself  were 
fighting  a  desperate  struggle  against  the  harsh  Serbs. 
Surely  no  greater  contrast  is  conceivable  than  that  be- 
tween the  idle  words  which  filled  M.  Pichon's  luxurious 
study  in  the  palace  on  the  Quai  d'Orsay  and  the  grim 
reality  of  fife  in  the  mountains  of  High  Albania,  where 
people  were  being  massacred  by  thousands. 

Such  scenes  as  this  appeared,  to  those  who  were  on  the 
spot  as  well  as  to  those  who  viewed  them  from  a  distance, 
unprofitable,  but  they  appeared  inevitable.  The  truth 
is  that  people  demanded  of  the  Conference  something  of 
a  show.  Even  though  the  meetings  of  the  Council  were 
supposed  to  be  secret  sessions,  and  though  the  subjects 
considered  and  action  taken  were  announced  to  the  pubhc, 
if  at  all,  only  by  brief  and  formal  statements,  still  it  was 
some  satisfaction  to  an  aspirant  people  to  know  that  its 
representatives  had  appeared  before  the  Council,  to  be 


20     WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

able  later  to  read  the  arguments  and  claims  that  had  been 
advanced,  and  to  hear  something  of  the  manner  of  their 
reception. 

For  spectacles,  such  as  those  indicated,  the  Council 
was  very  well  fitted.  The  spectacular,  however,  is  al- 
ways superficial,  and  when  the  Council  was  called  upon 
for  more  substantial  action,  for  definite  policies,  and  for 
vigorous  decisions,  its  weakness  became  apparent.  A 
survey  of  the  more  serious  kinds  of  work  which  the  Con- 
ference was  called  upon  to  do  will  make  more  clear  the 
reasons  for  a  change  in  its  organization. 

Some  of  the  questions  which  came  before  it  for  decision 
did  not  admit  delay.  When  the  term  of  the  armistice 
expired,  the  Council  must  fix  the  conditions  on  which  it 
was  to  be  renewed.  Marshal  Foch  was  summoned  to 
describe  the  mihtary  situation,  and  to  propose  arrange- 
ments which  would  safeguard  the  interests  of  the  Allies. 
Throughout  central  and  eastern  Europe  armies  were 
still  in  the  field,  engaged  in  formal  war;  the  Council 
must  define  its  attitude  toward  the  interests  which  they 
represented,  must  seek  to  curb  the  fighting  and  to  sta- 
bilize the  pohtical  situation.  The  revolution  in  Russia 
presented  a  whole  complex  of  problems.  The  Powers 
found  themselves  in  a  labyrinth,  in  which,  turn  and 
twist  as  they  might,  they  found  always  the  path  to  the 
outlet  blocked  before  them.  Revolution  in  Hungary 
added  to  their  difficulties.  Constantly,  moreover,  they 
must  seek  to  further  the  work  of  salvaging  what  could 
be  saved  from  the  wreck  of  Europe.  Mr.  Hoover 
would  appear  before  the  Council  with  proposals  for 
relief  which  involved  intricate  questions  of  shipping  and 
finance  and  raised  often  also  questions  of  a  military 
and  political  kind. 


THE   PEACE  CONFERENCE  21 

The  work  of  the  Council  cannot  be  appreciated  justly 
without  recognizing  the  burden  of  the  administrative 
duties  which  were  imposed  upon  it.  Assembled  to  draw 
up  terms  of  peace,  it  found  itself  still  in  the  midst  of  war, 
and  faced  by  conditions  which  demanded  active  treatment 
if  society  were  to  be  saved  from  dissolution.  Whether 
it  would  or  not  it  had  for  a  time  to  attempt  to  govern  a 
large  part  of  Europe,  managing  affairs  which  in  a  modern 
state  are  handled  by  organized  departments  of  foreign 
affairs,  of  war,  of  commerce,  of  finance.  According  to 
general  opinion  the  Council  managed  this  administrative 
business  rather  badly.  Indeed,  there  would  be  occasion 
for  surprise  if  it  had  succeeded;  even  the  Council  of  Four 
later  did  not  achieve  a  notable  success  in  this  part  of 
its  work.  Whatever  be  the  critic's  judgment  on  the  Con- 
ference as  an  executive  he  will  be  unjust  if  he  estimates 
the  merit  of  its  more  permanent  contributions  without 
taking  into  account  the  strain  upon  its  attention  of  this 
current  business,  which  constantly  distracted  it  from 
constructive  work. 

Besides  the  questions  coming  before  the  Council  de- 
manding administrative  action,  it  had,  if  it  were  to  reach  a 
settlement,  to  determine  problems  of  two  kinds,  namely, 
problems  of  fact  and  problems  of  policy.  The  principles 
of  settlement  had  been  enunciated  by  the  President,  and, 
with  certain  modifications,  had  been  accepted  both  by 
the  Allied  Powers  and  by  the  Central  Powers.  Most 
of  these  principles,  however,  were  expressed  in  general 
terms.  Agreement  upon  them  enabled  the  Powers  to 
stop  fighting,  but  did  not  enable  them  to  draw  up  definite 
terms  of  peace.  What  did  the  President  mean,  for  exam- 
ple, when  he  said  that  "a  readjustment  of  the  frontiers 
of  Italy  should   be   effected   along  clearly   recognizable 


22  WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

lines  of  nationality  ?  What  were  these  lines,  which  for  an 
indefinite  future  were  to  fix  the  boundaries  of  Italy  and  of 
neighboring  states?  The  President  himself  would  cer- 
tainly have  refused  to  define  them,  if  he  had  been  asked 
to  draw  them  on  a  map.  He  would  have  done  as  he  did 
later  when  the  question  of  the  Armenian  frontiers  was 
referred  to  him  for  settlement.  He  would  have  assem- 
bled experts,  whose  competence  and  impartiahty  he 
trusted,  would  have  told  them  to  study  the  region  and  to 
draw  the  best  fine  they  could,  and  when  he  had  satisfied 
himself  by  discussion  and  reflection  that  this  line  was  the 
best,  he  would  have  proposed  it  for  acceptance. 

Even  this  process  would  have  involved  not  only  a  de- 
termination of  the  facts  in  the  region  in  question,  but 
also  a  decision  on  questions  of  policy.  Rarely  does  a 
single  line  present  all  the  advantages  of  a  perfect  frontier. 
Even  if  nationahty  be  made  the  only  criterion,  rarely 
are  the  lines  of  nationality  so  ''clearly  recognizable"  that 
they  may  be  said  to  draw  themselves,  and  still  more  rarely 
will  such  lines,  if  drawn,  satisfy  the  other  desiderata 
expressed  or  imphed  in  the  President's  addresses  of  a 
just  and  lasting  peace.  A  decision  on  the  merits  of  al- 
ternative frontiers  involves  not  merely  a  knowledge  of 
details,  but  also  a  judgment  on  the  relative  importance 
of  different  human  interests,  and  a  prophetic  insight  into 
the  future  of  man's  development. 

If  it  be  difficult  for  a  single  individual,  supplied  with 
all  available  knowledge  and  power,  to  reach  a  decision 
in  a  matter  of  this  kind,  imagine  how  much  the  difficulty 
is  intensified  when  several  individuals  must  agree  upon 
the  decision,  when  each  has  his  individual  standard  of 
judgment,  when  some  have  views  which  to  the  others 
seem   clouded   or  distorted   by  individual   interests.     If 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  23 

agreement  is  to  be  reached  in  these  circumstances,  it 
will  almost  certainly  be  by  a  process  of  compromise,  in 
which  A  yields  his  position  at  one  part  of  the  frontier, 
to  get  the  adherence  of  B  to  his  line  at  another  part,  or 
A  yields  his  line  entire  in  one  part  of  the  world,  to  get  B 
to  accept  his  hne  in  a  distant  region.  This  process  of 
barter  is,  of  course,  offensive  to  the  idealist.  When  the 
result  is  analyzed  in  detail  many  perversions  of  justice 
will  appear.  The  result  must  be  judged  as  a  whole,  if 
it  is  to  be  judged  fairly.  And  the  critic  must  also  con- 
sider not  whether  the  actual  decision  is  as  good  as  one 
which  he  might  propose,  but  whether  it  is  better  than  no 
decision  at  all. 

For  the  determination  of  matters  of  fact  the  Council 
of  Ten  was  manifestly  ill  adapted.  It  lacked  the  techni- 
cal preparation  and  intimate  acquaintance  with  detail 
which  were  needed  for  the  effective  investigation  of  facts 
in  the  many  parts  of  its  great  field.  The  Council  of  Ten 
proved  also  unfitted  to  settle  the  serious  questions  of 
policy,  which  involved  both  its  administrative  and  its 
legislative  functions.  It  could  not  follow  a  definite 
plan  in  dealing  with  Russian  problems,  and  it  could  not 
clear  the  way  for  a  settlement  of  the  fundamental  terri- 
torial and  economic  problems,  until  the  great  Powers  had 
arrived  at  a  common  understanding  on  the  issues  in  which 
there  was  a  grave  divergence  of  view.  M.  Pichon's 
study  offered  a  noble  setting  for  a  spectacle,  but  con- 
sidered as  an  office  for  the  conduct  of  practical  business 
it  was  a  failure. 

There  were  too  many  people  in  the  room.  Secretaries 
and  speciahsts  served  a  useful  purpose  in  the  eyes  of  their 
principals,  but  to  the  eyes  of  the  principals  of  other  coun- 
tries they  appeared  as  a  crowd  of  hangers-on,  unknown 


24     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

to  them  personally,  possibly  dishonest  or  indiscreet, 
before  whom  the  principals  were  not  inclined  to  discuss 
delicate  questions  with  the  entire  candor  that  the  situa- 
tion demanded. 

There  were  too  many  states  represented  in  the  Council. 
The  Japanese  delegates  were  dihgent  in  attendance,  and 
(unlike  some  others)  kept  their  eyes  open,  however  tedi- 
ous were  the  proceedings.  When  a  territorial  question 
was  under  discussion  they  peered  at  their  maps  with  in- 
scrutable gravity.  One  never  knew,  however,  whether 
their  maps  were  right  side  up,  and  one  felt  pretty 
certain,  anyway,  that  it  made  no  difference  whether 
they  were  or  not.  The  Japanese  were  not  interested  in 
the  European  questions  that  composed  most  of  the  busi- 
ness. Nor  were  the  Italians  equally  concerned  in  all 
parts  of  the  field.  Keenly,  sometimes  passionately,  in- 
terested in  questions  that  touched  Italy  directly,  they 
were  complaisant  and  sometimes  almost  indifferent  when 
the  topic  was  remote. 

There  were  too  many  delegates  apportioned  to  each 
state.  The  panel  system  allowed  substitutions  and  a 
shifting  membership,  by  which  individuals  were  granted 
the  compliment  of  a  seat  at  the  Council,  but  by  which  the 
compactness  and  the  continuity  of  the  Council  itself  were 
impaired.  Normally  the  chief  of  each  state  was  accom- 
panied to  the  Council  meetings  by  his  foreign  minister. 
The  arrangement  assumed  an  equality  of  the  two  officials 
which  did  not  in  fact  exist.  The  comparison  involves  no 
question  of  the  actual  merit  and  abihty  of  the  foreign 
ministers.  Sonnino  was  probably  a  stronger  man  than 
his  principal,  Orlando,  more  determined  than  he  to  press 
Italian  demands,  and  certainly  better  equipped  for  the 
business  in  that  he  could  urge  his  claims  in  French  or 


THE   PEACE  CONFERENCE  25 

English  with  equal  facility.  "Which  language  shall  I 
speak?"  he  inquired  on  one  occasion;  **it  is  all  the  same 
to  me."  Balfour  appeared,  unfortunately,  to  think  that 
he  shared  this  advantage,  but  even  when  he  talked  French, 
he  presented  ideas  that  were  always  interesting,  if  they 
sometimes  inclined  to  the  abstract  and  doctrinaire.  It 
was  a  pleasure  to  hear  him  analyze  and  criticise  the  no- 
tion of  "autonomy,"  when  that  vague  concept  had  crept 
into  the  discussion.  No  one  could  surpass  Lansing  in  the 
logic  and  force  with  which  he  could  present  a  legal  argu- 
ment. But  ability,  even  first-rate  ability,  did  not  count 
when  it  was  in  the  second  place  in  the  delegation.  Lan- 
sing might  convince  every  one  else  in  the  room,  but  if  he 
did  not  convince  Wilson,  who  had  given  him  his  place 
and  who  himself  was  (in  the  words  to  the  treaty)  "acting 
in  his  own  name  and  by  his  own  proper  authority,"  his 
argument  profited  nothing;  it  hindered,  rather  than 
helped,  the  progress  of  deliberation.  An  observer  got 
the  impression  that  in  fact  the  principal  representatives 
of  the  American  and  British  delegations  were  less  open 
to  suggestions  from  their  foreign  ministers  than  to  those 
that  came  from  any  other  source;  they  appeared  openly 
to  resist  any  appearance  of  dependence  on  their  colleagues. 
As  to  Clemenceau,  he  did  not  allow  the  existence  of 
Pichon  to  inconvenience  him  in  the  slightest  degree; 
he  used  him  and  abused  him  without  any  recognition  of 
the  distinction. 

The  Council  of  Ten  recognized  early  that  it  was  not 
quahfied  to  investigate  the  intricate  facts  which  underlay 
most  of  its  problems.  Within  a  fortnight  after  its  open- 
ing session  it  began  therefore  to  establish  special  com- 
missions, to  which  it  referred  questions  as  they  arose, 
for  prehminary  study  and  report.     For  example,  after 


26     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

hearing  the  claims  advanced  by  the  Rumanian  representa- 
tive the  Council  voted:  "The  questions  raised  by  the 
declarations  of  M.  Bratianu  on  the  territorial  interests  of 
the  Rumanians  in  the  Peace  Settlement  shall  be  referred 
for  examination,  in  the  first  instance,  to  a  committee  of 
specialists  composed  of  two  delegates  for  each  of  the 
following  Powers:  the  United  States  of  America,  the 
British  Empire,  France,  and  Italy.  The  duty  of  this 
committee  will  be  to  study  the  questions  to  be  settled, 
to  condense  them  in  as  narrow  limits  as  possible  and  to 
propose  a  solution  for  an  equitable  settlement.  This 
committee  may  hear  representatives  of  the  peoples  con- 
cerned." 

The  advantage  of  this  process,  by  which  the  supreme 
organ  of  the  Conference  was  relieved  of  the  preliminary 
processes  of  investigation  and  discussion,  and  could 
devote  itself  to  the  decision  of  the  larger  questions, 
was  obvious.  Commissions  grew  rapidly  in  number. 
According  to  the  calculation  of  Andre  Tardieu,  fifty-two 
of  them  were  at  work  before  the  treaty  with  Germany  was 
signed,  and  these  fifty-two  commissions  held,  altogether, 
one  thousand  six  hundred  and  forty-six  sessions.  Dis- 
persed and  secluded,  these  commissions  attracted  in 
general  little  attention.  They  had  no  proper  authority 
except  that  of  recommendation.  They  had,  in  fact,  im- 
mense influence  on  the  outcome  of  the  Conference. 
Without  them  the  terms  of  peace  would  certainly  have 
been  very  different,  if  indeed  they  could  have  been 
written  at  all. 

Some  of  these  commissions"  were  intrusted  with  ques- 
tions so  important  that  their  contributions  to  the  settle- 
ment appear  positively  greater  than  those  of  the  Council 
of  Ten  itself.     At  the  head  of  the  list  comes,  of  course. 


THE   PEACE  CONFERENCE  27 

the  commission  on  the  League  of  Nations.  The  body 
which  formulated  the  Covenant  of  the  League  had  a  mem- 
bership which  (unlike  that  of  the  Council)  was  not  fixed 
by  any  official  convention,  but  was  determined  by  a  more 
personal  standard.  Under  the  presidency  of  Wilson  it 
reached  out  to  inchide  great  men  of  the  small  Powers, 
such  as  Venizelos  of  Greece  and  Dmowski  of  Poland,  and 
men  who  are  recognized  as  intellectual  and  moral  leaders 
in  the  greatest  empires,  like  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  General 
Smuts,  and  Leon  Bourgeois.  If  the  opinions  of  those  who 
believe  in  the  future  of  the  League  of  Nations  are  to  be 
trusted,  the  work  done  by  this  commission  in  its  sessions 
at  the  Hotel  Crillon,  is  destined  to  be  more  fruitful,  if  at 
the  time  it  seems  less  decisive,  than  that  accomplished 
by  any  other  organ  of  the  Conference.  Another  com- 
mission, whose  work  was  essentially  constructive,  was 
that  on  International  Legislation  on  Labor,  including  such 
representative  spokesmen  on  the  broad  and  difficult 
problems  that  it  covered  as  Gompers  of  the  United 
States,  Barnes  of  England,  and  Vandervelde  of  Belgium. 
Other  commissions  studied  the  reform  of  international 
commercial  relations,  in  the  case  of  customs  tariffs, 
shipping  regulations,  waterways,  and  railroads.  Every 
student  of  the  history  of  commerce  knows  how  seriously 
the  world  has  suffered  from  the  perversions  of  policy 
in  these  matters,  and  will  recognize  in  the  hsts  of  members 
of  the  commissions  some  of  the  names  of  those  most 
competent  to  initiate  reform. 

Two  commissions,  those  on  reparations  and  on  finan- 
cial questions,  occupy  a  place  apart  by  reason  of  the 
pecuhar  gravity  of  the  questions  intrusted  to  them. 
Some  of  the  ablest  men  in  banking  and  in  business,  some 
leaders  from  the  academic  and  some  from  the  official 


28     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

world,  were  associated  in  these  commissions  in  the  en- 
deavor to  determine  the  damages  inflicted  on  the  people 
of  the  Allied  countries  in  the  war,  to  decide  upon  the 
measure  and  means  of  reparation,  and  to  manage  the 
financial  questions  that  were  incidental  to  the  restora- 
tion of  peace.  Finally,  a  whole  group  of  commissions 
was  estabhshed  to  study  the  territorial  questions  involved 
in  the  peace  settlement,  with  a  central  committee  above 
them  to  correlate  their  work.  To  these  territorial  com- 
missions the  European  states  contributed  mainly  men 
trained  in  their  foreign  offices  and  in  their  diplomatic 
corps;  the  British  Government  complimented  some  of 
its  colonial  premiers  with  seats,  and  the  United  States 
was  ordinarily  represented  by  college  professors,  and  the 
like,  who,  as  members  of  the  The  Inquiry,  had  been 
studying  the  special  questions  with  a  view  to  the  even- 
tual discussion  of  terms  of  peace. 

The  commissions  varied  greatly  in  size.  The  four  great 
Western  Powers  had  always  one  or  two  representatives 
apiece;  Japan  had  a  seat  on  those  commissions  in  the 
work  of  which  it  felt  a  particular  interest,  and  other 
Powers  had  seats  on  the  larger  commissions.  Procedure 
resembled  that  of  the  Council.  Members  sat  about  a 
table  in  designated  places,  and  spoke  on  any  topic  in  an 
order  fixed  by  the  alphabetical  arrangement  of  countries; 
all  the  important  commissions  had  the  usual  apparatus 
of  secretaries,  interpreter,  and  stenographer,  and  printed 
in  their  minutes  the  substance  of  the  discussion.  Some 
of  the  sessions  were  formal;  one  of  the  Powers  would 
introduce  an  expert  to  present  a  studied  argument, 
or  representatives  of  outside  interests  would  be  heard. 
Most  of  the  sessions  were  distinctly  practical  and  busi- 
nesslike.    The  field  of  interest  was  specific  and  limited, 


THE   PEACE  CONFERENCE  29 

and  each  state  had  picked  for  its  members  those  who  were 
thought  to  be  most  competent  to  represent  it  in  that 
field.  Views  of  the  facts  and  of  the  proper  settlement 
usually  varied  greatly  when  they  were  first  presented. 
Discussion  and  criticism  often  cleared  away  mistakes  and 
misunderstandings,  and  led  to  an  agreement  based  on 
genuine  conviction.  Sometimes  they  did  no  more  than 
to  define  more  sharply  the  differences,  but  also  served  to 
suggest  some  compromise  on  which  both  parties  could 
agree  if  neither  could  have  his  own  way.  Sometimes, 
particularly  when  facts  were  obscure  and  interests  sharply 
divergent,  agreement  proved  to  be  impossible,  and  the 
commission  would  have  to  submit  a  divided  report. 

The  commissions  had  necessarily  not  merely  to  de- 
termine facts,  but  also  to  decide  questions  of  policy  in 
working  out  their  problems.  Representatives  of  some 
of  the  European  Powers,  notably  Italy,  were  bound  by 
strict  instructions,  which  required  them  to  work  for  a 
particular  solution;  their  policy  was  determined  by 
powers  above.  Delegates  of  the  United  States  were 
notably  free  from  such  influence;  they  could  share  with 
their  plenipotentiaries  the  responsibility  for  choosing  a 
certain  course,  but  were  encouraged  in  general  to  make 
their  own  decisions,  with  a  view  to  the  facts  in  their  own 
field,  and  with  httle  regard  to  outside  influences.  As 
time  passed  and  the  need  of  reaching  some  definite  con- 
clusion grew  more  urgent,  the  process  of  compromise 
became  prominent  as  a  means  of  adjusting  differences  of 
opinion  which  would  not  yield  to  argument. 

The  final  stage  in  the  work  of  a  commission  was  occu- 
pied with  the  preparation  of  its  report.  This  gave  in 
condensed  form  the  salient  facts,  the  principles  followed, 
and  the  conclusions  reached.     Its  most  important  con- 


30     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

tent  was  a  series  of  draft  articles,  embodying  the  results 
of  the  deliberations,  and  proposed  for  inclusion  in  the 
treaty  of  peace.  The  commission  drew  up  these  arti- 
cles with  the  greatest  care,  and  with  the  assistance  of 
specialists  skilled  in  drafting.  The  leader  of  these  special- 
ists, M.  Fromageot,  declared  modestly  that  he  was  a 
mere  ''machine  a  ecrire,"  to  be  employed  by  the  com- 
mission in  recording  its  results,  but  he  early  gave  evidence 
of  a  feature  not  common  in  typewriters;  the  machine 
locked  if  one  attempted  to  write  with  it  anything  that 
was  not  perfectly  clear  and  specific.  These  draft  articles 
supplied  the  materials  with  which  the  treaties  were  built 
up.  Only  in  rare  cases  were  amendments  or  additions 
made  by  some  superior  organ  of  the  Conference. 

The  establishment  of  the  commissions  relieved  the 
Council  of  Ten  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  business 
which  it  would  otherwise  have  had  to  conduct,  but  did 
not  improve  its  capacity  to  deal  with  the  problems  that 
remained  within  its  province.  The  weakness  of  the 
Council  became  actually  more  apparent  as  it  ceased  to  be 
occupied  with  minor  matters  and  ceremonial  audiences, 
and  faced  at  closer  range  the  great  questions  that  were 
beginning  to  take  shape.  Only  one  of  the  questions, 
that  relating  to  the  eastern  frontier  of  Germany  and  the 
Polish  outlet  by  way  of  Danzig,  actually  came  before  the 
Council  for  settlement.  In  the  background,  however,, 
were  other  questions  even  more  serious :  the  amount  and 
form  of  the  reparation  payments,  the  position  of  France 
on  the  Rhine  frontier,  the  claims  of  Italy  in  the  Adriatic 
region  and  of  Japan  in  the  Far  East.  Some  of  the  ques- 
tions were  being  debated  in  commissions,  some  were  dis- 
cussed only  in  private  conferences.  They  affected  such 
grave  interests,  and  they  were  so  entangled  with  each 
other  and  with  the  position  to  be  accorded  the  League  of 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  31 

Nations,  that  they  must  be  settled  before  the  Conference 
could  proceed  to  frame  terms  of  peace;  but  they  were 
questions  too  difficult  and  too  dehcate  to  be  intrusted 
to  the  Council  of  Ten.  The  Council,  estabhshed  as  the 
supreme  power  of  the  Conference,  appeared  now  as  an 
obstacle  blocking  the  way.  It  was  set  aside  in  the  sum- 
mary and  informal  manner  which  characterized  all  the 
vital  acts  of  the  Conference.  Wilson,  Lloyd  George, 
Clemenceau,  and  Orlando  ceased  to  attend  the  sessions 
of  the  Council  of  Ten  and  met  as  a  group  by  themselves. 
The  Council  of  Four  took  control  of  the  Conference. 

Events  had  in  fact  long  been  tending  toward  this  con- 
summation.    During  the  second  month  of  the  Conference, 
the  heads  of  the  three  most  important  Powers  had  been 
absent  from  the  Council.     Lloyd  George  was  occupied  in 
England  by  questions  of  domestic  poHtics;    Wilson  was 
absent  from  February   14  on  his  trip  to  America;    and 
Clemenceau  was  shot  on  February  19.     The  Council  of 
Ten  had  an  opportunity  to  realize  how  helpless  it  was  to 
reach  decisions  without  the  individuals  in  whom  authority 
and  power  centred.     The  Council  continued  its  sessions 
with  representatives  replacing  the  absent  members,  but 
did  httle  more  than  mark  time.     The  serious  business  of 
this  period  was  conducted  either  in  the  commissions  or 
over  the  telegraph  wires  and  in  private  conversations  at 
Paris.     When  the  representation  of  the  heads  of  states 
was  completed  again  by  the  return  of  Wilson  on  March 
14,  the  practice  of  private  conference  persisted.     The 
three  weeks  following  were  a  critical  period,  culminating 
in  the  announcement  from  Wilson  on  April  7  that  prepara- 
tions had  been  made  for  him  to  leave  France.     Following 
on  the  arrangement  of  the  differences  between  Wilson, 
Clemenceau,   and   Lloyd   George,   which   permitted   the 
settlement  of  terms  of  the  German  treaty,  came  the  Adri- 


32     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

atic  crisis  and  the  departure  of  the  Italians  for  Rome  on 
April  24.  To  submit  to  the  old  Council  of  Ten  the  points 
which  divided  the  great  Powers  in  this  period  would  have 
been  an  idle  form.  Lloyd  George,  Clemenceau,  and 
Orlando  were  bound  by  considerations  of  home  politics 
to  fight  for  certain  terms  of  settlement  which  they  had 
given  their  peoples  reason  to  expect.  Wilson  was  bound 
to  fight  for  terms  conforming  to  the  principles  which  he 
had  published.  Agreement  was  possible  only  by  way  of 
compromise.  Compromise  was  possible  only  as  each 
individual  became  convinced  that  he  was  getting  the 
most  he  could,  and  that  what  he  got  was  better  than  the 
nothing  which  would  ensue  if  he  declined  altogether  to 
agree.  He  might  hope  for  guidance  in  this  matter  by 
solitary  reflection  or  by  intimate  discussion  with  personal 
advisers,  but  he  could  hope  for  no  help  from  the  formal 
arguments,  the  platitudes,  the  sedulous  shrinking  from 
the  facts,  which  would  have  characterized  a  discussion 
of  the  subject  in  the  old  Council  of  Ten.  No  one  in  that 
body  at  this  stage  of  action  would  have  dared  to  tell  the 
truth.  His  fragment  of  truth  would  have  been  quoted, 
and  would  have  appeared  to  half  the  world  as  a  monstrous 
perversion.  An  attempt  to  realize  at  this  time  the  ideal 
of  "open  covenants  openly  arrived  at"  might  readily 
have  started  another  war,  and  would  certainly  have  de- 
layed interminably  the  agreement  on  terms  of  peace. 

Lacking  the  chiefs  of  state,  the  old  Council  lost  its 
former  prestige  and  authority.  It  continued  to  sit  now 
as  a  Council  of  Five  and  did  useful  work  as  a  sort  of 
superior  commission,  considering  the  reports  of  the  com- 
missions which  it  had  created  and  transmitting  them  with 
its  findings  to  the  Four.  It  bore  itself  with  dignity  in  a 
situation  which  was  not  agreeable.  If  the  Five  did  noth- 
ing definitive,  at  least  they  did  it  very  vvtII.     Of  the 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  33 

sessions,  however,  which  I  was  privileged  to  attend,  there 
was  but  one  in  which  I  noted  on  the  part  of  the  Five  a 
real  rehsh  for  the  work  in  hand.  The  Four,  busied  with 
matters  of  greater  moment,  had  directed  the  Five  to  send 
a  telegram  ordering  two  of  the  Allies  to  remove  their 
troops  from  a  district  in  central  Europe  where  they  were 
in  conflict.  The  action  proposed  appeared  ill-advised. 
Further,  was  it  a  duty  of  the  Five  to  send  telegrams  for 
their  superiors?  "We  are  not  messenger-boys,"  remarked 
one  of  the  plenipotentiaries.  At  last  a  subject  had  arisen 
on  which  the  Council  of  Five  could  express  itself  with 
some  decision;  and  it  considered  the  manner  in  which 
the  Four  had  best  be  corrected  with  a  zest  that  at  other 
times  was  lacking. 

An  indication  of  the  relative  activity  of  the  different 
councils  is  afforded  by  the  statistics  compiled  by  Tardieu. 
The  Council  of  Ten  held  seventy-two  sessions,  the  Coun- 
cil of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  ("the  Five")  held 
thirty-nine  sessions,  the  Council  of  Four  held  one  hundred 
and  forty-five  sessions.  In  comparison  with  this  last 
and  smallest  council  the  others  fade  into  insignificance. 
The  Ten  fell  into  the  background,  the  Five  never  emerged 
from  obscurity,  the  Four  ruled  the  Conference  in  the 
culminating  period  when  its  decisions  took  shape. 

The  Council  of  Four  had  begun  in  purely  personal  and 
informal  conversations,  and  preserved  its  privacy  in 
many  of  its  later  sessions.  It  needed  at  most  the  service 
of  an  interpreter,  and  of  a  secretary  who  could  be  called 
to  make  in  due  form  a  minute  of  some  decision.  To 
assume  on  this  account,  however,  as  some  have  done,  that 
the  treaties  were  drawn  by  the  four  heads  of  states  and 
that  the  terms  were  fixed  by  these  four  individuals,  is 
an  extraordinary  perversion  of  the  facts. 

Most  of  the  articles  in  the  treaties  were  taken  bodily 


34     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

without  change  from  the  reports  of  commissions.  Some 
serious  problems,  it  is  true,  notably  those  relating  to  the 
ItaHan  frontier,  had  not  been  referred  to  any  commis- 
sion; decision  on  these  problems  was  reached  in  the  pri- 
vate sessions  of  the  Four.  Further,  there  were  questions 
of  policy  in  the  field  of  the  commissions  which  were  too 
grave  to  be  definitely  settled  by  them,  and  which  were 
still  in  flux  when  the  Four  were  ready  to  hear  and  act 
upon  their  reports.  Doubtless  the  Four  discussed  these 
matters  in  their  secret  sessions,  and  they  sometimes  de- 
cided them  there.  On  the  other  hand,  they  followed 
often  the  practice  of  bidding  their  special  advisers  to 
attend  the  session,  as  the  Council  of  Ten  had  done,  in- 
viting suggestions  from  their  advisers  as  the  question  was 
discussed,  and  frankly  relying  upon  their  guidance  in  the 
effort  to  arrange  the  best  settlement.  At  these  later 
meetings  in  the  beautiful  salon  of  the  President's  resi- 
dence, the  attending  delegates  from  the  commissions  were 
indeed  given  a  position  of  far  greater  prominence  than 
was  ever  conceded  them  at  the  sessions  of  the  Council  of 
Ten.  They  were  called  from  the  back  row  of  chairs  to 
seats  immediately  by  their  principals,  and  conferred 
openly  with  them. 

It  is  impossible  to  apportion  exactly  the  influence  on 
the  final  settlement  of  the  many  individuals  and  groups 
who  contributed  to  it.  The  critic  of  the  proceedings  was 
inclined  at  the  time,  and  is  still  inclined,  to  take  for 
granted  the  terms  which  were  fixed  by  the  commissions, 
and  to  direct  his  attention  to  those  questions  which  had 
not  been  studied,  or  at  least  had  not  been  settled,  in  the 
commissions,  or  the  settlement  of  which  was  revised  in 
the  Council  of  Four.  Judging  the  matter  from  this  stand- 
point, he  exalts  the  power  of  the  Four,  and  ascribes  to 


THE   PEACE  CONFERENCE  35 

them  all  the  credit  or  blame  for  the  treaties.  In  truth 
the  Four  did  take  to  themselves  the  responsibility  of 
decision.  They  had  the  courage  to  determine  one  ques- 
tion in  comparison  with  which  any  other  question  seems 
a  matter  of  detail:  they  decided  that  there  should  be  a 
treaty  ready  for  the  signature  of  the  Germans  at  a  date 
pretty  definitely  fixed.  Their  power  to  determine  just 
what  the  terms  of  that  treaty  should  be  is  commonly 
much  exaggerated. 

Even  those  parts  of  the  final  settlement  which  had  not 
been  fixed  in  finished  form  by  the  commissions  had  been 
studied  and  discussed  for  months  by  experts  officially 
designated  to  investigate  them.  No  question  was  abso- 
lutely decided  by  this  process.  No  question  could  be 
subjected  to  this  process,  however,  without  a  narrowing 
of  the  field  of  choice  in  which  the  final  decision  was  Hkely 
to  he.  The  representative  of  a  great  Power  had  every 
reason  to  follow  the  guidance  of  his  expert  advisers, 
and  would  depart  from  it  only  in  the  rare  cases  in  which 
considerations  of  higher  policy,  concealed  fiom  his  sub- 
ordinates, made  a  sacrifice  in  one  part  of  the  field  appear 
to  him  the  inevitable  means  of  gaining  a  greater  benefit 
in  another  part.  Cases  of  this  kind  were,  at  least  as 
regards  the  American  representative,  extraordinarily  few. 

It  is  interesting  to  speculate  on  the  concealed  activities 
of  the  Council  of  Four,  and  particularly  on  the  interplay 
of  the  personahties  of  its  members.  If  one  can  judge 
from  the  impressions  obtained  in  council  meetings  which 
were  open  to  observation,  Orlando  must  have  played  a 
relatively  subordinate  part  in  the  general  settlement. 
It  seems  equally  clear  that  no  one  of  the  remaining  three 
dominated  the  group.  If  one  could  have  dominated  by 
a  dauntless  will,  it  would  certainly  have  been  Clemenceau. 


36     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

If  shrewd  management  and  ingenuity  in  devising  prac- 
ticable plans  had  been  enough  to  assure  control,  the 
leadership  would  have  gone  to  Lloyd  George.  If  abihty 
to  define  and  defend  the  aim  to  be  kept  in  view  had  been 
the  essential  quahty,  no  one  in  that  respect  matched  the 
American  President.  No  one  of  the  three  had,  in  fact, 
his  own  way.  Each  has  been  criticised  because  he  got 
less  than  was  expected  of  him.  Wilson  is  of  the  three 
the  one  most  blamed,  yet  time  may  prove,  as  I  beheve  it 
will,  that  his  generous  devotion  to  ideals  of  the  future 
contributed  the  most  positive  and  m.ost  permanent  fea- 
tures of  the  settlement.  Sufficient  time  has  already 
passed  to  show  that  some  features  which  he  opposed  are 
bad,  and  further  to  make  clear  that  these  features  are 
the  expression  of  deep-rooted  national  prejudices,  against 
which  even  now  reason  cannot  combat. 

Years  more  will  pass  before  real  peace  actually  prevails. 
The  war  released  blind  forces  in  all  fields  of  human  in- 
terest, and  the  Powers  of  the  world  were  as  helpless  in 
1 91 9  to  compose  these  forces  as  they  had  been  in  19 14 
and  are  now  in  1921.  No  human  peace  conference  could 
have  reheved  us  of  all  these  present  evils.  The  Confer- 
ence at  Paris  was  eminently  human,  and  the  critic  can 
readily  point  out  features  of  its  organization  and  of  its 
operation  which  in  a  different  and  a  better  world  would 
have  been  better  managed.  This  much,  at  least,  he  must 
recognize.  When  compared  with  similar  bodies  in  the 
past,  such  as  the  Congress  of  Vienna  or  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  the  Paris  Conference  faced  vastly  greater  problems, 
studied  its  problems  in  a  more  scientific  way,  and  sought 
more  earnestly  to  harmonize  its  settlement  with  the 
principles  of  justice. 


Ill 

THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY 

BY    CHARLES    HOMER    HASKINS 

The  new  frontiers  of  Germany  constituted  one  of  the 
fundamental  and  one  of  the  most  troublesome  problems 
of  the  peace  conference  of  Paris.  About  them  waged 
the  conflict  of  ideas  between  a  peace  of  justice  and  a 
peace  of  violence,  and  in  them  are  illustrated  the  chief 
difficulties  which  arose  in  giving  effect  to  the  peace  of 
justice  which  the  conference  sought  to  establish.  They 
meant  the  release  of  submerged  nationalities  like  the 
Danes  of  Schleswig,  and  the  undoing  of  ancient  wrongs 
like  the  partition  of  Poland,  or  recent  acts  of  force  like 
the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  1871.  They  in- 
volved the  question  of  the  best  kind  of  national  boun- 
daries and  the  meaning  and  limits  of  self-determination. 
Territorial  in  their  nature,  they  were  also  tied  up  with 
matters  of  reparation,  customs  zones,  national  defense, 
and  guarantees  for  the  future.  Though  the  provisions 
fixing  new  frontiers  occupy  less  than  one-fourth  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  such  matters  underfie  the  whole 
settlement,  and  their  history  would  cover  a  large  part  of 
the  history  of  the  conference. 

Fortunately  for  our  present  purpose,  all  this  can  be 
shortened  and  simpHfied.  Let  us  take  a  brief  view  of  the 
general  problem  and  then  go  on  to  a  survey  of  Germany's 
new  boundaries  in  the  west.  The  eastern  or  Polish 
frontier  is  a  topic  by  itself,  and  will  be  discussed  in 
another  chapter.^ 

^  See  Chapter  FV. 
37 


38     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

The  German  Empire  dates  only  from  1871,  but  its 
constituent  parts  have  a  long  history.  Its  chief  mem- 
ber was  the  kingdom  of  Prussia,  which  contained  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  three-fifths  of  the  empire's  area  and 
population.  Prussia  had  spread  in  all  directions,  and, 
save  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  belonged  to  the  whole 
empire,  the  frontier  problems  both  in  the  east  and  in  the 
west  were  all  concerned  with  Prussia.  It  was  Prussia 
that  had  partitioned  Poland,  that  had  swallowed  up  the 
Left  Bank  of  the  Rhine  in  1815,  that  had  seized  Schles- 
wig-HoIstein  in  1864.  Nearly  half  the  area  of  Prussia 
had  been  acquired  since  Frederick  the  Great.  It  was 
Prussia  that  dominated  the  empire,  and  it  was  the  Prus- 
sian king  who,  as  German  emperor,  had  declared  the 
war.  It  was  not  surprising  that  there  were  those  who 
urged  that  Prussia  should  lose  the  fruits  of  a  long  career 
of  mihtary  aggrandizement  and  be  reduced  to  the  hmits 
she  had  occupied  in  the  eighteenth  century  or  even 
earlier. 

Now,  if  the  conference  of  Paris  had  been  the  congress 
of  Vienna  of  a  hundred  years  before,  it  would  have  pro- 
ceeded to  carve  large  slices  out  of  Prussia  for  the  benefit 
of  the  victorious  Allies,  just  as  Prussia  had  done  for  her 
own  benefit  at  the  earlier  congress.  But  the  world  had 
moved  since  1815,  most  rapidly  of  all  since  1914,  and  a 
peace  of  the  older  sort  no  longer  accorded  with  the  com- 
mon moral  sense  of  mankind.  Moreover,  the  Allies  had 
accepted  as  the  basis  of  the  peace  the  Fourteen  Points 
and  other  utterances  of  President  Wilson,  and  these, 
while  providing  specifically  for  the  restoration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  Poland,  had  condemned  the  bartering  of 
peoples  from  sovereignty  to  sovereignty  without  their 
consent,  while  at  the  same  time  they  upheld  the  principle 


THE   NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    39 

of  self-determination,  which  Germany  had  so  conspicu- 
ously violated  in  the  past.  The  carving  up  of  Prussia 
was  impossible,  not  because  the  Prussian  Government 
did  not  deserve  it,  but  because  her  peoples  would  oppose 
it,  and  in  our  time  it  is  peoples  that  count.  The  righting 
of  historic  wrongs  may  easily  cause  greater  wrongs  when 
men  have  become  reconciled  to  the  conditions  once 
wrongly  established,  and  the  conference  was  cautious 
about  reaching  back  far  into  the  past  to  correct  old  acts 
of  injustice.  It  reached  farthest,  as  regards  Germany,  in 
the  case  of  Poland,  and  here  the  reason  was  not  so  much 
that  a  wrong  had  been  done  in  the  eighteenth  century  as 
that  the  Poles  continued  to  cry  out  against  this  wrong 
and  resist  it.  In  the  west  none  of  the  changes  made  by 
the  treaty  reached  back  farther  than  1814. 

The  conference  even  declined  to  compel  the  division  of 
Prussia  into  several  states  within  the  German  Empire. 
For  such  a  division  there  was  a  good  deal  to  be  said. 
The  German  Empire  pretended  to  be  a  confederation, 
yet  this  one  state  could  outvote  and  outmanoeuvre  all 
the  others;  there  was  inequality  everywhere.  If  Hanover 
and  Westphalia  and  the  Rhineland  had  been  set  off  as 
separate  federal  states,  the  empire  would  have  been  more 
truly  federal,  and  the  diverse  interests  of  the  western 
regions  would  have  had  some  chance  to  express  them- 
selves. For  some  weeks  Just  after  the  armistice  a  httle 
encouragement  from  the  Allies  might  have  accomplished 
this  result  at  the  hands  of  the  Germans  themselves; 
but  the  encouragement  was  not  forthcoming,  at  least 
from  England  and  the  United  States,  and  the  slight  local 
movements  in  this  direction  proved  abortive.  Anything 
of  this  sort  was  thought  to  involve  meddling  in  Ger- 
many's internal  affairs,  and  the  worst  feature  of  Prussia's 


40     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

anomalous  position  had  been  removed  with  the  flight 
and  abdication  of  the  HohenzoIIerns.  With  no  king  and 
no  emperor,  Prussia  seemed  less  dangerous,  and  there 
was  a  disposition,  especially  in  England  and  the  United 
States,  to  deal  gently  with  a  Germany  which  professed 
democracy  and  repentance. 

In  western  Germany  the  conference  used  the  knife 
very  sparingly  and  only  after  careful  local  diagnosis. 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  the  only  major  operation,  and  that 
was  really  performed  by  the  armistice.  But  the  patient 
will  often  suffer  much  pain  from  a  surface  wound,  and 
make  more  complaint  over  it  than  over  a  deep  incision. 
Although  the  Germans  had  contemptuously  refused  the 
self-determination  which  they  had  promised  the  Danes 
in  1866,  although  they  had  ignored  the  unanimous  pro- 
test of  the  deputies  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  1871,  in  1919 
they  became  suddenly  enamored  of  self-determination  as 
they  now  interpreted  it.  As  they  explained  this  prin- 
ciple, none  of  the  alien  peoples  could  get  out  of  the  em- 
pire without  a  popular  vote,  whereas  the  application  of 
such  a  vote  to  its  German-speaking  inhabitants,  outside 
of  Alsace-Lorraine,  was  not  self-determination  but  con- 
quest. They  even  retorted  that  the  Allies  ought  to  ap- 
ply self-determination  to  their  own  ancient  conquests, 
not  only  in  Ireland  and  Egypt,  but  in  Canada  and  Cuba 
and  the  Philippines.  I  have  a  German  map,  issued  during 
the  conference,  which  even  represented  Florida  and  Texas 
as  wild  buffaloes  straining  to  get  loose  from  the  brutal 
lasso  of  the  United  States  ! 

Whatever  happened  at  Paris  the  Germans  were  sure 
not  to  be  pleased  with  it.  A  good  deal  of  false  sympathy 
has  been  wasted  on  the  penitent  German  of  191 9  who  had 
failed  to  wreak  his  will  in  annexations  and  indemnities 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    41 

on  a  defeated  Europe,  and  who,  if  measured  by  his  own 
standards,  certainly  got  off  very  easily  at  Paris.  What  a 
victorious  Germany  would  do  in  the  east  was  seen,  less 
than  a  year  before  the  armistice,  in  the  treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk.  What  she  would  have  done  in  the  west  is,  for- 
tunately, exempHfied  in  no  such  document,  but  her  am- 
bitions were  stated  in  Pan-German  and  semi-official  form 
throughout  the  war,  and  an  official  formulation  of  191 7 
has  recently  been  revealed  in  the  "  War  Memories  "  of 
Ludendorff,^  including  a  huge  war  indemnity  from  France, 
a  protectorate  over  Belgium,  **  strategic  and  economic 
rectification"  of  the  French  frontier,  which  was  another 
name  for  the  seizure  of  the  iron-mines  of  Briey  and 
Longwy  and  unconquered  border  fortresses  like  Verdun. 
This  was  the  least  for  which  Germany  hoped,  and  vic- 
tory on  the  Marne  or  the  Somme  or  at  Verdun  might 
have  meant  far  more.  In  the  face  of  the  German  war 
aims  the  Allies  might  well  be  astonished  at  their  own 
moderation.  Accepting  at  the  armistice  the  principles 
proposed  by  the  American  president,  they  exacted  no 
indemnity,  enforced  only  moderate  restorations,  nearly 
all  of  them  definitely  agreed  to  by  Germany  in  advance, 
and  preserved  the  unity  of  an  empire  founded  by  force 
and  conquest.  The  world  had  certainly  moved  since 
Vienna — it  had  even  moved  far  since  Brest-Litovsk  and 
the  German  terms  of  191 7.  And  the  most  decisive  ele- 
ment in  that  advance  had  been  furnished  by  the  United 
States,  both  through  its  military  aid  in  the  war  and 
through  its  insistence  on  a  peace  of  justice  as  the  best 
preventive  of  future  wars  of  revenge. 

The  western  frontiers  of  Germany  include  the  problems 
of  Schleswig,  the  Belgian  border,   Luxemburg,  Alsace- 

'  I,  p.  320  (London,  1920). 


42     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Lorraine,  the  Left  Bank  of  the  Rhine,   and  the  Saar 
valley.    Let  us  review  them  briefly  in  this  order.* 

SCHLESWIG 

The  new  boundary  between  Germany  and  Denmark 
was  one  of  the  simplest  problems  presented  to  the  con- 
ference and  one  which  most  readily  reached  a  just  solu- 
tion. Like  every  region  on  the  circumference  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  this  had  been  an  area  of  dispute  for  many 
centuries,  the  dispute  being  settled  in  Germany's  favor 
by  the  war  with  Denmark  in  1864  ^^^  the  subsequent 
annexation  of  the  duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  to 
Prussia.  A  clause  was  inserted  in  the  treaty  of  1866 
that  the  "inhabitants  of  North  Schleswig  shall  be  again 
united  with  Denmark  if  they  should  express  such  a  desire 
by  a  vote  freely  given."  This  promise  Prussia  never 
made  any  pretense  of  carrying  out,  and  while  Denmark 
had  not  joined  in  the  Great  War,  the  conference  lent  a 
sympathetic  ear  to  her  claims  for  justice.  The  treaty 
provided  for  a  popular  vote  by  zones  under  an  interna- 
tional commission,  and  the  result  of  these  votes,  held  in 
the  spring  of  1920,  was  to  give  the  northern  zone  to  Den- 
mark and  the  southern  to  Germany.  It  was  originally 
proposed  to  have  a  third  zone  which  included  territory 
farther  to  the  south,  but  the  Danish  Government  was 
timid  on  this  point,  fearing  lest  the  thrifty  farmers  might 
try  to  vote  themselves  out  of  the  German  Empire  to 
escape  the  fiscal  burdens  left  by  the  war,  only  to  form  a 
recalcitrant  German-speaking  minority  as  soon  as  they 
got  into  Denmark.  Such  fears  proved  groundless,  for 
the  voting  followed  linguistic  rather  than  economic  lines, 

'  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  these  matters,  see  Haskins  and  Lord,  "  Some  Prob- 
lems of  the  Peace  Conference  "  (Cambridge,  1920),  Chaps.  II-IV. 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    43 

and  Danish  influence  in  the  middle  zone  was  probably 
weakened  by  the  elimination  of  the  southern  zone  from 
the  plebiscite. 

The  Schleswig  clauses  of  the  treaty  were  elaborated  by 
a  commission  of  ten,  which,  starting  from  the  principle  of 
determination  by  popular  vote,  had  merely  to  work  out 
the  method  and  extent  of  its  apphcation.  Delegations 
were  heard  from  Denmark  and  from  the  disputed  terri- 
tory. The  general  policy  of  the  commission,  which  was 
unanimous  on  all  its  recommendations,  was  to  make  the 
popular  consultation  as  broad  and  fair  as  possible,  even 
to  the  extent  of  allowing  a  vote  in  the  third  zone,  which 
was  finally  stricken  from  the  treaty.  The  basis  of  the 
settlement  has  generally  been  regarded  as  Just,  and  the 
final  elimination  of  this  question  from  the  field  of  con- 
troversy may  well  be  viewed  as  one  of  the  distinct  tri- 
umphs of  the  conference. 

Belgium 

The  Belgian  frontier,  which  raised  less  important  is- 
sues than  the  Danish,  was  handled  by  the  same  com- 
mission. Here  Prussia's  annexations  had  been  made  in 
1 815,  and  she  had  recently  used  them  to  prepare  her  at- 
tack on  Belgium's  neutrality  by  building  strategic  rail- 
ways through  a  sparsely  inhabited  region  and  by  con- 
structing a  great  military  camp  at  Elsenborn,  near  the 
Belgian  border.  Some  thousands  of  the  inhabitants 
continued  to  speak  French,  and  the  whole  region  was 
closely  connected  with  Belgium.  By  the  treaty  the 
circles  of  Eupen  and  Malmedy,  with  a  population  of 
61,000,  as  well  as  the  minute  border  territory  of  Mores- 
net,  which  had  been  ruled  jointly  by  Belgium  and  Prus- 
sia, were  handed  over  to  Belgium,  partly  on  the  score  of 


44     WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

reparation  and  of  security  against  future  attack.  The 
interests  of  the  people  were  covered  very  vaguely  by  a 
clause  which  required  the  Belgian  Government  to  open 
registers  in  which  written  protests  might  be  made  by 
such  inhabitants  as  opposed  the  cession.  This  was  the 
provision  of  the  first  draft,  but,  on  the  initiative  of  its 
two  American  members,  the  commission  of  June  7  unan- 
imously recommended  a  modification,  so  that  the  duty 
of  securing  a  free  and  secret  expression  of  the  desires  of 
the  population  should  fall  to  delegates  of  the  League  of 
Nations  rather  than  to  the  government  immediately  in- 
terested. Unfortunately,  this  change  failed  of  embodi- 
ment in  the  final  draft  of  the  treaty.  The  result  was  a 
dispute  in  which  Germany  has  accused  the  Belgians  of 
keeping  the  registers  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid  protests 
and  intimidate  protestants,  and  Belgium  has  accused  the 
German  Government  of  exerting  local  pressure;  but  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  to  which  the  Germans 
appealed,  rightly  decided  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction  to 
interfere.  I  have  no  first-hand  knowledge  of  the  merits 
of  this  dispute,  but  under  the  procedure  recommended 
by  the  Paris  commission  the  Germans  would  have  had 
no  excuse  for  their  protest,  and  the  Belgian  title  would 
have  escaped  any  possible  question  in  the  future. 

In  general,  this  change  of  frontier  was  of  minor  im- 
portance for  Belgium,  whose  interests  at  the  conference 
were  concerned  rather  with  reparation  and  with  her  re- 
lations to  Holland. 

Luxemburg 

In  the  case  of  the  grand  duchy  of  Luxemburg  the  only 
problem  concerned  the  customs  frontier,  not  the  political 
boundary.     It  is  a  quaint  bit  of  Old  World  fife,  this  di- 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    45 

minutive  state  of  a  thousand  square  miles  and  260,000 
inhabitants,  with  its  ancient  castles  and  its  modern 
blast-furnaces,  with  its  independent  grand  duchess  and 
its  people  whose  national  song  expresses  their  desire  to 
"remain  what  they  are."  Situated  between  Germany 
and  France,  in  a  position  of  great  strategic  importance, 
so  small  a  state  must  inevitably  gravitate  in  one  direc- 
tion or  the  other,  and  until  the  armistice  it  gravitated 
toward  Germany.  Its  dynasty  was  German,  its  rail- 
roads were  German,  it  was  a  member  of  the  German 
customs  union.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Germany 
violated  its  neutrality,  which  she  had  promised  by  treaty 
to  respect,  and  seized  its  railways  for  use  against  France 
and  Belgium,  though  she  was  bound  by  treaty  not  to  use 
them  for  military  purposes.  Indeed,  Luxemburg  was 
the  vital  connection  between  the  two  wings  of  the  Ger- 
man army  in  their  invasion  of  France.  German  princes 
and  generals  were  well  received  by  the  reigning  duchess, 
and  throughout  the  war  Luxemburg  was  swallowed  up 
in  Germany  and  cut  off  from  the  outside  world,  while 
popular  leaders,  like  Priim,  languished  in  German  pris- 
ons. No  wonder  the  Germans  were  not  allowed  to  keep 
the  railroads  which  they  had  turned  from  their  proper 
purposes,  no  wonder  the  Luxemburgers  denounced  the 
customs  union  with  their  defeated  neighbors.  This  the 
peace  treaty  confirmed,  and  this  was  all  that  it  required. 
Some  months  thereafter,  after  a  sharp  campaign  between 
Belgian  and  French  interests,  the  people,  by  this  time 
under  a  new  grand  duchess,  voted  for  a  customs  union 
with  France. 

Alsace-Lorraine 

Alsace-Lorraine  took  little  of  the  time  of  the  peace 
conference.    This  would  have  seemed  strange  at  any  time 


46     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

during  the  war  or  the  generation  which  preceded  it,  for 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  an  open  wound  which,  in  President 
Wilson's  phrase,  "had  unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world 
for  nearly  fifty  years."  It  was  not  a  direct  cause  of  the 
war,  but  it  became  a  burning  issue  as  soon  as  the  war 
broke  forth,  and  it  remained  one  of  the  chief  obstacles  to 
any  peace  of  compromise.  But  the  problem  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  settled  by  the  Allied  victory  and  evacua- 
tion required  by  the  armistice,  and  these  military  acts 
were  sealed  by  the  enthusiastic  reception  of  the  French 
troops  immediately  thereafter.  There  was  no  way  of 
reopening  the  question  at  the  conference,  for  the  Ger- 
mans had  accepted  President  Wilson's  eighth  point  re- 
quiring that  the  wrong  done  to  France  should  be  righted, 
and  by  their  enforced  evacuation  they  were  no  longer  in 
a  position  to  delay  or  to  interfere. 

Nevertheless  at  Versailles  Germany  put  up  a  last  fight 
for  the  retention  of  these  territories,  tied  up  as  they  were 
with  Germany's  imperial  tradition,  with  her  strategic 
position,  and  with  her  supply  of  iron  ore.  She  demanded 
that  there  should  be  a  popular  vote.  For  this  there  was 
no  legal  ground,  the  language  of  President  Wilson  speak- 
ing only  of  the  wrong  done  to  France,  and  the  armistice 
having  assimilated  Alsace-Lorraine  to  other  occupied  ter- 
ritories. Nor  could  Germany  point  to  her  past  record  as 
justification,  for  she  had  gone  directly  in  the  face  of 
popular  opinion  in  1871,  expressed  most  formally  in  the 
protests  of  the  representatives  of  these  three  depart- 
ments in  the  French  Chamber  at  Bordeaux,  and  had  from 
that  time  on  refused  any  popular  consultation  on  the 
question.  But  consistency  was  not  an  obstacle  in  the 
Germany  of  191 9,  and  a  referendum  was  her  laist  hope. 

To  this  the  French  objected  on  principle,  declining  to 


THE  NEW   BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    47 

recognize  the  Tightness  of  the  act  of  1871  by  any  form  of 
voting  to  undo  it.  There  were  also  grave  practical  ob- 
jections of  justice  because  of  the  emigration  of  perhaps  a 
half  milhon  Alsatians  and  the  incoming  of  nearly  as 
many  Germans  from  beyond  the  Rhine,  quite  apart  from 
the  effects  of  war  in  a  region  whose  man-power  had  been 
ruthlessly  sacrificed  for  German  imperialism.  No  im- 
mediate plebiscite  could  be  just,  and  any  postponement 
in  this  particular  region  might  work  even  greater  wrong. 
Perhaps  the  French  would  have  been  wise  to  call  a  large 
representative  assembly  by  which  some  formal  expression 
of  opinion  might  have  been  made  and  later  objections 
thus  forestalled. 

Since  the  signing  of  the  treaty  the  secret  propaganda 
of  the  German  Heimatdienst  has  been  active  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  keeping  alive  German  feeling  where  it  still  ex- 
ists and  in  particular  fomenting  a  so-called  Neutralist 
movement  for  the  separation  of  this  region  as  a  neutral- 
ized state  under  the  protection  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Propaganda  of  this  sort  has  begun  to  appear  in  American 
newspapers,  and  should  be  received  with  the  caution  with 
which  we  learned  to  treat  German  propaganda  during  the 
war.  It  is  amusing  to  hear  from  such  sources  of  a  "na- 
tional" movement  in  Alsace-Lorraine;  for  this  region, 
chiefly  German  in  speech,  has  no  traditions  of  separate 
life  or  national  independence,  and  w^as  not  even  allowed 
by  the  Germans  to  become  a  federal  state  of  their  empire. 
Whatever  the  strength  of  any  movement  for  autonomy, 
it  is  in  no  proper  sense  "national." 

With  the  major  question  of  the  return  of  the  lost  prov- 
inces to  France  settled  in  advance,  the  Paris  conference 
had  only  to  deal  with  matters  of  detail,  such  as  naturally 
arise  in  a  retrocession  from  one  country  to  another.     A 


48     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

draft  of  such  clauses  was  submitted  by  the  French  and 
referred  by  the  council  of  four  to  the  special  committee  of 
three,  Messrs.  Tardieu,  Headlam-Morley,  and  Haskins, 
which  had  already  been  at  work  on  the  Saar  valley. 
The  clauses  were  examined  point  by  point  by  economic 
and  legal  experts,  and  various  modifications  were  in- 
troduced in  detail  with  reference  to  other  portions  of 
the  treaty.  The  clauses  respecting  citizenship  are  par- 
ticularly comphcated,  and  much  depends  upon  the  spirit 
of  liberality  with  which  these  and  the  economic  clauses 
are  interpreted  by  the  French  administration.  One 
of  the  matters  which  occasioned  most  debate  was  the 
relation  between  the  port  of  Strasburg  and  that  of  Kehl, 
across  the  Rhine  in  Baden,  for  the  Germans  were  under- 
stood to  have  retarded  the  natural  development  of 
Strasburg  to  the  advantage  of  Kehl,  and  several  years 
would  be  required  to  bring  the  facihties  on  the  Alsatian 
side  forward  to  a  corresponding  point.  It  was  finally  de- 
cided to  place  the  two  ports  together  for  seven  years, 
to  be  extended,  if  necessary,  for  three  years  longer,  with  a 
free  zone  in  each  port,  under  the  international  authority 
of  the  Central  Rhine  Commission,  whose  control  over  the 
Rhine  was  given  a  more  international  character  by  the 
treaty.  In  the  discussion  over  the  port  of  Kehl  one  of 
the  American  advisers  remarked  to  a  French  minister: 
"The  simplest  solution  would  be  for  you  to  dig  a  new 
channel  for  the  Rhine  east  of  Kehl,  which  would  then  be 
permanently  united  with  the  Left  Bank !"  The  minister 
took  the  suggestion  seriously  and  needed  to  be  privately 
informed  of  the  danger  of  misunderstanding  the  American 
form  of  humor. 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    49 

The  Left  Bank 

So  far  the  boundary  changes  considered  have  been  rela- 
tively simple,  the  moving  of  a  line  backward  or  forward 
on  the  map,  followed  by  all  the  machinery  of  govern- 
mental administration.  When  we  come  to  the  questions 
of  the  Left  Bank  and  the  Saar  we  meet  with  various  pro- 
posals for  separating  the  economic  and  military  from  the 
political  frontier  and  for  introducing  elements  of  inter- 
national control  over  regions  in  some  measure  interna- 
tionalized. 

By  the  Left  Bank  of  the  Rhine  is  commonly  meant  the 
territory  of  the  German  Empire  lying  west  of  the  river 
between  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  Dutch  frontier,  in  all 
about  ten  thousand  square  miles  with  five  and  a  half 
million  inhabitants — about  the  same  number  as  the 
State  of  Illinois.  The  greater  part  of  this  territory  belongs 
to  Prussia,  which  acquired  it  from  the  French  in  1814, 
while  the  French  themselves  had  first  taken  it,  with  some 
minor  exceptions,  from  its  many  previous  lords  only 
twenty  years  earlier.  It  is  a  great  industrial  region,  not 
unlike  Pennsylvania.  It  was  also  a  military  region,  rich 
in  munition  factories  and  fortresses  and  strategic  rail- 
roads planned  to  support  German  military  enterprises  to 
the  westward.  And  it  is  a  thoroughly  German  region  in 
speech  and  government  and  economic  life,  closely  bound 
to  the  lands  beyond  the  Rhine. 

France  had  shown  interest  in  the  Left  Bank  in  the 
early  days  of  the  war,  and  it  formed  the  subject  of  a 
secret  agreement  with  the  Czar's  government  in  February, 
191 7.  Downright  and  immediate  annexation  was  not 
commonly  proposed,  but  many  desired  ultimate  annexa- 
tion, prepared  by  military  and  economic  control.     Thus 


GERMANY- 


SHOWING  THE  NEW   BOUNDARIES  AND   THE  DISPOSITIONS 


OF  TERRITORY  MADE  BY  THE   PEACE   CONFERENCE 


52     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  agreement  with  Russia  required  the  complete  separa- 
tion of  the  Left  Bank  from  Germany  as  an  autonomous 
and  neutral  state,  to  be  occupied  by  French  troops  until 
all  the  terms  of  the  final  treaty  of  peace  had  been  ful- 
filled. It  was  expected  that  this  occupation  would  be 
long,  and  the  buffer  state  might  remain  in  the  French 
customs  union  still  longer,  with  perhaps  a  favorable 
plebiscite  for  permanent  union  with  France.  In  other 
words,  the  political  frontier  of  France  remaining  for  the 
present  very  much  as  before,  its  economic  and  military 
frontiers  were  to  be  advanced  to  the  Rhine.  Part  of  this 
policy  was  traditional  interest  in  the  region  of  the  Rhine, 
part  of  it  was  plain  imperialism,  economic  or  political, 
but  much  was  legitimate  self-defense  on  the  part  of 
France  against  German  invasion.  Such  a  programme  had 
much  support  in  France  during  the  conference,  and  it 
gained  prestige  from  its  strong  advocacy  by  Marshal 
Foch,  commander-in-chief  of  the  victorious  Allies.  His 
plan,  as  sketched  just  after  the  armistice,  comprised  the 
moving  of  the  German  frontier  back  to  the  Rhine,  an 
independent  regime  for  the  Left  Bank,  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Rhine  bridges  until  the  full  execution  of  the 
terms  of  peace.  Such  a  plan  was  approved,  before  the 
opening  of  the  peace  conference,  by  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  French  Chamber. 

The  idea  of  a  separate  buffer  state  had  never  been  ac- 
cepted by  England;  indeed,  English  approval  had  been 
publicly  withheld  by  Mr.  Balfour  in  191 7,  and  Mr. 
Lloyd-George  had  frequently  repeated:  "We  must  not 
make  another  Alsace-Lorraine.'*  The  creation  of  such  a 
state  was  consistently  opposed  by  the  United  States  as 
contrary  to  the  best  interests  of  the  population  and  the 
conditions  of  the  armistice  and  as  a  source  of  future 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    53 

wars.  To  the  French,  on  the  other  hand,  some  special 
military  guarantee  on  the  Left  Bank  seemed  an  essen- 
tial part  of  the  peace  which  had  been  won  at  such  terri- 
ble cost.  Twice  within  half  a  century  Germany  had  in- 
vaded France,  and  it  was  a  universal  French  demand 
that  this  should  be  prevented  for  the  future.  Granting 
that  Germany  was  the  larger  and  more  populous  coun- 
try, the  only  defense  seemed  to  push  back  her  favorite 
field  of  concentration  and  to  meet  her  by  an  advanced 
line  before  she  could  reach  the  French  and  Belgian 
border.  More  than  once  it  was  pointed  out  that  England 
was  protected  by  the  sea,  all  the  more  since  the  surrender 
of  the  German  fleet,  and  America  by  the  Atlantic  Ocean, 
but  that  France  was  exposed  to  the  full  first  shock  of 
German  attack.  The  defense  of  the  Rhine,  it  was  argued, 
concerned  not  merely  France  but  western  civihzation. 
If  the  League  of  Nations  was  mentioned,  the  futility  of 
the  Hague  tribunal  was  called  to  mind,  as  well  as  the 
vain  attempts  at  mediation  in  1 914.  At  best,  its  action 
would  be  slow,  and  France  might  be  overwhelmed  in  the 
interval.  Inter-AIIied  control  of  the  Rhine  bridges  might 
be  a  sufficient  precaution,  as  was  urged  in  a  brilliant 
French  memoir  of  February  25,  19 19,  but  that  inevitably 
carried  with  it  a  certain  degree  of  separation  of  the  Left 
Bank  from  Germany. 

This  debate,  one  of  the  most  fundamental  of  the  peace 
conference,  lasted  off  and  on  for  six  months.  The  ne- 
gotiations have  been  traced  from  a  French  point  of  view 
by  M.  Tardieu,^  one  of  the  participants  who  was  responsi- 
ble for  several  able  memoirs  in  which  the  French  argu- 
ment was  set  forth.  Nothing  has  been  printed  by  the 
British  or  American  negotiators,  and  as  the  matter  was 

*  L' Illustration,  February  14,  1920. 


54     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

handled  by  a  small  group  of  plenipotentiaries,  their  part 
of  the  story  must  be  awaited.  Both  sides  were  firm,  and 
the  result  was  a  compromise.  France  gave  up  the  sepa- 
rate state  of  the  Left  Bank  but  secured  occupation  by  an 
inter-AIIied  force  for  fifteen  years  as  a  guarantee  of  exe- 
cution of  the  treaty.  In  return  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  offered  to  come  to  the  aid  of  France  in 
case  of  an  unprovoked  attack  by  Germany,  an  agree- 
ment, however,  which  was  valid  only  if  ratified  by  both 
countries,  and  the  United  States  Senate  has  not  yet 
ratified  it.  On  one  set  of  provisions  there  was  no  essen- 
tial difi'erence  of  opinion,  the  demihtarization  of  the  Left 
Bank.  Germany  agrees  to  maintain  no  fortifications 
west  of  the  Rhine  or  in  a  zone  of  fifty  kilometres  to  the 
east  thereof,  and  to  assemble  no  armed  forces  in  this 
whole  region;  any  violation  of  these  provisions  shall  be 
regarded  as  a  hostile  act  against  the  signatory  powers  and 
"as  calculated  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the  v/orld."  Ac- 
cordingly Germany's  military  frontier  now  lies  fifty 
kilometres  east  of  the  Rhine;  her  political  and  economic 
frontiers  remain  unchanged,  save  for  the  control  of  Rhine 
navigation  by  an  international  commission,  and  subject 
temporarily  to  the  occupation  of  the  Left  Bank  and  the 
Rhine  bridge-heads  as  a  guaranteeof  executing  the  treaty 
she  has  signed.  Another  temporary  change  in  the  Saar 
valley  will  be  considered  later. 

The  result  failed  to  satisfy  extremists  of  either  sort. 
Marshal  Foch  stood  out  for  the  separation  of  the  Left 
Bank  and  opposed  the  final  settlement  as  inadequate  in  a 
plenary  session  of  the  conference.  May  6,  which  was  not 
reported  in  the  press.  This  view  of  the  necessity  of  geo- 
graphical and  mihtary,  as  opposed  to  poHtical  and  pre- 
ventive, guarantees  has  naturally  had  many  advocates 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    S5 

in  France  with  the  failure  of  the  United  States  to  accept 
the  special  treaty.  Opponents  of  M.  Clemenceau  have 
insisted  that  this  tenacious  negotiator  yielded  too  much 
to  England  and  the  United  States.  On  the  other  hand, 
radical  critics  of  the  peace  held  up  their  hands  at  what 
they  called  a  military  alliance  of  these  countries  with 
France,  overlooking  the  very  significant  point  that  as- 
sistance was  to  be  given  only  in  case  of  an  unprovoked 
attack.  If  France  provokes  the  attack  she  goes  alone. 
If  Germany  without  provocation  attacks  France,  she  re- 
peats the  aggression  of  19 14  and  brings  on  a  general  war. 
The  mere  existence  of  such  an  obligation  would  have 
prevented  war  in  19 14;  if  ratified,  its  existence  ought  to 
prevent  such  a  war  again.  By  this  time  the  world  ought 
to  have  learned  that  the  Franco-German  frontier  is  not 
merely  a  local  question  but  an  international  matter,  for 
peace  between  France  and  Germany  is  a  condition  of 
world  peace.  It  is  well  known  that  there  is  an  important 
group  in  Germany  whose  declared  object  is  a  new  war  of 
revenge  against  France.  It  is  in  the  world's  interest 
that  this  movement  should  fail,  and  the  best  method  to 
defeat  it  is,  first,  the  avoidance  of  provocation  on  the 
part  of  France,  and,  second,  a  united  front  against  un- 
provoked aggression.  The  fifteen  years  of  inter-AIIied 
watch  on  the  Rhine  may  be  gradually  reduced  if  Ger- 
many executes  the  treaty  faithfully.  The  Anglo-American 
guarantee  will  prove  superfluous  if  Germany  refrains 
from  unprovoked  aggression.  And  the  permanent  de- 
militarization of  the  Left  Bank  remains  as  a  warning  to 
militarists  of  all  countries  that  frontiers  bristling  with 
forts  and  armies  are  not  the  safest  guarantees  of  inter- 
national peace. 


56     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

The  Saar  Valley 

One  corner  of  the  territory  of  the  Left  Bank  formed  a 
problem  by  itself,  namely,  the  Saar  valley  in  the  south- 
western part  of  Rhenish  Prussia  and  the  Palatinate 
along  the  northern  edge  of  Lorraine.  A  pleasant  region 
of  farm  and  forest  under  the  old  regime,  its  importance 
then  was  chiefly  mihtary,  through  the  use  of  its  bridge- 
heads for  the  defense  of  Lorraine  and  for  an  advance 
eastward.  In  more  recent  times  it  has  become  highly 
industrialized,  thanks  to  its  important  deposits  of  coal. 
Its  furnaces  and  iron  works  support  a  dense  population 
in  its  towns;  its  coal-mines  produced  before  the  war 
17,000,000  tons  a  year,  8  per  cent  of  the  enormous  coal 
output  of  the  German  Empire.  Its  western  portion, 
about  Saarlouis,  became  French  with  the  foundation  of 
this  fortress  by  Louis  XIV;  its  eastern  part,  about  Saar- 
briicken,  where  the  coal  chiefly  lay,  had  been  in  French 
hands  only  from  1793  to  181 5.  It  had  all  been  considered 
sufficiently  French  to  be  left  to  France  in  the  preliminary 
peace  of  1814,  but  had  been  taken  away  in  the  following 
year  and  handed  over  to  Prussia,  which  coveted  its 
bridge-heads  and  its  coal-mines.  The  frontier  of  1814 
continued  to  have  its  advocates  m  France  until  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  set  back  the  French  frontier  still 
farther;  and  the  recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  the  Great 
War  once  more  revived  French  claims  on  the  Saar. 

These  claims  differed  in  territorial  extent  according 
to  the  point  of  view.  The  historic  frontier  of  18 14  would 
have  returned  to  France  250  square  miles,  with  355,000 
inhabitants,  including  the  area  producing  about  two- 
thirds  of  the  coal  mined  north  of  the  new  boundary  of 
Lorraine.     An  economic  frontier  which  included  all  of 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY     c^-j 

the  coal  deposits  of  the  Saar  and  the  district  directly  de- 
pendent upon  them  would  have  included  an  area  more 
than  twice  as  large,  and  the  frontier  of  1814  would  have 
disrupted  this  economic  unit.  A  strategic  frontier,  drawn 
so  as  to  protect  the  mining  territory  and  the  approaches 
to  Lorraine,  would  have  extended  still  farther  to  the 
north  and  east.  The  strength  of  these  several  claims 
was  also  different.  The  frontier  of  1814  had  been  vio- 
lated by  Prussian  annexation  in  the  following  year,  but 
it  was  not  an  ancient  boundary,  had  never,  in  fact,  been 
laid  out  on  the  spot,  and  had  been  in  abeyance  for  more 
than  a  hundred  years.  The  inhabitants  nearly  all  spoke 
German,  and  while  it  was  alleged  that  many  thousands 
of  them  had  French  sympathies,  this  statement  was,  in 
the  nature  of  the  case,  incapable  of  verification  at  the 
time.  The  military  frontier  had  much  to  commend  it  on 
purely  strategic  grounds,  but  no  merit  on  the  ground  of 
history  or  the  desires  of  the  local  populations  whom  it 
would  annex,  while  its  importance  was  diminished  by  the 
demilitarization  of  the  Left  Bank.  The  economic  fron- 
tier, on  the  other  hand,  involved  a  new  element,  that  of 
reparation,  for  the  coal-mines  of  northern  France  had  been 
wantonly  and  systematically  destroyed  by  the  German 
authorities  as  a  means  of  wrecking  French  industry  and 
delaying  its  revival;  and  German  coal-mines  were  the 
most  appropriate  equivalent,  especially  those  of  the  Saar, 
which  lay  within  a  dozen  miles  of  the  new  French  fron- 
tier and  were  almost  wholly  the  property  of  the  Prussian 
and  Bavarian  states.  The  economic  claims  were  the  only 
ones  for  which  a  basis  could  be  found  in  the  agreed  basis 
of  the  peace  as  stated  in  President  Wilson's  Fourteen 
Points  and  other  utterances.  Here  the  justification  was 
clear  and  unmistakable,  both  in  the  eighth  point,  which 


58      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

provided  for  restoration  of  the  devastated  territory  of 
France,  and  in  the  pre-armistice  agreement  for  full  com- 
pensation of  damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  and 
their  property.  In  order,  however,  to  square  with  the 
basis  of  the  peace,  such  material  compensation  must  not 
involve  the  political  annexation  of  unwilling  populations. 
The  problem  of  separating  the  mines  from  the  people  who 
lived  over  them  was  thus  created,  and  it  was  not  a  sim- 
ple one. 

Annexation  in  the  Saar  valley  had  not  appeared  in 
any  of  the  pubhshed  statements  of  the  French  war  aims, 
but  both  the  mining  area  and  the  miHtary  frontier  had 
been  included  in  the  secret  agreement  with  Russia  in 
19 1 7,  and  the  Frei>ch  desires,  as  formulated  in  a  note  of 
M.  Briand,  January  12,  had  been  made  known  to  the 
British  Government  in  the  course  of  the  same  year. 
The  frontier  of  1814  was  urged  by  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Chamber  shortly  after  the  armis- 
tice, and  it  was  understood  that  Marshal  Foch  desired 
a  military  line  well  beyond  it.  The  French  plenipoten- 
tiaries took  their  time  about  formulating  their  demands 
in  this  district,  and  it  was  not  till  March  27,  1919,  that 
their  plan  was  laid  before  the  council  of  four.  This  in- 
cluded pohtical  annexation  up  to  the  frontier  of  18 14, 
with  full  ownership  of  the  mines,  but  only  the  mines,  in 
the  adjoining  districts  beyond.  President  Wilson  ac- 
cepted the  validity  of  French  claims  to  coal  from  the 
Saar,  and  was  early  convinced  that  the  ownership  of  the 
mines  was  the  surest  method  of  securing  Just  compensa- 
tion, but  he  did  not  admit  the  Justice  of  political  an- 
nexation. The  British,  while  favoring  the  transfer  of  the 
mines,  did  not  favor  the  frontier  of  18 14,  which  might 
have  created  a  new  Alsace-Lorraine,  with  protesting  dep- 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY  59 

uties  in  the  French  Chamber;  instead  of  direct  annexa- 
tion they  preferred  a  larger  autonomous  state  under 
French  protection.  The  difference  of  opinion  was  acute 
and  constituted  one  of  the  major  points  of  disagreement 
in  the  difficult  days  of  early  April. 

Like  the  Left  Bank  the  Saar  was  one  of  those  questions 
affecting  closely  the  principal  Allied  powers  which  were 
not  referred  to  commissions  but  were  reserved  for  the 
special  consideration  of  the  council  of  four.  Neverthe- 
less, the  members  of  this  council  were,  on  this  matter,  in 
close  touch  with  their  advisers,  and  established  a  special 
committee  on  April  2  which  worked  throughout  the 
month.  Italy  not  being  particularly  interested,  the  com- 
mittee consisted  of  representatives  of  three  countries 
only,  Messrs.  Tardieu,  Headlam-Morley,  and  Haskins, 
M.  Tardieu  presiding  with  the  resourcefulness  and  skill 
which  he  brought  to  all  matters  of  the  conference;  and 
the  final  draft  of  the  treaty  articles  was  the  unanimous 
work  of  the  committee.  It  was  aided  by  speciahsts,  such 
as  geographers,  mining  experts,  and  legal  advisers.  On 
the  American  side  the  work  of  Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller 
was  all-important  at  critical  points  in  the  negotiations,  as 
regards  not  only  the  drafting  of  specific  clauses  but  also 
in  all  larger  questions  connected  with  the  new  form  of 
government.  The  determination  of  certain  questions  of 
boundary  was  facilitated  by  a  special  visit  to  the  dis- 
trict. 

The  starting-point  of  the  committee's  work  was  a 
statement  formulated  on  March  29  by  Messrs.  Headlam- 
Morley  and  Haskins,  with  the  assistance  of  Major 
Douglas  W.  Johnson,  and  accepted  by  the  council  of 
four.  By  this  it  was  agreed  in  principle  that  full  owner- 
ship of  the  coal-mines  of  the  Saar  basin  should  pass  to 


6o     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

France  to  be  credited  on  her  claims  against  Germany  for 
reparation,  and  that  the  fullest  economic  facilities  should 
be  accorded  for  their  exploitation,  while  the  political  and 
administrative  arrangements  necessary  to  secure  these 
results  should  be  the  subject  of  further  inquiry.  In  the 
negotiations  which  followed,  the  French  naturally  sought 
to  secure  as  much  as  possible  with  the  mines,  while  the 
Americans  sought  to  safeguard  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  local  population.  The  British  in  general  favored 
intermediate  solutions  and  worked  steadily  for  a  final 
compromise.  President  Wilson  remained  firm  against 
any  form  of  annexation  or  protectorate,  yet  it  soon  ap- 
peared that  under  Prussian  political  control  the  owner- 
ship of  the  mines  might  easily  be  rendered  valueless  for 
France.  A  French  mandate  which  was  suggested  under 
the  League  of  Nations  looked  uncomfortably  like  an- 
nexation, besides  stretching  the  mandatory  principle  be- 
yond its  proper  purpose.  A  commission  of  arbitration  to 
settle  differences  was  shown  to  be  inadequate  to  prevent 
trouble  so  long  as  the  region  was  governed  from  Berlin, 
but  it  led  to  the  final  solution,  elaborated  from  the  Amer- 
ican side,  namely,  a  governing  commission  under  the 
League  of  Nations  acting  as  trustee  for  fifteen  years.  In 
the  working  out  of  this  idea  both  President  Wilson  and 
Mr.  Lloyd-George  had  specific  suggestions  to  make,  and 
took  much  interest  in  the  clauses  of  the  new  form  of  gov- 
ernment when  they  were  examined  in  detail,  with  ex- 
planations from  members  of  the  committee  at  meetings 
in  the  president's  study.  It  is  said  that  at  the  close  of 
one  of  these  meetings  when  the  general  arrangements  for 
the  new  government  had  been  approved,  the  prime 
minister  turned  to  the  president  and  said:  "Mr.  President, 
I  think  we  have  got  a  very  good  plan  here."    **WeII,"  the 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    6i 

answer  is  said  to  have  been,  "why  don't  you  apply  it  to 
Ireland?" 

The  final  result  was  a  compromise  which  sought  to 
reconcile  the  French  right  to  the  mines  and  the  inhabi- 
tants' right  to  local  self-government.  France  failed  to 
secure  the  frontier  of  1814  or  any  lesser  form  of  annexa- 
tion or  protectorate;  in  gaining  the  holding  of  a  plebi- 
scite at  the  end  of  fifteen  years  to  test  the  strength  of 
French  sympathies  in  the  basin,  she  gave  up  the  subse- 
quent ownership  of  the  mines  in  any  part  of  the  territory 
which  should  then  become  permanently  German.  Dur- 
ing these  fifteen  years  the  Saar  is  included  within  her 
econornic  frontier,  where  it  naturally  falls  because  of  its 
close  relations  to  the  iron-fields  of  Lorraine.  The  United 
States  stood  throughout  for  a  principle  which  also  had 
much  support  in  France,  namely,  the  mines  without  the 
people.  While  accepting  the  largest  possible  facilities 
for  repairing  the  wrongs  which  France  had  suffered  from 
Germany,  America  successfully  maintained  the  rights  of 
the  local  population,  finally  placed  under  the  protection 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  which  thus  became  a  guarantor 
of  peace  and  justice  on  this  portion  of  the  Franco-German 
frontier.  As  the  latest  and  most  authoritative  history  of 
the  conference,  the  British  account,  edited  by  Mr.  Tem- 
perley,  remarks:  "It  is  very  difficult  to  see  how  the  con- 
flicting interests  involved  could  have  been  reconciled 
without  some  serious  violation  of  justice,  if  the  machin- 
ery of  the  League  had  not  been  available  for  a  solution."^ 

The  provisions  respecting  the  Saar  were  bitterly  as- 
sailed in  the  German  memoranda  on  the  first  draft  of  the 
treaty,  but,  as  in  other  instances,  the  Germans  were 
stronger  in  general  denunciation  than  in  effective  criti- 

J  "A History  of  the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris"  (London,  1920),  vol.  II,  p.  183. 


62     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARlS 

cism.  Government  of  the  Saar  population  by  the  League 
of  Nations  was  pronounced  "odious,"  but  the  conve- 
nience and  immediate  certainty  of  this  form  of  reparation 
could  not  be  denied,  and  no  secure  or  acceptable  guar- 
antee was  offered  in  its  stead.  The  Allies  replied  that 
they  had  chosen  a  form  of  reparation  "which,  by  its  ex- 
ceptional nature  will  be,  for  a  limited  period,  a  definite 
and  visible  symbol,"  while  at  the  same  time  "they  in- 
tended, by  assuring  themselves  of  the  immediate  posses- 
sion of  a  security  for  reparation,  to  escape  the  risks  to 
which  the  German  memoir  itself  has  drawn  attention," 
in  emphasizing  Germany's  inability  to  pay.  At  one  point 
the  Germans  made  a  helpful  suggestion,  namely,  with  re- 
gard to  the  arrangements  for  repurchase  of  the  mines  in 
territory  which  might  vote  in  the  plebiscite  for  reunion 
with  Germany,  and  this  clause,  originally  designed  to 
enforce  prompt  action  on  Germany's  part,  was  modified 
so  as  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the  general  reparation 
clauses.  The  Germans  made  no  constructive  criticism  of 
the  new  form  of  government,  and  it  was  inferred  from 
this  that  the  clauses  had  been  drawn  with  sufficient  care 
to  safeguard  the  essential  interests  of  the  population. 

Like  all  settlements  of  a  complex  situation,  the  Saar 
settlement  has  been  criticised  as  too  comphcated;  and, 
like  all  compromises,  it  has  been  attacked  from  both  sides. 
Those  who  wanted  the  frontier  of  1 814  consider  it  made- 
quate;  those  who  are  soft-hearted  toward  Germany  pro- 
nounce it  too  severe.  And  because  it  is  complicated  and 
requires  for  its  understanding  that  unusual  accomphsh- 
ment,  the  reading  of  a  considerable  section  of  the  treaty, 
many  have  condemned  it  without  taking  the  trouble  to 
examine  it.  To  my  thinking,  the  Saar  settlement  is 
fundamentally  fair  in  principle,  and  its  practical  justice 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    63 

becomes  clearer  as  we  see  the  workings  of  reparation 
elsewhere.  Germany,  with  her  large  pre-war  surplus  of 
coal,  pays  for  the  mines  she  has  destroyed  by  handing 
over  other  mines,  which  were,  with  small  exception,  the 
government  property  of  Prussia  and  Bavaria;  and  any 
excess  value  is  credited  to  her  reparation  account  toward 
a  total  sum  which  she  declares  herself  unable  to  pay  in 
full.  Those  who  wanted  France  to  accept  an  engage- 
ment to  deliver  a  fixed  amount  of  coal  have  been  refuted 
by  the  events  since  the  conference,  namely,  the  dimin- 
ished coal  production  in  Germany  and  the  small  quan- 
tities actually  furnished  to  France  under  other  clauses  to 
which  Germany  affixed  her  signature.  As  other  prospects 
of  reparation  melt  away,  France  holds  one  solid  asset  and 
receives  therefrom  something  of  the  coal  so  sadly  needed 
for  the  revival  of  her  shattered  industries.  As  I  have 
said  elsewhere,  a  mine  in  hand  is  worth  many  contracts 
to  deliver.  Those  who  pity  Germany  on  account  of  the 
Fourteen  Points  would  do  well  to  remember  that  the 
Fourteen  Points  promised  restoration  to  France,  and  that 
this  is  a  fundamental  condition  of  any  right  and  Just  set- 
tlement. The  Fourteen  Points  cut  in  both  directions, 
and  should  be  applied  when  they  run  against  Germany 
as  well  as  when  they  are  in  her  favor.  If  in  practice  it 
may  be  necessary  to  forego  full  restoration  because  of 
Germany's  inability  to  pay  what  she  owes  under  the 
treaty,  it  is  worth  remembering  that  the  Saar  mines  are 
something  which  she  was  able  to  pay,  out  of  the  public 
property  of  Prussia  and  Bavaria,  and  in  the  concrete 
form  where  payment  was  definitely  due  and  imperatively 
needed.  And  the  final  decision  respecting  the  govern- 
ment of  each  part  of  the  territory  is  based  upon  the  vote 
of  its  inhabitants  as  they  may  express  their  preference 


64     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

for  France,  Germany,  or  permanent  internationalization, 
a  clear  application  of  the  principle  of  self-determination. 

In  the  meantime  the  internationalized  territory  of  the 
Saar  basin  comprises  about  700  square  miles,  with 
650,000  inhabitants.  The  people  retain  "their  religious 
liberties,  their  schools,  and  their  language."  During  the 
fifteen  years  while  German  sovereignty  is  suspended 
they  send  no  representatives  to  the  Reichstag  and  the 
Landtag,  but  they  have  local  assemblies  of  their  own. 
They  participate  in  the  government  to  a  much  greater 
degree  than  do  citizens  of  our  District  of  Columbia. 
The  administration  is  not  unlike  the  commissions  which 
have  been  established  in  many  American  cities,  only 
this  commission  is  appointed  by  the  League  of  Nations 
and  is  ultimately  responsible  to  it.  At  present  its  five 
members  inchide  a  Frenchman  as  chairman,  a  native 
of  the  Saar  basin  itself,  a  Dane,  a  Belgian,  and  a 
Canadian,  the  last  named,  Mr.  Waugh,  having  been 
mayor  of  Winnipeg  and  representing  in  a  peculiar  de- 
gree the  general  and  transatlantic  interest  in  the 
maintenance  of  peace  between  France  and  Germany. 
It  is  a  long  way  from  Winnipeg  to  Saarbriicken,  but  not 
too  long  for  one  who  cares  for  peace  and  justice. 

What  will  happen  in  the  popular  referendum  of  1935 
will  depend  on  the  conditions  of  the  moment  as  well  as 
upon  the  experience  of  the  intervening  years.  The  in- 
habitants of  the  Saar  basin  are  exempt  from  compulsory 
military  service  and  enjoy  valuable  economic  privileges 
which  are  sometimes  envied  by  their  French  and  German 
neighbors.  Last  spring  voters  of  certain  neighboring 
communes  and  cantons  in  Prussia  petitioned  the  League 
of  Nations  for  incorporation  in  the  new  district,  and  there 
is  evidence  that  opinion  in  the  district  is  favorable  to  its 


THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY    65 

new  government.  In  any  event  the  vote  fourteen  years 
hence  is  restricted  to  those  resident  in  the  territory  at  the 
time  of  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  so 
that  all  temptation  to  colonization  is  removed.  It  was 
conjectured  by  many  at  Paris  that  the  results  of  com- 
mission government  might  prove  so  satisfactory  that, 
under  the  alternatives  offeried  in  the  plebiscite,  the  major- 
ity would  vote  to  remain  under  the  League  rather  than  for 
union  with  either  France  or  Germany.  Whatever  jus- 
tification of  the  Saar  settlement  this  might  bring,  the 
American  participants  will  be  content  if  its  ends  are  ac- 
complished during  the  fifteen  years  of  League  rule  pro- 
vided in  the  treaty.  For  that  much  depends  on  the  ac- 
tual workings  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  settlement  of  Germany's  boundaries  was  by  no 
means  a  simple  matter,  and  at  times  it  strained  the  con- 
ference almost  to  the  breaking-point,  but  the  task  was 
accomplished  and  embodied  in  a  unanimous  agreement. 
Two  considerations  had  to  be  kept  constantly  in  mind: 
justice  to  the  local  populations,  in  spite  of  the  crimes  of 
the  imperial  government;  and  satisfaction  to  the  well- 
founded  demands  of  Germany's  injured  neighbors.  These 
two  were  not  ahvays  easy  to  reconcile,  and  the  different 
points  of  view  often  represented  very  different  personal 
and  national  backgrounds.  The  discussion  was  frank,  but 
it  was  friendly,  and  we  are  informed  by  participants  that 
even  at  its  most  tense  moments  in  the  council  of  four  it 
never  lacked  the  tone  of  mutual  respect  and  good-will.^ 

*  This  point  deserves  emphasis  because  the  nature  of  the  council's  sessions 
has  been  grossly  misrepresented  by  a  popular  writer,  Mr.  J.  M.  Keynes,  in  an 
effort  to  discredit  the  conference  and  its  work  ("The  Economic  Consequences  of 
the  Peace,"  pp.  30-32).  It  is  stated  by  the  official  interpreter,  Captain  Mantoux, 
that  Mr,  Keynes  never  attended  a  regular  session  of  the  council  of  four;  the  con- 


66     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

A  treaty  was  possible  only  through  the  fundamental 
agreement  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United 
States,  and  it  can  be  maintained  only  by  the  continued 
co-operation  among  these  powers,  which  is  an  essential 
basis  for  the  world's  peace. 

fused  and  furious  gathering  which  Keynes  describes  in  the  large  drawing-room  of 
the  president's  house  would  appear  to  have  been  so  rendered  by  the  presence  of 
a  large  number  of  economic  advisers  like  himself,  specially  called  in  for  the  oc- 
casion. The  real  work  of  the  council  was  done  quietly  and  efficiently  in  President 
Wilson's  down-stairs  study,  and  it  is  no  service  to  the  cause  of  truth  or  of  peace 
to  assert  the  contrary. 


IV 
POLAND 

BY    ROBERT    HOWARD    LORD 

Among  the  political  problems  that  came  before  the 
Peace  Conference,  the  problem  of  the  reconstruction  of 
Poland  was  one  of  the  first  to  be  taken  up  and  one  of  the 
last  to  be  finished.  Indeed,  it  is  not  altogether  finished 
even  yet.  It  was  also  one  of  the  gravest  and  thorniest 
questions  with  which  the  Conference  had  to  deal. 

It  was  difficult  because  the  eastern  frontiers  of  Poland 
could  not  be  settled  without  reference  to  the  Russian 
Soviet  Government,  whose  existence  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence could  not  pretend  to  ignore  but  never  felt  able  to 
recognize;  and  because  the  western  frontiers  of  Poland 
could  not  be  fixed  without  taking  a  good  deal  of  terri- 
tory from  Germany;  and  taking  territory  from  Germany 
is  very  serious  business.  How  serious  it  is  may  be  Judged 
from  the  fact  that  German  statesmen,  from  Bismarck  to 
Biilow,  have  been  unanimous  in  declaring  that  Prussia's 
very  existence  depended  upon  maintaining  her  estab- 
lished /rontier  in  the  east.  Prince  Lichnowsky  wrote, 
not  long  before  the  armistice,  that:  "The  Polish  question 
constitutes  for  Germany  the  gravest  question  of  the  war 
and  of  the  peace — far  graver  than  the  fate  of  Belgium. 
.  .  .  With  it  stands  or  falls  the  position  of  Prussia  as  a 
great  power,  and  therefore  that  of  the  Empire."  And  it 
may  as  well  be  remarked  at  once  that  no  other  part 
of  the  territorial  arrangements  made  at  Versailles  has 

67 


68    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

caused  so  much  anger  in  Germany  as  the  Polish  settle- 
ment, and  scarcely  any  other  part  has  been  more  fre- 
quently denounced  by  the  critics  of  the  peace  treaties 
outside  Germany. 

In  the  case  of  Poland,  as  of  most  other  territorial  prob- 
lems, the  Peace  Conference  proceeded  from  the  principle 
that  in  the  Europe  of  to-day  the  frontiers  that  are  most 
likely  to  prove  just,  satisfactory,  and  durable  are  those 
that  conform  to  ethnographic  divisions;  state  boundaries 
ought,  as  far  as  possible,  to  follow  the  lines  of  cleavage 
between  nationalities.  Whether  this  is  a  sound  principle 
I  cannot  undertake  to  discuss  here.  It  may  be  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  rights  of  nationality  has  been  enormously 
exaggerated;  self-determination  may  be  a  false  and  mon- 
strous idea;  it  may  be  that  economic  needs  or  his- 
toric rights  or  long-established  political  connections 
ought  to  be  the  chief  considerations  in  determining 
boundaries.  But  it  must  be  recalled  that  nationalistic 
ideas  have  been  the  most  important  factor  in  reshaping 
the  map  of  Europe  in  the  last  hundred  years;  that  most 
of  the  wars  of  the  past  century  have  been  due  to  the  de- 
sire of  so  many  peoples  to  gain  national  independence  or 
national  unity;  and  that  during  the  World  War  nearly 
every  one  seemed  to  applaud  such  utterances  of  President 
Wilson's  as  the  speech  before  Congress  in  which  he  said: 
**  Self-determination  is  not  a  mere  phrase.  It  is  an  im- 
perative principle  which  statesmen  will  henceforth  ignore 
at  their  peril.  .  .  .  Every  territorial  settlement  involved 
in  this  war  must  be  made  in  the  interest  and  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  populations  concerned,  and  not  as  a  part  of  any 
mere  adjustment  or  compromise  of  claims  amongst  rival 
states."  At  all  events,  it  seems  to  me  the  most  distinc- 
tive mark  of  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris  that,  more 


POLAND  69 

systematically,  more  completely,  and  upon  a  far  larger 
scale  than  at  any  previous  peace  congress,  it  attempted 
to  remake  the  map  of  Europe  upon  the  basis  of  the  rights 
of  nationality.  Its  territorial  work  must  be  judged  with 
reference  both  to  the  validity  of  that  principle  in  itself 
and  to  the  degree  of  honesty  and  intelligence  with  which 
it  applied  that  principle. 

Already  before  the  Conference  assembled,  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  had  in  general  terms  defined  their 
attitude  toward  the  Pohsh  question.     In  the  thirteenth 
point  of  the  famous  fourteen,  Mr.  Wilson  had  declared 
that   "an   independent   Pohsh  state  should  be  erected 
which  should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  indis- 
putably Polish  populations,  which  should  be  assured  a 
free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea.  ..."    The  prime  min- 7 
isters  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy,  in  their  dec-^^ 
laration  of  June  3,  19 18,  had  also  affirmed  that  "the 
creation  of  a  united  and  independent  Pohsh  state  with  v 
free  access  to  the  sea  constitutes  one  of  the  conditions  of 
a  solid  and  just  peace  and  of  the  rule  of  right  in  Europe." 

These  declarations,  however,  admitted  of  a  consider- 
able latitude  of  interpretation.  There  was  much  room  to 
discuss  what  constituted  an  "indisputably  Polish  popula- 
tion"; which  territories  really  contained  such  a  popula- 
tion; and  what  was  meant  precisely  by  "free  and  secure 
access  to  the  sea."  When  called  upon  to  apply  their 
formula  in  concrete  cases,  the  principal  Alhed  and  Associ- 
ated Powers  had  ample  opportunity  to,  and  in  fact  fre- 
quently did,  manifest  rather  divergent  tendencies  with 
regard  to  the  solution  of  Pohsh  problems. 

One  may  define  the  tendency  of  French  pohcy  as  being 
on  the  whole  extremely  favorable  to  Poland.  It  was  not 
invariably  so,  for  in  the  dispute  over  Teschen  France  was 


70     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

consistently  and  vigorously  on  the  side  of  the  Czechs 
against  Poland;  and  with  regard  to  the  eastern  frontier 
there  was  a  very  evident  desire  on  the  part  of  the  French 
representatives  to  keep  the  aspirations  of  the  new  ally, 
Poland,  within  limits  that  would  not  irrevocably  an- 
tagonize the  old  ally  that  might  some  day  be  won  back 
— Russia.  But,  with  these  restrictions,  France  was  for  a 
Poland  "grande  et  forte,  tres  forte,"  as  M.  Pichon  de- 
clared. And  for  obvious  reasons.  France  and  Poland,  the 
two  states  that  have  gained  most  territory  at  Germany's 
expense,  are,  quite  apart  from  their  old  and  well-estab- 
lished mutual  sympathies,  in  the  very  nature  of  things 
bound  together  almost  indissolubly  by  their  common 
interest  in  upholding  the  new  settlement.  A  Poland 
"grande  et  forte"  may  become  **a  new  France  on  the 
east  of  Germany,"  doubling  the  strength  of  the  France 
on  the  west. 

Rather  different  was  the  tendency  of  England.  While 
committed  to,  and  doubtless  sincerely  anxious  for,  the 
restoration  of  an  independent  Poland,  she  did  not  appear 
to  be  particularly  concerned  that  it  should  be  a  large  or 
a  strong  one.  Indeed,  I  think  I  may  say,  for  it  is  an  open 
secret,  that  in  the  case  of  almost  every  question  that  came 
up  England's  attitude  was  less  favorable  toward  Polish 
claims  than  that  of  any  other  Power,  and  the  Poles  are 
accustomed  to  ascribe  most  of  their  diplomatic  disasters 
at  Paris  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  Why  this  was  so  I  cannot 
adequately  explain.  I  am  inclined  to  think  it  was  pri- 
marily because  England  regarded  Poland  as  a  liability 
rather  than  an  asset.  Poland  was  a  weak  country,  set 
down  between  a  hostile  Germany  and  a  no  less  unfriendly 
Russia.  The  defense  of  such  a  state  was  likely  to  be 
something  of  a  burden  for  the  signatories  of  the  peace 


POLAND  71 

treaty;  the  more  contested  territories  you  assigned  to 
it  the  greater  were  the  chances  of  getting  into  trouble  on 
its  account;  and  England  seems  to  have  had  little  desire 
to  increase  her  responsibilities  unnecessarily  in  behalf  of 
a  state  that  was  a  natural  client  of  France  but  of  no 
special  interest  to  herself. 

The  Italians  were  in  general  disposed  to  favor  Polish 
claims,  but  not  to  advance  themselves  very  far  or  to 
fight  very  hard  in  support  of  them.  The  Japanese 
scarcely  intervened  at  all  in  these  questions.  As  for  the 
Americans,  I  think  I  may  say  that  the  president  and  his 
advisers,  while  very  friendly  and  sympathetic  toward 
Poland,  viewed  her  problems  primarily  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  general  principles  involved.  The  chief 
Polish  historian  of  the  Peace  Conference  has  done  us 
the  honor  of  saying  that  America  obviously  desired  that 
Poland  should  get  neither  too  much  nor  too  little,  but 
just  what  belonged  to  her. 

Such  seems  to  me  to  have  been  the  general  attitude  of 
the  several  Powers  toward  the  Polish  question.     But  I 
should  hke  to  emphasize  that  whatever  divergences  ap- 
peared related  to  secondary  matters ;  all  the  great  Powers  / 
were  agreed  on  the  fundamental  propositions  that  there 
should  be  an  independent  Polish  state,  including  Russian, 
"^  Austrian,  and  Prussian  Poland  alike  and  possessing  as- 
/  sured  access  to  the  sea,  and  that  its  boundaries  should  be 
\   settled  chiefly  upon  the  ethnographic  basis. 
^     For  the  elaboration  of  detailed  proposals  as  to  the 
frontiers  of  the  new  state,  the  Supreme[CounciI,  about  the 
end  of  February,  appointed  a  commission  on  Polish  af- 
fairs, headed  by  M.  Jules  Cambon,  who  had  been  French 
ambassador  at  Berlin  down  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
This  was  one  of  the  first,  if  not  the  first,  of  the  territorial 


72     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

commissions  to  be  appointed;  and  perhaps  some  account 
of  its  methods  of  work  may  not  be  out  of  place  here.  ^ 

The  commission  received   no  detailed  or  precise  in- 
structions from  the  Supreme  Council.     Individual  mem- 
bers   frequently   sought   and    obtained    directions    from 
their  superiors  on  particular  points,  but,  in  the  main,  the 
commission  was  left  to  work  out  its  problems  as  it  thought 
just  and  right,  always  bearing  in  mind  the  general  prin- 
ciples adopted  by  the  Peace  Conference  and  whatever 
each  of  us  might  know  as  to  the  views  of  our  respec- 
tive governments.    And  since  there  seems  to  be  a  wide- 
spread opinion  that  at  Paris  the  Fourteen  Points  were 
from  the  start  buried  in  oblivion,  I  should  like  to  attest'^ 
that  in  the  discussions  about  Poland,  both  in  the  com-/ 
mission  and  before  the  Supreme  Council,  the  particular  n 
"point"  among  the  fourteen  that  referred  to  Poland  was  \ 
(    both  the  principle  from  which  the  discussion  started  and  J 
I  to  which  appeal  was  made  again  and  again.    The  Polish 
\  commission  made  something  of  a  record  at  least  for  in- 
dustry.    It  sat  from  February  to  December;  at  some 
periods  it  met  nearly  every  day  in  the  week  and  some- 
times twice  a  day;  it  held  more  meetings,  I  think,  than 
almost  any  other  commission  of  the  Peace  Conference. 
Its  task,  of  course,  was  simply  to  work  out  detailed  prop- 
ositions to  submit  to  the  Supreme  Council;  it  was  the 
Ten  or  the  Five  or  the  Four  who  made  the  decisions. 
Usually  they  accepted  the  proposals  laid  before  them 
without  serious  alterations;  but  there  were  several  occa- 
sions, as  will  be  explained  later,  when  the  Supreme  Coun- 
cil very  substantially  modified  or  quite  set  aside  the  rec- 
ommendations of  the  commission. 
(^    The  first  and  most  important  Polish  question  to  be 
^  taken  up  was  that  of  the  boundary  on  the  side  of  Ger- 

I 


POLAND  73 

many.  How  difficult  that  problem  was  can  hardly  be 
appreciated  without  having  made  a  close  study  of  the 
extraordinary  intermixture  and  interpenetration  of  Poles 
and  Germans  in  the  former  eastern  provinces  of  Prussia. 
In  these  regions,  almost  all  of  which  were  originally 
purely  Polish  in  population,  there  was  for  centuries  a 
steady  inflow  of  German  immigrants  even  during  the 
period  of  Polish  rule,  and  much  more  so  after  the  annexa- 
tion of  Prussia.  In  the  last  half-century  the  Prussian 
government  has  worked  systematically  to  colonize  these 
provinces  with  Germans,  spending  over  $100,000,000 
for  that  purpose  and  endeavoring  especially  to  build  up 
belts  of  German  population  that  would  separate  the 
Poles  of  Russian  Poland  from  those  of  Posen  or  from 
Danzig  and  the  sea.  Hence  the  ethnographic  map  of 
these  regions  has  become  a  very  intricate  mosaic.  The 
two  peoples  are  everywhere  intermingled;  there  are  many 
islands  of  German  predominance  surrounded  by  seas  of 
Slavs;  and  to  draw  a  frontier  that  would  separate  the  two 
peoples  in  clean-cut  fashion  without  leaving  a  large  resi- 
due of  the  one  nation  in  the  territories  of  the  other  is  a 
thing  that  simply  cannot  be  done. 

Another  kind  of  difficulty  arose  from  the  nature  of  the 
statistics  with  which  one  had  to  work.  The  only  avail- 
able statistics  as  to  the  numbers  and  distribution  of  the 
two  peoples  in  these  territories  were  those  issued  by  the 
Prussian  government;  and  it  has  bee^  repeatedly  demon- 
strated by  the  most  careful  and  painstaking  investigations 
that  these  statistics  are  often  tendentious  and  **  doc- 
tored up,"  and  in  some  cases  absolutely  false  and  mis- 
leading. They  are  too  often  designed  to  show  that  the 
success  of  Prussia's  Germanizing  policy  has  been  greater 
than  is  actually  the  case. 


74     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  to  be  considered  that  the 
strength  of  Pohsh  national  feeling  varied  a  good  deal  in 
the  different  provinces  of  Prussia,  and  with  it,  presum- 
ably, the  desire  of  these  different  populations  for  separa- 
tion from  Germany  and  union  with  Poland.    The  prov- 
inces of  Posen  and  West  Prussia,  for  instance,  had  be- 
lono-ed  to  Poland  right  down  to  the  partitions  at  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century   (save  for  one  interval  of  a 
century  and  a  half  in  the  case  of  West  Prussia).    It  was 
there  that  the  racial  struggle  had  been  hottest  in  the 
past  half-century.      In  this  case  there  could    be   little 
doubt  as  to  the  sentiments  of  the  PoHsh  population.    On 
the  other  hand,  Upper  Silesia  had  been  separated  from 
Poland  for  six  hundred  years;  and  although  there  had 
been  a  considerable  revival  of  Polish  national  feeling  in 
recent  decades  and  much  animosity  between  Poles  and 
Germans,  still  the  case  here  was  not  so  clear  as  in  the 
other  two  provinces  just  mentioned.     Finally,  in  East 
Prussia  there  was   a   large   Polish-speaking  population 
which  had  never  been  directly  under  Polish  rule  at  all;  a 
population  that  was  Protestant,  unlike  the  overwhelming 
majority   of  the   Poles   outside,   and   which   had   never 
shown  any  very  marked  signs  of  Polish  national  con- 
sciousness.    Such   facts  raised  doubts  whether  all  the 
Poles  in  Prussia  could  fairly  be  treated  in  the  same  way 
just  because  they  were  Poles.     It  was  clear  that  many 
Poles   detested  and  abhorred   Prussian  rule,   had  been 
badly  oppressed  under  it,  and  would  never  be  reconciled 
to  it;  but  it  was  equally  apparent  that  other  Poles  had  no 
such  feelings,  and  it  was  not  easy  to  draw  the  line  be- 
tween such  groups. 

The  commission  on  Polish  affairs  submitted  its  first 
report  to  the  Supreme  Council  about  the  end  of  March. 


POLAND  75 

This  report  recommended  that  the  larger  part  of  Posen 
and  of  Upper  Silesia  should  be  transferred  to  Poland, 
while  leaving  to  Germany  the  western,  predominantly 
German-speaking  districts  of  both  territoiies.  In  both 
the  areas  to  be  ceded  to  Poland  the  Poles  formed  about 
two-thirds  of  the  population  {6^  per  cent),  according  to 
the  German  census  of  191  o.  In  addition,  the  commission 
proposed  to  give  to  Poland  the  central  and  eastern  zones 
of  the  province  of  West  Prussia,  inchiding  both  banks  of 
the  lower  Vistula  and  Danzig,  the  capital  of  the  province. 
This  was  the  origin  of  the  famous  Polish  "corridor  to  the 
Baltic."  This  "corridor"  has  been  so  much  discussed 
that  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  enter  a  little  fully  into 
the  reasons  that  led  the  commission  to  propose  it. 

West  Prussia,  the  province  around  the  mouth  of  the 
Vistula,  occupies  an  area  of  such  strategic  importance 
that  for  many  centuries  it  has  been  a  battle-ground  be- 
tween Germans  and  Slavs.  It  has  been  the  meeting- 
place,  the  point  of  intersection  of  two  opposing  streams 
of  colonization,  the  Polish  current  from  south  to  north, 
down  the  Vistula,  and  the  German  current  from  west  to 
east,  along  the  coast  of  the  Baltic.  In  this  conflict  the 
south-to-north  movement  has  been  the  stronger;  the 
Poles  have  succeeded  in  maintaining  a  continuous  belt 
of  Polish-speaking  territory  extending  through  to  the 
Baltic,  while  the  Germans  have  failed  to  bridge  the  gap 
between  Germany  proper  and  the  •  German  colony  in 
East  Prussia.  The  ethnographic  map  of  West  Prussia 
showed  the  province  roughly  divided  into  three  zones: 
a  German  zone  on  the  west,  and  another  on  the  east, 
along  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula,  while  the  central  and 
southeastern  zone  was  predominantly  Polish.  This  was 
the  primary  reason  for  the  construction  of  the  corridor; 


SHOWING  ARRANGEMEMTQ   .vTr^       POLAND 


MADE  BY  THE 


POLAND  77 

the  cession  of  this  central  zone  to  Poland  was  the  only 
arrangement  that  could  fit  the  ethnographic  situation, 
the  only  arrangement  that  corresponded  to  the  rather  un- 
fortunate way  in  which  the  German  and  Polish  popula- 
tions had  become  fixed  in  this  region,  as  the  result  of  cen- 
turies of  conflict. 

But  there  was  another  important  reason  for  the  build- 
ing of  the  corridor.  Poland  had  been  promised  "a  free 
and  secure  access  to  the  sea."  There  seemed  to  be 
strong  grounds  for  holding  that  this  ''free  and  secure 
access"  could  be  obtained  only  across  and  through  terri- 
tory actually  owned  and  controlled  by  Poland,  and  that 
it  could  not  be  regarded  as  assured  if  the  lower  course  of 
Poland's  greatest  river  and  the  port  at  its  mouth  were 
left  in  the  hands  of  Germany.  For  Germany  has  always 
been  Poland's  chief  enemy,  and  unless  all  prevision  fails 
is  likely  to  remain  so  for  a  long  time  to  come. 

It  was  true  that  the  proposed  arrangement  would  have 
the  grave  disadvantage  of  separating  East  Prussia  from 
the  rest  of  Germany.  But  it  was  a  case  of  choosing  be- 
tween two  evils.  Either  East  Prussia  would  have  to 
communicate  with  Germany  by  land  across  Polish  terri- 
tory (there  would  always  be  easy  communication  by  sea) 
or  else  Poland's  communications  with  the  sea  would  have 
to  be  across  German  territory.  And  were  the  two  re- 
spective interests  comparable  or  at  all  commensurable? 
Was  it  to  be  argued  that  the  interest  of  the  2,000,000 
Germans  in  East  Prussia  in  having  a  land  connection  with 
Germany  ought  to  outweigh  the  interest  of  25,000,000 
Poles  in  having  assured  access  to  the  sea? 

Such  considerations  led  the  commission  to  propose  the 
corridor,  and,  it  must  be  added,  to  propose  to  build  it 
somewhat   broader   than   strictly   ethnographic   reasons 


78     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

would  have  warranted.  For  it  was  recommended  that 
the  corridor  should  inchide  the  city  and  district  of  Dan- 
zig, although  their  population  of  about  300,000  is  over- 
whelmingly German,  and  also  a  narrow  belt  of  German- 
speaking  territory  around  Marienwerder,  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Vistula.  These  were  the  only  cases  in 
which  the  commission  proposed  a  serious  deviation  from 
an  ethnographic  frontier.  In  the  case  of  Danzig  it  was 
from  the  conviction  that  that  city  was  the  natural 
port  of  Poland,  and  the  only  port  in  any  sense  available; 
and  that  the  only  clean-cut  solution  of  the  problem 
was  to  annex  the  city  outright  to  Poland.  As  for  the 
Marienwerder  district  it  was  argued  that  the  possession 
of  that  small  area  (the  population  is  about  138,000)  was 
necessary  in  order  to  assure  to  Poland  control  of  the 
lower  Vistula  and  of  the  one  direct  railroad  between 
Danzig  and  Warsaw. 

Finally,  it  remained  to  deal  with  that  southern  zone"^ 
of  East  Prussia  which  is  generally  called  the  District  of 
Allenstein.  Although  the  majority  of  the  population 
here  was  Polish  in  nationality,  for  reasons  suggested  above 
it  was  to  be  doubted  whether  these  Protestant  Poles 
really  desired  to  be  annexed  to  Poland  as  a  strict  inter- 
pretation of  the  Fourteen  Points  would  seem  to  have  re- 
quired. Hence  the  commission  recommended  that  the 
fate  of  this  territory  should  be  referred  to  a  plebiscite. 

The  set  of  proposals  Just  outlined  was  agreed  upon  by 
the  experts  of  all  the  Powers  represented  in  the  commis- 
sion after  very  long  discussions  and  a  good  deal  of  give- 
and-take  on  all  sides.  When  these  unanimous  recom- 
mendations were  then  submitted  to  the  Supreme  Council 
it  seemed  for  a  time  as  if  they  would  be  accepted  in  toto. 
It  soon  became  evident,  however,  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George 


POLAND  79 

was  dissatisfied;  he  held  that  with  the  frontiers  proposed 
the  number  of  Germans  to  be  incorporated  in  Poland 
was  dangerously  large,  and  ought,  if  ever  possible,  to  be 
reduced.  As  a  result  of  a  first  intervention  on  his  part  / 
the  Supreme  Council  decided  that  the  Marienwerder  dis- 
trict should  not  be  transferred  to  Poland  outright,  but 
should  also  be  subjected  to  a  plebiscite. 

Soon  after  the  British  prime  minister  proposed  a  sec- 
ond change,  of  much  greater  consequence  to  the  Poles, 
in  the  matter  of  Danzig.  President  Wilson  was  persuaded 
to  agree  to  his  suggestions;  and  Mr.  Clemenceau,  quite 
certainly  against  his  own  inclinations,  was  induced  to 
acquiesce.  The  upshot  was  an  entirely  new  plan,  which 
was  intended  to  insure  Poland's  economic  interests  in  the 
port  of  Danzig  and  at  the  same  time  to  avoid  the  incon- 
venience of  annexing  that  German-speaking  city  to  Po- 
land. According  to  this  plan,  Danzig  and  the  small  ad- 
jacent district  were  to  form  a  free  city  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  League  of  Nations.  While  with  regard  to  most 
internal  affairs  Danzig  was  to  be  quite  autonomous,  it 
was  stipulated  that  the  free  city  was  to  be  inchided  within 
the  Polish  customs  frontiers,  and  that  its  foreign  relations 
and  the  protection  of  its  citizens  abroad  were  to  be  in- 
trusted to  Poland.  Poland  also  received  the  right  of 
freely  using  and  of  developing  and  improving  all  water- 
ways, docks,  and^vharfs  within  the  territory  of  the  free 
city;  and  the  control  and  administration  of  the  Vistula 
River,  and — subject  to  some  restrictions — of  the  railway, 
postal,  and  telegraph  systems  of  Danzig.  The  details  of 
the  arrangement  were  to  be  regulated  by  a  treaty  between 
Poland  and  the  free  city,  the  terms  of  which  were  to  be 
fixed  by  the  principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers. 

With  these  modifications  the  proposals  submitted  by 


8o      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

the  commission  on  Polish  affairs  were  incorporated  in  the 
terms  of  peace  communicated  by  the  Paris  Conference  to 
Germany  on  May  7,  191 9.  As  is  well  known,  the  Ger- 
mans returned  a  reply  of  vehement  protest,  objecting 
particularly  to  the  cessions  demanded  in  favor  of  Poland 
and  especially  to  the  threatened  loss  of  Upper  Silesia. 
This  led  to  something  of  a  crisis  in  Paris.  The  British 
Labor  party  and  every  other  element  in  England  and 
America  that  regarded  the  proposed  terms  of  peace  as  too 
draconic,  made  their  voices  heard;  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
after  a  visit  to  London,  returned  convinced  of  the  neces- 
sity of  making  concessions,  whether  in  order  to  induce  the 
Germans  to  sign  or  in  order  to  placate  British  labor.  His 
colleagues  again  to  some  extent  gave  way  to  him.  Among 
the  concessions  to  the  Germans  that  were  then  decided 
upon,  the  most  important,  perhaps,  related  to  Upper 
Silesia. 

It  had  originally  been  resolved  to  demand  most  of  that 
territory  for  Poland,  because  of  the  large  Polish-speaking 
majority  {6^  per  cent  for  the  whole  area,  and  in  not  a  few 
districts  80  or  even  90  per  cent);  and  also  because  the 
Silesian  Poles  seemed  to  have  given  sufficient  proof  of 
their  Polish  sentiments  and  their  desire  for  union  with 
the  mother  country.  But  it  was  not  to  be  denied  that  the 
loss  of  Upper  Silesia  would  mean  a  very  severe  blow  to 
Germany.  For  this  territory  was  one  of  the  chief  mining 
centres  and  one  of  the  most  highly  industrialized  regions 
of  the  former  German  Empire.  Before  the  war  it  pro- 
duced about  44,000,000  tons  of  coal  a  year,  i.  e.,  23  per 
cent  of  Germany's  annual  output,  three  times  as  much 
as  the  Saar  basin;  and  it  also  furnished  81  per  cent  of 
her  zinc,  34  per  cent  of  her  lead,  and  a  very  large  part  of 
her  steel  and  iron  products.    It  could  well  be  argued  that 


POLAND  8i 

so  great  a  sacrifice  could  not  fairly  be  proposed  unless  it 
was  certain  that  the  majority  of  the  population  desired 
union  with  Poland.  And  it  was  impossible  to  be  quite 
certain  of  that  without  putting  the  matter  to  a  popular 
vote.  Hence  the  decision  that  in  Upper  Silesia,  too,  there 
should  be  a  plebiscite,  and  that  in  case  the  vote  fell  out 
in  favor  of  Poland,  Germany  should  enjoy  a  treaty-right 
to  a  certain  amount  of  Silesian  coal. 

With  this  third  important  modification  of  the  original 
proposals,  the  Polish-German  settlement  assumed  final 
form  and  was  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  The 
results  may  be  summarized  by  saying  that  Germany  has 
been  forced  to  cede  to  Poland  about  16,750  square  miles 
of  territory  and  about  2,900,000  people,  i.  e.,  about 
three  "times  the  area  and  one  and  one-half  times  the 
population  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Among  the  ceded  popu- 
lations there  are,  according  to  the  last  German  census, 
about  1,800,000  Poles  and  about  1,000,000  Germans, 
i.  e.,  a  ratio  of  nine  to  five. 

Plebiscites  have  already  taken  place  in  the  Allenstein 
and  Marienwerder  districts.  In  both  cases  the  results 
were  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  Germany,  as  was,  in- 
deed, to  be  expected;  for  in  the  Marienwerder  district 
there  is  a  large  majority  of  Germans  and  in  Allenstein  the 
Polish-speaking  majority  is  a  backward,  rural  popula- 
tion, very  much  under  the  control  of  German  landlords, 
pastors,  and  officials,  and  a  population  among  which  the 
Polish  national  movement  was  only  in  its  first  faint  be- 
ginnings. 

In  Upper  Silesia  the  plebiscite  is  to  be  held  within  the 
next  few  months.  Its  outcome  must  be  awaited  with  some 
trepidation,  for  plebiscites  have  the  drawback  of  raising 
national  animosities  to  fever  pitch;  there  have  already 


82      WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

been  two  bloody  outbreaks  in  Upper  Silesia,  and  both  the 
contending  peoples  are  desperately  anxious  not  to  lose 
what  is  undoubtedly  the  richest  territorial  prize  that  re- 
mains to  be  awarded. 

Finally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  the  treaty  between 
Poland  and  Danzig,  which  has  been  drawn  up  by  the 
Council  of  Ambassadors  at  Paris,  has  just  been  signed. 
In  the  meantime  there  has  been  an  unhappy  amount  of 
friction  between  the  Poles,  the  Germans  of  Danzig,  and 
the  British  high  commissioner  representing  the  League  of 
Nations.  The  Poles  in  Danzig  are  frequently  mobbed; 
in  the  face  of  the  crisis  threatening  her  very  existence 
last  summer  Poland  found  her  one  port  virtually  closed 
to  her  through  the  animosity  of  the  Danzigers  and  what 
seems  to  me  the  very  ill-advised  action  of  the  high  com- 
missioner— in  short,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  com- 
phcated  arrangement  about  the  free  city  of  Danzig  has 
so  far  worked  out  rather  badly. 

The  Peace  Conference  made  no  definitive  arrangements 
about  Austrian  and  Russian  Poland.  In  the  case  of  the 
former  region  there  were  two  principal  territorial  dis- 
putes. The  duchy  of  Teschen  in  Austrian  Silesia,  which 
in  spite  of  its  small  size  is  extremely  valuable  because  of 
its  excellent  coking  coal  and  its  thriving  industries,  was 
the  object  of  a  long  controversy  between  Poland  and 
Czecho-SIovakia.  After  going  through  a  great  many 
vicissitudes,  this  dispute  was  finally  settled  by  a  decision 
of  the  Council  of  Ambassadors  last  summer,  which,  with 
slight  regard  for  the  rights  and  the  vehemently  expressed 
wishes  of  the  Polish-speaking  majority  of  the  population, 
awarded  to  the  Czechs  the  whole  mining  region  and  the 
chief  railroad  line  running  through  the  territory.  As  a 
result  the  city  of  Teschen  is  cut  in  two;  the  larger,  eastern 


POLAND  83 

portion  of  the  town  goes  to  Poland,  but  the  western  part, 
with  the  railway  station,  goes  to  the  Czechs;  the  electric- 
light  plant  goes  to  the  one  state,  but  the  gas-works  to  the 
other,  and  I  do  not  recall  what  has  become  of  the  munic- 
ipal water-works.  This  judgment  of  Solomon  is  a  curious 
monument  of  the  wisdom  of  diplomats. 

Eastern  Galicia,  which  was  in  dispute  between  the 
Poles  and  the  Ukrainians,  also  furnished  the  Peace  Con- 
ference with  a  complicated  set  of  problems,  into  the  de- 
tails of  which  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  enter  here.  The 
Conference  finally  decided  to  leave  Eastern  Galicia  under 
Polish  sovereignty,  but  as  an  autonomous  province,  with 
ample  guarantees  for  the  national  rights  of  the  three  and 
one-half  millions  of  Ukrainians,  who  form  the  majority 
of  the  population,  and  with  provisions  for  a  plebiscite 
twenty-five  years  hence.  The  Poles,  however,  have  been 
unwilling  to  accept  these  conditions,  which,  they  affirm, 
would  only  keep  up  unrest  and  agitation  and  would  make 
it  almost  impossible  to  govern  the  country.  For  the  past 
year  the  negotiation  seems  to  have  been  at  a  standstill. 
While  the  Poles  are  actually  in  possession  of  the  prov- 
ince, the  ultimate  fate  of  Eastern  Galicia  has  not  been 
settled. 

The  Peace  Conference  also  found  itself  unable  to  fix 
the  eastern  boundaries  of  Poland  on  the  side  of  Russia. 
The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  were  not  at  war  with 
Russia;  they  had  no  desire  to  dispose  of  Russian  territory 
without  Russia's  consent;  and  there  was  no  recognized 
Russian  Government  with  which  they  could  deal.  It 
was,  indeed,  possible  to  assume  that  Warsaw  and  the 
adjacent  region  had  been  renounced  by  Russia,  because 
immediately  after  the  revolution  of  March,  191 7,  the 
government  of  Prince  Lvov  had  spontaneously  recognized 


84      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  principle  of  '*an  independent  Polish  state  including  i 
all  regions  with  an  indisputable  Polish  ethnic  majority." 
Unhappily,  however,  there  lies  between  Poland  and 
Russia  a  large  debatable  zone  where,  because  of  the  un- 
reliability of  our  statistics  and  other  data,  it  is  difficult 
to  say  what  the  ethnic  majority  is  or  what  are  the  wishes 
of  a  very  ilhterate  and  inarticulate  population.  At  pres- 
ent, it  is  almost  impossible  to  say  with  certainty  just 
where  ethnographic  Poland  leaves  off  and  ethnographic 
Russia  begins. 

The  Peace  Conference  did,  at  all  events,  issue  one  pro- 
visional declaration  regarding  this  question — a  declara- 
tion that  has  been  much  referred  to  in  recent  months 
and  the  nature  of  which  has,  I  think,  been  much  misun- 
derstood. 

Wishing  to  reduce  the  area  of  controversy  and  to  make 
it  possible  for  the  Warsaw  Government  to  organize  a 
permanent  administration  in  that  part  of  Russian  Poland 
that  was  certain  to  remain  to  it,  the  Conference  on  De- 
cember 8,  1 91 9,  defined  a  provisional  boundary  for  Po- 
land on  the  east,  including  all  the  territory  that  could  be 
regarded  as  having  "an  indisputably  Polish  ethnic  ma- 
jority." This  was,  in  short,  a  kind  of  minimum  line. 
Whatever  lay  to  the  west  of  it  was  to  be  considered  as 
belonging  henceforth  unconditionally  to  Poland.  The 
Conference  expressly  reserved,  however,  the  claims  Po- 
land might  have  to  territories  east  of  this  line;  claims  on 
which  the  Conference  did  not  feel  able  to  pronounce  and 
which  must  therefore  be  left  to  future  negotiations  be- 
tween Poland  and  Russia. 

This  provisional  minimum  boundary  of  December, 
1 9 19,  has  since  become  famous  as  the  "Curzon  line."  In 
the  crisis  of  the  Polish-Bolshevist  conflict  last  summer, 


POLAND  85 

Lord  Curzon,  acting  for  the  British  Government,  at- 
tempted to  mediate  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  acceptance 
of  this  line  as  a  definitive,  permanent  boundary.  As  this 
would  have  involved  the  renunciation  by  Poland  of 
broad  areas  in  which,  it  is  claimed  by  the  Poles,  there  are 
majorities  of  Polish  population,  the  Warsaw  Government 
staved  off  such  a  settlement,  and  finally,  by  the  pre-  _ 
liminary  peace  signed  at  Riga  on  October  12,  it  has  se-  c^ 
cured  a  boundary  much  farther  east  than  the  Curzon 
line  and  much  more  advantageous. 

The  Treaty  of  Riga,  while  disposing  of  Bolshevist 
claims  to  whatever  lies  west  of  the  new  frontier,  has  not 
altogether  settled  the  fate  of  Vilna,  the  largest  city  in 
the  ceded  territory.  Vilna  and  the  region  about  it  form 
the  subject  of  a  long-pending  dispute  between  Poland 
and  Lithuania.  While  fully  reliable  data  are  lacking 
here,  it  would  seem  that  the  Polish  claim  is  much  the 
stronger,  if  the  question  is  to  be  settled  chiefly  with  refer- 
ence to  the  language  and  the  presumable  desires  of  the 
population.  The  case  for  Lithuania  rests  mainly  on  the 
fact  that  Vilna  was  the  historic  capital  of  the  old  Lithu- 
anian state,  and  that  the  bulk  of  the  population  of  this 
region,  though  now  decidedly  Polonized,  is  probably 
originally  of  Lithuanian  stock. ^  Through  the  interven- 
tion of  the  Allied  Powers  an  attempt  is  now  being  made 
to  induce  the  two  contending  governments  to  decide  the 
question  by  a  plebiscite. 

Apart  from  this  problem  and  that  of  Upper  Silesia,  and 
barring  the  possibility  of  a  new  conflict  with  the  Bol- 
shevists, the  frontiers  of  Poland  are  thus  at  last  fixed. 

^According  to  the  census  taken  by  the  Germans  in  1916-17  the  population 
of  Vilna  (139,000)  was  made  up  of:  Poles,  53.6  per  cent;  Jews,  41.4  per  cent;  and 
Lithuanians,  2.1  percent. 


86      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

As  now  constituted,  the  new  state  has  an  area  of  about 
148,000  square  miles,  i.  e.,  it  is  much  larger  than  the 
United  Kingdom  or  Italy,  and  about  three-fourths  as 
large  as  France.  Its  population,  which  cannot  be  fixed 
with  any  certainty  because  of  the  chaos  caused  by  the 
war,  is  variously  estimated  at  between  twenty-seven  and 
thirty-two  millions.  At  all  events,  Poland  now  ranks  as 
the  sixth  state  of  Europe,  both  in  size  and  in  popu- 
lation; and  it  may  be  considered  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant of  the  new  states  which  the  war  has  produced  in 
eastern  Europe. 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE:   REMNANTS  OF 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

BY  CHARLES  SEYMOUR 

"  If  Austria  did  not  exist,  it  would  be  necessary  to  cre- 
ate her."  This  diplomatic  aphorism,  coined  by  a  member 
of  one  of  the  very  nationalities  oppressed  by  the  Haps- 
burgs,  had  rung  in  the  ears  of  European  statesmen  for 
many  decades.  It  had  become  almost  axiomatic  that  the 
union  of  Danubian  territories  was  essential  to  the  eco- 
nomic welfare  and  political  tranquillity  of  southeastern 
Europe.  There  were  few  who  did  not  recognize  the  ser- 
vice performed  for  Europe  by  the  Hapsburgs  in  holding 
together  regions  naturally  interdependent,  and  in  ob- 
structing the  advance  up  the  Danube  of  that  internecine 
strife  which  has  characterized  the  political  habits  of  the 
Balkans.  The  disruption  of  the  Hapsburg  empire  would 
threaten  economic  dislocation  at  the  same  time  that  it 
would  inflame  the  nationalistic  jealousy  and  ambition  of 
the  peoples  that  had  been  crushed  under  the  Hapsburg 
yoke.  The  prospect  was  regarded  with  a  doubt  that  bor- 
dered upon  dismay  even  by  the  nations  that  were  fighting 
Austria  in  the  Great  War. 

But  the  statesmen  of  the  Peace  Conference  were  con- 
fronted by  a  condition  and  not  a  theory.  However  clearly 
they  recognized  the  dangers  coincident  with  the  disinte- 
gration of  Austria-Hungary,  it  was  not  for  them  to  de- 
cide.    The  question  had  already  been  settled  by  the 

87 


88      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

nationalities  of  the  dying  empire,  which  in  the  last  weeks 
of  the  war  had  set  up  their  own  governments,  contemptu- 
ously brushing  away  the  traditions  of  centuries.  Austria- 
Hungary  as  a  political  entity  had  crumbled  like  the 
one-hoss  shay,  and  the  most  solemn  peace  conference 
imaginable  could  not  put  her  together  again. 

Such  a  disintegration  had  long  been  foreshadowed  and 
discussed.  The  empire  had  never  been  a  nation,  and 
factors  of  union  and  disunion  had  always  engaged  in 
fierce  struggles.  Ties  of  language  and  blood  kinship, 
which  form  the  strongest  elements  of  political  integra- 
tion, were  lacking,  and  neither  the  political  skill  nor  the 
good  fortune  of  the  Hapsburgs  succeeded  in  welding  into 
a  single  whole  the  myriad  of  peoples  who  had  come  to 
sojourn  in  the  regions  that  make  up  the  modern  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  development  of  revolutionary  organiza- 
tion during  the  war  was  slow.  It  came  first  and  most 
effectively  among  the  Czechs,  who  organized  wholesale 
desertion  of  Czech  battalions  from  the  Hapsburg  armies 
and  the  betrayal  to  the  Alhes  of  Austrian  military  secrets. 
The  Jugo-SIavs  were  more  cautious.  Especially  after  the 
entrance  of  Italy  into  the  war  they  showed  themselves 
suspicious  of  Allied  propaganda,  for  they  feared  lest 
emancipation  from  the  Hapsburg  yoke  might  become 
simply  the  first  step  toward  enslavement  by  Italy.  Nor 
were  the  AIHes  anxious,  at  first,  to  foster  revolution,  since 
the  disruption  of  Austria  did  not  enter  completely  into 
their  diplomatic  plans.  But  the  growing  conviction  that 
Austria  had  become  the  catspaw  of  Germany,  combined 
with  the  disgust  of  the  subject  nationalities,  resulted  in 
the  encouragement  and  the  success  of  the  revolution.  In 
19 1 8  Czecho-SIovakia  was  recognized  as  an  independent 
AIHed  state.     The  newly  formulated  aims  of  the  Jugo- 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  89 

Slavs  for  independence  and  union  with  Serbia  were  gen- 
erally approved,  and  a  cordial,  though  informal  and  tem- 
porary, understanding  with  Italy  was  established. 

With  the  surrender  of  Bulgaria,  the  rolling  back  of  the 
German  tide  in  France,  and  the  defeat  of  Austrian  armies 
on  the  Piave  the  revolution  was  inaugurated.  Irresis- 
tibly and  with  extraordinary  quiet  it  gathered  headway. 
Hapsburg  officials  and  organs  of  government  were  not 
assailed,  but  simply  passed  over,  and  in  their  place  arose 
the  provisional  councils  representing  the  nationalities. 
Within  the  space  of  a  month  the  artificial  cement  that 
held  the  empire  together  had  crumbled,  loyalty  to  the 
emperor  had  evaporated,  and  the  overlordship  of  Ger- 
mans and  Magyars  had  been  cast  aside.  The  Tyrol  and 
Trieste  were  occupied  by  Italians;  at  Prague  the  new 
Czecho-SIovak  Government  was  solidified;  in  Croatia  the 
Jugo-SIavs  seized  the  reins  of  power  and  prepared  for 
union  with  Serbia,  while  on  the  coast  they  took  over  the 
Austrian  fleet;  in  GaHcia  the  Poles  negotiated  with  the 
new  national  government  of  Warsaw;  in  Transylvania 
the  Rumanians  were  greeted  as  liberators. 

When  the  peace  conference  opened,  therefore,  the 
empire  of  Austria-Hungary  was  a  thing  of  the  past.  One 
journalistic  critic  complains  that  the  conference  angrily 
broke  up  Austria  into  jigsaw  bits;  but  the  accusation 
betrays  a  wealth  of  ignorance  and  shows  how  much  easier 
it  is  to  be  critical  than  correct.  The  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  would  have  been  glad  to  create  a  federa- 
tion of  the  Danubian  nationalities  which,  without  the 
vices  that  had  led  to  the  fall  of  the  Hapsburgs,  might 
have  accomplished  the  economic  integration  and  pre- 
served the  political  order  so  essential  to  the  tranquillity 
and  prosperity  of  southeastern  Europe.    The  suggestion 


90      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

would  have  been  no  more  effective  than  a  tenor  solo  in  a 
boiler-shop.  The  nationalities  would  have  none  of  it. 
They  had  freed  themselves,  they  were  instinct  with  the 
sense  of  their  own  capacity,  bursting  with  nationalistic 
ambitions,  suspicious  of  any  federation  as  likely  to  revive 
the  tyranny  under  which  they  had  so  long  suffered.  The 
Conference  lacked  the  right,  as  well  as  the  power,  to  im- 
pose union  upon  them.  By  virtue  of  the  principle  of  self- 
determination  it  was  for  the  nationalities  to  determine 
their  own  destiny,  and  if  they  preferred  disunion  no  one 
could  deny  them.  The  independent  sovereignty  of  the 
Czechs  had  been  recognized;  the  union  of  the  Poles  of 
Galicia  with  the  mass  of  the  nationality  in  Russia  and 
Germany  was  generally  admitted;  the  right  of  Rumania 
to  Transylvania  had  been  acknowledged;  and  there  were 
few  inclined  to  dispute  the  union  of  the  Serbs,  Croats, 
and  Slovenes  of  southern  Hungary,  Austria,  and  Bosnia, 
with  their  kinsmen  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  although 
the  prospect  was  not  hailed  with  enthusiasm  by  Italy. 

It  was  true  that  the  Allies  and  President  Wilson  had 
declared  that  they  had  no  intention  of  breaking  up 
Austria-Hungary,  and  the  Fourteen  Points  had  stipu- 
lated merely  the  autonomy  of  the  subject  nationalities. 
But  as  Mr.  Wilson  pointed  out  in  his  reply  to  the  first 
request  of  Austria  for  an  armistice  in  September,  191 8, 
the  face  of  circumstances  had  changed  so  rapidly  that 
mere  autonomy  had  become  insufficient;  the  sovereign 
rights  of  the  Czechs  and  the  aspirations  of  the  Jugo- 
slavs had  been  recognized.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment admitted  its  willingness  to  accept  this  change. 
It  might  fairly  be  argued  that  in  the  division  of  Hapsburg 
territory  the  new  Austrian  and  Hungarian  Governments 
had  a  right  to  expect  that  the  Peace  Conference  would 


THE  END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  91 

allocate  territory  in  the  spirit  of  the  Fourteen  Points; 
there  was  at  least  a  strong  moral  obligation  laid  upon  the 
Allies  to  treat  Austria  and  Hungary  with  the  justice  that 
had  been  so  eloquently  voiced  by  President  Wilson,  al- 
though in  fact  the  armistice  of  November  3  had  been  con- 
cluded so  hastily  that  the  Fourteen  Points  had  apparently 
been  forgotten.  But  even  so,  the  integrity  of  the  ancient 
empire  could  not  be  preserved. 

The  Peace  Conference  was,  accordingly,  placed  in  the 
position  of  executor  of  the  Hapsburg  estate.  The  heirs 
were  generally  recognized — Czecho-SIovakia,  Poland,  Ru- 
mania, Jugo-SIavia,  the  new  lesser  Austria,  lesser  Hun- 
gary, and  Italy.  The  duty  of  the  Conference  was  to  de- 
termine the  character  of  the  division.  Even  this  had  al- 
ready been  fixed  in  its  broad  lines,  so  that  much  of  the 
task  of  the  peacemakers  consisted  simply  in  the  deter- 
mination of  detailed  frontiers.  The  task,  however,  was 
not  one  which  could  be  easily  and  satisfactorily  accom- 
plished. There  were,  it  is  true,  two  treaties  in  existence 
which  had  mapped  out  the  new  frontiers  of  Italy  and 
Rumania  in  Austria-Hungary.  The  first  of  these,  the 
famous  Treaty  of  London,  had  been  signed  in  May,  1915, 
and  it  was  upon  the  basis  of  the  promises  therein  made 
that  Italy  had  entered  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 
The  second  treaty,  signed  in  August,  191 6,  had  assured 
Rumania  generous  frontiers  in  Hungary.  But  the  United 
States  had  not  been  party  to  either  of  these  secret  treaties, 
drawn  up  before  our  entrance  into  the  war,  and  had  never 
been  officially  informed  of  their  existence.  President 
Wilson  had  gone  on  record  as  opposed  to  the  approval  of 
secret  treaties  of  any  kind.  Furthermore,  the  promises 
made  by  France  and  England  were  by  no  means  in  ac- 
cord with  the  new  international  ideals  enunciated  by 


92      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Wilson  and  crystallized  in  the  Fourteen  Points.  If  Italy 
and  Rumania  insisted  upon  holding  the  AHies  to  their 
promises  and  if  the  United  States  delegation  refused  to 
recognize  the  justice  and  the  wisdom  of  carrying  those 
promises  into  effect,  the  Peace  Conference  obviously 
would  face  a  problem  of  the  greatest  difficulty. 

It  soon  became  clear  that  the  heirs  of  the  Hapsburg 
empire  would  furnish  no  assistance  to  the  Conference  in 
its  task  of  territorial  delimitation  by  entering  into  friendly 
agreements  among  themselves.  Each  nationality  viewed 
affairs  through  the  colored  prism  of  its  own  ambitions. 
When  the  Conference  assembled  in  January,  191 9,  it  was 
confronted  with  the  necessity  not  merely  of  drawing  per- 
manent boundary-lines  but  of  composing  the  quarrels 
that  had  sprung  up  between  the  different  nationalities, 
which  threatened  to  break  into  open  warfare.  In  Silesia, 
Poles  and  Czechs  each  violently  claimed  the  district  of 
Teschen  with  its  invaluable  coal-mines;  in  the  Adriatic, 
Italians  and  Jugo-SIavs  were  face  to  face;  in  southern 
Hungary,  in  the  Banat  of  Temesvar,  the  Rumanians  and 
Serbs  stood  ready  to  come  to  blows.  Jugo-SIavs  and 
German-Austrians  fought  along  the  Drave;  the  Rumanian 
army  that  had  invaded  Transylvania  constantly  advanced 
and  threatened  to  occupy  and  hold  pure  Hungarian  ter- 
ritory. 

Such  were  some  of  the  problems  faced  by  the  supreme 
council  of  the  Conference,  in  addition  to  the  necessity  of 
making  arrangements  for  the  renaissance  of  normal  eco- 
nomic life,  the  transportation  of  food,  the  rehabilitation 
of  the  raihvays,  the  opening  up  of  river  traffic,  and  the 
resumption  of  coal-mining.  At  first  the  members  of  the 
council  of  ten  may  have  hoped  themselves  to  settle  these 
boundary  disputes.     But  it  was  not  long  before  they 


THE   END  OF   AN   EMPIRE  93 

realized  that  if  they  gave  to  each  the  time  and  study  es- 
sential to  securing  a  just  solution,  their  dehberations 
would  last  for  long  months.  And  after  all,  the  Austrian 
problem  was  but  one  of  many.  Nothing  was  more  strik- 
ing than  the  sense  of  discouragement  that  manifested  it- 
self upon  the  faces  of  the  statesmen  of  the  great  powers 
as  they  listened  to  the  claims  and  charges,  the  counter- 
claims and  counter-charges  presented  to  them  by  the 
representatives  of  the  nationalities,  so  recently  allied 
in  a  common  cause,  now  inflamed  by  the  bitterest  Jeal- 
ousy. 

The  hearings  took  place  in  Secretary  Pichon's  study 
in  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  with  its  old  pearly  gray  carpet  marked 
with  red  roses,  its  rich  Gobehn  tapestries,  and  high  French 
windows  opening  on  to  the  perfect  lawns  of  the  foreign 
office  gardens.  In  the  centre,  behind  the  empire  desk,  sat 
Clemenccau,  squat,  stolid,  gray  of  face,  his  hands  clasped 
quietly,  covered  by  the  eternal  gray  gloves,  on  his  counte- 
nance an  expression  of  bored  tolerance.  In  his  cynical 
wisdom  he  had  never  believed  that  the  end  of  the  war 
would  bring  the  millennium;  these  nationalistic  quarrels 
seemed  to  him  entirely  natural,  even  though  inconve- 
nient. His  arid  humor,  his  biting  sarcasm  displayed  in  an 
infrequent  question,  contrasted  with  the  patient  earnest- 
ness of  President  Wilson,  who  sat  upon  his  right,  and  to 
whom,  it  is  not  uninteresting  to  note,  the  claimants  ap- 
pealed by  their  manner,  if  not  in  form,  as  the  man  of 
justice  upon  whom  their  hopes  rested.  Next  to  the  Amer- 
icans sat  Lloyd  George  and  Balfour,  perfect  contrast. 
The  British  prime  minister,  consumed  with  an  electric 
energy,  always  on  the  edge  of  his  chair,  questioning  and 
interrupting;  Balfour,  with  his  long  legs  outstretched,  his 
head  on  the  back  of  his  chair,  eyes  not  infrequently 


94      WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

closed,  philosophic  in  his  attitude,  completely  proof 
against  those  sudden  gusts  of  enthusiasm  which  some- 
times assailed  his  chief.  Next,  on  the  right  were  the 
Japanese,  with  features  immobile  as  the  Sphinx,  enig- 
matic as  the  Mona  Lisa.  Facing  Clemenceau  sat  the 
Italians:  Orlando,  florid  in  manner,  eloquent  in  speech; 
Sonnino,  with  eagle  features,  powerful  nose,  and  jaw  set 
like  a  vise.  In  the  corners  were  the  secretaries.  Behind 
the  principals  sat  the  attaches  and  experts,  with  their 
maps  and  tables  of  statistics,  whispering  corrections  of 
the  ex  parte  statements  which  the  delegates  of  the  nation- 
alities presented. 

The  latter  stood  or  sat  before  Clemenceau's  desk, 
presenting  the  particular  claims  of  their  newly  founded 
or  expanding  states.  There  was  the  black-bearded  Bra- 
tiano  of  Rumania,  rather  moody,  fighting  for  the  treaty 
of  191 6,  resentful  of  opposition.  Or,  contrasting  type,  the 
young  and  smiling  foreign  minister  of  the  Czecho-SIovak 
Republic,  Edward  Benes,  magnetic  in  manner,  frank  in 
negotiation.  He  had  done  much  to  organize  the  revolu- 
tion that  swept  aside  the  Hapsburgs  and  to  build  up  the 
Czecho-SIovak  army  in  Siberia;  his  diplomatic  skill  had 
combined  with  the  solid  honesty  of  President  Masaryk  to 
win  the  recognition  of  the  Allies  for  the  infant  state. 
Then  again  the  claimant  would  be  the  Pole,  Dmowski, 
with  furrowed  visage,  clear  logic,  and  power  of  satire 
that  wounded  as  effectively,  though  less  ostentatiously, 
as  the  scalding  invective  of  Bratiano.  Paderewski  came 
to  Paris  only  late  in  the  history  of  the  Conference. 
There  also  were  the  Serbs,  the  patriarchal  Pachitch,  with 
white  flowing  beard,  veteran  of  many  a  diplomatic  bat- 
tle in  the  Balkans,  and  the  smooth-spoken  Vesnitch,  both 
representing  the  Serbia  of  old,  together  with  Trumbitch 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  95 

and  Zholger,  representatives  of  the  newly  freed  Austrian 
Jugo-SIavs. 

It  is  easy  to  imagine  the  perplexity  of  the  leading 
statesmen  of  the  Allies  as  they  listened  to  the  conflicting 
claims.  Districts  of  which  they  had  heard  but  vaguely, 
if  ever,  were  discussed  as  though  upon  the  fair  apportion- 
ment of  each  depended  the  entire  security  of  the  future. 
The  Banat,  Teschen,  Klagenfurt,  many  another  name 
which  was  soon  to  become  familiar — how  were  the  merits 
of  each  contention  justly  to  be  adjudged?  And  where 
the  time  for  the  study  of  details?  Inevitably  the  council 
adopted  a  suggestion,  long  mooted  by  Colonel  House 
and  approved  by  President  Wilson,  as  the  latter  appreci- 
ated the  time  lost  in  fruitless  debate,  namely,  that  the 
claims  of  the  Austrian  nationalities  be  heard  by  com- 
missions of  Allied  experts,  who  should  formulate  reports 
to  be  submitted  to  the  Conference,  and  which  when  ap- 
proved should  form  the  basis  of  the  treaties.  On  Feb- 
ruary I,  191 9,  the  council  appointed  the  first  of  the  terri- 
torial commissions,  whose  function  it  was  to  reduce  the 
questions  at  issue  in  the  matter  of  Rumanian  boundaries 
to  the  narrowest  possible  limits  and  to  suggest  solutions. 
Shortly  afterward  other  commissions  were  formed,  with 
similar  purpose,  to  study  Czecho-SIovak,  Polish,  and 
Jugo-SIav  frontiers,  and  in  this  way  prepare  the  new  map 
to  replace  the  Austria-Hungary  that  had  been  torn  to 
pieces. 

The  commissions  that  drafted  the  new  boundaries  were 
composed  of  representatives  of  France,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  and  the  United  States,  two  delegates  for  each 
power.  The  Europeans  were  generally  professional 
diplomats,  taken  from  the  foreign  offices,  and  included 
such  well-known  personalities  as  Jules  Cambon,  formerly 


96      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

French  ambassador  at  Berlin;  Andre  Tardieu,  Clemen- 
ceau's  chief  lieutenant  and  commissioner  of  Franco- 
American  affairs;  Marquis  Salvago  Raggi,  former  Italian 
ambassador  to  Berlin;  and  Sir  Eyre  Crowe,  of  the  British 
Foreign  Office.  They  were  supplemented  by  officials  not 
so  well  known,  but  qualified  by  their  special  study  of  the 
problems  to  be  settled. 

The  American  representatives  were  for  the  most  part 
chosen  from  Colonel  House's  "Inquiry,"  men  who  had 
spent  the  preceding  fourteen  months  in  gathering  ma- 
terials of  all  kinds,  economic,  poKtical,  geographic,  and 
historical,  which  would  help  to  form  a  basis  for  just  and 
practicable  boundaries.  The  Americans  were  naturally 
at  a  great  disadvantage  in  their  lack  of  diplomatic  experi- 
ence; they  were  incapable  of  utilizing  the  time-worn 
diplomatic  tricks  of  negotiation,  even  had  they  been  so 
inclined.  But  the  American  representatives  found  them- 
selves as  well  equipped  with  exact  facts  as  any  of  the 
foreigners.  There  is  an  incident  that  occurred  in  one  of 
the  commissions  that  is  not  without  interest  and  signifi- 
cance. The  commission  had  agreed  to  recommend  a 
certain  frontier,  but  on  studying  this  frontier  the  Amer- 
icans decided  that  a  change  should  be  made.  At  the  next 
meeting  the  American  delegate  asked  permission  to  in- 
troduce an  amendment  to  the  boundary-line,  stating 
that  he  had  with  him  the  statistics  which  would,  in  his 
opinion,  justify  the  change.  A  foreign  delegate  said  at 
once:  "I  suggest  that  we  accept  the  amendment  without 
asking  for  the  evidence.  Hitherto  the  facts  presented  by 
the  Americans  have  been  irrefutable;  it  would  be  a  waste 
of  time  to  consider  them." 

In  their  labors  the  commissions  followed  the  informal 
methods  of  discussion  inaugurated  by  the  council  of  ten. 


THE  END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  97 

They  were  presided  over  by  the  senior  French  delegate, 
full  minutes  of  the  debates  were  taken  by  a  joint  secre- 
tariat, and  remarks  were  translated,  since  proceedings 
were  in  both  Enghsh  and  French.  Informality  was  as- 
sisted by  the  practice  of  smoking,  without  which  their 
labors  would  have  seemed  interminable.  For  the  commis- 
sions took  their  responsibility  seriously  and  spared  neither 
time  nor  effort  in  endeavoring  to  secure  ideal  frontiers. 
In  general,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  their  decisions  resuhed 
from  honest  study  and  were  only  slightly  affected  by 
selfish  political  considerations.  The  American  point  of 
view  was  that  we  had  chief  interest  in  securing  a  lasting 
settlement  which  would  guarantee  tranquillity;  absolute 
justice  was  desirable,  not  merely  in  the  abstract  but  as 
promising  better  chance  of  permanence.  The  American 
propositions  were  accordingly  characterized  by  greater 
generosity  toward  the  defeated  nationalities — the  Ger- 
man-Austrians  and  the  Magyars.  So  far  as  possible,  the 
Americans  believed,  the  frontiers  ought  to  be  determined 
by  the  distribution  of  the  peoples,  and  the  creation  of 
discontented  groups  of  irredentists  should  be  avoided. 
Common  sense  and  justice  ahke  argued  against  the  bar- 
terings  of  peoples  for  political  purposes. 

The  Europeans  readily  accepted  this  point  of  view  in 
theory,  although  at  times  they  were  affected  by  special 
considerations.  Both  the  French  and  British  desired  to 
create  a  Czecho-SIovakia  with  easily  defensible  frontiers 
and  solid  economic  strength,  even  though  it  meant  the  in- 
clusion in  the  state  of  a  large  number  of  Germans  and 
Magyars.  Bohemia  was  looked  upon  as  a  bulwark 
against  a  resuscitated  Germany  which  might  some  time 
in  the  future  plan  a  new  drive  to  the  east.  They  also  de- 
sired adequate  railway  connections  between  the  Czechs 


98      WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

and  the  Rumanians,  an  ideal  which  compelled  the  ex- 
tension of  Rumanian  boundaries  beyond  the  Hmit  that 
strict  justice  might  have  required.  They  found  it  hard 
to  forget  that  the  Austrians  and  Magyars  were  still  the 
"enemy"  and  easy  to  accord  portions  of  their  territory 
to  their  friends,  Rumania  and  Czecho-SIovakia. 

The  Itahans,  on  the  other  hand,  showed  some  tender- 
ness toward  the  Austrians,  except  in  the  Tyrol,  since  they 
were  anxious  to  resume  friendly  commercial  relations  and, 
especially,  because  of  their  desire  to  weaken  the  Jugo- 
slavs. For  a  time  they  supported  the  claims  of  Rumania, 
based  upon  the  secret  treaty  of  191 6,  presumably  because 
they  wished  to  emphasize  the  validity  of  secret  treaties, 
for  they  themselves  had  been  promised  important  ac- 
quisitions by  the  secret  Treaty  of  London  of  191 5.  But 
when  the  Americans  declared  that  they  had  no  official 
knowledge  of  the  treaty  and  that  their  decisions  could 
not  be  affected  by  promises  made  before  America  entered 
the  war,  and  of  which  they  had  never  been  informed,  the 
Italians  accepted  the  situation  and  tended  rather  to  op- 
pose the  extensive  claims  of  Czechs  and  Rumanians. 
Evidently  they  feared  the  political  predominance  in 
southern  Europe  of  what  was  soon  to  be  called  the 
Little  Entente,  made  up  of  the  Czechs,  Rumanians,  and 
Jugo-SIavs. 

It  would  be  a  mistake,  however,  to  overemphasize  such 
motives  in  the  drawing  up  of  the  new  frontiers.  The  com- 
missions spent  long  hours  in  studying  the  conflicting 
claims  of  the  nationalities  and  in  comparing  them  with 
the  host  of  statistics  which  were  available.  If  nothing 
else  interfered  the  obvious  frontier  was  the  line  that 
separated  the  nationalities,  Czechs  from  Germans,  Ru- 
manians   from   Jugo-SIavs,   Jugo-SIavs    from   Magyars. 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE 


99 


But  many  other  factors  had  to  be  considered,  physio- 
graphic features,  the  disturbance  of  normal  economic  life, 
the  cutting  of  raihvays  by  boundaries.  If  a  chain  of 
mountains  or  a  river  offered  a  natural  frontier,  it  might 
seem  advisable  to  depart  slightly  from  the  linguistic  line. 
If  an  agricultural  district  of  Jugo-SIavs  were  economi- 
cally dependent  upon  a  German-Austrian  city,  it  might 
be  wise  to  leave  the  district  in  Austria.  If  the  linguistic 
line  were  crossed  and  recrossed  by  a  railway  or  canal,  it 
would  be  questionable  policy  not  to  arrange  the  political 
frontier  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  the  railway  or  canal 
entirely  within  one  state  or  the  other,  so  as  to  avoid 
troublesome  customs  interference  with  trade.  It  might 
even  be  necessary  to  consider  whether  a  district  should 
not  be  assigned  to  one  state  because  it  needed  its  agri- 
cultural or  mineral  wealth  in  order  to  secure  economic 
independence,  whereas  the  rival  state  did  not. 

With  such  factors  in  mind,  the  commissions  labored 
steadily  through  February  and  much  of  March,  finally 
presenting  their  reports  to  the  supreme  council.  The 
reports  were  composed  of  definite  recommendations  of 
the  new  boundaries,  illustrated  with  maps,  and  supported 
by  the  reasons  for  the  decisions  taken;  they  also  con- 
tained draft  clauses  to  be  inserted  in  the  treaties  with 
Germany,  Austria,  and  Hungary,  and  these  clauses 
formed  the  basis  of  the  territorial  sections  of  the  treaties. 
It  is  important  to  emphasize  the  fact,  perhaps,  that  the 
technical  aspects  of  the  treaties  were  not  drafted  hastily 
by  the  statesmen  of  the  great  powers,  who  obviously 
must  have  been  ignorant  of  many  details,  but  resulted, 
rather,  from  the  labors  and  application  of  a  body  of  tech- 
nical experts  who  had  taken  pains  to  go  into  all  phases 
of  the  situation. 


100    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

By  the  time  the  reports  were  completed  the  council  of 
ten  had  been  broken  up,  and  the  direction  of  the  Confer- 
ence assumed  by  the  council  of  four — Wilson,   Lloyd 
George,  Clemenceau,  and  Orlando.     It  was  for  them  to 
approve  the  boundaries  proposed  and  to  settle  any  dif- 
ferences  that   might   have   arisen   in   the   commissions. 
In  general  the  reports  were  unanimous,  for  all  the  dele- 
gates felt  the  necessity  of  arriving  at  definite  decisions 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  in  view  of  the  troubled  condition 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  the  imperative  need  of  a  resump- 
tion of  normal  life;  but  in  some  cases  a  delegation  had 
not   been   able  to  join  with  the  others  and  presented 
reservations  or  minority  reports.     Such  differences  must 
be  settled  by  the  council  of  four.     With  few  exceptions, 
the  four  approved  the  unanimous  recommendations  of 
the  commissions  without  alteration.     In  the  case  of  the 
northern   frontier  of  the  Czecho-SIovak  Republic  they 
failed  to  accept  recommendations  for  a  series  of  minor 
alterations   in   the  old   frontier  between   Bohemia   and 
Germany,  which  had  been  inserted  in  order  to  secure  a 
frontier  more  in  accordance  with  physiographical  fea- 
tures and  economic  convenience;  their  refusal  was  based 
upon   unwillingness  to   disturb   a  boundary  which   has 
existed  for  centuries.     Furthermore,  in  the  frontier  be- 
tween Austria  and  the  Jugo-SIavs,  they  listened  to  the 
protests   of  the   Jugo-SIavs,    who   demanded   that   the 
Klagenfurt  basin  be  divided  for  purposes  of  plebiscite, 
whereas  the  commission  had  voted  to  preserve  the  integ- 
rity of  the  basin.     And,  in  fact,  the  commission  was  later 
to  be  justified  by  the  recent  vote  of  the  peoples  concerned, 
which  kept  the  basin  intact  and  awarded  it  to  Austria, 
a  solution   for  which  the  Americans   had   always   con- 
tended.    Such  changes  in  the  recommendations  of  the 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  loi 

commissions  were  rare,  and  they  seemed  more  important 
at  the  moment  and  to  the  members  of  the  commission 
than  they  will  to  the  historian. 

Over  the  points  in  dispute  the  council  of  four  worked 
with  earnest  industry  and  surprising  informahty.  They 
met  in  the  front  room  of  President  Wilson's  house,  fre- 
quently with  the  members  of  the  commissions,  Hstening 
to  different  points  of  view.  There  one  might  have  seen 
President  Wilson  himself  on  all  fours,  kneeling  on  a 
gigantic  map  spread  upon  the  floor  and  tracing  with 
his  finger  a  proposed  boundary,  other  plenipotentiaries 
grouped  around  him,  also  on  all  fours.  In  such  matters 
the  President  took  a  keener  interest  than  either  Lloyd 
George  or  Clemenceau,  and  absorbed  with  extraordinary 
speed  the  salient  points  relating  to  an  issue,  which  were 
frequently  whispered  to  him  by  some  American  expert 
sitting  on  the  sofa  beside  him.  When  finally  approved, 
the  draft  clauses  were  inserted  in  the  treaties  and  com- 
municated to  the  nationalities  of  the  disrupted  empire. 
The  latter,  while  they  were  apparently  in  the  position  of 
litigants  in  a  suit,  in  reality  had  been  kept  informed  of 
the  different  decisions  taken  and  had  been  able  at  vari- 
ous points  to  influence  decisions  in  their  favor.  The 
representatives  of  the  new  Austria  and  Hungary  were, 
of  course,  not  called  to  Paris  until  the  treaties  were  com- 
pleted, at  least  in  their  main  aspects,  and,  like  the  Ger- 
mans, could  plead  their  cause  only  in  written  notes. 

With  certain  exceptions,  the  boundaries  finally  ap- 
proved conform  roughly  to  the  distribution  of  the  sev- 
eral peoples,  although  in  all  matters  of  doubt  the  balance 
turns  slightly  against  the  former  dominant  nationalities 
— the  Germans  and  Magyars.  One  of  the  exceptions  to 
be  noted  is  the  case  of  the  Austrian  Tyrol,  where  the 


102     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

demands  of  the  Italians  for  annexation  of  the  Tyrol  as 
far  north  as  the  Brenner  Pass  were  granted,  as  promised 
in  the  secret  Treaty  of  London.  It  should  not  be  for- 
gotten that  this  problem  was  not  considered  by  any  ter- 
ritorial commission,  since  Italy  refused  to  permit  any 
discussion  of  her  territorial  claims  except  by  the  supreme 
council.  France  and  Great  Britain  were  bound  by  their 
promises,  and  President  Wilson,  early  in  the  history 
of  the  Conference,  agreed  to  Italian  demands  in  this 
quarter. 

To  Italy  the  Brenner  frontier  appears  the  merest 
Justice,  for  it  is  unquestionably  the  best  geographical 
boundary  and  affords  the  surest  strategical  security; 
the  importance  of  the  latter  factor  was  emphasized  the 
more  by  Italians,  inasmuch  as  Italy's  northern  frontier 
had  in  the  past  always  been  dominated  by  the  Austrian 
military  positions.  Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  while 
admitting  the  justice  of  the  annexation  by  Italy  of  the 
southern  Tyrol,  with  its  400,000  Italians,  complained 
that  the  Brenner  frontier  would  annex  some  250,000 
German-Austrians  to  Italy,  and  that  these  peoples  are 
of  all  Hapsburg  subjects  the  most  loyal  to  Vienna;  for 
this  was  the  home  of  Andreas  Hofer.  Austria  asked, 
accordingly,  that  the  linguistic  frontier,  farther  south,  be 
followed  in  assigning  political  boundaries.  A  third  solu- 
tion was  advanced  by  certain  experts  at  Paris,  and  ap- 
proved by  many  Americans,  which  would  have  placed 
the  line  about  midway  between  the  other  two,  thus  leav- 
ing the  majority  of  the  Germans  in  Austria,  but  securing 
for  Italy  a  better  defensive  frontier  and  one  less  injurious 
to  the  economic  interests  of  the  inhabitants  than  the 
linguistic  hne.  The  decision  of  President  Wilson,  who 
may  have  desired  to  convince  Italy  of  his  friendliness  in 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  103 

view  of  the  Adriatic  situation,  settled  the  problem  in 
favor  of  Italy. 

A  second  exception  to  the  general  rule  that  the  politi- 
cal boundary  should  conform  roughly  to  the  linguistic  is 
to  be  found  in  the  case  of  Czecho-SIovakia.  The  Czechs 
demanded  not  merely  union  with  their  Slovak  cousins  of 
northern  Hungary,  a  development  which  in  view  of  their 
services  in  the  war  was  inevitable  and  probably  wise, 
but  also  that  their  boundaries  should  be  so  arranged  as 
to  include  a  large  number  of  Germans  and  Magyars. 
The  northern  rim  of  Bohemia  is  almost  exclusively  Ger- 
man and  a  strict  application  of  the  principle  of  nation- 
ality in  this  region,  and  in  Moravia  and  Silesia,  would 
have  given  something  more  than  3,000,000  Germans 
to  Austria  and  Germany  (for  the  creation  of  a  separate 
German-Bohemian  state  was  hardly  within  the  realm  of 
practical  possibility).  But  the  Czechs  argued  that  to 
rob  Bohemia  of  its  geographic  and  historic  boundary 
would  be  to  lay  it  open  to  the  attack  of  Germany  from 
the  north.  Furthermore,  it  would  deal  a  mortal  blow 
at  the  economic  life  of  the  new  state  by  taking  away 
districts  essential  to  Bohemia's  industrial  prosperity. 
The  districts  in  question,  even  though  inhabited  by 
Germans,  were  closely  bound  in  the  economic  sense  to 
the  Czech  districts,  and  naturally  separated  from  Ger- 
many; the  inhabitants  themselves  would  suffer  from  any 
arrangement  which  cut  them  off.  Such  arguments,  par- 
ticularly those  which  emphasized  the  economic  factors, 
seemed  valid  to  the  commissions,  which  accordingly 
recommended  the  historic  boundaries  of  the  provinces  of 
Bohemia  and  Moravia,  with  slight  rectifications.  The 
third  province,  Silesia,  was  divided  between  the  Czechs 
and  the  Poles. 


THE  END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  105 

While  the  Czechs  argued  for  historic  frontiers  in  Aus- 
tria, when  it  came  to  the  Slovak  districts  of  Hungary, 
they  insisted  that  the  historic  boundaries  of  the  king- 
dom be  broken  so  as  to  permit  incorporation  of  those 
districts  in  the  new  Czecho-SIovakia.  They  also  asked 
that  a  notable  Magyar  minority  be  included  on  the 
south.  Without  the  territory  of  these  Magyars,  Slo- 
vakia, which  is  a  mountainous  country  with  no  transverse 
valleys  of  importance  running  east  and  west,  would  be 
deprived  of  practical  means  of  communication  between 
one  part  of  the  country  and  the  other.  Again,  the  com- 
mission agreed,  not  forgetting  President  Wilson's  prin- 
ciple that  every  state  has  a  right  to  conditions  that  will 
assure  its  economic  life.  Czecho-SIovakia  is  thus  a  poly- 
glot, for  of  its  14,000,000  inhabitants  there  are  more 
than  a  third  belonging  to  other  nationalities,  chiefly 
Germans,  Magyars,  and  Ruthenians. 

The  new  Rumania,  which  acquired  enormous  terri- 
tories in  Transylvania,  Hungary,  and  Bukowina,  is  like- 
wise a  polyglot  state.  This  results  partly  from  the  fact 
that  in  Transylvania,  which  is  chiefly  Rumanian  in 
character,  large  colonies  of  Magyars  (Szeklers)  and  Ger- 
mans are  to  be  found.  Furthermore,  Rumania,  like 
Czecho-SIovakia,  was  assigned  generous  frontiers  on  the 
Hungarian  side  in  order  to  assure  facilities  of  transpor- 
tation. Without  the  railways  running  north  and  south, 
communication  between  northern  and  southern  Tran- 
sylvania would  be  costly  or  impossible.  Hence  the  new 
Rumania  includes  a  notable  Magyal  fringe. 

The  chief  interest  of  Rumania,  however,  was  to  acquire 
that  district  in  southern  Hungary  between  the  Danube, 
Theiss,  and  Maros  Rivers,  which  is  known  as  the  Banat 
of  Temesvar.     This  district,  which  is  an  economic  en- 


io6    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

tity,  was  claimed  by  both  Rumanians  and  Serbs,  the 
former  demanding  all  of  it,  the  latter  only  the  western 
portion,  since  the  eastern  third  is  admittedly  Rumanian. 
The  problem  was  intensified  by  the  confused  distribution 
of  peoples,  Serb,  German,  Magyar,  and  Rumanian  vil- 
lages being  scattered  in  that  Macedonian  fashion  which 
has  given  its  name  to  a  well-known  salad.  It  was  fur- 
ther intensified  by  the  network  of  communications,  rail- 
ways, rivers,  and  canals,  through  which  no  frontier  could 
be  drawn  without  injury  to  the  economic  interests  of  the 
inhabitants.  But  to  hand  the  entire  region  to  Rumania 
meant  the  creation  of  an  irredentist  spirit  among  the 
Serbs,  who  claimed  several  districts  as  the  homes  of 
national  heroes,  who  needed  protection  across  the  Dan- 
ube for  Belgrade,  and  who,  in  the  western  portions,  un- 
doubtedly outnumbered  the  Rumanians.  With  such 
considerations  in  mind,  the  commission  decided  to  divide 
the  Banat,  giving  the  western  third  to  the  Serbs  and  the 
eastern  two-thirds  to  the  Rumanians.  The  decision  was 
probably  inevitable.  No  one  will  call  it  satisfactory.  It 
has  at  least  this  merit:  it  so  enraged  both  parties  to  the 
dispute  that  they  forgot  the  enmity  toward  each  other 
in  their  common  disgust  with  the  Peace  Conference. 

Whatever  the  disappointment  occasioned  to  the  con- 
tending nationalities  of  the  former  empire,  the  new 
boundaries  of  the  states  into  which  the  fragments  have 
been  formed  are  a  clear  manifestation  of  the  degree  of 
importance  assigned  to  the  principle  of  nationality  by 
the  Conference.  That  principle  was  even  applied  to 
Austria  and  Hungary,  the  former  being  accorded  districts 
inhabited  by  Germans  along  its  eastern  frontier,  which 
by  historic  right  belonged  to  Hungary.  Respect  for  the 
principle  of  nationality   forms   the  strong  side   of  the 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  107 

settlement.  In  place  of  the  semi-feudal  system  of  the 
Hapsburgs,  imposing  the  edicts  of  hostile  minorities  upon 
subject  majorities,  outworn  remnant  of  an  age  that  is 
past,  we  have  political  power  granted  in  accordance  with 
popular  desires.  It  is  the  principle  for  which  Ameri- 
can statesmen  have  contended  since  the  birth  of  the 
nation. 

No  honest  student  of  European  conditions,  however, 
can  be  blind  to  the  new  dangers  which  have  been  created. 
It  is  undeniable  that  a  considerable  stretch  of  territory 
has  been  Balkanized,  that  in  place  of  a  co-ordinating 
whole  we  find  a  group  of  small  states,  which  by  temper 
and  experience  are  not  as  yet  well  qualified  to  meet  the 
contingencies  of  the  future  with  that  moderation  and 
spirit  of  compromise  which  is  essential  to  tranquillity 
and  progress.  The  very  factors  which  enabled  the 
nationalities  to  secure  their  freedom  have  intensified 
their  self-confidence,  their  sense  of  nationalistic  Jealousy, 
their  willingness  to  take  up  arms. 

Occasion  for  friction  between  the  different  states  will, 
unfortunately,  not  be  lacking.  Each  state  includes 
something  of  a  nationalistic  minority,  which  will  look  for 
support  to  its  kinsmen,  who  form  the  majority  in  the 
neighboring  state.  Czecho-SIovakia  and  Rumania,  we 
have  seen,  include  large  minorities  of  aliens;  Ruthenians 
are  brought  under  the  political  control  of  Poland;  Ger- 
mans and  Jugo-SIavs  are  annexed  in  large  numbers  by 
Italy.  Jugo-SIavia  includes  comparatively  few  outsid- 
ers, but  the  diff^erences  between  Croats,  Slovenes,  and 
Serbs  do  not  promise  a  tranquil  future.  In  the  United 
States  we  think  little  of  the  dangers  apt  to  proceed  from 
a  racial  melange,  but  in  this  part  of  Europe,  if  a  man 
speaks  a  diff"erent  language  from  that  of  his  neighbor,  he 


io8    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

becomes  almost  necessarily  his  enemy.  With  this  in 
mind  the  Conference,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the  states, 
drew  up  guarantees  to  be  furnished  to  all  minority 
groups,  assuring  them  the  protection  and  the  justice 
which  in  this  country  are  taken  as  a  matter  of  course. 
How  seriously  these  guarantees  will  be  observed  is  a 
problem  of  the  future. 

We  may  also  expect  that  difFicuIties  will  develop  from 
economic  quarrels.  Three  of  the  states  formed  from  the 
Hapsburg  empire  are  absolutely  landlocked.  Of  these, 
lesser  Austria  is  perhaps  in  the  worst  plight.  Cut  off 
from  territorial  access  to  the  sea,  with  its  capital  city  of 
2,000,000  inhabitants  placed  on  the  eastern  frontier,  and 
poor  in  natural  resources,  the  new  Austria  lacks  many 
of  the  conditions  conducive  to  economic  prosperity.  It 
would  have  been  natural,  in  view  of  the  purely  German 
character  of  its  population,  to  have  permitted  union  with 
Germany.  This  was,  on  the  whole,  approved  by  the 
American  delegates,  as  it  was  requested  by  the  Austrians 
themselves.  The  French,  however,  set  their  face  firmly 
against  any  acquisition  of  territory  by  the  secular  enemy 
across  the  Rhine.  We  may  ask  whether  the  six  and  a 
half  million  German-Austrians  might  not  tend  to  coun- 
terbalance the  Prussian  domination  in  Germany,  for  they 
have  much  in  common  with  the  south  German.  Cer- 
tainly union  would  tend  toward  the  economic  rehabilita- 
tion of  these  regions  which  is  so  essential  to  political 
tranquillity. 

If  the  Conference  made  a  mistake,  the  economic  conse- 
quences of  which  may  prove  disastrous,  in  not  permitting 
the  union  of  lesser  Austria  with  Germany,  it  committed 
another  of  equally  serious  character  when  it  attempted 
to  lay  the  sins  of  the  Hapsburgs  upon  the  new  state. 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  109 

The  Austrian  representatives  at  St.  Germain  argued 
with  a  logic  which  to  many  Americans  seemed  incontro- 
vertible, that  lesser  Austria  was  in  reality  a  new  state, 
sprung  from  the  revolution  of  November,  191 8,  and  that 
it  should  not  be  punished  by  being  forced  to  assume 
responsibility  for  a  war  debt  and  reparations  account  in- 
curred by  the  Hapsburg  government,  with  which  it  had 
no  connection.  In  the  case  of  Germany,  the  fall  of  the 
HohenzoIIerns  had  not  made  a  new  Germany;  but  the 
Austrian  revolution  had  resulted  rh  the  birth  of  a  num- 
ber of  new  states,  and  it  was  unfair  to  impose  upon  two 
of  those  states  responsibility  for  the  misdeeds  of  the  old 
empire.  Austria,  they  insisted,  was  as  much  a  new  state 
as  Czecho-SIovakia.  With  greater  force  they  pointed 
out  that  with  a  population  less  than  a  seventh  that  of  the 
former  Hapsburg  empire,  it  would  be  physically  impos- 
sible to  make  good  the  war  damage  for  which  the  old 
empire  was  responsible.  But  the  Conference  persisted 
in  treating  lesser  Austria  with  lesser  Hungary  as  the 
successors  of  the  Hapsburg  empire  and  adopted  the  same 
method  as  that  used  in  dealing  with  Germany;  the  Treaty 
of  St.  Germain  compels  Austria  to  recognize  her  liability 
to  pay  full  reparations,  although  the  reparations  commis- 
sion is  given  wide  discretionary  powers. 

The  same  attitude  was  taken  toward  lesser  Hungary. 
Like  Austria,  that  state  now  becomes  landlocked,  and  it 
has  been  deprived  of  its  mountainous  periphery,  so  rich 
in  coal,  precious  metals,  lumber,  and  water-power.  But 
Hungary  retains  the  fertile  plain,  productive  of  cereals, 
and  can  ahvays  feed  itself.  Czecho-SIovakia,  the  third 
landlocked  state,  has  inherited  the  lion's  share  of  the 
industrial  districts  of  the  former  empire,  the  coal  and 
lignite  fields,  the  great  manufactories,  and  also  fertile 


no    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

agricultural  regions,  so  that  it  appears,  broadly  speaking, 
to  be  economically  independent. 

But  in  the  case  of  all  three  of  these  states,  which  lack 
seaports,  there  is  the  danger  that  freedom  of  transit 
may  be  denied  them  by  the  neighboring  states,  through 
whose  territory  they  must  send  their  exports.  Such  a 
danger  was  constantly  in  the  minds  of  the  peacemakers 
at  Paris,  who  not  merely  drew  up  general  articles  guar- 
anteeing freedom  of  transit  and  international  control  of 
means  of  transportation,  but  gave  to  Czecho-SIovakia 
part  of  the  ports  of  Hamburg  and  Stettin,  and  approved 
her  claim  to  Pressburg  on  the  Danube,  although  the 
population  of  the  city  included  only  a  Czech  minority. 
But  the  danger  resulting  from  lack  of  seaports  is  none 
the  less  real,  though  clearly  perceived  at  Paris  and  pos- 
sibly mitigated  to  some  extent  by  international  control 
of  communication. 

That  danger  is  intensified  by  the  economic  interde- 
pendence of  the  heirs  of  the  Hapsburgs.  Austria  will 
have  to  import  raw  materials,  coal  and  the  like,  from 
which  to  produce  manufactured  goods,  and  will  have  to 
export  these  goods  to  buy  food.  Hungary  will  have  to 
exchange  its  grain  for  manufactured  articles.  There  is 
always  the  opportunity  for  one  state  to  exercise  political 
pressure  upon  its  neighbor  through  an  economic  boycott. 
It  was  this  danger  that  as  much  as  anything  else  con- 
vinced the  commissions  who  worked  on  the  new  bound- 
aries of  southeastern  Europe  that  some  general  super- 
visionary  agency  was  necessary  to  replace  the  co-ordina- 
tion that  the  Hapsburgs  had  exercised.  Without  such 
international  supervision  economic  tranquillity  and  polit- 
ical peace  would  always  be  endangered.  For  this  reason 
many  of  the  delegates,  certainly  those  from  America, 


THE   END  OF  AN   EMPIRE  in 

believed  that  the  proposed  League  of  Nations  was  de- 
sirable, not  merely  because  of  its  abstract  idealism,  but 
rather  as  a  concrete  necessity.  And  they  readily  appre- 
ciated the  remark  of  Venizelos:  "Without  a  League  of 
Nations  southeastern  Europe  would  face  the  future 
with  despair  in  its  heart." 


VI 

FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM 

BY   DOUGLAS   WILSON   JOHNSON 

The  story  of  Fiume  is  closely  linked  with  the  whole 
problem  of  Italy's  new  frontiers.  Both  in  the  Trentino 
on  the  north  and  in  the  region  of  the  Isonzo  on  the  east 
Italy  suffered  before  the  war  from  frontiers  which  were 
geographically  unsound,  and  which  invited  invasion  by 
a  dangerous  neighbor.  The  boundary  ran  either  close 
to  the  southern  margin  of  the  Alps,  or  actually  down  on 
the  piedmont  plain  south  of  them,  leaving  almost  the 
whole  of  the  formidable  mountain  mass  in  Austria  as  a 
well-nigh  impregnable  defense  against  Italy,  while  Italy 
remained  virtually  defenseless  against  possible  Austrian 
aggression. 

It  is  difficult  for  Americans  to  conceive  what  this 
meant  to  the  Italian  people,  for  we  live  secure  with  de- 
fenseless frontiers  separating  us  from  weaker  neighbors 
on  the  north  and  south.  Yet  if  we  are  to  appreciate  the 
Itahan  point  of  view,  we  must  try  to  put  ourselves  in 
the  position  of  a  people  who  find  the  gateways  into  their 
country  held  by  an  hereditary  enemy,  who  have  often 
suffered  from  invasions  through  those  gateways  in  the 
past,  and  who  know  that  they  are  held  by  the  enemy 
for  the  deliberate  purpose  of  making  any  possible  future 
invasion  easy.  Add  to  this  the  further  fact  that  Austria's 
strategic  designs  against  Italy  involved  the  enslavement 
of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Italians,  both  in  the  north 

112 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC  PROBLEM     113 

and  in  the  east,  and  it  is  not  difFiciiIt  to  understand  that 
the  battle-cry  of  "Trent  and  Trieste!"  should  awaken 
the  fighting  spirit  of  every  patriotic  Italian.  Whatever 
the  objectives  of  the  then-existing  government  of  Italy, 
it  would  seem  clear  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people, 
who  knew  nothing  of  the  terms  of  the  secret  Treaty  of 
London,  entered  the  war  not  to  subject  large  areas  of 
Germanic  and  Slavonic  territory  to  their  rule,  nor  even 
to  gain  the  port  of  Fiume,  with  its  remote  islet  of  Italian 
population;"  rather,  they  entered  the  war  in  a  fervor  of 
exalted  patriotism,  to  complete  the  great  work  of  uni- 
fication of  Italy  by  freeing  truly  Italian  territory  from  a 
foreign  yoke,  and  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the  very 
threshold  of  their  homes  back  into  his  own  domain. 

Since  certain  aspects  of  the  Trentino  or  Tyrol  problem 
are  inseparable  from  the  story  of  Fiume,  let  us  pass  in 
brief  review  the  salient  features  of  that  problem.  The 
Italian  Government  demanded  the  whole  Trentino  to  the 
line  of  the  Brenner  Pass,  and  in  the  secret  Treaty  of 
London  the  Allies  promised  it  as  part  of  the  compensa- 
tion to  be  given  Italy  for  her  aid  against  the  Central 
Powers.  At  the  Peace  Conference  Italy  increased  her 
demands,  claiming  in  addition  to  what  the  treaty  allowed 
her  several  important  areas  on  the  northern  slopes  of 
the  watershed  having  considerable  strategic  importance. 

As  the  Italian  claims  would  certainly  be  supported  by 
racial,  historical,  geographic,  and  strategic  arguments,  it 
was  necessary  for  the  American  specialists  to  examine 
fully  into  every  aspect  of  the  problem.  It  is  true  that  in 
the  drainage  basin  of  the  Adige  River,  forming  most  of 
the  Trentino,  the  majority  of  the  population  is  Italian. 
But  it  is  equally  true  that  even  the  Italian  authorities 
on  the  distribution  of  races  in  the  Trentino  admit  that 


114    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  Italian  majority  is  largely  confined  to  the  south, 
while  the  northern  parts  of  the  basin  are  overwhelmingly 
German  and  have  been  so  for  centuries.  It  was  found 
possible  to  draw  in  the  Trentino  one  of  the  cleanest-cut 
ethnographic  frontiers  in  the  world,  leaving  few  Germans 
to 'the  south  and  few  Italians  to  the  north  of  it. 

A  careful  study  of  the  theory  that  the  watershed 
crossing  the  Brenner  Pass  was  the  only  natural  northern 
frontier  for  Italy,  and  that  the  drainage  basin  of  the 
Adige  River  constituted  an  indivisible  geographic  unit, 
did  not  substantiate  that  view.  In  the  Alps,  as  is  so 
often  the  case  in  glaciated  mountains,  the  drainage  di- 
vide is  in  places  determined  by  some  insignificant  topo- 
graphic detail,  such  as  a  small  moraine  or  a  tiny  alluvial 
fan  in  the  bottom  of  a  great  valley.  The  Adige  water- 
shed, instead  of  following  along  Alpine  ridges,  actually 
descends  into  and  cuts  squarely  across  the  floor  of  the 
Pusterthal,  thus  dividing  in  an  accidental  and  abnormal 
manner  one  of  the  most  striking  geographic  units  in  the 
Alps.  The  true  boundary  between  geographic  units,  the 
real  topographic  barrier  separating  German  and  Italian 
lands  in  that  part  of  the  Alps  east  of  the  Brenner  Pass, 
lies  not  on  the  watershed,  but  some  distance  south  of  it. 

Italy's  historical  claim  to  a  frontier  on  the  Brenner  Pass 
seemed  equally  weak.  The  former  extent  of  the  Roman 
Empire  over  the  coveted  area  could  not  seriously  be 
regarded  as  a  basis  of  territorial  awards  in  the  twentieth 
century.  The  argument  that  Napoleon's  annexation  of 
the  upper  Adige  to  the  kingdom  of  Italy  showed  the  mili- 
tary and  political  necessity  of  granting  Italy  a  frontier  on 
the  Brenner  fell  to  the  ground  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  "Upper  Adige"  of  Napoleon's  time  stopped  far  short 
of  the  Brenner   and   included   little   beyond  the  lands 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     115 

which  to-day  are  unquestionably  Italian.  If  Napoleon's 
action  proved  anything,  it  proved  that  that  military 
genius  did  not  regard  a  frontier  on  the  Brenner  as  vital 
to  Italy. 

Yet  the  strategic  arguments  in  favor  of  Italy's  claim  to 
the  whole  of  the  Trentino  were  the  strongest  which  could 
be  advanced.  The  long,  narrow  form  of  the  Italian 
peninsula,  by  rendering  peculiarly  difficult  the  mobihza- 
tion  of  Italy's  man-power,  makes  the  need  of  a  strong 
frontier  on  the  north  especially  urgent.  Fifty  per  cent 
of  the  defenders  of  the  frontier  must  come  from  south  of 
the  constriction  of  the  peninsula  near  the  latitude  of 
Bologna,  and  must  journey  to  and  through  that  con- 
striction on  four  main  railway  lines,  of  which  three 
traverse  the  Apennines  mountain  barrier  and  two  can  be 
destroyed  from  the  sea.  Hence,  Italy  might  with  some 
show  of  reason  demand  a  strategic  frontier  so  strong  that 
in  case  of  attack  a  fraction  of  her  man-power  could  defend 
it  successfully  against  superior  enemy  forces  until  the 
whole  could   be  mobilized. 

The  geographic  character  of  Italy's  northern  frontier 
compels  her  to  maintain  two  campaigns  against  a  Teu- 
tonic or  a  combined  Teutonic-Slavonic  aggression.  Italy's 
northern  plain  is  vulnerable  from  the  north  and  from  the 
east.  The  armies  defending  the  eastern  frontier  depend 
upon  supply  fines  which  traverse  the  Venetian  plain  for 
150  miles  in  sight  of  an  enemy  advancing  over  the  north- 
ern mountains.  Hence  the  eastern  armies  must  always 
fight  under  the  menace  of  a  disaster  which  is  inevitable 
if  the  enemy  on  the  north  succeeds  in  reaching  the  plain 
and  cutting  their  communications.  In  the  present  war 
Cadorna's  eastern  operations  came  to  an  abrupt  halt 
in  May,  191 6,  when  he  was  compelled  to  transfer  large 


ii6    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

forces  westward  to  check  the  dangerous  Austrian  advance 
across  the  Asiago  plateau  almost  to  the  edge  of  the 
plains.  Irretrievable  disaster  to  the  eastern  armies  was 
narrowly  averted.  The  magnitude  of  the  Caporetto 
disaster,  consequent  upon  the  Teutonic  armies'  breaking 
through  to  the  plains  near  the  extreme  eastern  end  of  the 
northern  frontier,  enables  one  to  picture  the  far  more 
serious  consequences  which  must  ensue  if  ever  the  north- 
ern mountain  barrier  is  breached  farther  west,  and  the 
communications  of  the  eastern  armies  destroyed  150 
miles   in   their   rear. 

Since  Italy's  military  forces  will  not  admit  of  two  offen- 
sive campaigns  against  so  powerful  an  enemy,  at  least 
one  of  these  campaigns  must  be  defensive.  Topographic 
conditions  dictate  that  the  defensive  campaign  should  be 
the  northern  one,  for  a  successful  offensive  across  the 
main  Alpine  barrier,  supported  by  but  one  through  rail- 
way line,  has  less  chance  of  success  than  an  offensive  in 
the  east,  where  the  terrain  is  less  difficult,  raihvays  are 
more  numerous,  and  support  by  sea  is  possible.  Hence 
we  conclude  that  Italy's  northern  frontier  should  be 
strategically  so  strong  as  to  render  a  defensive  campaign 
in  the  north  comparatively  simple  and  assured  of  success, 
leaving  the  bulk  of  her  forces  free  to  defend  the  eastern 
gateways. 

It  so  happens  that  the  Central  Alps  provide  a  series  of 
natural  trenches  and  mountain  barriers  together  consti- 
tuting one  of  the  strongest  defensive  terrains  in  the 
world.  But  the  Austrian  province  of  the  Trentino 
drove  a  wedge  clear  through  the  system,  rendering  the 
defense  of  Italian  territory  extremely  difficult,  and  assur- 
ing tremendous  advantages  to  a  possible  Teutonic  in- 
vasion.    In  the  opinion  of  the  American  specialists,  to 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     117 

push  the  frontier  northward  only  so  far  as  the  ethno- 
graphic frontier  would  still  leave  Austria,  or  Germany 
and  Austria  combined  in  case  of  their  future  union,  in 
possession  of  very  great  strategic  advantages  over  their 
Latin  neighbor,  advantages  which  might  invite  aggression. 
To  push  the  boundary  farther  north,  to  the  natural 
topographic  barrier  referred  to  above,  would  give  rea- 
sonable protection  to  Italy  by  making  invasion  from  the 
north  so  difficult  as  to  be  highly  improbable,  and  would 
add  the  minimum  German  population  to  Italy  compatible 
with  securing  a  good  geographic  and  defensive  frontier 
for  the  southern  Kingdom.  To  push  the  frontier  clear 
to  the  Brenner  and  eastward  into  the  Pustertal,  as  Italy 
asked,  would  be  to  carry  it  far  into  purely  Germanic 
territory,  to  enlarge  the  German  irredenta  to  dangerous 
proportions,  and  to  spht  the  geographic  and  economic 
unit  of  the  Pusterthal.  In  favor  of  the  latter  proposal 
it  could,  however,  be  urged  that  the  territory  to  the 
Brenner  had  secretly  been  promised  to  Italy  by  England 
and  France  in  order  to  secure  Italy's  entry  into  the  war 
on  the  Allied  side,  that  a  frontier  well  advanced  into 
Germanic  territory  would  still  more  effectively  protect 
Italian  territory,  and  that  generous  treatment  of  Italy's 
demands  on  the  northern  frontier,  where  the  mountainous 
terrain  was  not  in  any  sense  vital  to  the  development  of 
neighboring  lands,  might  make  Italy  more  willing  to 
reduce  her  demands  on  the  east  where  she  claimed  areas 
the  annexation  of  which  would  render  impossible  the  free 
economic  development  of  her  neighbors. 

The  Conference  decided  in  favor  of  the  most  generous 
fulfilment  of  Itahan  ambitions  on  the  north,  and  gave 
her  not  only  all  the  territory  to  the  watershed  frontier 
promised  by  the  Treaty  of  London,  but  in  addition  the 


ii8    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Sexten  valley  district  lying  beyond  the  watershed  and 
conferring  important  strategic  advantages  on  its  pos- 
sessor. With  Italy's  frontier  established  in  an  impreg- 
nable position  on  the  north,  and  all  danger  of  invasion 
from  that  direction  eliminated,  we  may  now  consider  the 
eastern  frontier  in  its  proper  relation  to  Italy's  frontier 
problem  as  a  whole. 

On  the  east  the  Italian  Government  had  demanded  as 
one  of  the  conditions  of  Italy's  entrance  into  the  war, 
and  in  the  Treaty  of  London  England  and  France  had 
promised  to  give,  not  only  the  Italian-inhabited  areas 
around  Goritzia  and  Trieste,  but  vast  areas  of  almost 
pure  Slavonic  country  about  the  head  of  the  Adriatic 
and  on  the  eastern  shores  of  that  sea,  as  well  as  a  large 
proportion  of  the  Slav-populated  islands  fringing  the 
eastern  coast. 

The  American  Government  not  only  consistently  re- 
fused to  recognize  the  Treaty  of  London,  a  document 
held  to  be,  both  in  the  manner  of  its  execution  and  in 
its  precise  terms,  fundamentally  in  opposition  to  the 
very  principles  for  which  America  was  lighting,  but  early 
recognized  the  right  of  the  Jugo-SIavs  to  rule  them- 
selves. President  Wilson  took  certain  other  steps  more 
or  less  incompatible  with  the  fulfilment  of  the  terms  of 
the  treaty,  such  as  securing  the  consent  of  the  Allied 
Powers  to  make  peace  on  terms  which  provided  for  the 
determination  of  Italy's  new  frontiers  "along  clearly 
recognizable  lines  of  nationality."  Throughout  the  ne- 
gotiations the  American  Government  held  to  the  view 
that  the  Treaty  of  London  was  obsolete  in  view  of  the 
disappearance  of  Austria-Hungary  as  a  great  Power  (at 
whose  expense  the  treaty  was  to  have  been  executed), 
the  agreement  of  the  AHies  to  erect  a  new    Jugo-SIav 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC  PROBLEM     119 

nation  associated  with  them  and  Italy,  the  entry  into 
the  war  of  new  nations  not  parties  to  the  treaty,  and 
the  agreement  of  the  Alhes,  Italy  included,  to  make 
peace  on  a  new  basis  of  right  and  Justice. 

When,  as  a  result  of  the  Russian  revokition,  the  con- 
tents of  the  secret  Treaty  of  London  were  made  public, 
the  Jugo-SIav  forces  in  the  Austrian  army,  strongly  dis- 
affected toward  their  Teutonic  master  and  held  in  con- 
trol only  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  were  galvanized 
into  new  hostility  against  Italy.  It  was  not  difficult  for 
the  Austrian  leaders  to  show  that  by  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  itself  Italy  was  not  fighting  to  set  the  western 
Jugo-SIavs  free,  but  rather  to  transfer  nearly  a  million 
of  them  to  Italian  rule.  The  consequences  were  most 
harmful,  not  only  to  Italy,  but  to  the  whole  Allied  cause. 
Thoughtful  Italians  deplored  the  fact  that  much  Itafian 
blood  was  being  shed  by  a  people  who  were,  fike  them- 
selves, sufferers  at  the  hands  of  a  common  enemy  and 
oppressor. 

After  the  Caporetto  disaster  Italian  appreciation  of 
this  anomalous  situation  became  more  acute,  and  infor- 
mal negotiations  were  begun  between  Itafian  and  Jugo- 
SIav  representatives  looking  toward  an  accord.  These 
negotiations  bore  fruit  in  the  "Pact  of  Rome,"  ratified 
by  the  Congress  of  Oppressed  Austro-Hungarian  Nation- 
alities at  Rome  in  April,  191 8,  according  to  which  the 
representatives  of  the  Itafian  people  and  of  the  Jugo- 
SIav  people  specifically  agreed  **in  the  interests  of  good 
and  sincere  relations  between  the  two  peoples  in  the 
future,  to  solve  amicably  the  various  territorial  contro- 
versies on  the  basis  of  the  principles  of  nationality  and 
of  the  rights  of  peoples  to  decide  their  own  fate,  and  in 
such  a  way  as  not  to  injure  the  vital  interests  of  the 


120    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

two  nations,  such  as  shall  be  defined  at  the  moment  of 
peace." 

Later  Italy,  in  common  with  the  other  AUies,  accepted 
as  the  basis  of  the  peace  with  Germany  the  Fourteen 
Points,  the  ninth  of  which  read:  "A  readjustment  of  the 
frontiers  of  Italy  should  be  effected  along  clearly  recog- 
nizable lines  of  nationality." 

The  beneficial  effects  of  the  Rome  agreement  were  soon 
apparent,  for  Jugo-SIavs  united  with  Itahans  in  pushing 
a  vigorous  propaganda  to  convince  Jug'o-SIav  troops  in 
the  Austrian  armies  that  Italy  was  henceforth  the  friend 
of  their  national  aspirations,  the  Pact  of  Rome  having 
recorded  the  agreement  that  "the  unity  and  independence 
of  the  Jugo-SIav  nation  is  a  vital  interest  of  Italy,  Just  as 
the  completion  of  Italian  national  unity  is  a  vital  interest 
of  the  Jugo-SIav  nation."  The  propaganda  was  effective, 
and  reports  from  independent  sources  gave  it  credit  for 
being  one  of  the  several  causes  which  brought  about 
the  remarkably  complete  disintegration  of  the  Austrian 
armies  revealed  by  their  final  debacle,  when  in  a  few  days, 
on  one  of  the  strongest  defensive  terrains  in  the  world, 
they  surrendered  wholesale  to  the  victorious  Italians. 

Such  was  the  background  of  the  thorny  problem  of 
Fiume  and  the  Adriatic  when  it  came  before  the  Peace 
Conference.  Instead  of  reducing  their  territorial  de- 
mands to  accord  with  the  provisions  of  the  Pact  of  Rome 
and  the  Fourteen  Points,  the  Italian  representatives  be- 
lieved themselves  justified  in  increasing  them  even  be- 
yond the  hmits  of  the  Treaty  of  London.  While  insist- 
ing upon  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  London  in  respect 
to  the  territories  which  it  assigned  to  Italy,  the  Itahan 
representatives  asked  that  it  be  revised  where  favorable 
to  the  Jugo-SIavs,  in  order  that  Fiume,  definitely  assigned 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     121 

to  Croatia  by  the  treaty,  should  be  given  to  Italy.  Other 
territories  of  much  strategic  or  economic  value,  lying 
beyond  the  Treaty  of  London  line,  were  also  included  in 
the  Italian  demands.  The  American  specialists  were 
thus  called  upon  to  examine  into  the  validity  of  Italian 
claims  to  important  territories  scattered  all  the  way  from 
the  Carnic  Alps  past  Fiume  and  down  the  Adriatic  coast 
to  and  beyond  Valona  at  the  mouth  of  that  sea. 

On  the  basis  of  nationality  the  case  was  extremely 
clear.  The  Italian  populations  did  not  cease  at  the  old 
Austro-Italian  frontier,  but  were  in  a  majority  as  far 
eastward  as  Goritzia  and  along  the  western  margin  of 
the  Istrian  peninsula  from  Trieste  southward  to  Pola. 
Italy  could  thus  claim  on  racial  grounds  a  frontier  co- 
inciding approximately  with  the  western  base  of  the 
eastern  mountain  barrier.  From  that  line  eastward, 
however,  both  Italian  and  Jugo-SIav  authorities  were 
agreed  that  the  Jugo-SIavs  constituted  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  population.  A  few  Italians  were  scat- 
tered here  and  there  along  the  eastern  Adriatic  coast, 
but  they  formed  remote  Latin  islets  in  the  midst  of  a 
great  Slavonic  sea,  the  two  most  notable  of  which  were 
at  Fiume  and  Zara.  By  no  possible  interpretation  could 
the  principle  of  nationality  be  stretched  to  sanction  the 
annexation  to  Italy  of  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Jugo-SIavs  who  must  be  subjected  to  Italian  domina- 
tion against  their  will  if  Italy's  frontiers  were  to  reach 
eastward  over  purely  Slavonic  territory  far  enough  to 
incorporate  the  remote  islets  of  Italian  population.  To 
reach  the  few  tens  of  thousands  of  Italians  in  Fiume 
(approximately  24,000  according  to  the  last  official  cen- 
sus, 33,000  according  to  Italian  claims)  about  half  a 
million  Jugo-SIavs  would  have  to  be  thus  annexed. 


122    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

On  the  basis  of  self-determination  the  case  was  equally 
clear.  It  was  undoubtedly  true  that  many  of  the  Slavs 
used  the  Italian  language  as  well  as  their  own,  and 
that  many  of  them  were  strongly  influenced  by  Italian 
culture.  But  against  these  facts  and  Italy's  claim  that 
in  general  these  people  were  not  unfavorable  to  her 
political  programme  concerning  them,  the  American 
specialists  had  to  weigh  the  overwhelming  mass  of  testi- 
mony coming  in  from  every  possible  source,  which  dem- 
onstrated beyond  any  possibility  of  doubt  that  the  Jugo- 
slav populations  in  question  were  deeply  resentful  of 
ItaHan  occupation  of  their  territories  and  violently  op- 
posed to  any  form  of  Itahan  sovereignty  over  them. 
Even~the  Italian  representatives  ceased  to  press  this 
argument  and  rejected  all  proposals  looking  toward  a 
solution  of  the  vexed  question  on  the  basis  of  a  vote  by 
the  people  themselves. 

The  historical  argument  that  in  the  days  of  Rome  and 
Venice  the  east  Adriatic  coast  came  under  the  dominion 
of  those  states,  and  the  fact  that  traces  of  Latin  culture 
abound  throughout  the  territories  in  discussion,  were 
given  full  consideration.  But  it  seemed  to  the  special- 
ists impossible  to  draw  frontiers  on  the  basis  of  condi- 
tions in  an  age  that  is  past,  when  such  frontiers  would 
violate  the  fundamental  racial  and  economic  conditions 
upon  which  the  present  and  future  peace  of  Europe  must 
rest.  Whatever  political  systems  endured  for  longer  or 
shorter  periods  in  the  past,  we  faced  the  inescapable  fact 
that  the  east  Adriatic  coast  is,  and  long  has  been,  over- 
whelmingly Slavonic,  and  that  it  intensely  desired  its 
own  rule  rather  than  that  of  an  alien  race  dwelling  be- 
yond the  Adriatic  Sea. 

On  geographic  and  economic  grounds  Italy  could  prop- 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC  PROBLEM     123 

eriy  claim  much  more  than  on  the  basis  of  nationality, 
self-determination,  or  history.  Assuredly  the  old  boun- 
dary across  the  plain  west  of  the  Isonzo  River  was  a 
geographical  absurdity,  and  a  line  close  to  the  mountain 
base  would  be  little  better.  Neither  would  it  be  wise  to 
cut  off  the  Slavonic  populations  of  the  mountain  valleys 
from  the  Italian  markets  on  the  plain,  for  the  two  are 
economically  mutually  dependent.  In  the  opinion  of  the 
specialists,  this  was  one  of  the  cases  where  a  literal  appli- 
cation of  the  Fourteen  Points  would  work  injury,  and  it 
was  accordingly  recommended  that  Italy's  eastern  fron- 
tier should  not  be  determined  solely  along  clearly  recog- 
nizable lines  of  nationahty,  but  that  it  should  be  pushed 
far  eastward  into  Slavonic  territory,  so  as  to  include  not 
only  the  Italian  cities  at  the  mountain  base,  but  in  addi- 
tion the  Slavonic  hinterland  dependent  upon  them.  The 
President  promptly  accepted  this  view,  and  agreed  to 
the  frontier  recommended  by  the  experts  along  the  crest 
of  the  mountain  barrier,  the  only  logical  frontier,  geo- 
graphically and  economically,  in  the  region.  That  it 
gave  a  solid  block  of  more  than  300,000  Jugo-SIavs  to 
Italy  was  regrettable;  but  it  seldom  if  ever  happens 
that  the  racial  frontier,  the  economic  frontier,  the  natural 
geographic  frontier,  and  the  historical  or  political  frontier 
coincide  in  any  given  district.  It  is  necessary  to  weigh 
each  case  on  its  merits,  and  to  seek  that  line  which  will, 
all  things  considered,  work  the  maximum  of  good  and 
the  minimum  of  injury  to  the  vital  interests  of  those 
directly  concerned.  In  the  present  case  this  line  followed 
high  mountain  ridges  and  barren  limestone  plateaus, 
separating  the  natural  hinterland  of  Trieste  on  the  west 
from  the  natural  hinterland  of  Fiume  on  the  east. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  northern  frontier,  so  in  that  of 


124    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  eastern,  strategic  arguments  loomed  larger  than  all 
others.  Here,  as  in  the  Trentino,  Austria  had  enjoyed 
strategic  advantages  which  made  Italy's  successful  de- 
fense of  her  own  territory  against  hostile  aggression  ex- 
tremely difficult,  if  not  impossible.  With  the  disap- 
pearance of  Austria  as  a  world  power,  and  with  the 
substitution  of  a  new,  small,  and  comparatively  weak 
nation  on  Italy's  eastern  border,  the  strategic  argument 
would  seem  to  have  lost  much  of  its  weight.  Neverthe- 
less, it  was  given  serious  consideration,  and  the  details  of 
the  so-called  **  American  line,"  already  located  wholly  in 
Slavonic  territory  in  a  dominating  position  on  the  moun- 
tain barrier,  were  so  drawn  as  to  insure  to  Italy  strong 
tactical  positions  which  would  enable  her  to  block  the 
available  passes  with  ease  in  case  of  enemy  attack.  The 
line  was  deemed  strategically  strong  as  well  as  economi- 
cally and  geographically  good. 

Strategic  arguments  alone  could  justify  Italian  claims 
to  extensive  territory  in  Dalmatia  and  on  the  east- 
coast  islands,  inhabited  almost  wholly  by  Jugo-SIavs. 
The  mountainous,  ragged  eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic, 
with  its  numerous  harbors,  is  in  strong  contrast  with 
the  low,  simple  western  coast,  where  harbors  are  few 
in  number  and  inferior  in  quality.  Any  naval  power 
on  the  eastern  coast  must  find  itself  possessing  immense 
advantages  over  Italy.  A  fleet  taking  refuge  in  one  of 
the  Italian  harbors  is  visible  from  far  out  to  sea  because 
of  the  flatness  of  the  coast,  whereas  vessels  secreted  along 
the  eastern  shore  are  invisible  behind  mountain  barriers. 
From  the  low  western  coast  observation  of  an  approach- 
ing squadron  is  limited  as  compared  with  the  better  ob- 
servation enjoyed  by  those  on  the  dominating  heights  of 
the   eastern   shores.     Coast   defense   artiflery   has   little 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     125 

choice  of  inferior  positions  on  the  Italian  side  and  un- 
limited choice  of  excellent  positions  on  the  eastern  coast. 
A  fleet  emerging  from  one  of  the  western  harbors  to  give 
battle  may  be  taken  unawares  before  it  can  develop  its 
battle  formation,  while  a  fleet  manoeuvring  behind  the 
protective  fringe  of  islands  along  the  east  coast  may 
emerge  from  a  number  of  passages  simultaneously  and 
assume  a  predetermined  formation  without  delay.  The 
ItaHan  submarines  scouting  along  the  eastern  shores 
find  the  bottom  rough  and  deep,  so  that  lying  in  wait 
for  an  enemy  is  a  dangerous  proceeding,  while  the  enemy 
submarine  finds  shaKow  water  and  a  smooth  bottom 
upon  which  to  lie  concealed  pending  the  passage  of  a 
prospective  victim.  The  clear  waters  along  the  eastern 
coast  reveal  hidden  mines  or  submarines  to  the  scouting 
hydroplane,  v^hile  the  murkier  waters  bordering  the 
Italian  coast  make  it  difficult  for  Italian  observers  to 
locate  enemy  submarines  or  mines  sown  by  enemy  craft. 
Even  in  the  matter  of  iflumination  the  Itahans  are  at  a 
great  disadvantage.  Raids  are  usually  made  by  crossing 
the  sea  under  the  cover  of  darkness  and  appearing  off" 
the  enemy  coast  in  the  early  morning.  When  a  raider 
thus  appears  off"  the  Italian  coast,  his  objective  is  well 
ifluminated  by  the  rising  sun;  whereas  the  Italian  artil- 
lerymen must  look  into  the  sun  when  firing  upon  their 
attacker.  And  when  an  Italian  squadron  appears  off" 
the  eastern  coast,  it  finds  its  objective  obscured  by  the 
shadow  of  high  chffs  and  must  look  toward  the  sun  when 
developing  its  fire,  the  while  its  own  vessels  are  so  well 
ifluminated  as  to  form  exceflent  targets  for  the  east-coast 
batteries. 

On  such  arguments  as  these  Italy  might  claim  the  need 
of  special  consideration  in  the  Adriatic.     The  three  keys 


126    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

to  naval  domination  of  this  sea  are  the  great  naval  base 
and  harbor  of  Pola,  controlling  the  northern  Adriatic; 
the  mountain-girt,  impregnable  harbor  of  Valona,  guard- 
ing the  southern  Adriatic  and  the  exit  into  the  Mediter- 
ranean; and  some  central  base,  as  in  the  Lissa  group  of 
islands  midway  between  Pola  and  Valona.  These  key 
positions  could  not  be  assigned  to  Italy  without  marked 
departures  from  the  principles  of  nationahty;  but  here 
again  it  was  deemed  wise  to  accord  a  generous  response 
to  the  Italian  point  of  view,  and  to  assure  her  absolute 
security  for  her  eastern  coast.  The  President  early  an- 
nounced his  willingness  to  see  all  three  key  positions — 
Pola,  Valona,  and  Lissa — assigned  to  Italy.  Thus  was 
Italy  assured  absolute  supremacy  in  the  Adriatic,  along 
with  strategically  strong  frontiers  on  the  east  and  north. 

That  no  attempt  was  made  to  apply  with  strictness  in 
Italy's  case  the  principle  of  nationality,  the  right  of  self- 
determination,  or  the  Fourteen  Points,  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  every  mile  of  Italy's  new  frontiers,  from 
Switzerland  to  Valona,  as  recommended  by  the  American 
experts  and  accepted  by  the  President,  lay  far  within 
alien  territory  from  which  Italians  were  nearly  or  com- 
pletely absent.  Whether  such  wide  departures  from  a 
strict  application  of  the  principles  upon  which  it  was 
proposed  to  execute  the  peace  were  justified  by  geo- 
graphic, economic,  and  strategic  considerations,  and  by 
the  peculiar  difficulties  presented  by  the  Italian  settle- 
ment, is  a  question  of  opinion  lying  beyond  the  scope  of 
this  discussion.  Here  we  are  solely  concerned  with  the 
fact  that  such  departures  appeared  both  necessary  and 
advisable  to  the  American  delegation. 

But  the  Italian  representatives  demanded  far  more 
than  is  included  in  the  limits  described  above.     At  the 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     127 

head  of  the  Adriatic  they  asked  that  the  Italian  frontier 
should  be  carried  well  beyond  the  crest  of  the  mountain 
barrier  down  into  the  Jugo-SIav  lands  to  the  east,  ex- 
panding their  claims  beyond  the  Treaty  of  London  line 
at  a  number  of  critically  important  points,  and  demand- 
ing, among  other  things,  the  city  and  district  of  Fiume, 
containing  the  only  practicable  port  for  the  new  Jugo- 
SIav  nation,  and  specifically  reserved  to  Croatia  in  the 
Treaty  of  London.  On  the  Dalmatian  coast  a  vast  area 
of  the  mainland  and  a  large  proportion  of  the  islands,  the 
former  expanded  beyond  the  Treaty  of  London  terms 
by  the  addition  of  a  request  for  the  port  of  Spalato,  were 
included  in  the  Italian  programme.  Control  over  all  of 
Albania,  instead  of  the  portion  tentatively  assigned  to 
Italy  by  the  Treaty  of  London,  was  asked.  The  Italian 
representatives  felt  that  Italy  was  entitled  to  increased 
compensation  partly  because  the  war  had  lasted  longer 
than  anticipated,  and  partly  because  the  collapse  of 
Russia  had  thrown  a  heavier  burden  upon  Italy  than  was 
foreseen  when  the  Treaty  of  London  was  negotiated. 
The  American  experts  studied  the  full  Italian  claims 
with  the  greatest  care,  and  advised  the  President  and 
other  American  commissioners  of  their  findings.  From 
the  racial  point  of  view  it  was  clear  that  the  Itahans  con- 
stituted a  very  small  minority  in  each  mainland  area, 
and  in  the  group  of  islands  claimed  by  them.  In  this 
connection  it  must  always  be  carefully  borne  in  mind 
that  while  the  Italian  representatives  supported  their 
claims  to  Fiume  and  Zara  with  the  contention  that  those 
localities  contained  Italian  majorities,  they  demanded 
the  port  of  Fiume  and  much  additional  territory  on  the 
west,  together  with  the  portion  of  the  port  in  the  suburb 
of  Susak,  on  the  southeast;   also  the  district  oj  Zara  and 


128    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

surrounding  territory  sufficiently  large  to  give  the  tiny 
Italian  town  breathing  space.  As  both  Fiume  and  Zara, 
thus  delimited,  contained  a  majority  of  Jugo-SIavs,  the 
argument  that  the  principle  of  nationality  favored  the 
Italian  claims  was  always  invalid.  The  Itahan  represen- 
tatives doubtless  realized,  as  did  the  representatives  of 
other  countries,  that  a  tiny  morsel  of  Italian  territory  in 
the  midst  of  a  Slavonic  sea  was  an  anomaly  which  could 
not  hope  to  endure;  and  at  no  time  during  the  Peace 
Conference  negotiations  did  they  restrict  their  demands 
to  areas  having  an  Italian  majority,  or  to  which  the 
argument  of  nationahty  could  apply  with  results  favora- 
ble to  Italy.  Much  confusion  has  resulted  from  the 
failure  to  understand  that  the  Fiume  and  Zara  claimed 
by  Italy  were  entirely  different  entities  from  the  restricted 
Fiume  and  Zara  represented  as  containing  Italian  ma- 
jorities. 

From  the  economic  standpoint  it  was  evident  that  the 
granting  of  Italy's  claims  must  have  disastrous  conse- 
quences for  the  newly  recognized  Jugo-SIav  nation.  The 
area  claimed  in  Dalmatia  was  found  to  be  economically 
the  most  valuable  portion  of  the  province.  It  is  a  large 
tract  of  comparatively  low-lying  territory  along  the  coast, 
and  was  so  outlined  as  effectively  to  block  one  of  the 
few  practicable  routes  from  the  interior  across  the  Balkan 
mountains  to  the  sea.  Fiume,  the  only  practicable  port 
for  Jugo-SIavia,  for  reasons  which  will  appear  fully  below, 
would  be  in  a  foreign  country.  Much  of  the  rest  of  the 
coast  would  be  blocked  by  a  cordon  of  Italian  islands 
and  Italian  territorial  waters.  Under  these  conditions  it 
seemed  fair  to  say  that  Italy  would  literally  possess  a 
strangle-hold  upon  the  economic  development  of  her 
neighbor.     It  was  not  necessary  to  accuse  the  Italian 


FIUME  AND  THE   ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     129 

people  of  any  desire  to  exercise  the  tremendous  power 
which  they  would  thus  acquire  in  order  to  appreciate  the 
evident  danger  to  future  peace  in  the  Balkans  which 
must  result  from  sanctioning  an  arrangement  so  mani- 
festly inequitable  and  so  pregnant  with  possibilities  of 
trouble.  It  could  not  be  forgotten  that  one  of  the  potent 
causes  of  unrest  in  the  Balkans  had  long  been  the  mis- 
taken policy  of  blocking  Serbia's  efforts  to  obtain  "  free 
and  secure  access  to  the  sea." 

The  possible  political  consequence  of  sanctioning 
Italy's  desire  to  obtain  a  solid  foothold  in  the  Balkans 
through  control  of  Albania  and  the  annexation  of  Sla- 
vonic territories,  against  the  bitter  protests  of  both 
peoples  concerned,  appeared  most  grave.  The  people 
who  were  rejoicing  over  the  ehmination  of  Austrian  inter- 
ference in  Balkan  affairs  were  evidently  equally  hostile 
to  anything  which  might  savor  of  Italian  interference. 
Under  these  conditions  it  was  believed  that  to  grant 
Italy's  claims  to  the  eastern  islands  and  mainland  must 
be  to  sow  the  seeds  of  a  new  Balkan  conflict. 

When  examined  from  the  standpoint  of  strategic  geog- 
raphy the  three  main  areas  along  the  eastern  Adriatic 
coast  claimed  by  Italy  were  seen  to  possess  tremendous 
military  value.  It  was  the  manifest  duty  of  the  Ameri- 
can specialists,  without  in  the  least  degree  questioning 
the  motives  actuating  the  Itahan  claims,  to  study  the 
inevitable  consequences  which  must  necessarily  follow 
upon  granting  them.  It  seemed  obvious  that  the  Fiume 
region  and  adjacent  territory  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic, 
by  dominating  the  great  northwestern  gateway  into  the 
Balkans;  the  Dalmatian  region  and  coastal  islands  by 
controlling  the  central  route  across  the  mountains  into 
the  interior  and  closing  the  ship  passages  to  and  from 


130    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  mainland  harbors;  and  Albania  with  Valona,  by 
commanding  the  most  important  southern  routes  into 
the  Balkans  and  blocking  access  to  and  egress  from  the 
Adriatic  Sea,  did  in  effect  constitute  three  extremely 
strong  and  admirably  located  mihtary  bridge-heads,  assur- 
ing to  Italy  the  possibility  of  moving  her  armies  across 
the  Adriatic  and  advancing  them  into  the  Balkans, 
should  occasion  require.  With  the  mouth  of  the  Adriatic 
sealed  by  a  barrage  protected  by  naval  units  based  on 
Valona,  the  lines  of  sea  communication  across  the  Adri- 
atic from  Italy  to  the  bridge-heads  would  be  secure  from 
outside  interference.  Every  direct  access  to  the  sea 
possessed  by  the  Jugo-SIav  lands  would  be  blocked,  and 
the  power  of  resistance  to  an  Itahan  advance  enormously 
curtailed.  Assuredly  if  the  three  areas  in  question  had 
been  specifically  and  solely  claimed  with  the  express 
purpose  of  gaining  for  Italy  firm  political  and  economic 
footholds  on  the  eastern  Adriatic  as  bases  for  future 
expansion  into  the  Balkans,  capable  of  serving  as  mili- 
tary bridge-heads  for  armed  support  of  that  expansion 
if  need  be,  they  could  not  have  been  better  adapted  to 
serve  such  purposes. 

The  territorial  specialist  must  judge  claims  on  their 
essential  merits  and  not  with  respect  to  the  motives 
which  prompt  them,  since  obviously  governments  and 
motives  may  change  while  the  acts  and  their  conse- 
quences endure.  It  is  appropriate,  nevertheless,  in  order 
to  show  that  the  significance  of  the  three  areas  discussed 
above  is  not  a  figment  of  the  imagination,  to  note  the 
fact  that  well-informed  and  influential  circles  in  Italy 
frankly  declared  that  the  object  of  the  proposed  annexa- 
tions was  to  establish  political,  economic,  and  military 
bridge-heads  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Adriatic,  in  order 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     131 

to  assure  Italy's  future  expansion  in  the  Balkans.  The 
following  quotation  from  the  Giornale  d' Italia  of  July  4, 
1 9 19,  is  of  more  than  ordinary  interest  because  that 
paper  was  generally  regarded  as  the  mouthpiece  of 
Baron  Sonnino.  It  is  part  of  a  defense  of  the  policy 
of  the  Orlando-Sonnino  government  published  shortly 
after  that  government  had  fallen  from  power.  After 
rebuking  certain  influential  Italian  elements  for  refusing 
to  admit  '*the  strategic,  political,  and  economic  reasons 
for  which  Italy  must  set  foot  in  Dalmatia,  thereby  con- 
stituting with  Istria  and  Albania  the  triple  bridge-head 
for  expansion  in  the  Danubian  and  Balkan  system,  which 
expansion  is  feared  by  others  and  is  the  true  motive  of 
the  resistance  offered  to  our  Adriatic  claims,"  and  stating 
that  it  is  now  necessary  "to  put  our  cards  on  the  table,'* 
the  defense  enumerates  the  following  objects,  which 
Orlando  and  Sonnino  had  in  view  in  consenting  to  dis- 
cuss at  Paris  the  so-called  "Tardieu  project"  for  a  free 
state  of  Fiume: 

First.  Annexing  to  Italy  the  whole  of  Istria,  even 
including  that  part  of  eastern  Istria  which  Wilson  denies 
us. 

Second.  Giving  to  the  small  free  state  of  Fiume 
such  a  statute  as  would  have  effectively  placed  it  for 
fifteen  years  under  our  government  through  the  long 
arm  of  a  local  government  faithful  to  us,  pending  its 
eventual  annexation  to  Italy. 

Third.  Saving  in  Dalmatia  the  harmonious  system 
of  Zara-Sebenico  and  the  islands,  while  leaving  Jugo- 
slavia a  part  of  the  interior;  but  thus  establishing  an 
adequate  political,  economic,  and  military  bridge-head, 
together  with  a  substantial  guarantee  of  the  Italianita  of 
Dalmatia  and  full  security  against  any  future  contingency. 


132    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Fourth.  Having  Albania  under  mandate  and  thus 
insuring  through  its  integrity  and  national  independence 
our  influence,  our  expansion,  and  our  strategic  safety. 

In  view  of  all  the  considerations  enumerated  and  of 
others  which  cannot  be  dealt  with  in  this  short  review, 
the  American  specialists  reported  that  the  handing  over 
to  Italy  of  the  areas  in  question  would  be  wholly  unjus- 
tifiable and  extremely  dangerous.  In  addition  to  the 
advice  of  the  territorial  speciahsts,  the  President  had 
before  him  the  reports  of  naval  and  military  students  of 
the  question,  of  special  investigators  in  the  Adriatic 
region,  and  other  expert  opinions.  There  was  remarkable 
unanimity  in  the  conclusion  that  the  coveted  territories 
could  on  no  basis  of  justice  or  right  be  assigned  to  Italy. 
The  French  and  British  specialists,  consulted  informally, 
were  of  the  same  opinion,  and  it  is  an  open  secret  that 
the  French  and  British  Governments,  while  loyal  to  their 
engagements  and  maintaining  their  readiness  to  execute 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  London  if  Italy  required  it, 
nevertheless  felt  strongly  that  under  the  entirely  new 
conditions  created  by  the  disappearance  of  Austria- 
Hungary  from  the  Adriatic  and  the  agreement  to  recog- 
nize the  right  of  the  Jugo-SIavs  to  govern  themselves  in 
a  new  federated  nation,  Italy's  annexation  of  the  terri- 
tories in  question  was  neither  just  nor  wise. 

There  followed  a  long  series  of  negotiations,  in  the 
course  of  which  Italy  reduced  her  demands  in  Dalmatia 
and  among  the  east-coast  islands,  but  sought  at  the 
same  time  to  maintain  in  its  essential  integrity  the  sys- 
tem of  three  bridge-heads  on  the  Balkan  shore,  and 
to  pave  the  way  for  the  early  annexation  of  Fiume. 
Little  progress  was  made  with  Orlando  and  Sonnino,  and 
after   their    retirement   the   Giornale    d' Italia    correctly 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC  PROBLEM     133 

stated  that  this  Italian  delegation,  in  consenting  to  dis- 
cuss the  so-called  '*Tardieu  project"  (one  of  many  com- 
promise suggestions),  ''had  not  allowed  itself  to  be  caught 
in  any  actual  and  substantial  concessions.  And,  in  fact, 
if  that  scheme,  together  with  the  amendments  which  our 
delegates  had  ready,  had  been  approved,  we  should  have 
achieved  all  the  claims  of  the  London  Pact,  with  the 
exception  of  a  strip  of  the  Dalmatian  hinterland  and  of 
a  few  islands  of  no  military  importance;  and  in  addition 
would  have  created  at  Fiume  a  situation  genuinely 
Italian  and  susceptible  of  certain  transformation  in  time 
into  annexation  to  Italy." 

It  would  not  be  profitable  to  trace  the  history  of  the 
negotiations,  which  dragged  out  over  many  long  months, 
although  in  a  more  friendly  spirit  in  view  of  the  concilia- 
tory spirit  of  the  new  Nitti  government.  Attention  soon 
centred  on  the  Fiume  region,  the  most  important  and 
dangerous  of  the  three  bridge-heads,  and  the  one  over 
which  the  Italians  were  most  insistent  on  gaining  control. 

A  glance  at  a  good  physical  map  will  show  that  the 
Dinaric  Alps,  a  broad  belt  of  wild  and  rugged  mountain- 
ous country,  intervenes  between  the  interior  of  the 
Balkan  peninsula  and  the  Adriatic  Sea.  South  of  Fiume 
this  range  is  crossed  by  but  two  or  three  narrow-gauge 
railroads,  wholly  inadequate  to  serve  the  commercial 
needs  of  the  interior.  The  only  standard-gauge  road 
crosses  the  mountain  barrier  at  its  narrowest  point,  oppo- 
site Fiume.  The  geographic  conditions  are  such  as  per- 
manently to  preclude  any  cheap  and  effective  rail  trans- 
port across  the  broad  part  of  the  barrier;  hence  Fiume, 
advantageously  situated  opposite  the  narrowest  part, 
and  at  the  head  of  a  sea  that  makes  water  transportation 
both  cheap  and  easy,  is  the  inevitable  economic  outlet 


134    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

for  the  nortPiern  part  of  Jugo-SIavia.  Physical  condi- 
tions render  Buccari  and  other  suggested  substitutes 
unavailable. 

Nearly  all  of  the  standard-gauge  railroad  system  of 
Jugo-SIavia  is  in  the  latitude  of  Fiume,  because  the  fer- 
tile river  plains  of  the  country  are  largely  confined  to 
that  region;  because  nearly  two-thirds  of  the  people 
live  in  these  plains  and  valleys;  because  railroad  con- 
struction is  easy  and  comparatively  inexpensive  there; 
and  because  there  is  sufficient  local  traffic  to  maintain 
the  roads  and  keep  rates  down.  Thus  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  life  of  the  Jugo-SIav  nation  is  to  an  unusual 
degree  concentrated  in  the  north  of  the  country,  and  as 
the  railroad  system  upon  which  this  economic  life  de- 
pends has  its  only  direct  outlet  to  the  sea  at  Fiume,  it 
has  well  been  said  that  the  power  that  holds  Fiume  holds 
the  life  of  an  entire  nation  in  its  hands.  Hence  the 
peculiar  value  of  Fiume  as  a  base  from  which  to  exert 
economic,  political,  and  military  power  in  the  Balkans. 

In  view  of  the  facts  that  Italy  had  no  need  of  Fiume, 
whereas  for  Jugo-SIavia  and  adjacent  lands  to  the  north 
it  constituted  an  absolute  necessity  for  their  free  eco- 
nomic development;  that  the  future  expansion  of  the 
port  must  be  financed  by  those  to  whom  it  was  an  eco- 
nomic necessity;  that  it  could  not  be  annexed  to  Italy 
without  placing  under  her  domination  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  Jugo-SIavs;  and  that  it  was  by  treaty  defi- 
nitely promised  to  one  branch  of  the  Jugo-SIav  people 
by  the  Allies  (including  Italy  herself)  it  was  held  that, 
regardless  of  what  a  majority  of  the  very  mixed  popula- 
tion of  the  city  of  Fiume  might  desire,  the  first  princi- 
ples of  justice  and  the  prosperity  of  the  port  required 
that  Italy's  demand  for  Fiume  must  be  rejected. 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC  PROBLEM     135 

The  American  specialists  did,  however,  examine  into 
the  claims  that  Fiume  was  in  majority  Italian,  and  that 
the  city  had  by  ** self-determination"  proclaimed  its  un- 
alterable will  to  be  annexed  to  Italy.  They  found  that 
only  in  the  so-called  corpus  separatum  of  Fiume,  which 
includes  a  part  only  of  the  port  of  Fiume,  did  the  Italians 
outnumber  the  Jugo-SIavs;  that  even  here,  according  to 
the  last  official  census,  there  was  only  a  relative,  not  an 
absolute,  majority  of  Italians  (not  quite  50  per  cent  of 
the  total  population);  that  this  number  inchided  many 
Italians  who  still  retained  their  citizenship  in  Italy;  and, 
finally,  that  even  this  relative  majority  was  of  compara- 
tively recent  date  and  probably  resulted  from  artificial 
encouragement  by  the  Hungarian  Government,  which 
had  a  comprehensible  interest  in  developing  an  afien 
rather  than  a  Slavonic  majority  in  the  city.  But  the 
corpus  separatum  of  Fiume  is  not  all  of  the  real  city 
and  port.  The  Itafian  representatives  asked  for  the 
whole  port,  including  the  part  in  the  suburb  of  Susak. 
When  Susak  is  included,  even  the  relative  Italian  ma- 
jority disappears,  and  the  Jugo-SIavs  constitute  the 
absolute  majority  of  the  population. 

The  claim  that  Fiume  had,  by  exercising  the  right  of 
self-determination,  proclaimed  her  will  to  be  annexed  to 
Italy  could  not  be  substantiated.  This  claim  rested 
upon  the  speech  of  Ossoinack,  deputy  from  Fiume,  in  the 
Hungarian  Parfiament,  October  18,  191 8,  and  upon  cer- 
tain proclamations  and  other  manifestations  of  later 
date.  The  stenographic  report  of  Ossoinack's  address  as 
submitted  showed  that  he  only  demanded  for  the  city 
the  right  of  self-determination,  and  that  Fiume  should 
**be  Italian  in  the  future  as  it  had  always  been  Itafian  in 
the  past."     Even  had  he  made  any  demand  for  pofitical 


136    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

union  with  Italy,  which  did  not  appear  to  be  the  case, 
the  expression  of  a  single  deputy  elected  on  a  limited 
suffrage  could  not  be  called  self-determination.  Im- 
mediately after  the  Hungarian  authorities  evacuated  the 
city,  a  group  of  Itahans  and  Italian  sympathizers  consti- 
tuted themselves  into  the  Italian  National  Council  of 
Fiume,  and  proclaimed  the  annexation  of  Fiume  to  Italy. 
The  following  day  this  proclamation  was  approved  by 
some  sort  of  a  convocation  of  citizens.  Later,  renewed 
expressions  of  a  desire  for  annexation  were  proclaimed. 
All  of  these  manifestations  appeared  to  have  been  most 
irregular,  and  took  place  under  the  direction  of  a  self- 
constituted  and  unrepresentative  body  of  citizens  from 
which  Jugo-SIav  sympathizers  were  excluded,  or  under 
Italian  military  occupation  which  was  accompanied  by 
the  imprisonment  and  deportation  of  Jugo-SIavs  manifest- 
ing opposition  to  the  Italian  programme.  There  was  no 
evidence  that  the  people  of  Fiume  had  ever  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  express  freely  their  will.  Indeed,  it  seemed  not 
improbable  that  the  large  Jugo-SIav  vote,  augmented  by 
that  of  other  nationalities  and  of  Italians  whose  interests 
in  the  commercial  activities  of  the  port  led  them  to  fear 
the  economic  consequences  of  union  with  Italy,  would 
give  a  majority  against  annexation,  were  that  vote  per- 
mitted to  be  cast  without  the  coercive  influence  of  Italian 
military  occupation,  which  had  from  the  first  efl'ectively 
stifled  all  free  expression  of  public  opinion  in  Fiume. 

Such,  then,  was  the  complex  of  considerations  sur- 
rounding the  thorny  Fiume  question.  After  it  had  been 
carefully  examined  by  the  chiefs  of  the  Italian,  Austro- 
Hungarian,  and  Balkan  divisions  of  the  territorial  staff", 
as  well  as  by  the  chiefs  of  the  divisions  of  Economics  and 
Boundary  Geography,  who  approached  the  problem  from 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC   PROBLEM     137 

their  respective  points  of  view,  these  united  in  submitting 
to  the  President  their  unanimous  opinion  that  the  Italian 
claims  to  Fiume  could  not  be  recognized,  and  that  no 
arrangement  should  be  sanctioned  which  threatened 
future  external  interference  with  the  development  and 
use  of  the  port  by  those  who  alone  had  any  valid  claim 
upon  it. 

Throughout  the  negotiations  the  American  delegation 
maintained  this  position;  and  if  the  deadlock  continued, 
it  was  not  due  to  differences  over  details,  but  to  the 
fundamental  fact  that  all  arrangements  proposed  by 
Italy  must  inevitably  have  had  the  effect  of  preventing 
the  normal  development  and  use  of  Fiume  by  threaten- 
ing the  freedom  of  the  port  and  insuring  its  early  annexa- 
tion to  Italy.  But  while  maintaining  inviolate  the  prin- 
ciple that  it  would  not  unite  in  forcing  upon  a  weak 
nation  against  its  protest  a  solution  of  the  Fiume  prob- 
lem which  it  regarded  as  flagrantly  unjust  and  fraught 
with  grave  danger  for  the  future  peace  of  the  world,  and 
which  both  England  and  France  sought  on  occasions  to 
induce  Italy  to  abandon,  the  American  delegation  made 
extensive  concessions  in  the  effort  to  reach  an  amicable 
solution.  The  Sexten  valley  and  the  Tarvis  basin,  both 
beyond  the  Treaty  of  London  line,  the  Lussin  and  Pela- 
gosa  groups  of  islands,  as  well  as  the  remaining  islands  of 
the  Lissa  group,  the  Albona  coal  region  in  Istria,  and 
finally  a  mandate  over  a  united  Albania,  were  offered 
to  Italy,  in  addition  to  the  territorial  concessions  already 
described,  which  everywhere  carried  Italy's  frontiers  far 
into  alien  lands.  On  the  other  hand,  the  American  rep- 
resentatives frequently  expressed  their  willingness  to  see 
the  whole  Adriatic  question  solved  by  any  fair  and 
equitable  procedure.     Solutions  by  arbitration,  by  vari- 


138    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

ous  forms  of  plebiscites,  and  by  placing  the  disputed  ter- 
ritories under  the  League  of  Nations  were  proposed  at 
various  times;  but  the  Italian  representatives  did  not 
feel  that  any  of  these  solutions  would  prove  satisfactory 
to  Italy. 

The  latter  stages  of  the  negotiations  and  the  ultimate 
initiation  of  direct  discussions  between  the  Italian  and 
Jugo-SIav  governments  are  all  set  forth  in  published 
notes  and  despatches.  It  could  not  be  expected  that 
Italy  and  Jugo-SIavia  would  meet  on  an  equal  footing  in 
the  recent  negotiations,  when  Italians  held  the  disputed 
territory,  and  were  backed  by  the  pledge  of  the  French 
and  British  to  execute  the  Treaty  of  London  in  case  the 
Jugo-SIavs  failed  to  accept  some  other  solution  satis- 
factory to  the  Itahans.  The  pohtical  situation  in  Amer- 
ica had  by  this  time  eliminated  this  country  as  a  factor 
in  any  European  territorial  settlement,  and  the  Jugo- 
SIavs  alone  faced  the  Itahan  representatives  backed  by 
the  French  and  British,  the  two  latter  committed  by 
treaty  obligations  and  anxious  to  get  through  with  an 
awkward  problem  at  almost  any  cost.  The  terms  of  the 
Rapallo  Treaty  reflect  this  situation. 

In  the  north  the  Jugo-SIavs  yield  a  large  expanse  of 
purely  Slavonic  lands  east  of  the  natural  frontier,  thus 
bringing  Italian  sovereignty  to  the  very  doors  of  a  nomi- 
nally independent  Fiume.  The  islands  dominating  the 
entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  Fiume  go  to  Italy,  as  does  also 
the  Lagosta  group  of  islands  near  the  centre  of  the  east 
coast.  In  Dalmatia  Italy  receives  Zara  with  a  surround- 
ing district  greatly  reduced  from  that  demanded  during 
the  Paris  negotiations,  while  the  island  of  Lissa,  earlier 
offered  to  Italy,  apparently  goes  to  Jugo-SIavia.  In 
effect  Italy  obtains  strategic  and  other  advantages  which 


FIUME  AND  THE  ADRIATIC  PROBLEM     139 

strengthen  her  foothold  on  the  Fiume  bridge-head,  en- 
danger the  free  economic  development  and  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  port  of  Fiume,  and  create  a  Slav  Irredenta 
of  serious  proportions  on  her  eastern  frontier.  On  the 
other  hand,  when  the  reported  terms  are  compared  with 
Italy's  original  demands,  it  will  be  clear  that  the  firm 
refusal  of  the  American  representatives  to  sanction  the 
Italian  programme  of  sweeping  annexations,  coupled 
with  the  moderating  influence  of  the  Nitti  and  Giolitti 
governments,  has  achieved  the  emancipation  of  several 
hundred  thousand  Jugo-SIavs,  and  made  the  ultimate 
settlement  far  less  harmful  and  unjust  than  it  would 
otherwise  have  been.  It  is  but  fair  to  state  that  what- 
ever amelioration  of  the  harsh  terms  of  the  Adriatic  set- 
tlement has  been  accomplished,  despite  the  commitments 
of  an  unfortunate  secret  diplomacy,  is  due  primarily  to 
the  firm  stand  of  President  Wilson  in  favor  of  equal  Jus- 
tice for  both  great  and  small  nations. 


VIl 

CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS  ^ 

BY    ISAIAH    BOWMAN 

It  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  men  now  look  out 
upon  world  conditions  and  upon  peoples  almost  unknown 
until  yesterday  much  as  men  looked  out  upon  the  world 
at  the  threshold  of  the  Age  of  Discovery.  People  every- 
where have  been  shaken  violently  out  of  their  former 
routine.  The  aspects  of  life  familiar  before  the  war  have 
in  most  cases  been  strangely  altered.  The  current  of 
the  individual's  life  as  well  as  the  current  of  national  life 
has  been  diverted  into  new  channels.  Paderewski,  when 
asked  if  he  found  it  difficult  to  face  the  crowds  of  War- 
saw on  his  first  appearance  there  two  years  ago,  said 
that  though  he  expected  to  have  stage  fright,  actually  he 
felt  quite  at  ease,  and  that  he  supposed  it  was  due  to 
experience  in  facing  audiences  during  his  musical  career. 
"You  know  I  used  to  play,"  he  said.  "Yes,"  replied  his 
listener,  "I  used  to  hear  you." 

A  few  years  ago  the  Balkan  wars  were  a  matter  of 
paramount  public  interest.  Vast  uncontrollable  forces 
were  then  unloosed.  No  man  could  have  foreseen  the 
way  in  which  they  were  to  lead  through  the  World  War 
to  the  present  chaos.  Now  we  look  back  upon  them  as 
incidents;  the  stage  of  the  world  has  been  reset.  The 
word  "Balkanized"  has  become  the  familiar  epithet  of 

1  Most  of  the  data  for  this  article  and  some  entire  paragraphs  are  taken  from 
my  book  entitled  "The  New  World:  Problems  in  Political  Geography,"  published 
by  World  Book  Company,  Yonkers-on-Hudson,  New  York,  1921. 

140 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     141 

the  journalist.  What  have  the  Allied  leaders  done  to 
better  the  political  conditions  of  this  "dark  and  bloody 
ground"  of  Central  Europe? 

Whatever  practical  considerations  were  brought  to  the 
peace  conference  of  Paris  by  the  European  powers — and 
there  were  indeed  a  multitude — it  remains  a  fact  that 
never  before  in  the  history  of  the  world  was  there  put 
beside  these  practical  considerations  a  group  of  idealistic 
principles  which,  winning  "here  a  little,  there  a  little," 
were  finally,  by  the  processes  of  fate,  to  end  in  a  vital 
struggle  both  in  the  field  of  our  own  domestic  politics 
and  in  the  material  field  of  Allied  interests. 

We  may  take  the  partisan  view  that  the  idealism  faded 
and  died,  or  we  may  take  the  view  that  here  and  there 
something  was  accomplished  that  was  far  better  than  the 
world  had  known  hitherto.  Whatever  view  we  hold,  it 
must  not  be  supposed  that  because  of  the  great  clamor 
of  criticism  against  the  peace  treaties  other  leaders  could 
have  united  more  effectively  upon  a  programme  of  set- 
tlement. From  the  first  there  was  confusion  concerning 
the  objects  of  the  war  and  of  the  peace  treaties.  With 
the  whole  fabric  of  society  torn  and  disfigured  it  was 
natural  that  there  should  be  many  divergences  of  opinion 
as  to  the  manner  by  which  it  could  be  restored.  To 
some  the  war  meant  political  freedom,  to  others  the  lib- 
eration of  oppressed  minorities.  The  freedom  of  the 
seas  meant  one  thing  to  Germany  and  another  to  Eng- 
land. To  one  group  in  Russia  self-determination  meant 
independence,  to  another  autonomy,  to  a  third  the  rule 
of  the  proletariat.  One  soldier  from  America  might  hope 
for  better  working  conditions  at  home,  while  another 
thought  only  of  helping  France  or  beating  Germany,  or 
possibly  of  a  glorious  adventure  or  a  chance  to  follow 


142     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  invisible  banners  of  the  spirit.  Men  suffered  and 
died  for  different  objects. 

When  the  peace  treaties  came  to  be  framed  every  per- 
son hoped  to  have  his  special  object  achieved;  other- 
wise he  would  be  disappointed.  So  diverse  were  the 
hopes  of  different  nations  and  peoples  that  no  set  of 
formulae  could  have  been  found  to  fit  Allied  purposes. 
The  Fourteen  Points  of  President  Wilson  received  almost 
universal  approval,  because  they  were  put  into  general 
terms.  The  vast  scale  of  the  losses,  the  bitterness  of  the 
mihtary  contest,  was  such  that  the  moment  that  specific 
settlements  were  proposed  every  interested  party  felt 
betrayed.  Each  delegation  felt  that  only  its  brand  of 
**doxy"  was  orthodoxy. 

If  there  was  confusion,  it  is  also  true  that  never  be- 
fore were  the  peoples  of  the  world  all  talking  at  once, 
as  befitted  the  end  of  a  war  that  embraced  the  world.  A 
delegation  from  Orawa  in  the  foothill  region  of  the  Car- 
pathians came  to  Paris  in  native  peasant  costume  to 
argue  union  with  Poland;  Jugo-SIav  representatives  came 
to  argue  against  Italian  ownership  of  Fiume;  Mace- 
donians came  looking  for  the  millennium.  Each  one  of 
the  Central  European  nationalities  had  its  own  bagful 
of  statistical  and  cartographical  tricks.  When  statistics 
failed,  use  was  made  of  maps  in  color.  It  would  take  a 
huge  monograph  to  contain  an  analysis  of  all  the  types 
of  map  forgeries  that  the  war  and  the  peace  conference 
called  forth.  A  new  instrument  was  discovered — the 
map  language.  A  map  was  as  good  as  a  brilliant  poster, 
and  just  being  a  map  made  it  respectable,  authentic. 
A  perverted  map  was  a  life-belt  to  many  a  foundering 
argument.  It  was  in  the  Balkans  that  the  use  of  this 
process  reached  its  most  brilliant  chmax. 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND   THE   BALKANS     143 

It  is  no  error  of  political  judgment  to  suppose  that 
any  international  agreement  of  the  immediate  future  or 
any  international  pohcy,  whether  it  relates  to  frontiers, 
commercial  opportunities,  or  the  formation  of  a  govern- 
ment, will  have  a  far  greater  number  of  unfriendly  critics 
than  supporters.  America  has  yet  to  frame  its  new 
programme.  To  have  that  programme  accepted  it  will 
have  to  deal  with  much  the  same  kind  of  humanity; 
it  will  have  to  deal  with  essentially  the  same  human 
leaders  that  met  in  19 19,  and  back  of  the  leaders  stand 
the  common  people  with  their  nationahstic  and  at 
times  uncontrollable  aspirations  and  their  simple  and 
easily  betrayable  sense  of  right  and  wrong. 

Constantinople 

Had  the  secret  Treaty  of  London  of  April,  1915,  been 
made  public,  the  world  would  have  discovered,  in  less 
than  nine  months  from  the  opening  of  the  World  War, 
that  the  objects  of  the  war  had  completely  changed.  The 
orbit  of  political  thought  could  no  longer  be  calculated 
from  the  events  of  July  and  August,  19 14.  As  Presi- 
dent Wilson  said  in  19 18,  with  full  world  approval, 
"whatever  the  causes  of  the  war,  the  objects  have 
changed.'*  The  great  principle  of  the  Allied  commanders 
in  the  field  and  in  the  foreign  offices  was  to  augment  and 
solidify  the  power  opposed  to  Germany  and  her  allies, 
and  this  could  be  done  in  the  case  of  the  materially 
minded  only  by  offering  material  advantages.  Though 
granting  full  credit  to  the  noble  idealism  that  pervaded 
a  part  of  their  people,  it  is  yet  true  that  Italy,  Greece, 
and  Russia  were  to  be  paid  for  a  part  of  their  services, 
and  Constantinople  and  Dalmatia  were  as  so  much  cash 
in  hand. 


144    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

From  that  time  until  the  break  between  the  Bolshe- 
vists and  the  Allies,  Constantinople  was  looked  upon  as 
an  ultimate  prize  of  war.  Instead  of  Russian  control  of 
Constantinople,  as  promised  in  191 5,  we  have  Allied 
control.  Instead  of  a  free  commercial  passage  with  in- 
ternational guarantees  of  equality  and  security,  but  with 
a  Russian  flag,  we  have  a  so-called  Zone  of  the  Straits, 
to  be  administered  by  a  commission  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  While  this  arrangement  is  to  be  carried  out 
through  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  (August,  1920), 
it  is  interesting  to  note  that  it  was  suggested  in  principle 
by  the  head  of  the  American  Government  on  January  8, 
19 1 8,  and  that  this  view  corresponded  with  the  recom- 
mendations of  "The  Inquiry"  (organized  under  Col- 
onel House)  in  a  memorandum  to  the  President  dated 
January  2,  191 8.  In  this  memorandum  it  was  urged, 
among  other  things,  that  there  should  be  friendly  inter- 
course through  and  across  the  Straits,  and  that  inter- 
national administration  be  invoked  to  the  end  that  the 
Straits  should  remain  a  commercial  passage  or  should 
form  part  of  an  international  zone. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  expound  either  the  historical 
or  the  commercial  importance  of  Constantinople.  That 
theme  has  been  presented  so  often  that  I  could  hardly 
expect  to  add  anything  new  or  particularly  illuminating. 
The  Ukrainian  section  of  southern  Russia  has  in  the  past 
generation  undergone  significant  economic  change.  The 
iron  and  coal  deposits  have  invited  capital  and  labor.  A 
period  of  increasing  agricultural  production  has  corre- 
sponded with  a  period  of  rapid  industrial  development 
in  Germany,  Belgium,  France,  and  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  growing  export  of  cereals  has  been  one  of  the 
chief  sources  of  wealth.     Manganese  and  petroleum  from 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     145 

Transcaucasia  and  even  the  dairy  products  of  western 
Siberia  have  in  some  measure  at  least  been  turned  toward 
the  commercial  focus  of  Constantinople.  Here  gathered 
Austrian,  Russian,  British,  Dutch,  Italian,  and  Greek 
shipping.  Looking  ahead  for  a  period  of  fifty  years  one 
can  see  that  both  from  its  geographical  position  and  from 
its  economic  and  political  importance  Constantinople  was 
to  take  a  place  in  the  modern  world  that  accorded  not 
with  the  ambitions  and  perspective  of  the  Turk  but 
with  the  view  of  the  Western  powers.  It  was  to  resume 
once  more  somewhat  the  place  that  it  had  as  one  of  that 
group  of  four  cities  on  or  near  the  eastern  Mediterranean 
— Constantinople,  Athens,  Rome,  Jerusalem — from  which 
for  centuries  have  emanated  religious  and  political  move- 
ments of  the  first  order. 

I  shall  merely  touch  upon  the  place  of  Constantinople 
in  the  German  pohtical  scheme.  The  enterprise  of  her 
merchants  and  diplomats  was  substantially  rewarded. 
In  the  period  1887-19 10  Turkish  imports  of  German 
goods  rose  from  6  to  21  per  cent,  and  of  Austrian  goods 
from  13  to  21  per  cent.  In  the  same  period  the  imports 
of  English  goods  fell  from  60  to  35  per  cent;  the  imports 
of  French  goods  from  18  to  11  per  cent.  Between  1908 
and  19 II  German  contractors  obtained  harbor  conces- 
sions at  Alexandretta  and  concessions  for  a  railway  line 
from  Basra  to  Bagdad  in  territory  of  great  strategic  im- 
portance to  India  and  the  Far  East,  and  in  relation  to 
the  politics  and  commerce  of  the  Mohammedan  world. 
In  191 3  General  Liman  von  Sanders  headed  a  German 
mihtary  mission  at  Constantinople,  which  thereafter 
practically  controlled  the  Ottoman  army. 

The  city  of  Constantinople  is  an  important  source  of 
the  revenues  of  the  Turkish  state.     It  is  the  most  impor- 


146    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

tant  focus  of  trade  in  Turkey.  Its  entries  in  the  year 
19 10-19 1 1  amounted  to  31^^  per  cent  of  the  total  imports, 
with  Smyrna  and  Saloniki  10  per  cent  each.  In  exports, 
however,  Smyrna  led  with  20.6  per  cent,  and  Constanti- 
nople ranked  second  with  9  per  cent.  It  has  also  been 
the  chief  focus  of  Turkish  political  life  for  a  period  ante- 
dating the  discovery  of  America  by  forty  years.  Rep- 
resentatives of  the  various  sections  of  Turkey  have  come 
here.  It  is  the  seat  of  the  council  of  administration  of 
the  Ottoman  foreign  debt.  With  the  capital  retained  at 
Constantinople  instead  of  in  an  interior  location,  there 
is  a  better  hold  upon  the  functionaries  of  the  state,  a 
readier  access  to  them,  a  more  convenient  centre  for  the 
spread  of  Allied  influence  in  connection  with  the  main- 
tenance of  the  principle  of  the  Ottoman  public  debt  as 
of  19 14,  which  continues  to  be  administered  in  favor  of 
the  bondholders  in  order  that  the  debt  may  be  ultimately 
extinguished. 

If  we  throw  the  position  of  the  Turk  at  Constantinople 
against  the  background  of  fact  and  judgment  that  I 
have  briefly  sketched,  I  think  we  shall  have  far  more 
patience,  and,  if  I  may  say  so,  resignation.  Every  one 
expected  the  Turk  to  be  kicked  out  of  Europe.  Follow- 
ing the  defeat  of  the  Turk  at  the  second  siege  of  Vienna, 
in  1683,  he  has  been  pushed  step  by  step  toward  the 
southeastern  corner  of  the  Balkan  peninsula.  Here  was 
the  long-hoped-for  opportunity  to  overwhelm  him,  and 
here  apparently  there  should  have  been  no  revival  of 
that  historic  rivalry  between  England  and  Russia  which 
prolonged  the  stay  of  the  unspeakable  Turk.  To  many 
it  seemed  a  betrayal  of  one  of  the  Allied  purposes  to 
leave  him  there. 

But  here,  again,  we  are  dealing  with  one  of  the  actuali- 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     147 

ties  of  life,  not  with  its  ideologies.  Constantinople  is 
still  to  a  great  many  Mohammedans  the  focus  of  their 
religious  world.  From  Constantinople  proceeded  for 
many  years  an  authority  that  extended  over  260,000,000 
people.  Though  a  rival  appeared  during  the  war  in  the 
sherif  of  Mecca  (the  king  of  the  Hedjaz),  who  not  only 
refused  to  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the  Sheikh-ul- 
Islam  at  Constantinople,  but  even  fought  against  the 
Turks,  his  influence  w^as  in  the  main  confined  to  the 
Arab  world.  North  and  east  of  the  Arab  world,  particu- 
larly in  Anatoha,  Persia,  and  India,  were  Mohammedans 
who  still  looked  to  Constantinople  for  religious  leading, 
and  among  these  were  one  group  of  66,000,000  Moham- 
medans in  northwestern  India  who  had  it  in  their  power 
to  set  in  motion  vast  and  evil  forces.  Were  they  to 
attempt  to  disrupt  the  Indian  Empire  or  even  to  turn 
their  large  section  of  India  into  a  state  of  anarchy,  the 
British  might  be  unable  to  restore  peace. 

Thus  the  Mohammedan  question,  focussed  at  Con- 
stantinople, leads  into  a  maze  of  vital  problems  in  the 
fields  of  religion  and  colonies  and  sea-borne  trade  and 
international  politics.  French  and  Italian  as  well  as 
British  and  Greek  interests  are  involved.  Let  us  look 
at  a  particular  aspect  of  the  matter — the  relation  of  Con- 
stantinople to  the  powerful  secret  societies  or  confraterni- 
ties among  the  Mohammedan  populations.  "Confra- 
ternities" is  a  general  or  collective  name  for  the  various 
religious  societies  of  the  Mohammedan  world,  of  which 
there  are  from  fifty  to  one  hundred  scattered  from  Mo- 
rocco to  Bagdad.  Almost  every  male  Moslem  is  a  mem- 
ber of  one  of  these  societies. 

The  confraternities  came  into  existence  in  an  interest- 
ing way.     After  Mohammed's  death  Mohammedanism 


148    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

changed  its  aspect.  It  reached  into  the  field  of  law  and 
gave  religious  authority  to  the  words  and  decrees  of  the 
lawyers.  The  rulers,  on  their  side,  also  sought  to  control 
the  church  and  make  it  an  instrument  of  military  and 
political  conquest.  In  addition,  the  Turks  and  the 
Arabs  developed  strong  racial  and  then  political  animosi- 
ties. In  reaction  to  all  these  changes  pious  men  of 
strong  character  founded  sects  or  fraternities,  withdrew 
to  a  remote  region,  gathered  disciples,  and  built  monas- 
teries. 

Some  of  these  societies  were  widely  known  and  their 
influence  reached  from  one  end  of  the  Moslem  world  to 
the  other;  others  were  quite  obscure  and  local.  Some 
have  lived  for  a  long  time;  others  went  out  of  existence 
almost  with  the  death  of  the  original  founder.  Some 
were  military  in  spirit;  others  were  pacifistic.  Some  of 
them  have  become  great  missionary  agencies  whose  chief 
goal  has  been  the  great  interior  of  Africa,  where  they 
would  be  far  from  the  arm  of  European  authority  and 
where  there  are  milhons  of  ignorant,  superstitious  ne- 
groes to  convert. 

The  most  powerful  of  the  African  societies  is  the 
Senussi,  which,  with  a  quite  special  character,  has  been 
in  existence  for  about  eighty  years.  Though  at  first 
free  from  all  political  influence,  the  Senussi  gradually 
were  drawn  into  political  relations  which  have  afl"ected 
their  later  development.  They  strongly  resisted  the 
coming  of  the  Itafians  after  the  Italo-Turkish  War,  feel- 
ing that  with  Italian  control  over  the  northern  seaports, 
the  lucrative  trade  in  slaves  and  control  of  the  caravan 
routes  would  be  afl'ected.  Between  191 2  and  191 4  they 
were  supphed  with  arms,  ammunition,  and  money  by 
the  Turks,  and  thus  were  able  to  resist  successfully  the 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     149 

Italian  advance  into  the  interior  of  Cyrenaica.  With  the 
outbreak  of  war  in  August,  19 14,  Turkish  agencies  be- 
came active  in  Libya  and  TripoH,  and  the  Italian  forces 
were  driven  back  nearer  the  coast.  As  the  war  pro- 
gressed, the  leader  of  the  Senussi  became  more  and  more 
ambitious  and  desired  to  make  himself  sovereign  of  the 
Moslem  world.  He  attacked  the  Egyptian  border  from 
three  points,  the  central  one  being  the  oasis  of  Siwa;  but 
the  British  defeated  this  movement  and  finally,  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1 91 7,  drove  him  out  of  Siwa. 

While  the  confraternities  represent  in  some  respects  a 
disruptive  force  in  Mohammedan  hfe — they  have  often 
quarrelled  with  each  other  and  with  the  central  rehgious 
authority — yet  their  fanaticism  is  always  aroused  by  any 
consohdation  of  threatening  power  on  the  part  of  the 
Christian  ''infidel."  The  recent  report  of  Tilho's  work 
{Geographical  Journal,  London,  1920),  during  the  war 
period,  in  the  desert  region  northeast  of  Lake  Tchad,  in 
the  border  of  the  Tibesti  highlands,  illuminates  this 
point.  The  virtually  annual  military  expeditions  of  the 
British  in  the  neighboring  districts  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan  also  clearly  show  the  constant  strain  involved  in 
maintaining  order  in  a  remote  desert  region  sprinkled 
with  strongholds  maintained  by  fanatical  tribesmen. 

When  we  consider  the  geographical  distribution  of  the 
military  expeditions  and  the  cost  that  they  involve,  and 
especially  when  we  view  the  generally  unsettled  state  of 
the  world,  shall  we  not  agree  that  a  pohcy  of  conciliation 
in  deafing  with  the  Turk  is  wholly  justified?  Is  the  social 
and  pohtical  wreck  of  the  whole  border  of  the  Mohamme- 
dan world  not  too  great  a  price  to  pay  for  the  driving  of 
the  Turk  from  Europe?  For  his  presence  at  Constanti- 
nople is  a  mere  shadow.    The  armed  forces  about  the  Sul- 


150    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

tan  are  limited  to  700  guards.  The  total  armed  forces  of 
Turkey  shall  not  exceed  50,000  men,  and  these  are  to  be 
distributed  regionally  by  a  military  inter-AIIied  commis- 
sion of  organization  in  collaboration  with  the  Turkish 
Government.  The  fortifications  of  the  Bosporus  and  the 
Dardanelles,  and  on  adjacent  islands  of  the  northeastern 
v^gean,  are  to  be  demohshed,  together  with  purely  mili- 
tary roads  and  other  works.  In  practice  Allied  war-ships 
occupy  strategic  positions,  and  doubtless  will  always 
remain  there  if  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  is  confirmed.  At  a 
moment's  notice  the  feeble  military  forces  of  the  Turk 
in  Europe  could  be  extinguished.  That  a  patch  of  the 
map  of  Europe  should  be  colored  in  a  way  to  correspond 
with  Anatolia  may  seem  a  pity  to  the  unthinking,  but  it 
has  no  significance  whatever  in  reality.  A  centuries-old 
hope  of  the  Western  powers  has  been  realized.  Effec- 
tively the  Turk  is  no  longer  in  Europe. 

Constantinople,  seen  in  this  light,  is  one  of  a  number 
of  world  objects  which  can  be  protected  only  by  a  con- 
tinuance of  Allied  solidarity.  If  the  Allies  fall  apart  old 
jealousies  will  be  revived  and  new  groupings  formed,  and 
Constantinople  will  once  more  become  a  prize  of  old- 
style  diplomacy.  This  will  not  only  be  of  advantage  to 
the  Turk;  it  will  revive  the  rivalry  of  the  Balkan  states, 
and  it  would  almost  certainly  bring  Russia  back  into  a 
programme  of  expansion  and  result  in  the  nationahstic 
control  of  what  the  world  has  long  agreed  should  be  an 
international  waterway. 

What  may  happen  may  be  judged  by  the  status  of  the 
place  since  19 18.  With  the  occupation  by  the  Allied 
fleet  it  was  changed  from  a  commercial  thoroughfare  to 
a  military  base.  Franchet  d'Esperey  became  the  leader 
of  the  Allied  land  forces  in  the  region,  and  detachments 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     151 

of  French  troops  were  distributed  through  the  eastern 
Balkans.  Commissions  of  control  were  located  at  im- 
portant points  in  Bulgaria  and  in  eastern  and  western 
Thrace;  and  individual  French  officers  were  stationed  at 
Budapest,  Lemberg,  and  other  critical  localities,  Con- 
stantinople also  became  the  base  for  British  and  French 
activities,  the  one  in  the  Caucasus  and  the  other  in  the 
Ukraine. 

Between  the  French  and  British  some  sort  of  agree- 
ment appears  to  have  been  reached  that  looked  toward 
French  control  of  the  Ukraine  as  a  French  sphere  of  influ- 
ence, and  British  control  of  the  Baltic  and  of  the  Cau- 
casus as  British  spheres  of  influence.  Sydorenko  and 
Panyeko  brought  to  various  members  of  the  American 
delegation  a  document  which  has  since  been  published 
in  an  American  periodical,  purporting  to  represent  the 
claims  of  France  upon  the  Ukraine,  late  in  191 8,  and 
these  claims  included  French  control  of  railways,  finance, 
and  the  Ukrainian  general  staff*.  It  is  alleged  that  the 
withdrawal  of  the  French  from  Odessa  early  in  1919  was 
due  to  the  refusal  of  the  Ukrainians  to  accept  the  terms 
which  the  French  proposed.  British  occupation  of  the 
Transcaucasus  region  was  terminated  soon  afterward, 
when  it  became  evident  that  only  a  strong  land  force 
could  maintain  order. 

Thus,  in  the  interval  since  the  armistice  with  Turkey 
in  October,  191 8,  Constantinople  has  been  governed  by 
army  authorities  which  have  had  in  view  two  objects: 
first,  the  military  control  of  the  city  and  the  Straits,  and, 
second,  the  use  of  Constantinople  as  a  base  of  both  mili- 
tary and  political  operations  in  regions  political  and 
strategically  tributary  to  the  Straits.  In  Allied  hands 
Constantinople  has  changed  its  role,  and  we  have  as  a 


152    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

result  of  the  change  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  pre- 
cise objects  which  the  Allied  governments  have  histori- 
cally associated  with  this  important  focus. 

In  order  to  set  the  point  which  we  have  just  considered 
into  higher  relief,  let  us  look  at  two  quite  concrete  aspects 
of  the  Constantinople  question — the  primacy  of  British 
shipping  in  the  region  of  the  Straits  and  the  economic 
situation  of  Bulgaria  with  respect  to  its  foreign  trade,  for 
the  latter  country  has  lost  advantages  which  it  formerly 
enjoyed,  and  it  is  under  a  handicap  in  the  process  of 
reconstruction.     Who  makes  a  corresponding  gain? 

In  1913-1914  the  approximate  totals  of  ship  tonnage 
in  the  Black  Sea,  Red  Sea,  and  Persian  Gulf  were,  by 
nationalities,  as  follows: 

British 14,000,000  tons 

Austro-Hungarian 6,500,000 

Russian 5,500,000 

Turkish 5,000,000 

Italian 4,000,000 

French 4,000,000 

German 2,750,000 

Greek 2,250,000 

Dutch,  Belgian,  and  Rumanian,  less  than  1,000,000     "    each 

That  is,  the  entire  block  of  territory  included  within 
these  seas  is  a  region  which  is  primarily  served  by  British, 
Austro-Hungarian,  Russian,  and  Turkish  ships.  Italy 
and  France  have  4,000,000  tons  each;  Russia  and  Turkey 
are  for  the  moment  entirely  out  of  it;  Austro-Hungarian 
shipping  has  disappeared  by  reason  of  its  surrender  to 
the  Allies.  British  shipping  has  made  the  most  conspicu- 
ous gains  as  a  result  of  the  division  of  the  German  fleet. 
Of  ships.  Great  Britain  has  taken,  roughly,  70  per  cent. 
In  the  reconstruction  of  commerce  in  the  Constantinople 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     153 

region,  and  in  the  revival  of  shipping  facilities,  Great 
Britain  stands  ready  to  play  not  merely  the  principal, 
but  a  wholly  dominating   part.     To   her  statesmen   it 
would  be  unthinkable  that,  with  these  material  advan- 
tages in  her  hands,  her  diplomacy  should  fail  to  give  her 
such  a  measure  of  control  in  so  vital  an  outlet  as  the 
Bosporus  as  not  to  enable  her  to  develop  there  a  great 
trading  reahn,  possibly  second  only  to  that  which  she 
has  developed  in  India.     While  she  has  maintained  mili- 
tary forces  in  Transcaucasia,  in  Syria  (until  the  French 
occupation  in  November,  191 9),  and  is  still  maintaining 
them  in  Egypt  and  Mesopotamia,  she  has  most  distinctly 
attempted  to  follow  the  policy  of  walking  quite  softly. 
Though  her  political  agents  had  penetrated  as  far  as 
Kurdistan  in  191 9,  they  were  quick  to  disappear  (and 
the  detachments  that  occupied  advanced  posts  were  with- 
drawn) as  soon  as  Arab  and  Kurd  pressure  developed  in 
any  important  degree.     Though  Great  Britain  is  charged 
with  almost  every  imperial  crime  under  the  sun,   her 
policy  in  this  section  of  the  Arab  world  has  been,  I  think 
it  is  fair  to  say,  conciliatory  in  the  extreme;  for  Great 
Britain    recognizes    the    vital    connection    between    her 
social,  political,  and  commercial  life,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  her  trade  on  the  other;  and  in  the  long  run  the  best 
trading  relations  are  those  based  upon  good-will. 

Having  said  this  much,  one  is  bound,  also,  to  say  that 
most  of  the  political  settlements  of  the  time,  though 
apparently  based  upon  principles  of  justice,  are  very 
strongly  contributory  toward  British  material  advan- 
tage. If  Great  Britain  were  to  share  in  the  control  of 
the  Zone  of  the  Straits  of  Constantinople,  it  might  be  a 
desirable  thing  in  contrast  to  Turkish  control,  with  all  of 
its  effects  upon  minority  peoples  and  the  welfare  of  the 


154    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Balkan  states;  but  it  would  also  place  Great  Britain  in 
an  extremely  favorable  position  at  the  outlet  of  eastern 
Bulgaria's  commerce  by  way  of  the  Black  Sea.  Like- 
wise, Rumania,  encouraged  in  the  Dobrudja,  will  see  her 
commerce  flow  in  increasing  degree  toward  the  Black  Sea, 
and  this  trade  also  will  have  its  outlet  at  the  Bosporus. 
When  Greece  asked  for  eastern  and  western  Thrace,  she 
obtained  the  territory  after  long  and  skilful  negotiations, 
and,  possibly,  she  ought  to  have  it;  but  it  cuts  Bulgaria 
off  from  the  i^gean,  puts  her  trade  outlets  on  this  sea  in 
the  hands  of  Greece,  and  obliges  her  to  despatch  a  con- 
siderable part  of  her  goods  over  the  railroad  to  Con- 
stantinople. 

Here  we  have  one  of  the  complexities  of  the  time  into 
which  I  shall  not  venture  to  go  more  than  a  step.  In 
the  modern,  closely  organized,  strongly  commercialized 
world  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  make  a  clean-cut 
distinction  between  what  is  right  from  the  standpoint  of 
ethnography,  nationalistic  sentiment,  and  abstract  jus- 
tice, and  what  is  fair  from  the  standpoint  of  economic 
advantage.  Lloyd  George  said  that  the  Germans  would 
not  sign  the  treaty  if  Danzig  were  given  to  the  Poles,  and 
this  may  have  been  true;  but  the  alternative  to  Polish 
ownership  was  not  German  ownership,  but  a  free  state 
under  a  British  high  commissioner.  And  can  we  sup- 
pose that  British  statesmen  did  not  also  have  in  mind 
textile  mills,  railroads,  oil -fields,  ships,  and  coal?  So 
that  if  we  introduce  a  new  set  of  conceptions  into  diplo- 
macy, if  we  call  it,  let  us  say,  "The  New  Diplomacy,"  we 
shall  perhaps  be  able  here  and  there  to  achieve  justice  in 
minor  cases,  but  the  great  stakes  of  diplomacy  remain 
the  same.     We  simply  discuss  them  in  diff'erent  terms. 

If  these  things  be  true,  the  mandatory  principle  of  the 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     155 

League  of  Nations  may  have  in  it  one  of  the  most  pow- 
erful elements  of  international  justice;  and  if  the  League 
of  Nations  continues,  and  particularly  if  it  develops,  the 
attention  of  a  disinterested  government  should  be  very 
strongly  focussed  upon  the  precise  manner  in  which  the 
mandates  of  the  League  are  exercised.  With  the  com- 
plex relations  that  we  have  sketched  above  between 
trade  and  diplomacy,  it  is  inconceivable  that  the  terms 
of  a  mandate  should  be  drawn  up  by  the  interested 
power.  No  such  thing  as  equality  of  trade  privileges, 
one  of  the  objects  of  the  mandatory  principle,  will  fol- 
low. And  to  the  degree  to  which  there  is  an  investment 
of  capital  and  development  by  the  mandatory  power  to 
the  exclusion  of  other  powers  or  to  their  disadvantage, 
there  will  be  laid  the  basis  for  undivided  control  and 
outright  ownership.  It  remains,  therefore,  to  be  seen 
whether  the  mandatory  principle  is  merely  a  transition 
stage  between  the  extreme  of  military  occupation  as  a 
result  of  war  and  the  extreme  of  complete  ownership,  or 
whether  it  is  the  first  step  toward  the  real  administration 
of  mandated  regions  by  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  Balkan  Countries 

From  being  an  undernourished  and  undeveloped  part 
of  the  Turkish  Empire,  with  life  demoralized  or  even 
degraded,  with  persecution  rife  and  with  society  of  a 
low  order  of  development,  the  Balkan  lands  changed 
their  character  in  the  nineteenth  century  and  were 
brought  within  the  limits  of  the  western  European  indus- 
trial realm.  They  became  the  transit  lands  for  a  part 
of  the  Oriental  trade  under  that  autonomy  or  semi- 
dependence  w^hich  they  had  gained  by  several  centuries 
of  effort.     Under  the  protection   of  general    European 


156    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

treaties  whose  execution  involved  chiefly  the  welfare  of 
western  European  powers,  the  Balkan  states  increased  in 
population,  developed  cities  of  considerable  size  and 
commercial  importance,  and  put  their  products  into  the 
current  of  world  trade.  Though  principally  of  impor- 
tance as  transit  lands,  the  Balkans  became  important, 
also,  because  of  their  own  economic  resources  and  the 
increased  purchasing  power  of  their  people. 

Two  broad  groups  of  Slavic  peoples  had  developed, 
the  Jugo-SIavs  and  the  Bulgarians.  The  former  is  com- 
posed of  such  diverse  elements  as  the  Serbs  and  the  Slo- 
venes, and  the  latter,  originally  Finno-Ugrian,  as  the 
ethnologist  would  say,  and  not  Slavic,  has  been  so  thor- 
oughly penetrated  by  Slavic  peoples  in  successive  migra- 
tions that  it  is  now  properly  classed  as  a  Slav  state. 
The  South  Slavs  form  one  of  two  great  fingers  of  Slav- 
dom thrust  westward  into  Central  Europe,  and  it  ex- 
tends all  along  the  Adriatic,  enveloping  the  key  cities  of 
Fiume  and  Trieste. 

The  degree  of  unity  of  these  two  Slavic  groups,  Jugo- 
SIavs  and  Bulgarians,  is  quite  diff'erent.  The  Bulgari- 
ans are  chiefly  a  peasant  people,  with  fairly  uniform 
economic  advantages  and  ethnic  qualities.  Four-fifths 
of  Bulgarian  exports  consist  of  agricultural  products,  and 
three-fourths  of  the  imports  are  manufactured  wares. 
While  the  large  estate  has  long  been  a  feature  of  land 
tenure  in  Rumania,  Jugo-SIavia,  and  Greece,  Bulgaria  is 
pre-eminently  the  land  of  smafl  peasant  proprietors. 
Three-fourths  of  her  land  is  held  in  smafl  farms  not 
exceeding  twenty  hectares  (fifty  acres).  Proprietors 
holding  more  than  thirty  hectares  (seventy-five  acres) 
hold  only  14  per  cent  of  the  total  area  of  cultivable  land. 
In  contrast  to  the  Bulgarians  the  Jugo-SIavs  are  com- 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE   BALKANS     157 

posed  of  most  diverse  elements.  The  Slovenes,  for  ex- 
ample, fought  in  the  Austrian  army  and  faced  Italian 
divisions  up  to  the  end  of  the  war.  By  the  Pact  of 
Corfu,  signed  in  19 17,  and  the  organization  of  a  recog- 
nized, government  at  Agram  after  the  November  armis- 
tice, 191 8,  the  kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slo- 
venes was  created,  and  the  group  of  Slovenes  incorpo- 
rated with  the  Serbs  and  Croats  to  form  a  new  Allied 
state.  Thus,  by  a  political  phrase,  Croats  and  Slovenes 
became  allies  of  the  Italians,  whom  they  had  just  been 
fighting !  This  was  one  of  the  facts  that  was  used 
against  them  again  and  again  by  the  Italians  to  support 
their  claim  to  a  large  part  of  the  Jugo-SIav  territory  and 
its  commercial  outlets  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic. 

The  degree  of  unity  of  the  Jugo-SIav  state  is  altogether 
problematical,  and  doubt  as  to  its  political  stability  was 
a  source  of  grave  weakness  in  its  diplomacy.  There  has 
been  a  steady  growth  of  the  agrarian  party  which  seeks 
such  control  and  division  of  the  land  and  such  commer- 
cial arrangements  as  will  be  of  greatest  benefit  to  it. 
Opposed  to  each  other  are  two  other  political  groups,  the 
one  seeking  a  strongly  centralized  government,  the  other 
a  confederation  which  would  leave  the  various  states 
with  a  high  degree  of  political  and  commercial  autonomy. 
Such  a  state  finds  it  difficult  to  manage  its  domestic 
affairs,  and  is  almost  groping  in  the  dark  in  attempting 
to  negotiate  with  foreign  powers. 

Thus  the  war  has  completely  changed  the  orientation 
of  the  Serbian  state,  a  part  of  Jugo-SIavia.  Its  original 
thought  at  the  opening  of  the  first  Balkan  War  was  to 
unite  only  its  immediate  kinsmen  with  the  main  body, 
and  to  secure  a  window  on  the  sea.  Because  Greek 
troops  captured  Saloniki  from  the  Turks  after  a  long 


158    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

siege  in  19 12  Serbia  was  deprived  of  an  outlet  on  the 
.^gean.  Her  eyes  thereupon  turned  to  the  Adriatic,  and 
here  she  has  struggled  with  Italy  for  just  two  years  with 
the  object  of  controlling  the  eastern  Adriatic  littoral. 
Realizing  that  she  could  not  win  on  the  programme  of 
19 1 9,  Jugo-SIavia  took  renewed  interest  in  her  eastern 
frontier,  where  she  was  able  to  make  gains  at  Bulgaria's 
expense.  To  understand  the  background  of  this  action 
requires  us  to  digress  a  moment  for  a  view  of  the  general 
situation  and  an  earlier  phase  of  the  treaty-making 
process. 

The  boundary  settlements  of  the  Balkans  were  made 
on  a  principle  quite  different  from  that  which  governed 
the  making  of  the  German  treaty.  The  signatures  of 
Germany  and  Austria  had  been  obtained — and  the  rati- 
fication also — to  the  treaties  of  Versailles  and  St.  Ger- 
main-en-Laye.  It  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  Bul- 
garia would  sign.  Months  before,  in  the  case  of  Ger- 
many, there  was  no  such  assurance.  It  is  perhaps  worth 
while,  therefore,  to  sketch  an  historic  incident  that  bears, 
if  only  by  contrast,  on  the  Balkan  question,  and  which 
involves  one  of  the  most  dramatic  moments  of  the  peace 
conference. 

The  early  days  of  the  peace  conference  were  filled  with 
organization  plans,  with  a  multitude  of  questions  of  the 
first  order  respecting  the  management  of  a  world  still 
largely  under  military  control,  and  with  hearing  the  in- 
sistent claims  of  minor  nationalities.  It  would  have 
been  a  ruthless  spirit  that  denied  a  hearing  to  Poles, 
Czecho-SIovaks,  Greeks,  to  mention  only  the  leading 
delegations  of  minor  rank.  Their  representatives  were 
not  trained  in  the  principles  of  effective  speaking.  When 
Dmowski  related  the  claims  of  Poland,   he  began  at 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE   BALKANS     159 

eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  in  the  fourteenth 
century,  and  could  reach  the  year  191 9  and  the  pressing 
problems  of  the  moment  only  as  late  as  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.  Benes  followed  immediately  with  the 
counter-claims  of  Czecho-SIovakia,  and,  if  I  remember 
correctly,  he  began  a  century  earlier  and  finished  an 
hour  later !  Venizelos,  a  more  practised  hand,  confined 
himself  to  one  century  of  Greek  history  rather  than  to 
five,  and  was  adroit  enough  to  tell  his  story  in  instal- 
ments. To  listen  to  these  recitals  of  national  claims,  to 
organize  field  commissions  to  Berlin,  Vienna,  southern 
Russia,  etc.,  for  gathering  political  and  economic  data 
on  the  spot,  to  draft  the  projects  for  reparation,  the 
League  of  Nations,  etc.,  filled  the  first  two  months  of 
the  conference. 

At  last  it  was  apparent  to  every  one  that  the  confer- 
ence had  to  be  speeded  up.  It  had  accomplished  a  vast 
amount  of  labor  in  a  brief  time,  but  the  taking  of  evi- 
dence in  the  supreme  council  had  to  stop.  This  work 
was  thereafter  largely  assigned  to  commissions  who  then 
reported  to  the  supreme  council.  To  facilitate  one 
branch  of  the  work,  the  territorial  settlements,  and  to 
determine  the  new  boundaries,  Premier  Clemenceau,  Mr. 
Balfour,  and  Colonel  House  planned  to  meet  at  the 
French  Foreign  Office  on  February  19.  On  his  way  to 
the  conference  Clemenceau  was  shot.  Mr.  Balfour  and 
Colonel  House  went  ahead  with  the  arrangements.  On 
the  forenoon  of  February  21  a  group  of  British  and 
American  experts  met,  at  the  suggestion  of  Colonel 
House,  in  my  office,  room  446  of  the  Crillon  Hotel.  The 
British  delegation  included  Sir  William  Tyrell,  Headlam- 
Morley,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cornwall,  and  others ;  among 
the  Americans  were  Haskins,  Seymour,  and  Johnson. 


i6o    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

When  the  session  ended  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
of  that  day,  the  boundaries  of  Germany  were  tentatively 
sketched  and  the  way  prepared  for  a  conclusion  of  the 
matter  in  the  various  territorial  commissions  that  worked 
out  the  details. 

The  first  boundary  report  to  be  presented  and  then 
argued  before  the  supreme  council  was  that  of  the  Polish 
territorial  commission,  fixing  Germany's  eastern  boun- 
dary. Jules  Cambon  read  the  report  of  the  Polish  com- 
mission. At  last  the  time  had  come  for  settling  the  de- 
tails of  a  particular  boundary.  Up  to  this  time  every- 
thing had  been  preliminary — the  taking  of  evidence;  now 
there  was  to  be  fixed  a  definite  frontier.  Moreover,  it 
was  recommended  that  Danzig  be  given  to  the  Poles, 
and  the  report  of  the  commission  was  unanimous  on  this 
point.  Here  was  an  old  Hanseatic  town,  a  modern  com- 
mercial port,  a  focus  of  sea-borne  trade  of  great  future 
importance.  Trade  is  the  life  of  the  British  Empire. 
It  was  an  Englishman  who  wrote  that  shipping  was  to 
England  like  the  hair  of  Samson,  the  secret  of  strength. 
Would  Lloyd  George  continue  in  the  role  of  irresponsible 
and  playful  plenipotentiary,  or  would  he  recognize  the 
stake  at  Danzig — Danzig,  behind  which  were  textile 
mills,  coal,  and  the  petroleum  of  the  Carpathian  fore- 
lands? Suddenly  Lloyd  George  changed  from  a  state  of 
bored  indifference  to  one  of  aggressive  participation. 
From  that  moment  forward  Lloyd  George  never  relaxed 
his  interest  or  his  control.  Sitting  forward  in  his  chair, 
and  speaking  in  an  earnest  voice,  he  proceeded  to 
tear  the  report  to  pieces,  and  the  argument  he  employed 
wiped  the  smiles  from  the  faces  and  drove  fear  into  the 
hearts  of  his  listeners.  "Gentlemen,"  he  said,  "if  we 
give  Danzig  to  the  Poles  the  Germans  will  not  sign  the 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE   BALKANS     i6i 

treaty,  and  if  they  do  not  sign  our  work  here  is  a  failure. 
I  assure  you  that  Germany  will  not  sign  such  a  treaty.'* 
There  ensued  a  silence  that  could  be  heard.  Every  one 
was  shocked,  alarmed,  convinced.  Lloyd  George  had  in- 
troduced a  bogey  and  it  had  worked.  Thenceforth  the 
motto  of  the  British  premier  might  have  been:  **I  have 
a  little  shadow  that  goes  in  and  out  with  me !" 

When  the  report  was  resubmitted  to  the  Polish  com- 
mission the  next  morning,  it  was  the  British  representa- 
tive himself  who  brought  a  typed  answer  to  the  asser- 
tions of  his  chief,  Lloyd  George.  When  on  the  same 
day  the  supplementary  report  was  read.  President  Wil- 
son reviewed  in  a  masterly  fashion  the  two  sides  of  the 
question,  emphasizing  what  had  been  promised  the  Poles 
in  Article  XIII  of  his  declaration  of  January  8,  191 8, 
before  a  Joint  session  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 
Thereupon,  with  his  eyes  fixed  upon  the  trade  prize  of 
Danzig  and  his  mind  fortified  with  the  historic  prece- 
dents so  skilfully  supplied  by  Headlam-Morley,  Lloyd 
George  moved  that  the  report  be  tentatively  accepted 
as  read,  but  that  final  decision  on  Germany's  boundaries 
be  reserved  until  all  the  territorial  reports  had  been 
considered.  Directly  thereafter  the  council  of  four  was 
organized,  where  decisions  could  be  reached  without  the 
bother  of  territorial  experts,  with  whose  facts,  or  any 
other  kind  of  facts  except  purely  political  ones,  Lloyd 
George  had  no  patience  whatever.  The  next  we  hear 
of  the  Danzig  question  Lloyd  George  and  President 
Wilson  have  agreed  to  make  it  a  free  city. 
'  With  this  solution  I  have  no  quarrel.  It  was  even 
with  a  sense  of  relief  that  we  heard  that  the  matter  had 
been  thus  settled.  While  I  believe  that  Danzig  should 
be  a  Polish  port,  I  also  realize  that  there  are  two  very 


1 62    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

big  sides  to  the  question.     To  find  out  what  had  been 
agreed  upon  and  to  give  the  agreement  substance,  Head- 
lam-Morley  and  myself  waited  on  the   President,   for, 
within  the  space  of  an  hour,  to  two  different  members 
of  his  staff  Lloyd  George  had  given  two  quite  different 
versions  as  to  what  had  been  agreed  upon  between  him- 
self and  the  President,  and  a  midnight  meeting  between 
the  British  experts  and  myself  failed  to  untangle  the 
matter.     The  President  reported  that  it  had  been  agreed 
to    follow   the   ethnic   principle   in   delimiting   Danzig's 
boundaries  and  to  give  the  city  a  "free"  status.     Spread- 
ing out  various  maps  upon  the  floor  of  the  President's 
study,  we  examined  the  matter  in  some  detail,  and  de- 
cided to  avoid  discussion  as  to  the  relative  merits  of  the 
ethnic  maps  of  the  different  delegations  by  submitting  a 
small  map  prepared  by  Lloyd  George's  advisers.     There- 
upon Mr.  Paton,  of  the  British  delegation,  and  I  set  to 
work  upon  a  large-scale  map  prepared  by  the  American 
Inquiry,  which  was  used  throughout  the  Polish  negotia- 
tions as  the  authoritative  map  on  ethnic  matters.     Be- 
tween four  and  six  o'clock  we  traced  the  boundaries  of 
Danzig  as  they  stand  in  the  treaty  to-day.     Transferring 
these  boundaries  to  the  British  small-scale  map  for  the 
benefit  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George   they  w^ere  presented   to 
the  council  of  four,  and  there  passed  without  delay. 

Six  months  thereafter,  and  against  the  protest  of  the 
American  representative  on  the  supreme  council.  Sir 
Reginald  Tower  was  appointed  high  commissioner  at 
Danzig.  His  stormy  course  there  could  have  been  pre- 
dicted with  mathematical  accuracy  by  any  one  inter- 
ested enough  to  see  why  Lloyd  George  labored  for  a 
free  city  on  the  shores  of  the  Baltic,  where  British  ship- 
ping and  capital  were  to  be  rapidly  increased,  and  why 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS  163 

Sir  Reginald  was  chosen  on  the  basis  of  a  record  in  South 
America  quite  unfavorably  known  to  many  American 
merchants.  In  this  and  in  many  other  matters  the  Brit- 
ish knew  Just  what  they  wanted  and  how  to  get  it.  In 
training  and  experience  they  were  second  to  no  other 
delegation,  and  they  worked  with  a  sureness  of  touch 
that  aroused  the  deepest  admiration. 

No  such  fear  as  that  which  beset  the  minds  of  the 
leading  statesmen  with  respect  to  the  German  treaty 
assailed  them  when  Bulgaria  came  to  sign.  The  cere- 
mony of  the  signing  was  altogether  extraordinary.  In 
the  old  town  hall  at  Neuilly  stood  files  of  soldiers,  guards 
with  fixed  bayonets  were  stationed  at  the  angles  of  the 
stairway,  the  cars  of  the  different  delegations  swanked 
up  to  the  entrance,  the  Alhed  leaders  took  their  seats, 
and  very  powerful  and  formidable  they  appeared.  It 
was  a  splendid  array.  In  the  background  was  a  com- 
pact mass  of  onlookers  from  the  various  delegations, 
including  a  sprinkling  of  women.  It  was  a  scene,  and 
they  were  there  to  see  it.  Several  bound  copies  of  the 
treaty  lay  on  the  table.  One  looked  to  see  the  doors 
thrown  open  and  a  file  of  Bulgarian'  officials  and  a  lit- 
tle ceremoniousness  and,  in  short,  something  befitting 
the  power  and  majesty  of  the  sovereign  Bulgarian  people 
on  a  solemn  and  historic  occasion.  Instead,  there  was  a 
military  order  in  French  in  the  hallway  outside,  the 
doors  slowly  opened,  a  half-dozen  French  foreign  office 
secretaries  rose  and  stood  about  the  entrance,  and  after 
a  pause  a  single  gray-faced  and  very  scared-looking, 
slightly  stooped  man  walked  slowly  in  and  was  ushered 
to  a  seat  at  one  end  of  the  room.  Was  all  this  cere- 
mony and  this  imposing  array  for  the  purpose  of  dealing 
with  this   lone  individual — the  peasant,   Stambouliski? 


1 64    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

It  looked  as  if  the  office  boy  had  been  called  in  for  a  con- 
ference with  the  board  of  directors.  Of  course  he  would 
sign,  as  presently  he  did,  very  courteously  escorted  and 
supported  by  the  hovering  foreign  office  secretaries;  and 
then  the  great  chiefs  of  the  Alfies  signed,  and  presently 
the  lone  Bulgar,  still  scared  and  wall-eyed,  was  led  to 
the  door,  and  thus  furtively  he  escaped.  The  break-up 
of  the  rest  of  the  assemblage  wore  the  cheerful  aspect  of 
an  afternoon  tea.  The  AIHes  were  at  peace  with  Bul- 
garia ! 

What  did  the  treaty  do?  It  took  things  from  Bul- 
garia. Were  any  of  these  actively  protested?  On  what 
principle?  These  are  important  matters  over  which  we 
would  do  well  to  reflect  for  a  moment,  for  both  during 
the  w^ar  and  the  peace  conference  the  position  of  the 
American  Government  was  little  understood,  abroad  as 
at  home.  On  the  one  hand,  we  were  accused  of  softness 
respecting  a  treacherous  enemy  state,  an  ally  of  Ger- 
many; and,  on  the  other,  we  were  thought  heartless  and 
lacking  moral  courage  for  signing  a  treaty  that  stripped 
Bulgaria  of  territory  and  property  when  we  had  never 
declared  war  against  her.  Let  us  see  where  the  line  of 
justice  lies  and  exactly  what  was  the  record  of  the 
American  delegation. 

The  Alfies  naturaHy  viewed  the  peace  now  from  the 
standpoint  of  imposing  terms  upon  an  enemy,  again 
from  the  standpoint  of  abstract  justice  as  expressed  in 
President  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points.  In  the  settlements 
now  one  view%  now  another  was  dominant.  Thus  the 
path  of  concifiation  was  everywhere  made  difficult.  At 
every  turn  one  must  needs  give  documentary  evidence  of 
hating  the  enemy  or  one  might  be  thought  pro-German. 
This  state  of  things  suggests  a  bit  of  self-analysis  on  the 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE   BALKANS     165 

part  of  the  man  who  didn't  like  olives:  '*I  don't  like 
olives,  and  I'm  glad  I  don't  like  'em,  for  if  I  liked  'em 
I'd  eat  'em,  and  I  hate  'em." 

America's  chief  representative  was  always  powerful 
and  respected,  and  on  every  occasion  demanding  clear- 
ness and  vision  it  was  he  who  stood  head  and  shoulders 
above  his  associates.  When  I  suggested  to  some  of  my 
British  colleagues  after  a  debate  between  Lloyd  George 
and  the  President  that  we  should  keep  score  on  our 
chiefs  to  see  which  made  the  most  points,  the  reply  was 
made:  "Up  to  now,  at  least,  your  chief  has  won  them  all !" 

But  with  delay  in  the  Senate  the  influence  of  the 
American  representatives  grew  steadily  less.  On  one 
occasion  Mr.  Polk  commissioned  me  to  secure  the  opinion 
of  Premier  Clemenceau  on  the  Fiume  question,  which 
was  then  leading  up  to  one  of  its  most  critical  phases. 
It  was  late  in  191 9,  we  had  not  ratified  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles,  the  conference  was  nearing  its  end,  the  Ameri- 
can delegation  was  soon  to  leave.  Tardieu  reported  his 
chief's  answer  to  our  suggestion:  "The  Americans  are 
charming  but  they  are  far  away;  when  you  have  gone 
the  Italians  remain — and  as  our  neighbors."  Just  at  the 
end  the  power  represented  by  America  had  a  sudden 
burst  of  recognition.  You  will  not  find  it  in  the  min- 
utes of  the  proceedings.  The  incident  is  historic.  The 
German  representatives  were  reluctant  to  sign  the  pro- 
tocol of  the  final  proceedings  respecting  the  ratification 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  The  American  delegation 
was  to  sail  on  December  5.  At  the  close  of  the  session 
on  December  3  Clemenceau  turned  to  Mr.  Polk  and 
begged  him  to  postpone  the  departure  of  the  American 
delegation.  On  his  face  were  no  longer  the  aggressive 
and  determined  lines  of  the  victorious  leader.     There  was 


1 66    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

a  day  when  he  had  called  the  President  pro-German 
and  left  the  council  of  four  in  anger.  Now  he  sought 
companionship  as  he  walked  through  the  dark  pathway 
of  his  fears.  Unless  ratifications  were  exchanged  all 
might  be  lost.  "Mr.  Polk,  I  beg  you  to  remain.  If 
you  don't  the  Germans  will  not  sign.  I  beg  you  to 
stay.  I  beg  you  not  to  go."  The  American  delegation 
delayed  its  departure. 

From  the  attitude  of  the  American  delegation  in  the 
case  of  the  Adriatic  dispute,  it  will  be  obvious  what  their 
position  was  in  the  case  of  those  three  salients  of  Bul- 
garian territory  toward  the  west  w^hich  Serbia  coveted 
and  eventually  obtained  by  the  Treaty  of  Neuilly,  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers. 
These  three  salients  are  occupied  by  Bulgarian  popula- 
tions, and  not  only  in  the  territorial  commissions  but  also 
in  the  supreme  council  the  American  representatives 
opposed  to  the  end,  and  had  their  opposition  entered 
in  the  record,  the  giving  of  Bulgarian  territory  to  a 
greatly  enlarged  Jugo-SIavia.  That  state  already  in- 
cluded Slovenes  of  doubtful  allegiance,  colonies  of  Ger- 
mans and  Hungarians  north  of  the  Save,  Montenegrins 
and  Macedonian  Slavs  who  certainly  wanted  least  of  all 
to  be  added  to  Serbia.  And  now  the  Jugo-SIavs  were 
bent,  for  strategic  reasons — the  protection  of  the  railway 
line  from  Nish  to  Saloniki — on  lopping  off  four  pieces  of 
Bulgarian  territory  and  carrying  the  boundary  in  one 
place  within  artillery  range  of  Sofia,  the  capital  of  Bul- 
garia. 

Of  the  four  pieces  of  territory  which  Bulgaria  has  lost 
on  the  west — Timok,  Tsaribrod,  Bosilegrad,  and  Stru- 
mitsa — the  southernmost  one,  the  Strumitsa  salient,  rep- 
resents the  most  significant  loss,  and  it  is  also  the  largest. 


1 68    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

For  the  lopping  off  of  this  projection  of  Bulgaria  into 
Macedonia  puts  an  end,  at  least  for  the  present,  to  the 
long  process  begun  in  1870,  with  the  foundation  of  the 
Bulgarian  exarchate,  and  enhanced  in  1878  with  the 
autonomy  of  Bulgaria,  which  had  for  its  object  the 
Bulgarization  of  Macedonia  and  its  ultimate  annexation 
to  the  Bulgarian  realm.  This  act  and  the  tacit  confir- 
mation by  the  powers  of  the  Serbo-Greek  boundary  in 
Macedonia  throws  the  Macedonian  question  into  its 
latest,  possibly  its  last,  phase.  The  refined  ethnographic 
and  linguistic  studies  of  the  past  few  years  have  shown 
contradictory  or  indefinite  results  as  to  the  individualis- 
tic character  of  the  Macedonian  region.  On  the  physical 
side  it  is  made  up  of  bits  of  several  adjacent  natural 
regions.  On  the  refigious  side  it  might,  in  the  nascent 
state  in  which  it  was  in  1 870,  have  just  as  readily  become 
an  appanage  of  Serbia  as  of  Bulgaria.  By  19 12,  how- 
ever, over  1,100  Bulgarian  churches  had  been  estab- 
lished in  the  region. 

The  population  of  Macedonia  is  estimated  variously 
between  1,200,000  and  2,000,000,  owing  to  the  indiffer- 
ent boundaries  of  the  region.  More  than  half  the  people 
are  Christians,  and  the  rest  chiefly  Mohammedans,  with 
some  Jews.  Each  of  the  three  adjacent  states,  Serbia, 
Bulgaria,  and  Greece,  made  an  effort  to  impose  its 
culture  upon  the  people  and  to  develop  a  nationalist 
sentiment  among  them.  Though  the  Bulgarians  at  one 
time  had  possession  of  the  region  and  though  the  racial 
character  of  the  people  is  perhaps  somewhat  more  closely 
similar  to  Bulgaria  than  to  Serbia,  the  Serbs  also  held 
the  country  for  a  time  and  they  left  a  deep  impression 
there,  as  is  shown  by  the  architecture  and  the  literature. 
Greek  influence  was  strong  in  Macedonia,  because  her 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     169 

agents  operated  chiefly  in  the  towns,  and  these  domi- 
nated large  expanses  of  tributary  country.  Even  Ru- 
mania Joined  in  the  effort  to  penetrate  Macedonia ;  there 
are  probably  between  75,000  and  100,000  pastoral  Vlachs 
of  Rumanian  affiliation  in  the  whole  Macedonian  country. 
But  greater  success  was  bound  to  attend  the  Bulgarian 
penetration,  because  from  the  first  the  Bulgarian  refigious 
organization  had  a  nationalistic  cast.  It  was  intimately 
associated  with  the  Bulgarian  effort  to  achieve  indepen- 
dence and  to  round  out  the  Bulgarian  realm  so  as  to 
include  all  Bulgarian  populations  adjacent  to  the  central 
group.  Thus  it  sought  to  include  lands  in  Turkish  hands 
in  eastern  and  western  Thrace.  It  had  as  one  of  its 
objects  the  incorporation  of  Macedonia  into  Bulgaria 
and  the  recovery  of  territory  inhabited  by  Bulgarians  in 
the  Dobrudja.  When  its  religious  teachers  went  into 
Macedonia  they  took  with  them  not  merely  the  faith  of 
their  church  but  the  hope  of  freedom  from  the  Turk, 
the  pride  of  nationafity  which  the  Bulgarians  had,  and 
kinship  with  a  closely  related  ethnic  group.  Naturally, 
under  these  conditions  Bulgaria,  at  the  close  of  the  first 
Balkan  War,  looked  upon  Macedonia  as  her  own,  and  the 
restriction  of  approach  of  Serbia  to  Saloniki  on  the  south 
was  acknowledged  by  the  Serbians  themselves.  In  the 
secret  treaty  with  Bulgaria  Just  before  the  first  Balkan 
War,  Serbia  agreed  to  the  definition  of  a  neutral  strip 
running  east-northeast  to  Lake  Okhrida,  one  hundred 
miles  northwest  of  Saloniki,  which  was  to  be  the  subject 
of  later  negotiation  between  her  and  Bulgaria.  The 
later  negotiation  never  took  place,  for  Bulgaria  made 
unexpected  gains  in  eastern  Thrace,  and  the  powers  de- 
cided to  form  an  independent  Albania  in  the  regions 
where  Serbia  had  hoped  to  increase  her  territory.     Serbia 


170    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

and  Greece  denounced  the  territorial  terms  of  the  alli- 
ance, Bulgaria  insisted  on  them  in  spite  of  changed  con- 
ditions, and  the  second  Balkan  War  resulted.  With  the 
complete  success  of  Serbia  and  Greece,  as  opposed  to 
Bulgaria,  they  divided  Macedonia  between  them,  leaving 
only  the  Strumitsa  salient  and  the  country  immediately 
northeast  and  east  of  it  to  Bulgaria;  and  the  Treaty  of 
Neuilly,  by  taking  away  the  Strumitsa  salient  has  shut 
the  door  on  Bulgaria's  expansion  in  this  direction. 

The  Macedonian  question,  once  the  chief  political  prob- 
lem of  the  Near  East,  has  passed  into  an  entirely  new 
phase.  Neither  Greece  nor  Serbia  is  expected  to  give  up 
Macedonian  territory  for  a  possible  future  Macedonia. 
The  Macedonians  are  without  leaders  of  real  ability,  and 
the  heterogeneous  character  of  the  population  makes  it 
impossible  for  them  to  have,  or  to  express,  a  common 
public  opinion.  There  are  no  significant  resources.  It 
is  a  poor  country,  unwooded,  rather  desolate,  and  will 
always  be  commercially  tributary  to  communities  or 
states  that  are  richer  and  economically  better  balanced. 
It  is  therefore  improbable  that  the  Macedonian  question 
will  be  revived  except  through  the  possible  cruelties  of 
Greeks  and  Serbs  in  their  treatment  of  the  Macedonians. 

It  was  a  part  of  the  programme  of  the  American  dele- 
gation that,  while  the  Strumitsa  salient  should  properly 
be  removed  because  of  the  menace  which  it  carried  to 
Greek  and  Serbian  railway  interests  from  Nish  to  Sal- 
oniki,  Bulgaria  should  not  suffer  the  loss  of  the  two 
middle  bits  of  territory — Tsaribrod  and  Bosilegrad.  For 
Sofia,  the  Bulgarian  capital,  is  brought  within  thirty  miles 
of  the  new  frontier,  that  is,  within  the  range  of  modern 
gunfire;  and  there  is  no  warrant  at  all  in  ethnic  consid- 
erations for  a  change  from  the  frontier  as  it  stood  before 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     171 

the  beginning  of  the  war.  But  the  government  of  the 
kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes  desired  to 
rectify  their  frontier.  Not  at  all  sure  of  a  satisfactory 
settlement  of  the  Adriatic  question,  Jugo-SIavia  sought 
to  make  the  best  of  the  new  boundary  arrangements 
elsewhere.  With  Greece,  a  friendly  ally,  on  the  south, 
she  could  hope  for  no  expansion  of  her  national  domain 
toward  Saloniki,  and  it  was  altogether  doubtful  if  she 
could  obtain  compensation  in  northern  Albania,  as  had 
been  promised  by  the  secret  Treaty  of  London  in  191 5. 
But  two  other  places  remained  where  advantages  could 
be  secured:  on  the  north,  where  the  enemy  states  of  Aus- 
tria and  Hungary  were  to  have  their  frontiers  defined; 
and  on  the  east,  where  the  Bulgarian  frontier  was  yet  to 
be  estabhshed.  It  was  not  in  the  interests  of  justice,  it 
was  solely  in  the  interest  of  the  Jugo-SIav  state,  that 
Bulgaria  suffered  territorial  losses  on  the  west.  The 
American  delegation  protested,  both  in  the  territorial 
commissions  and  finally  before  the  supreme  council, 
against  these  losses  of  territory,  claiming  them  to  be  un- 
justifiable according  to  any  principle  that  had  governed 
the  peace  conference  theretofore,  and  emphasizing  the 
menace  of  war  that  they  invited. 

While  the  arguments  of  the  American  representatives 
were  courteously  received,  our  delay  in  ratifying  the  treaty 
had  weakened  American  prestige.  If  the  loss  of  territory 
pained  an  enemy,  Bulgaria,  it  pleased  an  ally,  Jugo-SIavia. 
Germany  and  Austria  had  signed;  Bulgaria  would  also 
sign.  The  territory  could  be  taken  with  impunity.  Poli- 
tics had  become  quite  practical;  the  Fourteen  Points  and 
their  exponent,  as  Clemenceau  had  said,  were  far  away. 
However  charming  the  Americans  might  be,  the  Jugo- 
slavs were  nearer,  and  there  remained  the  Adriatic  dis- 


172    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

pute  to  settle.  Perhaps  a  concession  on  the  east  would 
soften  the  blow  that  impended  on  the  west.  When  Jugo- 
slavia insisted  on  taking  land  from  Bulgaria  by  the 
Treaty  of  Neuilly,  she  paved  the  way  for  Rapallo. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  remember: 

(i)  That  in  September,  191 5,  Bulgaria  agreed  to  join 
Austria-Hungary  against  Serbia  and  in  return  was  to 
receive  a  certain  share  of  Serbian  land  and  people. 

(2)  That  Bulgarian  authorities  at  one  time  even  de- 
clared that  Serbia  no  longer  existed  and  had  become 
Bulgarian,  closed  schools  and  churches,  and  even  burned 
them,  compelled  the  people  to  speak  Bulgarian,  and,  like 
the  Germans  in  Belgium  and  northeastern  France,  levied 
fines  and  contributions,  took  away  food,  and  ruined  the 
country. 

(3)  That  out  of  tens  of  thousands  of  Serbians  interned 
in  Bulgarian  camps,  at  least  half  died. 

(4)  That  Bulgarian  outrages  upon  Greeks  and  Serbs — 
men,  women,  and  children — were  among  the  most  hideous 
of  the  war. 

The  territorial  losses  of  Bulgaria  appear  slight,  but  the 
political  stability  of  the  state  has  been  seriously  affected 
by  them.  By  tacit  confirmation  of  the  northeastern 
boundary  of  Bulgaria  in  the  Dobrudja,  on  the  part  of  the 
powers,  Rumanian  merchants  of  Braila  and  Galatz  are 
given  a  vital  hold  upon  that  one-fourth  of  Bulgaria's  for- 
eign trade  that  passes  by  way  of  the  Danube.  She  is 
deprived  of  an  outlet  on  the  Mgean  save  by  the  untried 
experiment  of  international  guarantee  of  transit  trade 
across  a  neighboring  state,  and  the  possible  interna- 
tionalization of  the  Maritsa  River,  as  provided  in  the  still 
unratified  Treaty  of  Sevres.  Under  these  circumstances 
her  primitive  economic  organization  lends  itself  the  more 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS     173 

readily  to  exploitation  by  foreign  capital.  More  than  a 
fifth  of  so-called  Bulgarians  live  outside  her  new  national 
boundaries — 200,000  in  Thrace,  200,000  in  the  Dobrudja, 
800,000  exarchists  in  Macedonia — or  a  total  of  1,200,000. 
Favorable  to  national  solidarity  and  political  control  is 
the  compact  layout  of  the  land.  Favorable  also  in  this 
respect  is  the  ethnic  purity  of  the  people.  Of  4,000,000 
population,  80  per  cent  are  Bulgarian  (as  contrasted  with 
60  per  cent  of  Czecho-SIovaks  in  Czecho-SIovakia) .  Turks 
are  found  chiefly  in  the  east  and  Greeks  in  the  towns. 

Perhaps  the  principal  focus  of  territorial  difficulty  in 
the  Balkans  is  Thrace,  whose  eastern  and  western  sec- 
tions affect  the  commercial  outlets  of  Bulgaria  in  a  critical 
way.  This  whole  territory  was  coveted  by  Greece  and 
claimed  on  ground  of  strategy,  ethnography,  and  com- 
mercial advantage.  A  secret  treaty,  signed  in  February, 
191 3,  approved  of  the  cession  of  Kavala  to  Bulgaria  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  the  natural  outlet  for  the  western 
section  of  that  country,  and  at  that  time  there  was  no 
thought  but  that  Dedeagatch  would  also  remain  in 
Bulgarian  hands.  The  ethnography  of  the  entire  area 
would  certainly  indicate  such  a  solution,  and  Greece  had 
her  eyes  fixed  rather  on  Saloniki,  southern  Albania,  and 
the  remoter  borders  of  the  eastern  ^^gean.  But  with 
AHied  victory  Greece's  programme  expanded  so  as  to  take 
in  the  chief  elements  of  the  Greek  world,  and  she  sought 
to  consolidate  the  Greek  peoples  of  eastern  and  western 
Thrace  by  including  these  territories  within  her  national 
domain. 

Ultimately  she  won  the  assent  of  all  delegations  except 
the  American,  and  American  opposition  continued  until 
the  end,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  not  desiring  to  give 
Greece  all  of  the  territory  which  she  eventually  obtained. 


174    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

American  opinion  favored  a  rectification  of  the  Bulgarian 
frontier  at  Adrianople  and  Kirk-Kilisse,  so  as  to  advan- 
tage Bulgaria  to  some  degree,  and  thus  recognize  not  only 
the  ethnic  principle  but  also  the  historic  fact  that  in  the 
first  Balkan  War  it  was  the  effort  of  the  Bulgarian  army 
which  defeated  the  Turkish  legions,  and  that  the  flower 
of  Bulgarian  manhood  fell  in  the  sieges  and  campaigns 
against  Turkish  strongholds  in  eastern  Thrace. 

Having  reviewed  a  few  of  the  outstanding  problems  of 
the  eastern  Balkans  we  may  now  turn  to  Albania,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  peninsula,  where  a  sharp,  three-cornered 
conflict  has  raged  for  two  years  and  where  there  still  ex- 
ists a  problem  of  the  first  magnitude.  The  Albanians 
number  1,000,000  people.  Like  the  states  about  them, 
they  have  slowly  gained  political  self-consciousness. 
Their  homeland  is  a  broken  country,  and  a  large  part  of 
the  population  leads  a  pastoral  life.  Its  coastal  towns 
and  lowland  cities  are  intimately  tied  up  with  the  com- 
mercial systems  of  its  neighbors,  and  its  mountain  popu- 
lation retains  the  primitive  organization  of  the  clan. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  obvious  that  the  Alban- 
ians should  not  have  had  a  strong  national  programme 
or  the  means  to  advance  it.  It  was  the  will  of  the  great 
powers  in  191 3,  after  the  first  Balkan  War,  that  was  im- 
posed upon  Albania  in  establishing  her  boundaries,  and 
it  was  the  will  of  the  Allies  that  so  long  kept  Italy  at 
Valona  and  for  a  time  threatened  to  bring  Jugo-SIavia 
into  active  conflict  with  the  northern  Albanians  about 
Scutari.  Toward  such  a  people  in  such  a  land  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  frame  a  policy.  It  is  easy  to  award  indepen- 
dence, but  it  is  not  equally  easy  to  believe  that  right  use 
will  be  made  of  it.  Jugo-SIavia  and  Italy  are  equally 
hated,  and  Greece  is  no  exception  in  disfavor . 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE   BALKANS     175 

Had  the  terms  of  the  secret  Treaty  of  London  of  1915 
been  carried  out,  Albania  would  have  been  divided.  The 
central  portion  would  have  been  an  autonomous  Mo- 
hammedan state  under  Italian  protection;  the  northern 
part  would  have  been  under  the  protection  of  Jugo- 
slavia, and  the  southern  part  was  to  have  been  divided 
between  Greece  and  Italy.  Koritsa  would  have  become 
a  Greek  city,  Valona  an  Italian  stronghold  and  point  of 
penetration;  Scutari  and  the  Drin  valley  would  have 
become  an  outlet  for  Jugo-SIavia's  trade — and  all  of  these 
points  would  have  become  places  for  military  and  political 
conflict,  for  the  Albanians,  though  having  no  unity  of 
sentiment  regarding  a  national  programme,  are  united  in 
the  belief  that  they  can  manage  their  affairs  better  than 
the  people  about  them.  The  Italians  have  been  driven 
from  Valona  by  the  efl'orts  of  the  Albanians  themselves, 
and  Albanian  independence  has  been  recognized  by  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations.  By  a  subsequent 
treaty  (1921)  Italy  is  to  have  possession  of  the  island  of 
Sassens  and  the  two  peninsulas  that  embrace  the  Bay  of 
Valona  in  order  to  complete  her  defense  of  the  Adriatic. 
She  is  also  to  have  prior  rights  of  a  political  and  com- 
mercial nature,  but  the  reality  of  these  rights  have  yet 
to  be  proved. 


VIII 

THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  AND  THE   DISRUPTION 
OF  TURKEY 

BY  WILLIAM    LINN    WESTERMANN 

The  treaty  of  the  Alhed  Powers  and  Turkey,  signed  at 
Sevres  on  August  lo  of  last  year,  marks  the  end  of  the 
Turkish  Empire.  The  land  which  by  the  terms  of  this 
treaty  is  left  under  the  control  of  the  Sultan,  contains  in 
large  percentage  peoples  who  speak  the  Turkish  tongue 
and  are  believers  in  Islam,  however  much  they  may 
differ  in  the  component  strains  of  their  blood.  They 
feel  themselves  to  be  Turks,  or,  to  use  the  designation 
which  they  prefer,  Osmanli. 

The  Arab  peoples  of  Mesopotamia,  Syria,  and  desert 
Arabia  have  nothing  in  common  with  these  Turks  or 
with  their  rulers,  other  than  their  Moslem  religion.  The 
Treaty  of  Sevres  has,  indeed,  freed  the  Arabs  from  the 
domination  of  the  alien  Ottoman  dynasty;  but  it  has  not 
made  them  free.  The  Greek  islands  off  the  Asia  Minor 
coast  which  Italy  was  holding  in  19 14  have  been  reunited 
with  the  kingdom  of  Greece  by  a  separate  treaty  be- 
tween Italy  and  Greece.  Here  they  belong  by  all  the 
tests  of  language,  deep  desire,  and  other  affinities  which 
are  inherent  in  our  complex  idea  of  nationahty.  Pales- 
tine has  been  set  aside  as  a  homeland  for  the  Jews  of  the 
world,  under  the  mandate  of  Great  Britain.  If  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  are  carried  out,  thither  the  Jews  may  go,  if 
they  desire,  and  live  in  security  as  Jews,  free  to  carry  out 

176 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  177 

their  interesting  plans  for  the  social  and  economic  better- 
ment of  the  Jews  who  may  come.  To  the  Jews  of  the 
diaspora,  Palestine  is  to  be  the  symbol  of  the  political 
nationhood  which  they  lost  twenty  centuries  ago,  and  a 
pledge  that  the  great  tragedy  of  their  humiliation  may 
now  be  ended.  The  Arabs  of  the  Hedjaz,  lying  along 
the  eastern  shore  of  the  Red  Sea,  had  been  recognized, 
during  the  war,  as  forming  an  independent  state,  and  the 
Cherif  of  Mecca,  old  Hussein  Ibn  Ali,  had  been  called 
king  of  the  Hedjaz,  much  to  his  amusement,  by  the 
great  Western  Powers,  including  the  United  States.  The 
independence  of  this  kingdom  was  confirmed  in  the 
Turkish  treaty. 

Except  in  the  case  of  the  Greek  islands  and  the  king- 
dom of  Hedjaz,  these  solutions  are  not  as  yet  complete 
or  secure.  Men  will  still  have  to  face  death,  fighting  for 
or  against  the  stabilizing  and  continuity  of  the  decisions 
made  in  respect  to  Palestine,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia. 
Yet  these  four  results  of  the  Turkish  treaty  and  other 
negotiations  which  accompanied  and  are  practically  a 
part  of  it,  are,  on  the  whole,  to  be  rated  as  a  gain  to 
the  Greeks,  to  the  Arab  peoples,  to  the  Jews,  to  the 
Turks  themselves,  and  to  the  world  at  large.  This  is, 
however,  the  sum  of  the  satisfaction  which  the  peoples 
of  the  Near  East  may  derive  out  of  the  endless  discus- 
sions of  distinguished  diplomats  at  Paris,  at  London, 
and  at  San  Remo,  covering  in  all  a  period  of  twenty 
months  in  19 19  and  1920.  As  compared  with  the  hopes 
men  set  their  hearts  upon  at  Paris,  this  accomplishment 
is  meagre.  Far-seeing  men  believed  that  the  hold  of  the 
Ottoman  Sultan  upon  Constantinople  would  be  ended. 
He  still  rules  there — or,  better,  is  ruled  there.  The  world 
believed  that  the  highlands  of  Armenia  would  be  formed 


178    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

into  a  free  state,  and  the  policy  of  the  extermination  of 
this  people  would  be  thereafter  impossible  forever.  The 
Treaty  of  Sevres  does,  indeed,  constitute  a  free  and  inde- 
pendent state  of  Armenia;  but  that  state  exists  only  as 
a  name.  Its  boundaries  are  in  part  undetermined,  in 
part  demarcated  upon  maps  which  it  would  be  a  bitter 
derision  to  publish.  Actually  there  exists  to-day  a 
Soviet  Republic  of  Armenia,  a  small  territory  in  Trans- 
caucasian  Russia.  It  is  entirely  subservient  to  the  wishes 
and  designs  of  the  Soviet  Government.  The  Turkish 
provinces  of  old  Armenia,  Van,  Bitlis,  and  Erzerum,  are 
under  the  complete  mihtary  control  of  the  rebel  Turkish 
leader,  Mustapha  Kemal  Pasha.  He  and  his  followers 
lead  the  organization  called  the  Tashkilat  Milli  or  Na- 
tional Organization.  Their  purpose  is  to  defeat  the  prac- 
tical application  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Sevres, 
because  they  see  as  clearly  as  we  that  the  carrying  out  of 
its  terms  means  the  end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the 
foundation  of  a  small  but  compact  Turkish  state.  The 
liberation  of  Armenia  was  the  one  outstanding  result  ex- 
pected from  the  Near  Eastern  negotiations  at  the  Peace 
Conference.  The  failure  to  meet  this  general  expectation 
was  indirectly  a  result  of  the  struggle  among  the  Allied 
Powers  for  equahty  or  priority  of  opportunity  in  the 
commercial  exploitation  of  the  old  Turkish  Empire  in 
the  case  of  a  successful  termination  of  the  war.  In  the 
pursuit  of  these  objects  the  independence  and  protection 
of  Armenia  became  a  thing  men  talked  about,  but  did 
not  work  for. 

Directly,  the  United  States  is  responsible  for  the  pres- 
ent plight  of  the  Armenians,  by  default  of  service.  An 
essential  weakness  of  our  position  in  all  Near  Eastern 
affairs  was  that  we  had  not  declared  war  upon  Turkey. 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  179 

Hence  we  could  not,  in  the  period  of  the  armistice,  send 
troops  into  Turkish  Armenia  when  such  action  might 
have  saved  many  thousands  of  people  from  starvation. 
Not  having  declared  war  upon  Turkey,  we  were  always, 
during  the  period  of  discussion,  outsiders,  impotent  to 
affect  the  actual  course  of  the  negotiations  or  put  our 
own  stamp  upon  the  decisions  taken.  Even  so,  we,  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  might  have  saved  the  Arme- 
nians, had  we  been  willing  to  accept  a  mandate,  prefer- 
ably for  all  the  northern  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  but 
at  least  for  the  Armenian  portion.  We  may  justify  our- 
selves as  we  will.  The  mandate  for  Armenia  was  offered 
us  and  we  refused  to  accept  its  obligations  and  the  un- 
doubted troubles  which  their  acceptance  would  have 
entailed.  We  feared  foreign  entanglements.  That  fear 
was  justified.  But  it  is  fear.  The  policy  of  no  entan- 
gling alliances  advocated  by  the  founders  of  our  govern- 
ment was  based  upon  a  caution  which  served  well  the 
period  of  our  immaturity  and  undeveloped  union  and 
strength.  A  caution  justified  at  the  turning  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  has  become  a  counsel  of  cowardice  in  the 
twentieth  century.  We  were  asked  to  assist  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  new  international  policy  in  the  control  of 
undeveloped  peoples  under  the  mandate  system,  advo- 
cated by  liberal  sentiment  the  world  over,  by  able  lead- 
ers from  South  Africa,  Canada,  China,  Great  Britain, 
South  America,  and  where  not.  It  was  entirely  accept- 
able, if  honestly  enforced,  to  the  people  to  whom  it  was 
to  be  applied.  When  boldness,  confidence  in  the  strength 
of  our  own  political  integrity,  and  active  support  of  a 
new  political  ideal  might  have  saved  Armenia  and  with 
it  the  Near  East,  we  held  back.  President  Wilson  is  not 
responsible  for  this.     We  are,  we  the  people  of  the  United 


i8o    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

States.  The  decision  was  ours  and  we  took  it.  Ameri- 
can safety  first.  Where  we  might  have  led  at  the  zero 
hour  of  political  opportunity,  we  faltered  and  refused  to 
go  over. 

In  1908  a  successful  revolt,  led  by  the  Young  Turk 
party,  had  brought  to  book  the  old  tyrant,  Abdul 
Hamid,  the  Red  Sultan.  The  Turkish  constitution  of 
1876  was  revived,  dusted  off,  and  patched  up.  The 
old  absolutism  of  the  Sultan  was  severely  limited.  A 
new  spirit  ran  through  the  Turkish  Empire.  Extrava- 
gant hopes  of  liberal  treatment  were  aroused  among  the 
Arabs  and  the  Armenians.  They  believed  that  at  last  a 
modus  viveiidi  had  been  attained  by  which  they  might 
continue  to  exist  as  loyal  subjects  of  a  state  in  which 
they  would  no  longer  be  regarded  and  treated  as  **riayah," 
the  declassed,  but  as  free  Ottoman  subjects.  This  en- 
thusiasm was  soon  dissipated  by  the  actions  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Union  and  Progress,  the  central  controlling 
organization  of  the  Young  Turk  party.  Their  policy  of 
Turkizing  all  the  peoples  of  the  empire  was  a  foolish 
attempt  to  tear  out  roots  which  ran  deeply  into  the  his- 
tory of  the  Orient  and  drew  from  those  depths  the  emo- 
tional nourishment  of  the  centuries.  The  Turkizing 
policy  ran  afoul  the  Arab  revival,  a  movement  in  the 
Arab  world  for  the  maintenance  and  further  development 
of  Arab  culture.  Up  to  191 2  the  Arab  organizations 
which  had  arisen  in  this  revival  had  been  hterary  and 
academic,  harmless  and  unrevolutionary.  These  socie- 
ties with  their  numerous  branches  in  this  country  and  in 
South  America  continued  to  exist.  But  beside  them 
grew  up  two  secret  revolutionary  bodies,  the  one  called 
the  Fettah,  an  organization  in  the  civilian  world,  the 
other  and  more  dangerous  one  the  Ahad.     To  this  society 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  i8i 

were  admitted  only  Arab  military  officers  of  the  Turkish 
army.  In  19 14  the  loyalty  of  the  Turkish  army  was 
rotted  away  by  this  new  loyalty  among  Arab  officers, 
high  and  low,  who  had  sworn  an  oath  to  give  their  for- 
tunes and  their  lives  to  the  cause  of  the  political  separa- 
tion of  all  the  Arab-speaking  peoples  from  Turkish  mis- 
rule. Many  of  these  officers  were  intelfigent  and  well- 
trained  in  modern  military  science  by  Germans  supplied 
to  the  Turkish  armies  by  General  von  der  Goltz  and  his 
staff.  The  plans  for  Arab  liberation  had  matured  to  the 
point  where  the  year  1923  had  been  fixed  upon  as  the 
time  for  striking  the  blow  for  freedom. 

In  March,  19 15,  began  a  series  of  negotiations  be- 
tween the  Allied  Powers  in  respect  to  the  disposition  of 
Turkish  territory  in  case  of  AIKed  victory.  From  these 
issued  four  international  compacts.  By  the  Sazonof- 
Paleologue  Agreement  of  March  4,  191 5,  Constantino- 
ple and  the  control  of  the  Straits  were  to  go  to  Russia. 
By  the  London  Pact  of  April  26  of  the  same  year,  Italy 
was  to  receive,  in  the  event  of  Allied  victory,  full  sov- 
ereignty over  the  Dodecanese  and  recognition  of  her 
right,  in  case  of  a  partition  of  Turkey  in  Asia,  to  a  "just 
share"  of  the  Mediterranean  region  about  and  back  of 
Adafia.  In  vain  British  liberals  at  that  time  pointed 
out  to  their  government  that  it  was  entering  upon  a 
dangerous  course;  that  it  was  committing  itself  to  a 
policy  of  giving  away  rights  of  sovereignty  or  of  corre- 
sponding economic  priority  in  territories  to  which  it  had 
no  legitimate  claim  even  in  the  then  doubtful  event  of 
victory.  Italy's  participation  upon  the  side  of  the  Allies 
seemed  necessary  for  Allied  success.  And  Italy  fixed  in 
advance  her  price  for  the  blood  her  soldiers  were  to  shed 
and  the  war  debt  she  was  to  contract. 


1 82    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

In  the  spring  of  191 6  Russian  troops  had  pushed  for- 
ward into  the  four  northeastern  provinces  of  Turkish 
Armenia  and  were  in  military  occupation  of  a  large  ter- 
ritorial area.  Fear  aroused  among  her  allies  by  this 
Russian  advance  undoubtedly  dictated  the  next  step  in 
the  series  of  negotiations  which,  with  our  own  failure  to 
participate,  made  impossible  the  application  of  any  mod- 
ern or  liberal  policy  in  dealing  with  Turkey  and  rendered 
Impotent  at  the  peace  conferences  all  those  forces  which 
worked  for  new  and  sounder  methods  of  diplomatic  treat- 
ment in  settling  the  problems  of  the  Near  East.  In 
May,  1 91 6,  it  was  secretly  agreed  that  Russia  was  to 
acquire  in  sovereignty  the  four  Armenian  vilayets  of 
Trebizond,  Erzerum,  Van,  and  Bitlis.  British  and  French 
negotiations,  conducted  at  the  same  time,  roughly  defined 
the  respective  areal  acquisitions  or  spheres  of  these  two 
Powers  by  the  Ill-fated  Sykes-PIcot  Treaty.  Palestine, 
as  then  stipulated,  was  to  be  constituted  as  a  separate 
state  under  a  special  international  regime.  This  was  un- 
doubtedly a  British  demand,  conditioned  by  the  neces- 
sity of  protecting  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  narrow  sea- 
way it  offered  to  India.  Zionist  agitation  later  altered 
this  decision.  Established  as  a  homeland  for  the  Jews, 
Palestine  serves  equally  well  the  vital  need  of  British 
imperial  policy  for  a  protected  seaway  to  her  great 
Eastern  possession.  Zionism  gives  to  the  Palestinian  de- 
cision an  ideahstic  motivation  which  saves  it  from  the 
anachronistic  baldness  of  nineteenth-century  political  con- 
ception which  characterizes  the  Near  Eastern  decisions 
as  a  whole. 

The  Sykes-PIcot  Agreement  defined  the  advantages 
which  were  to  accrue  to  the  British  Empire  and  France 
out  of  the  hoped-for  dissolution  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  183 

The  zone  of  French  complete  control  gave  to  the  leaders 
of  the  Near  Eastern  policy  of  France  what  they  primarily 
desired,  control  over  the  potential  cotton  production  of 
Cilicia,  over  the  middle  section  of  the  Bagdad  railway, 
and  the  reputed  copper  wealth  of  the  Arghana  Maden 
mines  of  lower  Armenia.  In  the  Tripartite  Agreement 
between  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy,  which  was 
signed  upon  the  same  day  as  the  Turkish  treaty  and  is 
essentially  a  part  of  it,  this  zone  is  actually  delivered 
over  to  France  as  a  sphere  of  special  interest.  British 
pohcy  in  the  formulation  of  the  Sykes-Picot  Treaty 
was  dictated  apparently  by  three  considerations:  by  the 
necessity  of  controlling  the  outlet  of  Mesopotamia  into 
the  Persian  Gulf  as  a  danger-point  in  the  defensive  fron- 
tier of  India;  by  the  need  of  raw  cotton  for  the  looms  of 
Manchester;  and  by  the  requirement  of  a  sufficient  sup- 
ply of  petroleum  for  the  uses  of  the  British  navy.  The 
British  sphere  of  control  in  Mesopotamia,  as  delimited  in 
the  Sykes-Picot  Treaty,  may  be  defended  as  having  some 
sort  of  geographic  and  ethnic  justification.  The  French 
area  defies  every  known  law  of  geographic,  ethnographic, 
and  linguistic  unity  which  one  might  cite  who  would 
attempt  to  justify  it. 

One  feature  of  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  commends 
itself  as  dictated  by  a  more  liberal  spirit  than  the  clauses 
so  far  cited.  The  French  and  British,  Russia  later  con- 
curring, made  provision  for  the  establishment  of  an  Arab 
confederation  in  the  Syrian  desert,  four  sultanates  which 
were  to  be  independent,  though  somewhat  smothered, 
perhaps,  under  the  blanket  of  the  French  and  British 
spheres  of  influence  which  lay  upon  them.  This,  the 
sole  concession  to  the  Arab  movement  for  independence, 
was  brought  about  as  follows:  when  Turkey  entered  the 


i84    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

war  the  most  vulnerable  spots  in  the  British  Empire  were 
the  Suez  Canal  and  Egypt.  German  leadership  under- 
stood this  fact.  A  plan  was  projected  for  a  Turkish  ad- 
vance into  Egypt.  Djemal  Pasha  concentrated  the  fourth 
Turkish  army  corps  in  Syria  in  the  spring  of  1915  for 
this  attack.  The  British,  seeking  for  every  aid  in  the 
war,  seized  upon  the  movement  for  Arab  independence. 
Through  the  agency  of  a  Syrian  named  Faroki,  with  the 
assistance  of  Feisal,  son  of  the  Cherif  of  Mecca,  and  an 
able  young  British  archaeologist  named  T.  E.  Lawrence, 
they  approached  old  Hussein  Ibn  Ali,  the  Cherif  of 
Mecca.  For  over  a  year  the  negotiations  pended.  The 
old  Cherif  stood  out  for  the  complete  and  unified  inde- 
pendence of  the  Arab-speaking  world  in  Turkey  as  then 
constituted.  It  must  be  said  in  justice  to  British  diplo- 
macy that  its  agents  used  in  these  negotiations  claim 
that  their  correspondence  shows  no  definite  promise  to 
this  end.  But  Cherif  Hussein  insisted  that  he  would 
expect  consideration  of  this  claim  in  the  adjustment  to  be 
made  after  a  successful  issue  of  the  war.  It  is  credibly 
reported  that  in  the  consideration  of  this  problem  by  the 
Arabs  before  Hussein  at  Mecca,  one  of  the  sheiks  asked 
him  whether  he  were  not  becoming  involved  in  very  large 
affairs.  The  response  was  quite  Oriental,  worthy  of  a 
hero  of  Scheherazade  and  the  "Tales  of  the  Thousand 
and  One  Nights":  "I  am  the  fish  that  swims  in  the  sea. 
The  greater  the  sea  the  fatter  the  fish." 

The  entrance  of  the  Hedjaz  into  the  war,  in  revolt 
against  Turkey,  was  precipitated  by  the  senseless  cruelty 
of  Djemal  Pasha  in  Syria.  He  hung  the  most  honored 
leaders  in  Syria,  on  proof  of  academic  rather  than  dan- 
gerous plotting.  He  starved  the  Lebanese,  200,000  of 
them,  it  is  said,  in  their  beautiful  mountains,  by  drawing 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  185 

a  cordon  about  the  base  of  the  mountains  and  allowing 
no  food  to  go  up.  The  secret  and  really  dangerous  revo- 
lutionary societies  represented  in  the  heart  of  his  own 
armies  remained  unsuspected  by  him.  The  pressure 
brought  upon  the  Cherif  of  Mecca  in  his  position  as  the 
most  distinguished  leader  of  the  Arab  world  became  too 
great  to  resist.  In  19 16  he  declared  the  revolt  of  the 
Hedjaz  from  Turkey.  The  Arab  camel  corps  led  by  his 
son,  Emir  Feisal,  with  Colonel  T.  E.  Lawrence  as  liaison 
officer  between  the  Arab  forces  and  those  of  General 
Allenby,  rendered  distinguished  service  in  the  campaigns 
in  Palestine  in  191 7  and  191 8. 

Late  in  the  year  1916,  at  a  meeting  held  at  Saint  Jean 
de  Maurienne  in  the  southeastern  corner  of  France, 
Italy  obtained  a  definition  of  her  prospective  territorial 
acquisition  and  her  sphere  of  influence  in  Asia  Minor, 
which  had  been  left  undefined  in  the  London  Pact  of 
1 91 5.  The  territory  to  be  acquired  outright  included  the 
entire  southwestern  corner  of  Asia  Minor,  as  far  north 
as  Smyrna.  To  the  north  of  this  a  large  zone  of  Italian 
special  influence  was  delimited,  the  "equivalent"  of  the 
similar  zones  of  Great  Britain  and  France  in  the  Syrian 
desert.  A  final  clause  of  this  Agreement  of  Saint  Jean 
de  Maurienne  provided  that  the  consent  of  Russia  must 
be  obtained.  Before  this  could  be  done,  the  old  govern- 
ment of  Russia  was  overthrown  and  Russia's  signature 
was  never  given. 

This  is  the  complicated  tale  of  the  secret  agreements. 
A  change  was  made  in  regard  to  Palestine,  when  the 
British  Government  published  the  Balfour  declaration  of 
November,  191 7,  granting  to  the  insistent  Zionists  the 
privilege  that  Palestine  should  be  set  aside  as  the  home- 
land of  the  Jews.    This  was  an  open  covenant,  published 


1 86    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

to  the  world  and  fought  for  in  the  open.  It  received 
official  and  public  recognition  from  the  French  and 
Italian  Governments.  President  Wilson  declared  his  ad- 
herence to  it,  and  many  of  our  State  legislatures  passed 
resolutions  urging  the  national  government  to  support  it. 

One  more  secret  understanding  and  I  am  through  with 
all  the  list  of  these  follies  of  secrecy  and  blind  self-inter- 
est. When  Venizelos  brought  Greece  into  the  war  on 
the  Allied  side  he  was  able  to  obtain  a  promise,  never 
written  or  published,  so  far  as  I  know,  that  western 
or  Bulgarian  Thrace  would  be  granted  to  Greece  by  the 
peace  decision. 

Two  events  of  191 8  introduced  new  complications  into 
the  Near  Eastern  situation,  already  so  distorted  between 
two  incompatibilities,  the  desire  of  certain  of  the  non- 
Turkish  elements  of  the  empire  for  freedom,  and  the 
secret  covenants.  These  new  complications  were:  the 
defection  of  Russia  and  its  consequent  elimination  as  a 
participant  in  the  political  thanksgiving  which  the  secret 
agreements  contemplated;  and  the  clear  formulation  of 
the  American  attitude  toward  the  principles  of  the  peace 
as  first  expressed  in  the  Fourteen  Points  of  President 
Wilson  on  January  8,  191 8.  The  doctrine  of  "open  cov- 
enants openly  arrived  at"  was,  unfortunately,  not  so 
stated  as  to  be  retroactive  and  thereby  eliminate  the 
existing  secret  agreements  of  our  Allies.  The  whole 
spirit  of  President  Wilson's  speech  was,  however,  in 
direct  contrast  to  the  traditionahzed  diplomacy  which 
gave  rise  to  the  Near  Eastern  agreements.  It  empha- 
sized the  right  of  all  peoples,  strong  or  weak,  to  five  on 
equal  terms  of  liberty.  Only  the  practised  sophistry  of 
old-line  diplomacy  could  maintain  unimpaired  either  the 
spirit  or  the  substance  of  these  secret  agreements  after 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  187 

the  Fourteen  Points  had  been  accepted  in  the  armistice 
terms  as  the  basis  of  the  formulation  of  the  peace  terms. 

In  respect  to  Turkey,  Article  12  of  the  Fourteen  Points 
specifically  provided  that  "the  Turkish  portions  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty," 
that  the  non-Turkish  portions  should  have  the  right  of 
autonomous  development,  and  that  the  narrows  leading 
into  the  Black  Sea  should  be  permanently  open  under 
some  international  arrangement.  Liberal  British  states- 
men saw  clearly  the  impassable  gulf  between  this  declara- 
tion and  the  secret  agreements.  They  urged  their  gov- 
ernment to  take  up  with  the  United  States  the  whole 
question  of  the  basis  of  the  peace  terms,  and  arrive  at 
some  agreement  as  to  general  method  and  purpose,  as 
well  as  to  specific  and  detailed  terms.  The  failure  to  do 
this  vitiated  the  whole  course  of  the  negotiations  at  Paris 
regarding  Turkej^  blocked  every  effort  at  a  common  un- 
derstanding, and  made  the  Turkish  treaty  as  it  stands 
to-day  an  anachronism  and  a  by-word  to  all  the  peoples 
most  vitally  concerned,  except  the  Venezehst  Greeks. 

When  the  Peace  Conference  assembled,  the  Sazonof- 
Paleologue  Agreement  lay  buried  in  the  ruins  of  Russia. 
Constantinople  and  the  four  Armenian  vilayets  had  lost 
their  secret  tags.  The  President  of  the  United  States  sat 
in  the  chair  which  Sazonof  or  Isvolsky  had  expected  to 
occupy.  It  was  a  natural  thing  for  men  to  assume  that 
the  United  States  would  replace  Russia  in  the  pohtical 
settlement  of  the  Turkish  problems  as  she  had  in  the  war, 
by  accepting,  under  provisions  entirely  adjustable  to  our 
own  ideals  of  international  fair  play,  the  territorial  as- 
signments which  the  Russian  collapse  had  left  vacant. 
The  Armenians  desired  this  with  all  their  hearts.  Liberal 
British  and  French  opinion  urged  upon  our  delegation  the 


1 88    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

necessity  of  American  acceptance  of  a  mandate  over 
Armenia.  I  was  one  who  shared  their  opinion,  and  I 
still  share  it.  However  strongly  President  Wilson  favored 
this  plan  I  never  heard  any  man  say  that  either  he,  or 
any  one  of  his  colleagues  on  the  American  Peace  Com- 
mission, made  any  promise  which  would  tend  to  pre- 
empt the  constitutional  right  of  the  American  people  to 
answer  this  question  through  their  representatives  in 
Congress. 

At  the  Peace  Conference  the  principal  delegations  from 
the  Near  East  present  throughout  the  protracted  period 
of  the  peace  negotiations  were:  the  Greek,  headed  by 
Venizelos,  shrewd,  tireless,  and  innocent-looking;  the 
Arab  delegation,  headed  by  Emir  Feisal,  a  sincere  young 
man,  and  a  stately  and  attractive  figure  in  his  Arab  head- 
dress and  flowing  robes;  the  Zionist  delegation,  led  by 
Doctor  Chaim  Weizmann,  with  assistance  from  a  number 
of  able  American  and  British  representatives;  two  dele- 
gations of  Armenians,  that  of  Turkish  Armenia,  directed 
by  the  strange  figure  of  Nubar  Pasha,  a  wealthy  Egyptian 
landowner,  and  that  of  the  former  subjects  of  Russian 
Armenia,  under  the  leadership  of  a  distinguished  poet 
and  novelist,  Avetis  Aharonian.  There  came,  also,  other 
committees  whose  stay  was  temporary.  These  had  been 
sent  to  represent  certain  more  localized  phases  of  the  sepa- 
ratistic  tendencies  aroused  amid  the  ruins  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  by  the  new  political  evangel  of  self-determination. 
Among  them  were  the  delegates  of  the  Smyrna  Greeks, 
demanding  reunion  with  the  mother  country;  of  the  Pon- 
tic Greeks  headed  by  the  archbishop  of  Trebizond,  with 
the  same  Irredentist  dream,  or  faihng  that,  with  a  demand 
for  localized  independence  as  a  Pontic  Republic.  The 
Kurds  were  there,  claiming  rights  of  independent  state- 


THE  ARMENIAN  PROBLEM  189 

hood  over  an  area  which  covered  a  large  portion  of  the 
territory  claimed  by  the  Armenians  of  Turkey.  The  dis- 
integrated expanse  of  old  Russia  has  since  the  armistice 
been  welded  together  again  into  a  fairly  cohesive  mass 
in  the  fires  of  the  new  Bolshevist  fanaticism.  But  during 
the  first  year  of  the  Peace  Conference  it  lay  in  broken 
pieces.  In  the  Transcaucasian  region  of  Russia,  also,  the 
doctrine  of  self-determination  wrought  its  own  compli- 
cated local  problems.  The  Georgians  and  Azerbaijan 
Tartars  presented  claims  to  independent  statehood  which 
overlapped,  each  upon  the  other,  territorially;  and  both 
delegations  claimed,  as  their  own,  areas  within  the  north- 
ern and  eastern  limits  of  the  state  outlined  on  the  maps 
of  the  Armenians  as  the  minimum  of  the  Armenian  terri- 
torial area.  As  a  side-line  the  Georgians  had  interesting 
business  proposals  in  manganese.  The  Azerbaijan  Tar- 
tars talked  big  money  in  oil,  especially  in  the  Groszny  oil 
regions. 

The  conflict  of  local  native  desires  in  the  Arab  regions 
was  no  less  sharp.  The  French  interest  in  Syria,  already 
formulated  in  the  provisions  of  the  Sykes-Picot  Treaty, 
runs  back  for  centuries.  As  distinguished  from  their  de- 
sire to  control  Cilicia  and  central  Anatolia,  the  French  at- 
titude toward  Syria  cannot  be  regarded  as  bald  commer- 
cial imperiahsm.  For  sixty  years  the  French  Govern- 
ment has  regarded  itself,  and  with  some  Justification  in 
actual  accomplishment,  as  the  privileged  protector  of  the 
Maronite  Christians.  Syrians  resident  in  France  who 
were  French  citizens  by  adoption,  presented  to  the  Peace 
Conference  the  demand  for  a  French  mandate  as  that  of  a 
majority  of  the  native  Syrians.  A  Syrian  by  birth,  named 
Chukri  Ganem,  who  writes  poetry  in  the  French  language 
and  is  a  French  citizen,  spoke  long  and  in  eloquent  periods 


190    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

before  the  Council  of  Ten  for  French  control.  He  told 
how  "we  have  shed  our  blood"  in  Syria  for  this  ideal  of 
a  unified  Syria,  including  Palestine,  under  the  French 
segis.  When  one  knew  that  he  had  not  seen  Syria  for 
well  over  twenty  years,  that  he  was  a  propagandist  upon 
the  French  pay-roll,  and  saw  that  despite  the  terrible 
bloodletting  of  which  he  spoke,  he  seemed,  for  a  poet,  to 
be  in  quite  normal  health,  his  eloquence  failed  markedly 
of  its  effect.  From  Beirut  the  French  imported  (ex- 
penses paid)  a  committee  of  five  Lebanese  who  also  spoke 
for  French  guidance.  The  wishes  of  these  Syrian  groups 
conflicted  with  the  claims  of  Emir  Feisal,  representing 
the  hope  of  complete  independence  of  the  entire  Arab- 
speaking  section  of  Turkey  as  a  unit  (expenses  in  Paris 
paid  by  the  British  Government).  The  Zionist  move- 
ment, for  separation  of  Palestine  and  a  special  regime  to 
insure  the  estabhshment  of  the  Jewish  homeland,  was 
bitterly  opposed  by  the  Syrian  proteges  of  France,  less 
markedly  and  with  vacillating  policy  by  the  Arab  group 
of  FeisaL 

Behind  all  these  conflicting  local  hatreds  and  ambitions, 
more  confused  and  complicated,  in  fact,  than  they  can 
possibly  be  presented  here,  lay  always  the  secret  agree- 
ments. These  treaties  were  the  handiwork  of  the  old- 
style  diplomatic  craftsmanship  of  European  officialdom. 
Sanctified  by  the  signatures  of  the  Governments  con- 
cerned, they  remained  in  the  background,  adaptable  as  to 
form,  immutable  in  their  spirit,  working  inevitably,  like 
Ate  in  a  Greek  tragedy,  to  the  destined  end  of  the  Treaty 
of  Sevres  and  the  Tripartite  Agreement  of  August  lo, 
1920.  From  behind  it  all  came  the  sound  of  children's 
and  women's  voices  crying  for  bread.  American  relief 
workers  began  to  drift  in  and  tell  about  the  conditions  in 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  191 

Armenia.  The  younger  men  always  spoke  passionately: 
**Why  do  the  American  people  permit  this?  Why  do 
you,  who  are  sitting  at  Paris,  not  do  something?"  The 
middle-aged  men  spoke  more  quietly,  as  if  their  hearts 
were  old  and  their  sympathies  shrivelled.  They  were 
much  the  more  terrible  to  listen  to. 

The  first  of  the  Near  Eastern  claimants  to  appear  at  a 
hearing  before  the  Council  of  Ten  was  the  persistent  and 
astute  Greek  premier,  Eleutherios  Venizelos.  On  Feb- 
ruary 3  and  4  of  191 9  he  presented  the  claims  of  Greece. 
He  was  the  favored  of  France  and  Great  Britain.  In 
fluent  French,  and  with  an  engaging  appearance  of  frank- 
ness, he  laid  claim  to  southern  Albania,  Bulgarian  and 
eastern  Thrace,  and  the  western  coast  of  Asia  Minor. 
One  must  recall  that  his  claims  could  not  be  answered  by 
two  of  the  parties  most  interested  and  most  directly  af- 
fected by  his  patriotic  dreams  of  a  Greater  Greece.  Bul- 
garia and  Turkey,  as  enemy  Powers,  were  not  represented 
at  the  Peace  Conference.  But  in  the  Italian  delegation 
his  aspirations  found  bitter  and  persistent  opposition. 
In  the  Pact  of  London  western  Asia  Minor  south  of 
Smyrna  had  been  ear-marked  for  Italy.  By  the  Saint 
Jean  de  Maurienne  Agreement  a  large  section  of  the  coast 
of  Asia  Minor  lying  north  of  Smyrna  had  been  set  off  as 
a  sphere  of  Italian  influence.  Despite  skilful  and  tact- 
ful compliments  which  Venizelos  paid  to  Italy  in  the 
course  of  his  appearance  before  the  Council  of  Ten,  despite 
the  ponderous  return  compliments  of  the  Italian  premier, 
Orlando,  the  conflict  of  interest  between  Greece  and  Italy 
was  one  not  readily  to  be  adjusted. 

The  Greek  claims  were  then  referred  to  a  special  com- 
mission of  representatives  of  the  four  Powers  for  con- 
sideration and  report  to  the  Council  of  Four.     The  gen- 


192    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

eral  disposition  of  this  Greek  territorial  commission  was 
to  grant  to  Venizelos,  who  was  consistently  supported  by 
French  and  British  professional  diplomacy,  as  great  a 
measure  of  his  Pan-Hellenic  claims  as  could  be  done. 
Italy  was  consistently  opposed  to  all  his  claims,  because 
of  her  own  pohtical  and  commercial  aspirations  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean.  The  American  official  attitude 
at  that  time  was  dictated  by  a  desire  to  call  the  secret 
treaties  into  the  open  and  register  its  unalterable  oppo- 
sition to  any  recognition  of  these  as  determining  factors 
in  the  decisions  to  be  made.  It  was  indisposed  to  grant 
the  Venizelist-Greek  claim  to  any  territorial  control  in 
Asia  Minor.  The  reason  for  this  attitude  lay  in  the 
conviction  that  complete  control  of  Smyrna  was  an 
absolute  essential  to  the  possibility  of  development  of 
the  six  or  seven  milhon  people  of  Asia  Minor  whom  we 
call  Turks.  Smyrna,  or  some  harbor  in  its  immediate 
vicinity,  has  been  the  one  great  outlet  for  the  goods  of 
this  entire  region  in  all  the  period  since  history  has 
knowledge  of  its  life.  Through  Smyrna,  not  through 
Constantinople,  Anatolia  pours  out  its  goods  which  the 
western  world  desires.  In  return  for  these  goods  Ana- 
tolia may  take  in  through  Smyrna  harbor  western  prod- 
ucts and  ideas  which  it  sorely  needs,  modern  farm  imple- 
ments, modern  ideas  of  scientific  agriculture  and  indus- 
try. Only  through  this  means  can  the  peasant  of 
Asia  Minor,  whom  we  so  harshly  condemn  as  **the  Terri- 
ble Turk,"  become  an  acceptable  citizen  of  the  modern 
world.  To  this  end  Smyrna  and  its  harbor  are  the  eyes, 
the  mouth,  and  the  nostrils  of  the  people  of  Anatolia. 
It  is  the  consensus  of  opinion  of  American  missionaries, 
who  know  him  through  and  through,  of  American,  British, 
and  French  archseologists  who  have  worked  for  years 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  193 

beside  and  with  him,  of  British  merchants  who  have 
traded  with  him,  of  British  soldiers  who  fought  against 
him,  that  the  Anatolian  Turk  is  as  honest  as  any  other 
people  of  the  Near  East,  that  he  is  a  hard-working  farmer, 
a  brave  and  generous  fighter,  endowed  fundamentali3^ 
with  chivalrous  instincts.  That  these  characteristics  and 
instincts  have  been  distorted  by  the  brutalizing  effects  of 
Ottoman  rule  is  self-evident,  just  as  Ottoman  rule  once 
brutalized  the  Balkan  peoples,  and  continues  to  brutalize 
the  Armenians.  Of  all  these  peoples  the  Anatolian  peas- 
ants have  suffered  the  most.  They  have  been  conscripted 
for  fifty  years  to  fight  the  battles  of  a  government  whose 
corruption  has  been  a  stench  in  the  nostrils  of  the  world. 
They  have  been  scraped  to  the  bone  for  taxes  to  pay  for 
the  Sultan's  wars.  The  Young  Turk  leaders,  who  were, 
be  it  remembered,  largely  from  European  Turkey,  Mos- 
lemized  and  Turkized  Jews  and  Thracians,  robbed  them 
blind,  themselves  becoming  rich  and  mighty.  They  de- 
livered the  Turkish  peasants  to  the  tender  mercies  of 
Prussian  drill-masters,  who  beat  them  into  shape  as  sol- 
diers. These  soldiers  starved  or  died  of  disease,  chiefly 
cholera,  typhus,  and  dysentery,  hterally  by  the  thou- 
sand, while  the  wheat  their  people  raised  was  shipped  to 
Germany. 

It  was  the  American  belief  that  the  crux  in  the  ques- 
tion of  the  future  welfare  of  the  Near  East  lay  in  giving, 
for  once  in  history,  a  chance  to  this .  peasantry  of  Asia 
Minor.  The  great  majority  of  all  westerners  interested 
in  and  acquainted  with  the  Near  East — missionaries,  the 
British  Freshfield  and  Wital  merchant  organizations,  the 
American  tobacco  interests — were  opposed  to  granting 
Smyrna  to  Greece.  Yet  it  was  eventually  done,  though 
in  compromised  form. 


194    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

In  the  Greek  territorial  commission  it  was  impossible 
to  bring  the  question  of  the  secret  agreements  into  open 
discussion.  Only  once,  when  the  Italian  delegates  spoke 
of  the  promises  made  to  them  in  the  Saint  Jean  de  Mauri- 
enne  Agreement,  it  became  apparent  that  Great  Britain 
certainty,  France  by  its  silence,  refused  to  countenance 
that  understanding  as  a  binding  contract,  on  the  specious 
plea  that  one  of  the  parties  which  should  have  been  signa- 
tory to  the  agreement,  Russia,  had  not  signed.  The 
Italian  delegates  thereupon  withdrew  from  participation 
in  the  discussions  of  the  Greek  territorial  commission 
and  the  subsequent  recommendations,  though  they  re- 
mained as  silent  observers  throughout  the  following 
meetings.  The  futile  result  of  the  report  was,  on  the 
whole,  a  victory  for  Venizelos.  He  had  gained  a  favor- 
able recommendation  of  three  elements  of  the  commis- 
sion regarding  southern  Albania  and  the  Thracian  coast 
of  the  ^gean  Sea.  The  French  and  British  delegates 
recommended  the  Greek  claim  to  Smyrna  and  an  area 
about  it  much  reduced  from  Venizelos's  demand.  The 
American  delegates  opposed  the  Greek  desire  for  sov- 
ereignty in  any  part  of  Asia  Minor. 

When  Premier  Orlando  broke  with  President  Wilson 
upon  the  Fiume  issue  and  left  Paris,  the  astute  Venizelos 
immediately  pushed  forward  his  Smyrna  claim.  He  was 
able  to  gain  the  support  of  the  American  leaders  at  the 
Peace  Conference,  in  the  face  of  the  contrary  American 
stand  as  represented  upon  the  Greek  territorial  commis- 
sion. Under  a  secrecy  which  kept  knowledge  of  this 
decision  absolutely  from  the  office  of  the  American  ad- 
visers upon  Turkish  affairs,  he  gained  permission  to 
occupy  Smyrna  with  Greek  troops.  This  was  done  on 
the  morning  of  May  15,  1919,  in  open  daylight,  though 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  195 

the  Turkish  local  authorities  were  assured  repeatedly 
that  it  would  be  an  occupation  by  Allied  troops,  including 
Greeks.  Upon  May  15  and  16  Greek  troops  and  civilians 
massacred  between  400  and  800  Turks  in  the  city  and 
its  environs.  In  the  next  two  weeks  the  killing  of  Turks, 
with  all  the  horrible  accompaniments  of  Near  Eastern 
massacres,  spread  through  the  countryside  roundabout 
as  the  Greek  troops  advanced.  It  is  a  moderate  estimate 
to  say  that  over  2,000  Turks — men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren— were  done  to  death  unnecessarily  by  this  decision 
of  the  War  Council  and  the  Council  of  Four. 

It  is  a  tribute  to  the  skill  of  Venizelos  that  he  could 
still  ride  high  upon  the  wave  of  his  astounding  reputa- 
tion, despite  this  terrible  indictment  of  the  discipline 
and  self-control  of  the  Greek  army.  Venizelos  was  per- 
haps only  remotely  responsible.  The  Greek  officers  ap- 
pointed under  his  dictation  surely  were  directly  so.  In 
early  July  Venizelos  was  warned  by  the  Supreme  Council 
that  his  troops  were  advancing  beyond  the  limits  set 
by  them.  He  explained  and  made  promises,  and  sent 
within  forty-eight  hours  a  telegram  to  the  Greek  com- 
mand for  a  still  farther  advance. 

Knowledge  of  the  Smyrna  incident  is  necessary  to  an 
understanding  of  the  elements  which  have  made  the 
Turkish  negotiations  at  Paris  and  London  and  their  re- 
sults, embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Sevres,  entirely  ineffec- 
tive, especially  in  respect  to  their  provisions  for  Armenian 
independence.  For  Armenia  has  been  betrayed  by  the 
civilized  world  and  thrown  upon  the  tender  mercies  of 
Bolshevist  Russia  and  the  Turkish  Nationalist  forces. 

News  of  the  Smyrna  massacres  spread  rapidly  through- 
out the  Near  East.  It  caused  terror  and  suspicion  of 
the  Allied  intention,  even  in  Syria.     Great  mass  meetings 


196    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

of  protest  were  held  in  Constantinople.  Young  Turk 
leaders  had  already  fled  into  Asia  Minor  and  were  then 
attempting  to  organize,  under  the  new  name  of  the  Tash- 
kilat  Mini,  Turkish  resistance  to  the  disruption  of  the 
empire.  The  empire  had  meant  to  many  of  them  official 
position,  whether  in  the  army  or  in  civil  service,  which 
was  their  means  of  subsistence,  with  limitless  opportuni- 
ties of  graft.  The  massacres  gave  life  and  purpose  to 
their  appeal  to  the  Turkish  peasantry,  to  defend  them- 
selves against  other  massacres  which  would  surely  befall 
them  when  the  Allied  control  should  be  established.  It 
helped,  no  doubt,  in  destroying  the  confidence  of  the 
Allies  in  Venizelos,  and  in  the  possibihty  of  a  just  rule 
by  the  Greeks  over  the  Turkish  population  of  Asia 
Minor.  Venizelos  continued  to  work  tirelessly  through 
the  fall  of  1 91 9  and  the  spring  of  1920,  but  his  diplomatic 
skill  could  no  longer  meet  the  odds  against  him.  In  a 
last  desperate  cast  against  fortune  he  made  promises  in 
May  of  1920  to  defeat  the  forces  of  Mustapha  Kemal 
Pasha  in  Asia  Minor.  He  threw  in  additional  Greek 
troops  who  advanced  toward  Constantinople  and  Ismid. 
The  Turks  retreated  before  them,  fighting  guerilla  war- 
fare. In  October  of  1919  a  Smyrna  Greek  confessed: 
"Smyrna  will  be  the  tombstone  over  the  reputation  of 
Venizelos."  And  it  has  been  so.  In  the  Turkish  treaty 
the  Supreme  Allied  Council  ahered  its  Smyrna  poHcy. 
The  United  States  had  no  hand  in  this.  Instead  of  the 
complete  Greek  sovereignty  over  Smyrna  which  Veni- 
zelos had  hoped  for — and  almost  had — the  Treaty  of 
Sevres  has  made  a  five-year  provisional  arrangement. 
The  sovereignty  is  Turkish.  The  administration  is  in 
Greek  hands.  After  five  years  of  this  situation  the  pop- 
ulation in  the  Smyrna  district  is  to  hold  a  plebiscite  to 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  197 

determine  whether  it  desires  to  be  Turkish  or  to  become 
a  part  of  Greece. 

The  costly  and  fruitless  maintenance  of  Greek  troops 
in  Asia  Minor  gradually  wore  out  the  support  of  Veni- 
zelos  at  home.  In  the  parliamentary  elections  held  in 
Greece  on  November  14,  1920,  he  was  overwhelmingly  de- 
feated. Venizelos  had  ridden  the  crest  of  the  wave  of 
world-wide  popularity  and  confidence  for  seven  years. 
That  wave  has  now  thrown  him,  in  self-imposed  exile, 
high  and  dry  upon  the  beach  at  Nice.  His  dream  of  the 
--^gean  Sea  as  a  Greek  mare  clausum  is  past. 

At  the  Paris  Conference  Syrian  affairs  were  also  kept 
from  any  early  decision  by  the  incompatible  character  of 
the  secret  treaties  and  the  Arab  aspirations,  war-time 
diplomacy  and  the  new  doctrine  of  self-determination, 
and  the  local  native  hatreds  based  on  religious  groupings. 
On  November  9  of  191 8  General  Allenby  had  allowed  an 
official  statement  to  be  pubhshed  in  Palestine,  commit- 
ting both  the  French  and  British  Governments  to  the 
polic}'^  of  assisting  and  encouraging  the  establishment  of 
native  governments  in  Syria  and  Mesopotamia.  These 
native  governments  were  to  derive  their  authority  from 
the  free  will  and  initiative  of  the  peoples  concerned. 
This  solemn  promise  has  not  been  kept.  Emir  Feisal 
came  to  Paris  demanding  independence,  under  manda- 
tory guidance,  if  necessary,  for  all  the  Arab  portion  of 
Turkey,  and  that  the  Allied  Supreme  Council  send  out 
an  Interallied  commission  to  find  out  what  sort  of  gov- 
ernment the  Arabs  really  wanted.  He  spoke  before  the 
Council  of  Ten  in  the  Arab  tongue,  recounting  the  aid 
rendered  to  the  Allied  cause  by  the  Arab  camel  corps. 

There  came  also  to  Paris  from  Syria  a  great  American, 
Doctor  Howard  Bhss,  demanding  independently  of  Feisal 


198    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

that  a  commission  of  inquiry  be  sent  into  Syria.  Oblivi- 
ous of  its  results,  he  felt  that  the  good  faith  of  the  West- 
ern Powers  was  involved  in  the  keeping  of  the  promise 
inherent  in  the  Allenby  declaration  that  the  Arabs  should 
have  a  chance  of  making  their  wishes  known.  The  word 
of  great  Western  Powers,  he  said,  had  been  passed, 
and  their  honor  was  involved.  The  conspicuous  honesty 
of  Doctor  Bliss,  his  tremendous  influence  for  good  in  the 
Near  East,  are  deserving  of  a  much  greater  recognition 
by  Americans  than  they  have  received. 

Out  of  these  and  many  more  conversations,  out  of 
much  diplomatic  hauling  and  pulling,  came  the  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Council  to  send  a  commission  into  Syria. 
The  French  were  opposed  to  this  expedition.  Never  did 
they  intend  that  it  should  go,  to  judge  by  their  obstruc- 
tionist pohcy.  Their  official  policy  was  to  stand  abso- 
lutely upon  the  terms  of  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement. 
After  two  months  of  futile  conferences  of  all  kinds  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  in  exasperation,  determined  to  send  out  an 
American  commission  to  ascertain  what  the  SjTians 
really  wanted.  In  early  June  the  Crane-King  commis- 
sion departed  for  Syria,  returning  to  Paris  in  September. 
The  results  of  its  inquiries  have  never  been  made  public, 
and  the  reasons  for  suppression  can  only  be  surmised. 
Rumor  has  it  that  the  overwhelming  sentiment  of  the 
Syrian  population  desired  an  American  mandate  over  all 
of  Syria.  That  being  impossible,  they  preferred  a  British 
to  a  French  mandate. 

In  December  of  191 9  the  United  States  Government 
withdrew  from  active  participation  in  the  work  of  the 
Peace  Conference.  This  removed  the  chief  deterrent  to 
the  settlement  of  the  Turkish  problems,  in  the  sense  that 
no  force  opposed  to  the  secret  treaties  was  any  longer 


>!.«  Pre-war  boundaries 
-New  boundaries 
-Undefined  boundaries 


Long.  East  40  trond  Greenwion— ^45  ■ 


MAP   SHOWING  THE   DISPOSITIONS  MADE  BY  THE   PEACE   CONFERENCE  OF  THE 
TERRITORIES  OF  THE  FORMER  TURKISH  EMPIRE 


200    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

represented  in  the  meetings  of  the  Supreme  Council. 
From  this  time  on  the  application  of  the  secret  terms 
was  assured.  Seeing  this,  the  followers  of  Emir  Feisal 
proclaimed  Syria  an  independent  state  and  Feisal  its 
king,  at  a  meeting  held  at  Damascus  on  March  ii,  1920. 
In  anticipation  of  the  assignment  of  Syria  to  France, 
French  colonial  troops  were  already  in  occupation  of  the 
Syrian  coastal  towns.  "King"  Feisal  issued  an  ulti- 
matum in  March  to  the  French  commander  that  he  must 
withdraw  his  troops  by  a  given  date.  Upon  April  26, 
1920,  at  the  San  Remo  conference,  the  mandates  were 
assigned,  Mesopotamia  to  the  British  Empire,  Syria  to 
France,  Palestine  to  the  British  Empire,  under  pro- 
vision of  the  apphcation  of  the  Balfour  Zionist  declara- 
tion. If  we  combine  the  mandatory  assignments  for 
Syria  and  Mesopotamia  with  the  Turkish  treaty  and 
the  Tripartite  Agreement,  it  is  patent  that  the  secret 
treaties  have  been  clamped  upon  the  Arab  world,  as  also 
upon  the  territory  remaining  to  Turkey.  The  method 
of  control  imposed  upon  the  Arabs  is  called  the  mandate. 
The  character  of  this  mandatory  control  has  not  yet 
been  made  pubhc.  Nor  do  we  know  as  yet  of  any  pro- 
vision whereby  a  time  limit  has  been  set  upon  the  dura- 
tion of  the  mandates. 

The  Arabs  of  Syria  fought  the  French  colonial  troops 
in  desultory  skirmishes  for  four  months  in  1920.  The 
end  of  all  the  threats  of  the  Arabs  that  they  would  "throw 
the  French  into  the  sea,"  of  all  the  dreams  of  immediate 
Arab  independence,  was  shockingly  simple.  I  quote 
from  General  Gourand's  proclamation  of  July  2^,  1920: 
"Emir  Feisal  has  ceased  to  rule.  Emir  Feisal  has  been 
requested  to  leave  the  country  with  his  family."  Feisal 
is  now  in  Switzerland.     He  made  the  impression  of  a 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  201 

lovable  and  high-minded  personality,  too  little  ruthless 
to  carry  through  to  success  against  western  diplomacy, 
western  desires  for  commercial  privilege,  and  western 
arms  the  wishes  of  the  Arab  people  for  real  independence. 

By  the  Paleologue-Sazonof  Treaty  Constantinople  was 
to  go  to  Russia.  This  would  have  meant  the  elimination 
of  the  Sultan  from  the  city  on  the  Golden  Horn.  This 
result  would  have  been  a  blessing  for  Turkey.  It  would 
have  deloused  that  state  of  thousands  of  useless  and 
venal  officials  and  have  put  the  ruler  and  his  bureaucrats 
within  reach  of  the  Anatolian  Turks,  whom  they  have 
so  long  robbed  and  bled.  In  the  first  months  of  the 
Paris  Conference  it  was  expected  that  the  maintenance  of 
the  Sultan  in  Constantinople,  which  gives  a  Byzantine 
character  to  the  Turkish  state,  would  surely  be  done 
away  with.  Then  opposition  developed  on  the  British 
side.  Turbaned  Moslems  from  India  appeared  before 
the  members  of  the  Supreme  Council,  shepherded  by 
Mr.  Montagu.  They  asserted  that  the  60,000,000  Mos- 
lems of  India  protested  against  the  ejection  of  the  Sultan 
as  a  degradation  of  the  caliphate.  Two  considerations 
made  this  alleged  Moslem  danger,  in  case  of  a  changed 
status  of  the  old  Turkish  capital,  less  impressive  than  it 
might  otherwise  have  been.  The  first  was  that  the 
British  Government  had  not,  in  the  secret  treaty  which 
gave  the  city  of  Constantinople  to  Russia,  regarded  the 
Indian  Moslem  danger  as  paramount.  The  second  lay 
in  the  obvious  argument  that  this  danger  was  strictly  an 
internal  problem  of  the  British  Empire,  and  that  the 
question  of  the  control  of  Constantinople  must  be  set- 
tled with  a  view  to  world  welfare  rather  than  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  British  India  office  and  its  difficulties. 

Whatever  may  be  the  actual  as  opposed  to  the  osten- 


202     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

sible  reasons  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Turkish  capital 
at  Constantinople,  it  is  so  provided  in  the  Treaty  of 
Sevres.  To  insure  freedom  of  navigation  through  the 
Straits  a  commission  of  the  Straits  has  been  established, 
which  will  be  the  real  controlling  power  in  the  zone  of 
the  Straits.  Provision  is  made  for  representation  of  the 
United  States,  whenever  it  desires  to  participate,  for 
Russia,  when  it  becomes  a  member  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. As  to  Constantinople  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  has 
made  no  real  decision.  Matters  are  where  they  were  a 
half-century  ago.  International  control  means  control 
by  that  Power  which  is  strongest  upon  the  commission. 
The  pohcy  of  Russia  will  continue,  as  in  the  past,  to  look 
toward  complete  control  of  the  Straits,  as  even  Soviet 
Russia  has  already  begun  to  do. 

The  efforts  of  the  two  Armenian  delegations  at  Paris 
were  directed  toward  the  ultimate  end  of  establishing  an 
independent  state,  including  the  Armenians  of  Russian 
Transcaucasus  and  the  four  northeastern  vilayets  of 
Turkey,  stretching  southwestward  so  as  to  embrace  a 
part  of  Cilicia,  and  debouching  upon  the  Mediterranean 
Sea  at  the  Bay  of  Alexandretta.  Their  immediate  desire 
was  to  obtain  recognition  of  the  Armenian  Repubhc  of 
the  Transcaucasus  as  a  de  facto  government,  so  that  they 
might  be  in  a  position  to  obtain  credits,  money  for  food 
for  the  400,000  refugees  assembled  in  Russian  Armenia, 
and  for  arms  and  ammunition  with  which  they  might 
defend  themselves  against  Moslem  Tartar  and  Turkish 
attacks  and  move  the  refugees  back  to  their  homes  in 
Turkish  Armenia.  But  the  Armenian  mountains  have 
little  to  offer  in  exchange  for  help,  except  a  brave,  indus- 
trious, and  broken  people. 

The  Armenian  desire  for  Cilicia  conflicted  with  the  ter- 


THE  ARMENIAN   PROBLEM  203 

ritorial  assignment  to  France  by  the  Sykes-Picot  Treaty. 
Cilicia  and  central  Anatolia,  therefore,  remain  to  Tur- 
key in  the  Treaty  of  Sevres,  and  are  designated  as  a 
sphere  of  French  interest  in  the  Tripartite  Agreement. 
Again,  the  secret  treaties  had  won  in  the  diplomatic 
field.  But  the  attempt  of  the  French  to  occupy  Cihcia 
has  been  frustrated  by  the  Turkish  Nationahst  opposi- 
tion. Bitterly  disilhisioned,  the  French  press  is  demand- 
ing that  the  entire  Cilician  adventure  be  abandoned. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  President  Wilson  was  asked 
to  fix  by  arbitration  the  boundaries  between  Armenia 
and  the  Turkish  state.  His  competence  was  limited  to 
drawing  these  boundaries  within  the  four  vilayets  of 
Erzerum,  Trebizond,  Biths,  and  Van.  In  other  words, 
the  territory  which  he  could  possibly  assign  to  Armenia 
approximates  that  formerly  given  to  Russia  by  the 
Paleologue-Sazonof  Treaty.  Here,  too,  the  territorial 
dispositions  of  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  are  the  offspring  of 
the  secret  treaties.  Though  the  Turkish  treaty  declares 
them  to  be  free,  in  actuality  the  Armenians  have  been 
betrayed  by  the  western  world.  Lenine  and  Mustapha 
Kemal  have  cracked  the  whip  and  they  have  sovietized. 
Who  of  us  dares  look  an  Armenian  in  the  face  and  up- 
braid him  for  this? 


IX 

THE   PROTECTION   OF   MINORITIES   AND  NATIVES   IN 
TRANSFERRED  TERRITORIES 

BY   MANLEY   O.    HUDSON 

The  gulf  between  German  practices  before  the  war 
and  the  announced  aims  of  the  Allies  during  the  war  is 
nowhere  more  notable  than  in  dealing  with  subject  peo- 
ples. It  was  Prince  Billow's  defense  of  German  pohcy 
in  Poland  that  "in  the  struggle  between  nationalities, 
one  nation  is  the  hammer  and  the  other  the  anvil;  one  is 
the  victor  and  the  other  the  vanquished."  "It  is  a  law 
of  life  and  development  in  history,"  he  said,  "that  when 
two  national  civilizations  meet,  they  fight  for  ascen- 
dancy." It  would  probably  be  untrue  to  say  that  such  a 
conception  of  domination  was  ever  prevalent  throughout 
Germany.  But  the  notorious  efforts  at  Prussianization 
of  the  Poles  before  19 14,  and  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Germans  during  the  war  to  spread  the  German  language 
in  occupied  territories,  undoubtedly  did  much  to  bring 
German  Kultur  into  such  universal  disrepute.  The  fail- 
ure of  the  Germans  to  enlist  the  sympathies  and  the 
ambitions  of  the  mingled  nationalities  in  eastern  Europe 
must  be  counted  as  one  of  the  things  that  destroyed  them. 

When  President  Wilson  proclaimed  as  running  through 
the  whole  programme  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  "the  prin- 
ciple of  justice  to  all  peoples  and  nationalities,  and  their 
right  to  live  on  equal  terms  of  liberty  and  safety  with 
one  another,  whether  they  be  strong  or  weak,"  the  war 

204 


THE  PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES      205 

became  for  millions  of  men  in  Allied  countries  as  for 
many  thousands  in  enemy  territory,  a  crusade  for  the 
liberation  of  oppressed  peoples.  With  the  acceptance  of 
the  President's  explanation  as  one  of  the  conditions  of 
the  German  armistice,  the  AHied  states  were  com- 
mitted to  a  programme  of  territorial  readjustment  which 
excited  the  most  extravagant  hopes  in  many  peoples  of 
Europe.  The  fulfilment  of  such  a  programme  gave  the 
Peace  Conference  two  of  its  important  functions :  first,  to 
decide  on  the  actual  territorial  changes  which  should  be 
made;  and  second,  to  take  measures,  after  those  terri- 
torial changes  were  arranged,  to  protect  the  peoples  and 
nationalities  concerned — to  make  sure,  in  other  words, 
that  the  peace  did  not  mean  for  numerous  discontented 
groups  the  exchange  of  one  bad  master  for  another.  I 
shall  attempt  to  explain  the  work  of  the  Paris  Conference 
in  this  second  field,  and  to  describe  the  measures  which  it 
formulated  for  protecting  the  racial,  religious,  and  lin- 
guistic minorities  in  Europe  and  the  native  peoples  in 
former  German  territories  outside  of  Europe. 

Obviously,  self-determination  as  a  practical  measure 
has  very  definite  limits.  In  any  territory  where  races 
are  mixed,  where  numerous  languages  are  spoken,  and 
where  different  religions  are  practised,  the  fixing  of  a  na- 
tional boundary  is  beset  with  many  difficulties.  Any 
boundary  will  almost  surely  mean  that  people  of  different 
languages,  different  races,  and  different  religions  must 
find  it  possible  to  live  under  the  same  political  organiza- 
tion. In  the  case  of  Greece  and  Bulgaria,  for  instance, 
almost  any  line  which  might  have  been  drawn  would 
mean  that  many  Greek  sympathizers  would  be  left  in 
Bulgaria,  and  that  many  Bulgarian  sympathizers  would 
find  themselves  still  in  Greece. 


2o6    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

But  the  problem  is  more  difficult  still.  It  is  not  merely 
a  matter  of  national  sympathies  which  must  be  ferreted 
out.  There  is  also  the  comphcation  of  determining  what 
qualities  identify  particular  famihes,  or  even  individuals 
in  the  same  family,  with  one  or  the  other  of  the  contend- 
ing groups.  Families  Greek  by  inheritance,  rehgion,  and 
political  sympathy  may,  nevertheless,  speak  only  the 
Bulgarian  language;  or  in  some  cases  individuals  speak- 
ing Greek,  and  of  many  Greek  attachments,  may  be 
identified  with  the  Bulgarian  church.  Even  the  children 
of  the  same  parents  may  be  divided  in  their  political  al- 
legiance. Obviously  then,  the  fixing  of  a  boundary  be- 
tween two  such  states  will  leave  many  people  dissatisfied, 
and  if  one  envisages  any  degree  of  permanence  in  the 
frontiers  estabhshed  it  is  necessary  to  encourage  tolera- 
tion which  will  reduce  dissatisfaction  to  a  minimum. 
The  history  of  Switzerland  shows  that  this  ideal  is  not 
an  impossible  one. 

After  the  armistices  in  October  and  November,  191 8, 
the  wildest  expectations  began  to  be  entertained  by  scat- 
tered groups  of  dissatisfied  peoples  throughout  the  Cen- 
tral Empires.  During  191 8  the  Allies  had  made  it  plain 
that  Poland  was  to  become  independent.  They  had 
recognized  the  Czecho-SIovaks  as  entitled  to  a  national 
existence.  They  had  given  assurances  of  sympathy  with 
the  territorial  ambitions  of  Serbia,  Roumania,  and  Greece. 
The  result  was  that  at  the  moment  of  Allied  victory  many 
thousands  of  people  found  themselves  quite  uncertain 
as  to  their  political  future.  During  the  winter  of  191 8- 
1919,  in  some  cases  this  uncertainty  grew  into  concern, 
and  from  concern  into  alarm.  The  chaos  of  defeat  and 
the  scarcity  of  food  had  prepared  the  field  in  which  such 
alarm  spread  rapidly.     Among  the  Germans  in  several 


THE   PROTECTION  OF   MINORITIES      207 

parts  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  for  instance,  there 
was  a  feeling  that  they  were  about  to  be  handed  over  to 
an  inferior  civilization,  which  would  rob  them  of  their 
language,  which  would  deny  them  political  equality, 
which,  in  a  word,  would  submerge  their  culture.  And  the 
Protestant  Magyars  in  Transylvania  began  to  fear  for 
their  religion.  Some  of  the  peoples  liberated  had  been 
very  badly  treated,  and  their  oppressors  naturally  ex- 
pected liberation  to  mean  a  reversal  of  the  process,  with 
the  oppressor  becoming  the  oppressed.  The  success  of 
the  AHied  armies  had  given  a  tremendous  impetus  to 
nationahsm — the  kind  of  nationalism  which  is  satisfied 
only  with  superlatives. 

Some  of  the  attempts  to  extend  the  use  of  languages 
went  very  far.  One  of  the  complaints  received  at  the 
Peace  Conference  was  that  Czech  troops,  on  entering  a 
part  of  German  Bohemia,  would  immediately  order  all 
advertising  signs  on  the  stores  to  be  written  in  the  Czech 
instead  of  in  the  German  language.  The  whole  situation 
could  only  result  in  intensifying  existing  divisions  and 
in  increasing  the  barriers  to  co-operation  and  toleration. 
With  reference  to  the  Germans,  this  situation  was,  per- 
haps, more  serious  than  with  reference  to  other  peoples. 
More  than  a  million  Germans  lived  in  the  territory  about 
to  be  transferred  to  Poland,  and  fully  three  millions  in 
territory  about  to  become  part  of  Czecho-SIovakia.  Ger- 
man is  one  of  the  great  international  languages  of  Europe. 
The  Polish  language  is  seldom  spoken  out  of  Poland. 
The  Czech  language  is  known  to  but  few  people  in  other 
countries.  The  Serbian,  the  Magyar,  the  Roumanian, 
and  the  Greek  languages  are  all  restricted  to  particular 
regions.  But  in  a  certain  sense  German  is  in  eastern 
Europe  what  French  is  in  western  Europe,  and  what  the 


2o8    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

English  language  is  so  fast  becoming  in  many  parts  of 
the  world.  To  a  German,  therefore,  there  is  more  than 
sentimental  value  in  making  sure  that  his  children  will 
speak  his  own  language.  There  is  an  economic  interest 
in  their  using  a  language  which  will  serve  them  in  other 
countries.  There  is  a  cultural  interest  in  continuing  the 
use  of  a  language  which,  in  science  and  learning,  is  third 
only  to  English  and  French  in  importance.  Yet  the 
Germans  had  set  an  example  in  their  efforts  to  force 
unwilling  peoples  to  use  the  German  language,  and 
it  was  but  natural  if  the  peoples  whose  languages  had 
been  suppressed  made  similar  attempts  in  reviving 
them. 

The  responsibilities  of  the  Peace  Conference  in  this 
troubled  situation  were  quite  clear.  Its  first  goal  had  to 
be  the  estabhshment  of  a  stable  peace.  It  was,  there- 
fore, part  of  its  duty  to  anticipate  new  Irredentisms,  which 
might  call  for  future  vindication.  In  the  second  place, 
the  Peace  Conference  had  assumed  a  great  responsibihty 
in  dealing  with  the  political  fortunes  of  large  numbers  of 
Czechs,  Poles,  Serbs,  Roumanians,  Greeks,  Germans, 
Austrians,  Magyars,  and  Bulgarians  living  in  transferred 
territories.  President  Wilson's  insistence  on  "impartial 
Justice  in  every  form  of  the  settlement,"  and  on  the  "jus- 
tice that  knows  no  favorites  and  knows  no  standards  but 
the  equal  rights  of  the  several  peoples  concerned,"  con- 
stituted a  part  of  the  contract  under  which  the  peoples 
in  the  Central  Empires  had  laid  down  their  arms.  The 
President  had  made  it  very  clear  that  peoples  and  prov- 
inces were  not  to  be  "bartered  about  from  sovereign  to 
sovereign,  as  though  they  were  mere  chattels  and  pawns 
in  a  game,"  and  this  seemed  to  demand  that  the  fullest 
possible  provision  should  be  made  for  the  minorities  in 


THE   PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES      209 

race,  language,  or  religion,  living  in  territories  about  to 
be  transferred. 

Precedents  were  not  lacking  for  the  decision  of  the 
Conference  to  impose  special  obligations  on  the  new 
states,  and  on  states  to  which  large  accessions  of  territory 
were  to  be  made.  When  Greece  was  first  admitted  to  the 
family  of  nations  in  1832  the  Conference  of  London  had 
prescribed  the  form  of  her  government,  and  when  her  ac- 
quisition of  the  Ionian  Islands  was  recognized  in  1864, 
it  was  made  subject  to  guarantees  for  freedom  of  worship 
and  religious  toleration.  In  1878  the  Congress  of  Berhn 
had  elaborated  provisions  on  religious  freedom  and  politi- 
cal equality  to  be  embodied  in  the  public  law  of  the 
Principality  of  Bulgaria;  it  imposed  similar  guarantees 
as  a  condition  of  its  recognition  of  the  independence  of 
Montenegro  and  Serbia  and  Roumania;  and  specific  pro- 
visions were  included  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  for  protect- 
ing religious  liberties  in  the  territory  which  remained  with 
the  Ottoman  Empire.  After  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  pro- 
visions for  protecting  religious  minorities  had  frequently 
been  included  in  treaties  concerning  the  transfer  of  terri- 
tories— they  had  proved  particularly  important  to  the 
Mussulmans,  and  the  treaty  of  peace  between  Turkey 
and  Greece  in  November,  191 3,  went  into  such  detail  as 
to  provide  that  **the  name  of  his  Imperial  Majesty  the 
Sultan,  as  Caliph,  shall  continue  to  be  pronounced  in  the 
public  prayers  of  the  Mussulmans."  It  should  be  noted 
also  that  the  abortive  peace  of  Bucharest  between  the 
Central  Powers  and  Roumania,  in  May,  1918,  had  at- 
tempted to  establish  equal  freedom  in  Roumania  for  the 
Roman  Cathohc,  the  United  Greek,  the  Bulgarian  Ortho- 
dox, the  Protestant,  the  Mussulman,  and  the  Jewish 
faiths,  and  the  Central  Powers  had  recognized  the  neces- 


210    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

sity  for  a  provision  extending  Roumanian  citizenship  to 
Jews. 

For  almost  a  century,  therefore,  it  had  been  an  estab- 
lished practice,  if  not  a  principle  of  the  public  law  of 
Europe,  that  guarantees  to  rehgious  minorities  should  be 
incKided  among  provisions  deahng  with  the  transfer  of 
territory  inhabited  by  heterogeneous  peoples.  It  is  true 
that  the  practice  had  yielded  but  questionable  results  in 
some  cases,  notably  in  that  of  Roumania.  But  this 
would  not  have  warranted  a  departure  at  Paris,  even  if 
the  commitments  of  the  AHies  had  not  in  clearest  terms 
bound  them  to  protect  the  "equal  rights  of  the  peoples 
concerned." 

The  first  proposal  for  protecting  minorities  in  the  new 
states  was  made  by  President  Wilson.  It  provided  for 
religious  freedom  in  terms  not  unhke  those  to  be  found 
in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  His  proposal  went  further,  how- 
ever, in  providing  for  political  equality  among  the  various 
races  and  nationalities  in  the  states  which  might  be  asked 
to  give  guarantees.  Meanwhile,  at  the  instance  of  an 
American  Jewish  committee,  led  by  Judge  Julian  W. 
Mack  and  Mr.  Louis  Marshall,  the  question  of  protect- 
ing the  Jews  had  interested  Colonel  House,  and  the 
American  delegation  had  prepared  clauses  dealing  with 
minorities  in  Poland  for  insertion  in  the  treaty  with 
Germany.  It  was  so  obviously  a  question  on  which  dif- 
ferences of  opinion  would  arise,  requiring  perhaps  pro- 
longed negotiations,  that  the  Supreme  Council  decided  to 
refer  it  to  a  special  commission.  It  is  unfortunate  that 
this  decision  was  not  taken  until  May  i,  for  with  the 
presentation  of  the  conditions  of  peace  to  the  Germans 
set  for  May  7,  the  earlier  work  of  the  commission  was 
necessarily  hurried. 


THE   PROTECTION   OF  MINORITIES      211 

This  Committee  on  New  States  and  the  Protection 
of  Minorities,  as  it  was  called,  was  composed  of  M. 
Berthelot  and  M.  Kammerrer  of  France,  Mr.  Headlam- 
Morley  and  Mr.  Carr  of  Great  Britain,  Mr.  de  Martino 
and  Colonel  Castoldi  of  Italy,  Mr.  Adatci  of  Japan,  and 
Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller  and  Mr.  Hudson  of  the  United 
States.  In  the  later  stages  of  the  work  the  American 
representative  was  Mr.  Allen  W.  Dulles,  and  vakiable 
counsel  was  given  throughout  by  Professor  A.  C.  Coohdge, 
who  had  just  returned  from  his  mission  to  central  Europe. 
Between  May  and  November  the  committee  on  new 
states  held  sixty-four  meetings.  As  with  many  of  the 
other  commissions,  the  committee  was  given  only  the 
most  general  directions  by  the  Supreme  Council,  and 
where  unanimity  was  reached  in  the  committee  its  work 
was  usually  approved  without  close  re-examination. 

It  was  at  once  decided  that  the  two  new  states  whose 
independence  was  to  be  recognized  by  the  treaty  with 
Germany,  and  which  were  to  receive  cessions  of  German 
territory,  should  agree  in  the  peace  treaty  itself  to  accept 
such  guarantees  as  the  Principal  Powers  should  deem 
necessary  '*to  protect  the  interests  of  inhabitants  .  .  . 
who  differ  from  the  majority  of  the  population  in  race, 
language  or  religion."  This  applied  to  the  new  state  of 
Czecho-SIovakia,  with  not  less  than  3,000,000  Germans, 
and  to  the  new  state  of  Poland,  which  was  to  include  at 
least  1 ,000,000  Germans  and  4,000,000  Jews  in  its  popu- 
lation. The  incorporation  of  this  undertaking  in  the 
treaty  with  Germany  had  the  effect  of  obligating  these 
states  to  each  of  the  other  signatories  to  the  treaty,  and 
it  gives  even  Germany  a  locus  standi  for  seeing  that  the 
guarantees  accepted  are  performed. 

The  same  course  was  later  adopted  with  reference  to 


212     \\HAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

the  other  new  states.  Thus  the  peace  treaty  with  Aus- 
tria obliges  Jugo-SIavia,  Czecho-SIovakia,  and  Roumania 
to  accept  similar  obligations;  the  peace  treaty  with  Hun- 
gary binds  Jugo-SIavia  and  Roumania  in  the  same  way; 
the  peace  treaty  with  Bulgaria  binds  Greece;  and  that 
with  Turkey  binds  Greece  and  Armenia.  The  Hedjaz 
is  the  only  new  state  set  up  by  the  Peace  Conference 
with  reference  to  which  this  course  was  not  followed,  the 
population  being  so  homogeneous  as  to  make  it  un- 
necessary". 

But  one  may  ask,  what  was  done  for  the  minorities  in 
other  European  territories  severed  from  Germany  and 
the  former  Austro-Hungarian  Empire?  What  of  the  Ger- 
mans in  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  the  Trentino,  in  Schleswig, 
and  in  Eupen  and  Malmedy?  In  none  of  these  terri- 
tories were  the  problems  of  race  and  language  and  religion 
so  complicated  as  in  eastern  Europe.  Moreover,  these 
accessions  were  not  incident  to  settling  up  new  states  or 
reorganizing  old  ones.  In  none  of  these  cases  was  the 
territory-  acquired  by  a  state  already  subject  to  general 
international  obhgations  in  its  treatment  of  minorities. 
But  it  need  not  be  concealed  that  some  of  the  leaders 
of  the  smaller  Powers,  notably  Mr.  Bratiano  of  Rou- 
mania, found  it  very  difficult  to  believe  that  Italy  and 
Roumania  were  not  in  this  respect  in  identical  circum- 
stances. Even  if  Italy's  position  as  a  Principal  Power 
had  not  seemed  to  her  representati\-es  to  preclude  it,  per- 
haps her  record  of  religious  toleration  and  political  equal- 
ity would  have  seemed  a  sufficient  reason  for  not  bind- 
ing her  with  a  separate  minorities  treaty.  And  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  quite  generally  regarded  as  merely  a  case 
of  (fisannexation. 

But   some   of  the  representatrvxs   of  the   new  states 


THE   PROTECTION  OF   MINORITIES      213 

found  the  distinction  most  invidious,  and  the  incorpora- 
tion of  these  obligations  in  the  treaties  of  peace  was 
stouti}'  resisted  for  many  months.  As  the  question  first 
arose  with  reference  to  Poland,  her  case  began  the  con- 
test. The  statesmen  who  had  been  so  engrossed  in  the 
herculean  tasks  of  setting  up  new  commonwealths  had 
verj^  naturally  not  found  time  to  work  out  their  own 
international  position.  People  engaged  in  a  struggle  to 
be  free  do  not  easily  conceive  of  themselves  as  possible 
oppressors.  Where  excesses  and  pogroms  had  occurred, 
they  had  been,  perhaps  in  all  instances,  the  result  of  irre- 
sponsible zeal  rather  than  of  deliberate  government  policy. 
It  was,  therefore,  something  of  a  shock  to  the  Polish 
leaders  to  be  called  upon  to  sign  a  separate  treaty  with 
the  Principal  Powers  concerning  what  they  deemed  to  be 
a  domestic  matter.  It  was  argued  that  their  sovereignty' 
was  being  invaded,  that  their  good  intentions  were  being 
doubted,  and  that  their  national  unity  was  being  Jeopard- 
ized. Roumania  and  Serbia  thought  it  also  a  reflection 
on  their  past  records  and  on  their  performance  of  the 
obligations  undertaken  in  1878. 

The  opposition  culminated  in  a  protest  made  in  the 
plenary  conference  on  May  31,  which  was  styled  by  the 
press  a  revolution  of  the  small  Powers.  It  w^as  one  of 
the  few  occasions  when  a  real  issue  was  discussed  before 
the  plenary  conference.  Mr.  Bratiano  and  Mr.  Padcrew- 
ski  were  very  emphatic  in  rejecting  any  obligations  which 
did  not  inure  to  all  members  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Mr.  Kramar,  of  Czecho-SIovakia,  and  Mr.  Trumbitch, 
of  Jugo-SIavia,  were  insistent  on  amending  the  objection- 
able clauses.  Mr.  Venizelos,  of  Greece,  contented  himself 
with  pouring  oil  on  the  troubled  waters.  The  occasion 
called  forth  the  speech  of  President  Wilson,  which  was 


214    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

so  much  debated  in  our  1920  presidential  campaign,  in 
which  he  insisted  that  the  United  States  could  share 
the  responsibility  of  the  territorial  readjustments  only  if 
assurances  were  given  that  conditions  would  not  be  main- 
tained which  would  inevitably  lead  to  new  oppression 
and  renewed  conflict.  The  President  is  reported  to  have 
said: 

It  is  not,  therefore,  the  Intervention  of  those  who  would  interfere, 
but  the  action  of  those  who  would  help.  I  beg  that  our  friends  will 
take  that  view  of  it,  because  I  see  no  escape  from  that  view  of  it. 
How  can  a  Power  Hke  the  United  States,  for  example — for  I  can 
speak  for  no  other — after  signing  this  Treaty,  if  it  contains  elements 
which  they  do  not  believe  will  be  permanent,  go  three  thousand 
miles  away  across  the  sea  and  report  to  its  people  that  it  has  made 
a  settlement  of  the  peace  of  the  world?  It  cannot  do  so.  And  yet 
there  underhes  all  of  these  transactions  the  expectation  on  the  part, 
for  example,  of  Roumania  and  of  Czecho-SIovakia  and  of  Serbia, 
that  if  any  covenants  of  this  settlement  are  not  observed,  the  United 
States  will  send  her  armies  and  her  navies  to  see  that  they  are 
observed. 

In  those  circumstances  is  it  unreasonable  that  the  United  States 
should  insist  upon  being  satisfied  that  the  settlements  are  correct? 
Mr.  Bratiano — and  I  speak  of  his  suggestions  with  the  utmost  respect 
— suggested  that  we  could  not,  so  to  say,  invade  the  sovereignty  of 
Roumania,  an  ancient  sovereignty,  and  make  certain  prescriptions 
with  regard  to  the  rights  of  minorities.  But  I  beg  him  to  observe 
that  he  is  overlooking  the  fact  that  he  is  asking  the  sanction  of  the 
AHied  and  Associated  Powers  for  great  additions  of  territory  which 
come  to  Roumania  by  the  common  victory  of  arms,  and  that,  there- 
fore, we  are  entitled  to  say:  "If  we  agree  to  these  additions  of  terri- 
tory we  have  the  right  to  insist  upon  certain  guarantees  of  peace." 

This  was  in  no  sense  a  commitment  by  the  President. 
It  was,  instead,  an  appeal.  It  did  not  wholly  soothe 
the  excited  feehngs  of  the  Poles,  and  the  uncertainty  as 
to  their  course  continued  down  to  the  time  when  the 
first  minority  treaty  was  signed.  The  continued  dis- 
affection of  the  Roumanians  and  the  Jugo-SIavs  led  them 


THE   PROTECTION  OF   MINORITIES      215 

to  take  a  very  determined  stand  with  reference  to  the 
contents  of  the  treaties  themselves,  and  for  this  reason 
their  signatures  were  withheld  until  some  time  after  the 
Principal  Powers  had  signed.  That  this  attitude  of  the 
new  states  did  not  frustrate  altogether  the  attempt  to 
give  special  protection  to  minorities  is  due  in  no  small 
measure  to  President  Wilson,  whose  interest  in  the 
policy  was  perhaps  keener  than  that  of  his  colleagues  on 
the  Supreme  Council,  and  to  the  wise  and  patient  judg- 
ment of  Mr.  Frank  Polk. 

The  most  unfortunate  consequence  of  such  opposition 
was  that  it  inevitably  affected  the  procedure  adopted  in 
framing  the  treaties  themselves.  The  committee  on  new 
states  was  compelled  to  proceed  without  the  assistance 
and  co-operation  which  it  would  have  desired  from  the 
representatives  of  the  various  peoples  concerned.  But  the 
wisdom  of  Doctor  Benes,  of  Czecho-SIovakia,  and  Mr. 
Venizelos,  of  Greece,  had  led  them  to  recognize  the  de- 
sirability of  the  minority  treaties  from  the  start,  and  the 
Czecho-SIovak  and  Greek  delegations  were  very  helpful 
in  framing  their  respective  treaties. 

In  dealing  with  the  content  of  the  treaties,  certain 
provisions  must  be  noticed  which  are  common  to  all  the 
special  minority  treaties  and  to  the  minority  provisions 
of  the  treaties  of  peace  with  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Hungary, 
and  Turkey.  First,  they  are  designed  to  secure  to  all 
inhabitants  full  and  complete  protection  of  hfe  and  lib- 
erty without  distinction  as  to  birth,  nationality,  language, 
race,  or  religion,  as  well  as  the  privilege  of  practising  in 
pubhc  and  in  private  any  religion  which  is  not  incon- 
sistent with  public  order  and  pubhc  morals.  In  the 
second  place,  they  aim  to  assure  to  all  the  inhabitants  in 
the  transferred  territory  a  choice  between  acquiring  the 


2i6    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

nationality  of  the  country  to  which  the  transfer  is  made, 
and  retaining  their  old  nationality  by  removing  them- 
selves from  the  territory.  As  to  inhabitants  born  in  the 
future,  a  stipulation  not  unlike  that  in  our  own  four- 
teenth amendment  provides  that  all  persons  born  in  a 
state  become  ipso  facto  nationals  of  that  state.  This 
provision  seemed  essential  to  prevent  such  abuses  as 
have  been  suffered  by  the  Jews  in  Roumania,  where  the 
law  continued  to  classify  as  aliens  people  whose  families 
had  lived  in  Roumania  for  generations. 

Provision  is  also  made  for  securing  equality  in  the 
enjoyment  of  political,  religious,  and  cultural  liberty  to 
all  citizens  without  distinction  as  to  race  or  language  or 
rehgion.  To  make  this  more  than  an  expression  of  pious 
hope,  it  was  necessary  to  be  very  specific  about  the  use 
of  languages  and  the  control  of  schools.  To  a  person 
who  feels  the  necessity  of  perpetuating  his  stock  and  his 
kind,  nothing  is  dearer  than  his  mother  tongue.  Its 
extinction  almost  inevitably  spells  defeat.  The  stories  of 
PoHsh  children  striking  because  they  were  forced  to  say 
their  prayers  at  school  in  the  German  language,  are  indi- 
cations of  the  ruthlessness  of  the  nationalizing  process, 
and  it  is  not  strange  that  language  requirements  have 
brought  such  sharp  contests  in  eastern  Europe.  But 
even  the  instruction  received  at  a  mother's  knee  would 
soon  be  forgotten  if  children  had  all  their  school  training 
in  another  language.  To  the  Roumanian  living  in  East- 
ern Serbia,  for  instance,  it  is  not  enough  to  have  his  child 
taught  at  school  to  read  the  Roumanian  language — the 
instruction  must  be  in  the  medium  of  the  Roumanian  lan- 
guage if  the  child's  loyalty  to  his  parents'  beliefs  is  not 
to  be  weaned  away.  So  the  minority  treaties  provide 
that  in  districts  where  a  considerable  part  of  the  popula- 


THE   PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES      217 

tion  belongs  to  a  linguistic  minority,  instruction  must  be 
provided  in  that  people's  own  tongue.  Such  provisions 
are  enforceable  in  the  face  of  a  deliberate  attempt 
to  stamp  out  a  language,  or  a  religion,  only  if  the 
minority  is  given  some  share  in  managing  the  schools. 
The  minority  treaties,  therefore,  provide  for  an  equitable 
division  of  pubHc  funds  used  in  maintaining  educational, 
religious,  and  charitable  institutions  among  the  various 
groups  concerned. 

To  some  of  us  in  America,  such  provisions  are  likely  to 
seem  very  strange.  They  have  been  attacked  on  the 
ground  that  they  encourage  disunity  within  the  state — 
that  they  make  for  perpetuating  hyphens  instead  of  abol- 
ishing them.  Current  opinion  in  America  would  not 
have  much  hospitality  for  a  suggestion  that  instruction 
in  a  public  school  in  one  of  our  large  American  cities 
should  be  in  some  other  language  than  in  English.  But 
the  Germans  in  Czecho-SIovakia  and  the  Magyars  in 
Roumania  are  in  a  very  different  position  from  that  of  the 
Germans  in  St.  Louis  and  the  Magyars  in  Cleveland. 
They  have  lived  for  generations  or  centuries  on  the  land 
where  they  are  to-day — their  life  and  their  history  are 
identified  with  the  place  in  which  they  live.  Their  posi- 
tion can  better  be  compared  to  that  of  the  Spaniards  in 
California  or  Arizona,  and  to  that  of  the  natives  in  Porto 
Rico.  European  immigrants  in  Chicago  have  come  to 
a  new  world  where  an  American  tradition  has  preceded 
them,  and  a  claim  by  them  to  replace  existing  traditions 
with  their  own  would  be  more  comparable  to  the  Prus- 
sianizing of  a  Polish  city  in  the  days  before  the  war. 
The  situation  in  the  United  States  must  be  distinguished 
on  the  one  hand  from  that  of  homogeneous  communities 
like  France  or  England,  and  on  the  other  hand  from  that 


2i8    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

of  such  composite  states  as  Poland  and  Czecho-SIovakia. 
In  a  unified  state  like  England,  the  protection  of  racial 
and  Hnguistic  and  rehgious  minorities  is  not  an  issue. 
Our  American  problems  are  those  of  fusion — the  eastern 
European  problems  are  those  of  union. 

The  general  clauses  described  are  designed  to  protect 
the  Germans  and  white  Russians  and  Jews  and  Lithu- 
anians in  Poland,  the  Germans  and  Jews  and  Ruthenians 
in  Czecho-SIovakia,  the  Magyars  and  Germans  and  Rou- 
manians and  Albanians  and  Mussulmans  in  Jugo-SIavia, 
the  Magyars  and  Serbs  and  Jews  in  Roumania,  and  the 
Mussulmans  and  Jews  and  Albanians  and  Vlachs  in 
Greece.  They  were  also  included  in  the  treaty  of  peace 
with  Austria  to  protect  the  Czechs  and  Slavs  and  Jews 
left  within  the  new  state;  in  the  treaty  with  Bulgaria  to 
protect  the  Germans  and  Roumanians  and  Jews;  in  the 
treaty  with  Hungary  to  protect  the  Germans  and  Slavs 
and  Jews;  and  in  the  treaty  with  Turkey  to  protect  the 
Christians  and  Jews. 

But  special  protection  was  thought  to  be  needed  by 
the  Jews  in  Poland  and  Roumania  and  Greece.  The 
Jews  are  both  a  race  and  a  sect.  Scattered  throughout 
eastern  Europe,  engaged  often  in  trade  which  carries 
them  into  several  countries,  and  a  deeply  religious  people, 
their  problems  are  quite  distinct  from  those  of  other 
minorities.  Moreover,  unhke  the  Germans  or  Magyars 
or  Roumanians,  they  have  had  no  Jewish  country  to 
which  they  might  emigrate  until  the  treaty  of  peace  with 
Turkey  opened  Palestine  to  them.  The  Yiddish  language 
was  looked  upon  as  a  corruption  of  German,  and  many 
Jews  in  eastern  Europe  bore  the  stigma  of  pro-Germanism 
and  Bolshevism  in  1919,  with  the  result  that  anti-Semitic 
agitation  was  revived  in  some  places  in  very  revolting 
pogroms. 


THE   PROTECTION  OF   MINORITIES      219 

The  Polish  treaty  contains  a  provision  for  the  expendi- 
ture by  local  Jewish  committees  of  the  public  money  de- 
voted to  maintaining  Jewish  schools — a  provision  not 
uncommon  in  Europe  where  religious  schools  are  given 
state  support.  The  Roumanian  treaty  guards  specially 
against  the  Jews'  being  treated  as  aliens,  and  requires 
citizenship  to  be  extended  to  them.  The  Turkish  treaty 
provides  that  Jews  resident  in  Palestine  shall  become 
ipso  facto  citizens  of  Palestine.  In  Poland,  Roumania, 
and  Greece  the  Jews  are  not  to  be  forced  to  violate  their 
Sabbath.  But  pious  Jews  may  still  be  placed  at  an  eco- 
nomic disadvantage  if  after  resting  on  Saturday  they  are 
not  permitted  to  work  on  Sunday.  The  treaties  do  not 
attempt  to  deal  with  that  possibility. 

Several  other  minorities  seemed  to  need  special  protec- 
tion. The  Mussulmans  in  Jugo-SIavia  and  Greece,  the 
Saxons  and  Czechlers  in  Roumania,  the  Vlachs  of  Pin- 
dus  and  the  monks  of  Mt.  Athos  in  Greece  are  given  a 
measure  of  local  autonomy  in  scholastic  and  religious  ac- 
tivities. The  persecution  of  Christians  in  Turkey  in  the 
past  made  it  imperative  that  they  receive  special  protec- 
tion also.  In  Czecho-SIovakia  the  Ruthenians  living 
south  of  the  Carpathians  were  given  political  autonomy 
and  special  participation  in  the  government  at  Prague. 
The  Italian  delegation  proposed  that  Jugo-SIavia  should 
be  asked  to  give  similar  autonomy  in  Macedonia,  but  this 
proposal  was  not  supported  by  other  delegations,  and 
would  doubtless  have  been  stoutly  resisted  by  the  Jugo- 
slavs. 

The  elaboration  of  such  measures  will  doubtless  prove 
a  boon  in  times  of  stress  to  unpopular  groups  who  may 
resort  to  them  as  a  kind  of  bill  of  rights.  But  experience 
in  Roumania  has  shown  that  a  formal  treaty  provision 


220    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

will  not  execute  itself.  The  Congress  of  Berlin  had  been 
content  to  frame  provisions  for  protecting  minorities  and 
embodying  them  in  formal  treaties,  without  giving  them 
a  definite  sanction.  Any  of  the  Powers  signatory  to  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  might  have  protested  against  the  viola- 
tion of  its  provisions  by  Roumania  in  refusing  to  permit 
Jews  to  own  rural  land  because  they  were  aliens.  Only 
a  collective  protest  of  the  signatory  Powers  was  likely  to 
prove  availing,  and  it  was  never  made.  But  the  enforced 
emigration  of  Roumanian  Jews  to  America  gave  the 
United  States  an  interest  in  Roumanian  conditions. 
Though  our  government  had  not  signed  the  Treaty  of 
Berhn,  in  1902,  Secretary  John  Hay  made  a  very  strong 
protest  to  Roumania,  in  which  he  described  conditions 
then  existing  in  Roumania  in  the  following  terms: 

Starting  from  the  arbitrary  and  controvertible  premises  that  the 
native  Jews  of  Roumania  domiciled  there  for  centuries  are  "aliens 
not  subject  to  foreign  protection,"  the  ability  of  the  Jew  to  earn 
even  the  scanty  means  of  existence  that  suffice  for  a  frugal  race  has 
been  constricted  by  degrees,  until  nearly  every  opportunity  to  win 
a  livelihood  is  denied;  and  until  the  helpless  poverty  of  the  Jews  has 
constrained  an  exodus  of  such  proportions  as  to  cause  general 
concern. 

The  political  disabilities  of  the  Jews  in  Roumania,  their  exclusion 
from  the  public  service  and  the  learned  professions,  the  limitations 
of  their  civil  rights,  and  the  Imposition  upon  them  of  exceptional 
taxes,  involving  as  they  do  wrongs  repugnant  to  the  moral  sense  of 
liberal  modern  peoples  are  not  so  directly  in  point  for  my  present 
purpose  as  the  public  acts  which  attack  the  Inherent  rights  of  trade. 
The  Jews  are  prohibited  from  owning  land,  or  even  from  cultivating 
it  as  common  labourers.  They  are  debarred  from  residing  in  the 
rural  districts.  Many  branches  of  petty  tra"de  and  manual  produc- 
tion are  closed  to  them  in  the  overcrowded  cities  where  they  are 
forced  to  dwell  and  engage  against  fearful  odds  in  the  desperate 
struggle  for  existence.  Even  as  ordinary  artisans  or  hired  labourers 
they  may  only  find  employment  In  the  proportion  of  one  "unpro- 
tected alien"  to  two  "Roumanians"  under  any  one  employer.     In 


THE  PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES      221 

short,  by  the  cumulative  effect  of  successive  restrictions,  the  Jews 
of  Roumania  have  become  reduced  to  a  state  of  wretched  misery. 

If  these  conditions  existed  in  spite  of  the  solemn  under- 
taking of  Roumania  in  1878,  it  would  seem  that  some 
redress  should  have  been  possible.  The  British  Govern- 
ment seems  to  have  been  willing  to  act  on  Secretary 
Hay's  protest,  for  in  September,  1902,  it  sent  the  follow- 
ing reply  to  his  circular: 

His  Majesty's  Government  joins  with  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment in  deploring  the  depressed  conditions  of  the  Roumanian  Jews 
and  in  regarding  with  apprehension  the  results  of  their  enforced 
emigration. 

His  Majesty's  Government  will  place  themselves  in  communication 
with  the  other  Powers  to  a  joint  representation  to  the  Roumanian 
Government  on  the  subject. 

But  no  such  joint  representation  was  ever  made,  and 
Secretary  Hay's  efforts  to  secure  the  intervention  of  the 
Powers  which  had  signed  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  were 
fruitless. 

With  such  an  example  before  it,  the  Paris  Conference 
might  have  despaired,  if  no  means  of  enforcing  the  pro- 
tection of  minorities  could  have  been  found.  Such  means 
were  found  in  the  League  of  Nations.  All  the  minority 
clauses  were  expressly  framed  as  ''obligations  of  interna- 
tional concern,"  and  were  ''placed  under  the  guarantee 
of  the  League  of  Nations."  No  modifications  can  be 
made  in  them  without  the  assent  of  a  majority  of  the 
Council  of  the  League.  Moreover,  the  Council  is  em- 
powered to  enforce  the  provisions,  and  in  case  of  "any 
infraction  or  any  danger  of  infraction,"  to  take  such  action 
and  give  such  direction  as  it  may  deem  proper  and  effec- 
tive. The  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  is 
given  jurisdiction  over  certain  disputes  which  may  arise 


222    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

in  connection  with  the  interpretation  and  execution  of 
the  treaties.  Last  February  the  Council  of  the  League 
consented  to  this  guarantee  of  the  minority  provisions  in 
the  Polish  treaty,  and  in  October  it  assumed  the  guarantee 
of  the  minority  parts  of  the  Austrian  and   Bulgarian 

treaties. 

The  method  of  enforcement  adopted  is  carefully  re- 
stricted so  that  the  governments  of  the  new  states  will 
not  be  constantly  harassed.  An  aggrieved  minority  must 
interest  in  its  behalf  some  government  which  is  rep- 
resented on  the  Council  of  the  League  before  the  Council 
can  act.  A  direct  appeal  by  an  individual  Jew,  or  even 
by  a  committee  of  Jews,  is  not  enough  to  force  a  govern- 
ment to  defend  itself  at  the  bar  of  the  League.  The 
American  and  Italian  delegations  wanted  to  leave  the 
international  court  itself  to  frame  the  procedure,  and  they 
would  have  allowed  any  member  of  the  League,  and  not 
simply  the  members  represented  on  the  Council,  to  set 
the  League's  machinery  into  action.  But  the  other  dele- 
gations insisted  that  this  would  weaken  the  local  govern- 
ments. In  the  plan  agreed  upon,  it  is  important  to  note 
that  a  method  of  judicial  enforcement  is  provided,  and 
that  this  assures  the  new  states  against  the  dangers  of 
improper  political  interference. 

Such  a  programme  for  protecting  minorities  does  not 
take  care  of  all  the  difficulties,  however.  It  is  almost 
inevitable  in  drawing  a  boundary  in  a  closely  contested 
area  that  some  people  will  be  left  on  both  sides  who 
would  prefer  to  be  on  the  other  side.  This  is  particularly 
true  in  the  Balkan  peninsula,  and  it  led  Mr.  Venizelos  to 
propose  one  of  the  most  interesting  innovations  attempted 
at  Paris,  a  scheme  for  facilitating  the  intermigration  of 
dissatisfied   peoples   across   the   new    national   frontiers. 


THE   PROTECTION   OF  MINORITIES      223 

Mr.  Venizelos  suggested  that  a  mixed  commission  be 
set  up  to  facilitate,  during  a  period  of  two  years,  the 
removal  of  Greeks  from  Bulgaria  into  Greece,  and  of 
Bulgarians  from  Greece  into  Bulgaria.  In  some  instances 
whole  villages  wanted  to  remove  in  this  way,  but  it  was 
only  possible  if  government  aid  could  assure  them  against 
loss  of  their  property  in  their  old  homes  and  against  ex- 
ploitation in  the  places  to  which  they  should  go.  The 
scheme  of  Mr.  Venizelos  was  carefully  studied  by  the 
committee  on  new  states,  which  concluded  that  it  might 
contribute  to  a  solution  of  the  Balkan  tangle,  if  Greece, 
Bulgaria,  Jugo-SIavia,  and  Turkey  would  co-operate  in 
some  such  plan.  The  suggestion  was  not  favored  by  the 
Jugo-SIav  delegation,  however,  but  such  a  treaty  was 
signed  by  Greece  and  Bulgaria,  and  provision  for  a  simi- 
lar arrangement  between  Greece  and  Turkey  was  em- 
bodied in  the  Turkish  peace  treaty.  The  Greek-Bul- 
garian treaty  is  now  in  force,  and  last  September  the 
Council  of  the  League  nominated  two  members  of  the 
mixed  commission  which  is  to  supervise  the  intermigra- 
tion.  The  success  of  this  experiment  in  Balkan  polity  is 
to  be  awaited  with  greatest  interest. 

It  remains  to  speak  of  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Peace  Conference  for  the  protection  of  the  peoples  inhab- 
iting transferred  territories  outside  of  Europe.  Colonial 
expansion  had  been  one  of  the  principal  objects  of  most 
of  the  governments  of  Europe  before  the  war,  and  the 
contest  in  Africa  and  the  Near  East  and  the  Pacific  had 
given  rise  to  many  delicate  issues  in  international  politics 
during  the  decade  preceding  191 4.  One  need  not  say 
that  colonial  expansion  was  an  object  for  which  the  war 
was  fought,  on  either  side.  But  it  was  bound  to  have 
an  important  place  in  the  work  of  a  peace  conference  at 


224    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

any  time,  and  few  people  dreamed  that  the  status  quo 
ante  bellum  was  to  be  left  intact.  New  rivalries  had  been 
engendered  by  the  very  progress  of  the  war.  Japan  had 
seized  the  German  Islands  north  of  the  equator,  and 
Great  Britain  and  France  had  agreed  to  support  her 
claim  to  keep  them.  Austraha  had  seized  the  more  im- 
portant of  the  German  possessions  in  the  Southern  Pa- 
cific, and  her  representatives  came  to  Paris  determined 
that  they  would  not  be  given  up.  In  German  Southwest 
and  German  East  Africa  the  South  African  Union  was 
bitterly  opposed  to  any  restoration  of  German  control, 
and  the  frightful  treatment  of  the  Herreros,  who  had 
been  all  but  exterminated  by  the  Germans  in  Southwest 
Africa,  lent  support  to  the  general  attitude  toward  the 
German  colonizers'  treatment  of  native  races.  In  this 
situation  most  of  the  Allied  world  in  19 19  was  in  no 
temper  to  see  the  German  hold  continued,  and  posses- 
sion as  a  Jait  accompli  often  means  as  many  points  in 
politics  as  in  law. 

But  the  principle  for  action  was  not  simple,  once  action 
had  been  decided  upon.  The  Fourteen  Points  had  called 
for  an  "impartial  adjustment,"  on  the  vague  principle 
that  interests  of  the  populations  concerned  must  have 
equal  weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  govern- 
ments contending  for  title.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  been 
more  specific  in  declaring  that  the  general  principle  of 
self-determination  was  as  applicable  in  these  territories 
as  in  the  occupied  territories  of  Europe.  In  terms  of  the 
next  half-century  in  international  relations,  it  might  have 
contributed  to  a  more  stable  world  to  have  left  some  of 
her  African  possessions  to  Germany.  Yet  it  was  prob- 
ably true  that  few  of  the  indigenous  peoples  desired  such 
a  fate,  though  in  East  Africa  enough  of  loyalty  to  Ger- 


THE   PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES      225 

man  rule  survived  to  enable  the  German  army  there  to 
fight  through  the  war,  and  to  keep  together  until  after 
the  armistice.  In  all  of  the  German  colonies  there  were 
fewer  than  25,000  Germans  before  the  war.  It  seemed 
most  in  line  with  the  interests  of  the  15,000,000  of  natives 
to  regard  their  government  an  international  trust,  which 
would  not  only  prevent  their  exploitation,  but  which 
would  also  assure  to  all  nations  equal  opportunity  in 
trading  with  them  and  in  developing  their  territories. 

Various  suggestions  for  international  control  had  been 
made  during  the  war.  The  experiments  in  Egypt,  Mo- 
rocco, Samoa,  and  the  new  Hebrides  had  not  warranted 
great  confidence  in  the  possibilities  of  direct  international 
administration,  however,  and  the  suggestion  that  the 
League  of  Nations  should  assume  administrative  respon- 
sibility found  little  support.  But  in  his  well-known 
memorandum  on  the  League  of  Nations  General  Smuts 
had  formulated  a  proposal  widely  discussed  in  England 
that  a  system  of  mandates  should  be  devised  under 
which  the  state  administering  a  territory  should  be 
responsible  to  the  League  of  Nations  and  should  con- 
duct a  stewardship  along  general  lines  recognized  by  the 
League  to  be  just  and  proper.  The  American  delegation 
backed  the  English  support  of  this  proposal.  The  chief 
opposition  came  from  the  British  Dominions,  after  the 
French  had  been  won  over  to  it.  But  early  in  the 
Conference,  on  January  30,  an  agreement  was  reached 
which  was  later  incorporated  in  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  as  Article  22. 

The  mandate  system  provides  for  three  types  of  man- 
dates. The  class  A  mandates  are  to  apply  to  the  terri- 
tories formerly  Turkish,  which  are  to  be  set  up  as  pro- 
visionally independent  nations,  subject  to  administrative 


226    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

advice  and  assistance  from  a  mandatory  Power  until  such 
time  as  they  can  stand  alone.  Such  mandates  are  to 
apply  to  Palestine,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia.  The  class 
B  mandates  are  to  apply  to  Central  African  territories, 
administered  under  conditions  which  will  guarantee  free- 
dom of  conscience  and  religion  to  the  native  inhabitants, 
will  prohibit  such  abuses  as  the  slave-trades,  the  arms 
traffic,  and  the  liquor  traffic,  will  prevent  the  arming  of 
natives  for  other  purposes  than  police,  and  will  maintain 
an  open  door  and  equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  of 
all  members  of  the  League.  A  third  type  of  mandate, 
class  C,  deals  with  such  sparsely  settled  territories  as 
Southwest  Africa  and  certain  of  the  Pacific  Islands, 
which  are  to  be  administered,  subject  to  the  same  safe- 
guards for  the  natives,  under  the  laws  of  the  mandatory 
as  integral  portions  of  its  territory. 

After  this  plan  was  agreed  upon,  the  next  step  was  the 
decision  as  to  what  states  should  be  selected  as  manda- 
tories, and  in  what  territories.  On  May  7,  on  the  same 
afternoon  that  the  conditions  of  peace  were  handed  to 
the  Germans,  the  Supreme  Council  decided  that  France 
and  Great  Britain  would  make  a  joint  recommendation 
to  the  League  concerning  the  mandate  for  Togoland  and 
the  Cameroons;  that  the  mandates  for  German  East 
Africa  and  the  island  of  Nauru  should  be  held  by  Great 
Britain;  that  the  mandate  for  German  Southwest  Africa 
should  be  held  by  the  South  African  Union,  that  for  the 
German  Samoan  Islands  by  New  Zealand,  that  for  other 
Pacific  Islands  south  of  the  equator  by  Australia,  and 
that  for  the  islands  north  of  the  equator  by  Japan. 
Whether  this  allocation  to  Japan  of  the  islands  north  of 
the  equator  included  the  island  of  Yap  has  recently  been 
the  subject  of  some  controversy.     It  seems  quite  clear 


THE  PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES      227 

that  an  American  reservation  was  made  as  to  this  island, 
on  account  of  its  importance  as  a  cable  station,  but 
this  reserve  may  have  been  misunderstood  and  perhaps 
vaguely  recorded.  A  later  modification  assigned  part  of 
East  Africa  to  Belgium,  and  Kionga  to  Portugal,  to 
strengthen  the  territorial  position  of  those  Powers  in 
adjacent  territory.  The  disposition  of  the  territories 
severed  from  the  Turkish  Empire  had  to  await  the  fram- 
ing of  the  Turkish  treaty,  and  it  was  not  until  the  meet- 
ing at  San  Remo  in  1920  that  the  Supreme  Council 
assigned  to  France  the  mandate  for  Syria  and  Lebanon, 
and  to  Great  Britain  that  for  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia. 
No  state  was  found  wilhng  to  take  a  mandate  for  Armenia. 
The  formulation  of  the  mandates  themselves  was  un- 
dertaken by  a  committee  which  sat  in  London  during  the 
summer  of  19 19.  This  committee  framed  drafts  of  the 
B  and  C  mandates,  subject  to  a  Japanese  reservation 
based  on  their  desire  for  free  immigration  to  mandated 
territories,  and  an  unfortunate  French  reservation  con- 
cerning the  arming  of  natives  for  defense  of  the  territory 
under  the  mandate  and  the  territory  of  the  state  exer- 
cising it.  Apparently  these  drafts  have  now  been  finally 
approved  by  the  Allied  Powers,  and  the  C  mandates  were 
recently  approved  by  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
The  other  mandates  have  not  been  made  definitive,  al- 
though the  mandatories  are  controIHng  the  territory. 
Drafts  of  the  A  mandates  for  Syria,  Mesopotamia,  and 
Palestine,  and  the  B  mandates  for  Central  Africa,  are 
now  being  considered  by  the  Council  of  the  League.  The 
Assembly  of  the  League  has  recently  created  the  perma- 
nent committee  which  will  supervise  their  execution.  In 
view  of  America's  failure  to  play  any  part  in  the  later 
developments  of  this  situation,  perhaps  we  should  be 


228    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

patient  with  the  tardiness  and  delay.  If  conditions  in 
the  Near  East  should  become  more  settled  no  reason  will 
then  exist  for  any  further  delay  in  putting  the  mandates 
into  effect. 

Evaluation  of  the  mandate  system  must  await  experi- 
ence under  it.  The  Allies  have  been  criticised  for  a  failure 
to  apply  it  more  generally — yet  perhaps  few  Americans 
would  be  wilhng  to  extend  the  principle  of  general  ac- 
countability to  our  own  receiverships  in  such  independent 
countries  as  Haiti.  It  seemed  as  unnecessary  to  the 
Allied  states  to  apply  the  mandate  system  to  their  exist- 
ing African  possessions.  The  arrangement  at  Paris  did 
undoubtedly  mean  different  things  to  different  people. 
To  some  of  them  it  was  a  disguise  for  annexation.  To 
others  it  was  an  extension  of  the  field  of  law  and  order 
essential  to  proper  protection  of  native  inhabitants.  The 
execution  of  the  plan  will  determine  which  of  these  views 
is  to  prevail.  If  one  mandate  had  been  given  to  Germany, 
the  security  of  the  idea  in  public  law  might  have  been 
better  assured.  But  it  does  not  seem  too  sanguine  to 
hope  that  the  mandate  system  will  be  so  administered  by 
the  League  that  it  will  help  to  banish  that  vulture  attitude 
toward  backward  territories  which  produced  so  much 
international  friction  during  the  first  decade  of  the  present 
century.  If  it  has  not  now  been  made  impossible  to 
repeat  such  international  scandals  as  those  in  the  Congo, 
it  has  at  least  become  possible  to  check  them  effectively 
once  they  are  known  to  exist. 

The  attempt  made  at  Paris  to  assure  to  native  races 
and  to  racial  and  hnguistic  and  religious  minorities  such 
protection  that  the  world  may  not  be  thrown  into  another 
holocaust  to  deliver  them  from  oppressors  may  prove 
only  measurably  successful.     The  limits  on  effective  legal 


THE  PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES      229 

action  are  nowhere  more  rigid  than  in  dealing  with  the 
imponderable  elements  which  determine  men's  willing- 
ness to  admit  to  or  exclude  from  their  fellowship  other 
men  of  different  shaped  heads,  or  different  styled  clothes, 
or  different  forms  of  worship,  or  different  pohtical  views. 
Our  own  American  courts  do  not  attempt  to  force  men 
to  be  good  Samaritans.  With  constitutional  guarantees 
of  freedom  of  speech,  we  are  still  called  upon  to  oppose 
efforts  at  ruthless  suppression.  Our  thirteenth  amend- 
ment to  the  Federal  Constitution  did  not  prevent  numer- 
ous instances  of  peonage  worse  than  slavery,  and  the  pur- 
pose of  our  fifteenth  amendment  has  been  defeated  by 
"grandfather  clauses,"  judiciously  phrased  and  discrim- 
inatingly enforced.  It  will  not  be  surprising,  therefore, 
if  subterfuges  are  found,  where  Jew  or  German  or  Mag- 
yar is  disliked,  for  evading  such  provisions  as  those  in 
the  minority  treaties.  But  a  lever  has  been  provided  by 
which  a  group  in  distress  can  advance  its  claim,  and  which 
the  world  outside  can  seize  upon  for  action  when  a  Just 
claim  would  otherwise  go  unheeded. 

The  growth  of  international  law  is  slow.  Its  content 
in  any  era  depends  on  changing  conceptions  of  social  and 
national  Justice.  The  principle  of  religious  toleration 
was  made  the  basis  of  international  action  so  repeatedly 
during  the  last  century  that  Secretary  John  Hay  could 
refer  to  it  in  1902  as  a  "principle  of  international  law 
and  eternal  Justice."  The  Paris  Conference  has  en- 
trenched that  principle.  And  it  has  extended  the  pro- 
tection to  racial  and  linguistic  groups  as  well.  It  has 
created  in  this  field  a  new  body  of  public  law,  which 
constitutes  a  notable  contribution  to  the  effort  to  get  in- 
ternational Justice  through  law  rather  than  without  law. 
The  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  recognized  the 


230    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

value  of  this  contribution  recently  when  it  recommended 
to  Albania  and  the  Baltic  and  Caucasian  states  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  principles  of  the  minority  treaties  in  the 
event  of  their  admission  to  membership  in  the  League  of 
Nations.  Whatever  view  be  taken  of  the  satis  fact  oriness 
of  the  various  territorial  arrangements  made  at  Paris, 
the  efforts  on  behalf  of  the  minorities  affected  by  them 
were  certainly  conceived  in  the  hberal  spirit  which  gave 
the  Fourteen  Points  their  wide  appeal. 


X 

THE  TRIAL  OF  THE  KAISER 

BY   JAMES    BROWN    SCOTT 

"A  treaty  of  peace  is,  therefore,  an  agreement  to  waive  all  discussion  con- 
cerning the  respective  rights  of  the  parties,  and  to  bury  in  oblivion  all  the  original 
causes  of  the  war." — (Lord  Stowell  in  The  Eliza  Ann,  i  "Dodson's  Reports," 
244,  249,  decided  in  1813.) 

I  do  not  hold  a  brief  for  the  kaiser.  I  have  never 
met  him.  Indeed,  I  have  never  seen  him,  except  from 
a  distance — a  very  respectful  distance,  be  it  said.  I 
have  been  familiar  with  his  name  for  many  years,  but 
I  am  reasonably  sure  that  he  has  never  heard  mine.  I 
do  not  hold  a  brief  for  any  persons  in  the  civil  or  mili- 
tary employ  of  the  former  German  Empire  who  have 
been  accused  of  committing,  or  of  failing  to  prevent, 
crimes  against  our  common  humanity,  or  against  the 
laws  and  customs  of  war,  whom  some  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  made  up  their  minds  to  hale  before  a 
court  of  justice.  I  believe  that  I  have  not  met  any  of 
these  civilians,  although  I  may  inadvertently  have  seen 
some  of  them  from  time  to  time,  driving  hither  and 
thither  in  their  own  country,  or  at  some  receptions  which 
I  was  privileged  to  attend.  I  do  not  know,  personally, 
any  of  the  military  commanders,  although  it  is  possible 
that  as  a  young  man  in  Germany,  and  on  later  visits, 
my  mother,  my  sisters,  and  I,  may  have  been  brushed 
aside  by  them — pushed  off  the  sidewalk  into  the  street, 
with  the  horses  and  dogs  and  other  beasts  of  burden. 

231 


232    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

I  do,  however,  hold  a  brief  for  justice,  even  to  our 
enemies. 

First,  let  us  "hang  the  kaiser,"  to  use  the  phrase  of  the 
hour,  although  only  trial  is  meant — for  we  can  do  it  in 
this  place  as  well  as  anywhere  else. 

The  heavy  and  unwieldy  document  which  is  commonly 
called  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  and  which  few  read,  al- 
though many  criticise  it,  has  this  to  say  in  its  227th 
Article,  of  the  trial  of  the  kaiser: 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  publicly  arraign  William  II  of 
Hohenzollern,  formerly  German  Emperor,  for  a  supreme  offence 
against  international  morality  and  the  sanctity  of  treaties. 

A  special  tribunal  will  be  constituted  to  try  the  accused,  thereby 
assuring  him  the  guarantees  essential  to  the  right  of  defence.  It 
will  be  composed  of  five  judges,  one  appointed  by  each  of  the  follow- 
ing Powers:  namely,  the  United  States  of  America,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Italy  and  Japan. 

In  its  decision  the  tribunal  will  be  guided  by  the  highest  motives 
of  international  policy,  with  a  view  to  vindicating  the  solemn  obliga- 
tions of  international  undertakings  and  the  validity  of  international 
morality.  It  will  be  its  duty  to  fix  the  punishment  which  it  con- 
siders should  be  imposed. 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  will  address  a  request  to  the 
Government  of  the  Nethedands  for  the  surrender  to  them  of  the 
ex-Emperor  in  order  that  he  may  be  put  on  trial. 

The  meaning  of  this  is  tolerably  clear.  The  framers 
of  the  treaty  had  no  doubt  as  to  the .  guilt  of  Germany 
or  of  its  then  emperor  in  causing  the  war,  or  in  its  prose- 
cution. Yet  it  is  necessary  to  dwell  upon  these  things, 
inasmuch  as  the  trial  of  the  kaiser  presupposes  the  guilt 
of  Germany  and  of  William  II  of  Hohenzollern. 

The  commission  on  responsibilities  created  by  the 
peace  conference  of  Paris,  on  January  25,  1919,  was 
directed,  among  other  points,  to  inquire  into  and  report 
upon  the  responsibilities  of  the  authors  of  the  war.     The 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  233 

commission  was  composed  of  fifteen  members:  two  ap- 
pointed by  each  of  the  principal  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers,  the  United  States  of  America,  the  British  Em- 
pire, France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  and  five  elected  "from 
among  the  Powers  with  special  interests,"  to  quote  the 
language  of  the  conference.  These  special  Powers  turned 
out  to  be  Belgium,  Greece,  Poland,  Rumania,  and  Serbia. 
On  the  cause  of  the  war  the  commission  was  unani- 
mous, finding  it  to  have  been  due  to  Austria-Hungary, 
aided  and  abetted  by  Germany,  or,  to  quote  the  exact 
language  of  the  report : 

1.  The  war  was  premeditated  by  the  Central  Powers  together 

with  their  Allies,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  and  was  the  result 
of  acts  dehberately  committed  in  order  to  make  it  unavoid- 
able. 

2.  Germany,    in   agreement   with   Austria-Hungary,   dehberately 

worked  to  defeat  all  the  many  concihatory  proposals  made 
by  the  Entente  Powers  and  their  repeated  efforts  to  avoid 
war. 

During  the  meeting  of  the  commission  certain  docu- 
ments became  public  and  were  included  in  the  dissenting 
opinion  of  the  American  members.  The  first,  printed 
for  the  first  time  in  that  document,  is  from  Herr  von 
Wiesner,  who  had  been  sent  to  Serajevo  to  investigate 
the  circumstances  of  the  assassination  of  the  heir  to  the 
Austrian  throne  and  his  morganatic  wife,  on  June  28, 
1 9 14 — five  years  to  the  day  prior  to  the  signature  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  condemnation  of  the  Central 
Empires.  This  special  agent  thus  telegraphed  the  results 
of  his  investigation  to  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  at 
Vienna  from  Serajevo  on  July  13,  1914: 

Cognizance  on  the  part  of  the  Serbian  Government,  participation 
,in  the  murderous  assault,  or  in  its  preparation,  and  supplying  the 


234    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

weapons,  proved  by  nothing,  nor  even  to  be  suspected.     On  the 
contrary  there  are  indications  which  cause  this  to  be  rejected.^ 

The  second  telegram  is  from  Count  Szoegeny,  Austro- 
Hungarian  ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  the  minister  of 
foreign  affairs  at  Vienna.  It  is  dated  July  25,  19 14,  the 
very  day  on  which  the  forty-eight  hours  would  expire 
which  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  granted 
to  Serbia  to  answer  its  ultimatum.  This  telegram  reads 
as  follows: 

Here  it  is  generally  taken  for  granted  that  in  case  of  a  possible 
refusal  on  the  part  of  Serbia,  our  immediate  declaration  of  war  will 
be  coincident  with  military  operations. 

Delay  in  beginning  military  operations  is  here  considered  as  a 
great  danger  because  of  the  intervention  of  other  Powers. 

We  are  urgently  advised  to  proceed  at  once  and  to  confront  the 
world  with  a  Jait  accompli.^ 

The  third  telegram  Hkewise  is  from  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian ambassador,  at  Berlin,  to  the  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  at  Vienna.  It  is  dated  the  27th  of  July,  two  days 
after  Serbia's  favorable  reply,  and  the  day  before  the 
Austro-Hungarian  declaration  of  war  on  that  devoted  lit- 
tle country.     It  reads: 

The  Secretary  of  State  informed  me  very  definitely  and  in  the 
strictest  confidence  that  in  the  near  future  possible  proposals  for 
mediation  on  the  part  of  England  would  be  brought  to  Your  Excel- 
lency's knowledge  by  the  German  Government. 

^  "  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Responsibilities  of  the  Conference  of  Paris,  on 
the  Violation  of  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War,"  published  by  the  Carnegie 
Endowment  for  International  Peace,  1919,  p.  61. 

Karl  Kautsky,  "Wie  der  Weltkrieg  entstand.  Dargestellt  nach  dem  Akten- 
material  des  Deutschen  Auswartigen  Amts,"  Berlin,  1919,  p.  40.  English  trans- 
lation entitled,  "The  Guilt  of  William  HohenzoUern,"  1919,  p.  58. 

2  "Report  of  the  Commission  of  Responsibilities  of  the  Conference  of  Paris, 
on  the  Violation  of  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War,"  pp.  61-62. 

"Wie  der  Weltkrieg  entstand,"  p.  85.  "The  Guilt  of  William  HohenzoUern," 
p.  127. 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE  KAISER  235 

The  German  Government  gives  its  most  binding  assurance  that 
it  does  not  in  any  way  associate  itself  with  the  proposals;  on  the  con- 
trary, it  is  absolutely  opposed  to  their  consideration,  and  only  trans- 
mits them  in  compHance  with  the  EngHsh  request.^ 

These  documents  tell  the  whole  story.  They  need 
neither  explanation  nor  comment  other  than  to  say  that 
their  authenticity  is  not  denied,  and  that  the  most  com- 
petent of  authorities,  Karl  Kautsky  himself,  says,  refer- 
ring to  the  two  documents  last  quoted : 

Both  telegrams  came  into  the  hands  of  the  "Commission  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments  (formed  in  January,  1919),  for 
fixing  the  responsibility  of  the  originators  of  the  war  and  the  penalties 
to  be  imposed,"  and  were  pubHshed  in  its  Report,  which  gives  a 
sketch  of  the  origin  of  the  war  as  brief  as  it  is,  in  the  main,  correct.^ 

The  commission  on  responsibilities  found  the  German 
Government,  of  which  the  kaiser  was  the  head,  if  he  was 
not  the  government  itself,  aided  and  abetted  Austria- 
Hungary  to  declare  war  against  Serbia.  Russia  refused 
to  stand  by  and  see  the  little  Slav  brother  crushed.  It 
began  to  mobilize.  Therefore  the  kaiser's  government 
declared  war  against  Russia  on  August  i,  191 4,  thus  en- 
larging the  scope  of  the  war  and  making  it  certain  that 
at  least  all  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  would  be 
involved.  On  the  3d  of  August  Germany  likewise  de- 
clared war  against  France,  because  that  country  refused 
to  desert  Russia  and  to  promise  to  stay  neutral.  To 
strike  at  France  Germany  rushed  its  armies  through 
Luxemburg  and  through  Belgium,  although  the  German 

»  "  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Responsibilities  of  the  Conference  of  Paris,  on 
the  Violation  of  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War,"  p.  62. 

"Wie  der  Weltkrieg  entstand,"  p.  87.  "The  Guilt  of  William  Hohenzollern," 
p.  129. 

2  "Wie  der  Weltkrieg,"  p.  86.  i'The  Guilt  of  William  Hohenzollern,"  pp.  128- 
129. 


236    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Government  knew  and  stated  at  that  time,  through  its 
chancellor,  that  it  was  violating  international  law;  that 
it  was  overriding  the  just  protests  of  Luxemburg  and  of 
Belgium,  and  that  it  would  endeavor  to  make  good  the 
wrong  that  Germany  was  committing  **as  soon  as  our 
military  goal  has  been  reached,"  to  quote  instead  of 
paraphrasing  the  chancellor's  language  on  the  4th  day 
of  August,  1 9 14. 

Prussia  and  the  German  states  were  parties  to  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  neutralizing  Belgium,  and  to  the  Treaty 
of  1867,  guaranteeing  the  neutrahzation  of  Luxemburg. 

The  preamble  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  tells  the 
story,  not  merely  the  beginning  but  the  end  of  the  war, 
in  a  few  short,  crisp  sentences.  It  states  that  the  prin- 
cipal Allied  and  Associated  Powers  granted  an  armistice 
to  Germany  on  November  11,  1918,  on  the  request  of  the 
imperial  German  Government  in  order  that  a  treaty  of 
peace  might  be  concluded.  So  much  for  the  end  of  the 
war.  As  to  the  beginning,  the  preamble  says  that  the 
war  in  which  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  "weie 
successively  involved  directly  or  indirectly,  .  .  .  origi- 
nated in  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hungary  on 
July  28,  19 14,  against  Serbia,  the  declaration  of  war  by 
Germany  against  Russia  on  August  i,  191 4,  and  against 
France  on  August  3,  19 14,  and  in  the  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium." 

The  refusal  of  Germany  to  observe  the  neutrahty  of 
Belgium  brought  Great  Britain  into  the  war  on  August  4, 
1914.  ^ 

Various  forms  of  a  preamble  were  submitted  by  the 
drafting  committee  to  the  supreme  council.  This  one 
was  chosen  by  that  august  body.  The  absence  of  hon- 
eyed and  generous  phrases,  ordinarily  to  be  found  in 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE  KAISER  237 

preambles,  was  noted.  This  was  admitted  by  the  mem- 
ber of  the  drafting  committee  responsible  for  this  form, 
who  replied,  apparently  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  supreme 
council,  that  the  commissioners  who  put  their  hands  and 
seals  to  the  treaty  would,  for  the  first  time  in  history, 
sign  a  true  preamble,  and  that  any  one  consulting  the 
treaty  would,  in  its  opening  lines,  have  before  his  eyes 
the  cause  of  the  war  and  the  defeat  of  Germany,  admitted 
by  the  German  commissioners,  whose  signatures  were 
appended  to  the  treaty. 

Was  it  a  crime  to  declare  war  at  the  time  the  German 
Government  declared  it,  and  was  it  a  crime,  for  which 
the  law  of  nations  imposed  a  penalty,  to  break  the 
treaties  of  1839  and  1867?  It  was  not  in  point  of  law, 
although  in  the  forum  of  morals  it  assuredly  was. 

In  view  of  this  state  of  affairs,  could  the  kaiser  be  tried 
for  the  commission  of  a  crime,  or  could  he  be  tried  at 
all?  The  first  paragraph  of  Article  227  arraigned  the 
kaiser  '*for  a  supreme  offence  against  international 
morality  and  the  sanctity  of  treaties."  The  original 
draft  prepared  as  a  compromise  by  President  Wilson 
himself — for  he  was  adverse  to  any  proceeding  against 
the  kaiser — contained  an  express  denial  that  the  offense 
was  criminal,  but  at  tne  suggestion,  it  is  beheved,  of  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  this  was  omitted.  Arraigning  the  kaiser 
solely  for  an  offense  against  international  morality  and 
the  sanctity  of  treaties,  and  declaring  that  the  judgment 
of  the  tribunal  would  be  guided  by  the  highest  motives 
of  international  policy,  were  in  effect  an  admission  that 
law,  in  the  legal  sense  of  the  word,  did  not  exist  for  either 
offense,  or  that  its  violation  was  not  a  crime  in  the  sense 
of  criminal  law. 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  Article  227  of  the  treaty 


238    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

there  is  no  talk  of  trying  the  kaiser  for  a  violation  of  the 
"laws  and  customs  of  war,"  for,  contrary  to  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  commission  on  responsibilities,  al- 
though in  thorough  accord  with  the  views  of  the  Ameri- 
can members  of  that  commission,  a  sovereign  or  chief 
executive  of  a  state  was  not  to  be  sued  for  violation  of 
the  laws  and  customs  of  war.  At  present  such  a  person 
is  exempt  under  international  law — the  law  made,  or 
consented  to  by  all  nations.  He  is  immune  from  suit 
in  any  court,  national  or  international. 

This  does  not  mean  that  he  is  above  the  law.  The 
people  of  the  country  whereof  he  is  monarch  or  chief 
executive  deal  with  him  in  their  own  way.  In  our 
country,  for  example,  the  president,  like  other  civil 
officers  of  the  United  States,  can  be  impeached  and 
removed  from  office  on  conviction  of  "treason,  bribery, 
or  other  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors."  The  House 
of  Representatives  decides  whether  he  shall  be  im- 
peached ;  the  Senate,  under  the  presidency  of  the  chief 
justice,  tries  him.  If  impeachment  proceedings  be  not 
brought  against  him,  he  or  his  party  may  be  beaten  at 
the  polls,  which  is  generally  considered  a  punishment  of 
no  mean  order. 

In  the  future  the  sovereign  or  chief  executive  may,  by 
agreement  of  the  nations,  be  triable  for  a  crime  or  offense 
by  an  international  tribunal.  It  cannot  be  done  now. 
The  action  contemplated  by  the  treaty  was  therefore 
political,  not  criminal.  In  the  trial  of  the  kaiser  "for  a 
supreme  offence  against  international  morality  and  the 
sanctity  of  treaties,"  the  tribunal  was  to  be  so  consti- 
tuted that  he  should  have  "the  guarantees  essential  to 
the  right  of  defence,"  and  in  its  decision  the  tribunal 
was  to  be  "guided  by  the  highest  motives  of  international 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE  KAISER  239 

policy,"  in  order  to  vindicate  *'the  solemn  obligation  of 
international  undertakings  and  the  validity  of  inter- 
national morality,"  with  the  power  "to  fix  the  punish- 
ment which  it  considers  should  be  imposed." 

If  we  wished  to  be  critical  it  would  not  be  difficult. 
Terms  are  used  in  Article  227  without  attempting  to 
define  them.  What  is  morality?  What  is  international 
morality?  What  is  an  offense  against  international 
morality?  And  what  is  a  supreme  offense  against  this 
thing,  whatever  it  may  be?  It  is  safe  to  assume  that 
opinions  would  differ  as  to  the  meaning  and  application 
of  these  terms.  The  maxim  puts  it,  "Many  men,  many 
minds."  Admitting,  however,  that  these  matters  would 
be  as  clear  to  the  judges  as  they  were  to  the  members  of 
the  supreme  council,  no  form  of  punishment  was  pre- 
scribed, but  the  victim — for  he  was  condemned  in  ad- 
vance— was  to  suffer  the  punishment,  whatever  it  might 
be,  which  the  members  of  the  tribunal  might  hit  upon, 
without  any  tangible  limitation  or  restriction. 

But,  waiving  such  matters,  let  us  suppose  that  w^e 
have  the  special  tribunal  duly  appointed  and  ready  to 
inflict  punishment.  How  is  it  to  get  the  culprit?  One 
of  the  rules  of  the  culinary  art  is  that  you  first  catch  the 
rabbit  before  you  make  rabbit  soup. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte  abdicated  and  then  delivered  him- 
self up  to  the  enemy.  Not  so  William  of  HohenzoIIern, 
He  dropped  his  crown  and  ran.  He  fled  to  Holland,  to 
which  country  he  is  apparently  more  attached  than  in 
his  earlier  years.  We  can  ransack  the  history  of  the 
world,  without  finding  a  tragedy  in  which  the  hero  does 
not  kill  himself,  is  not  killed,  or  does  not  give  himself 
up  in  the  fifth  act,  before  the  curtain  falls.  Otherwise, 
the  spectators  would  hiss  him  from  the  stage.     Were  it 


240    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

not  for  the  death  of  millions  of  men  and  the  sorrow  which 
hangs  over  the  world  and  will  darken  it  like  a  cloud 
during  the  lives  of  those  now  living,  this  episode  of 
William  of  HohenzoIIern  could  more  aptly  be  termed  a 
comedy  than  a  tragedy. 

According  to  continental  practice,  a  person  may  be 
tried  in  his  absence,  even  in  criminal  matters.  The 
Alhed  and  Associated  Powers  did  not  contemplate  this 
form  of  procedure.  The  Government  of  the  Netherlands 
was  to  be  asked  by  them  to  surrender  the  ex-emperor, 
in  order  that  he  might  "be  put  on  trial."  Here  the 
hitch  occurred.  Holland  did  not  want  the  fugitive,  but 
the  rules  of  hospitality  required  that  he  should  not  be 
handed  over.  That  little  country  had  too  much  honor 
to  think  of  it — more  honor  than  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  which  dared  to  suggest  it. 

However,  the  Allied  Powers  were  without  shame,  and 
asked  the  Government  of  Holland  to  surrender  the  for- 
mer kaiser,  believing,  perhaps,  that  force  would  prevail 
where  right  was  lacking.  At  one  time  the  representa- 
tives of  a  principal  Power  affected  to  believe  that  Hol- 
land would  yield,  inasmuch  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  not 
hitherto  failed  in  anything  which  he  had  undertaken, 
and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  appeared  to  be  bent  on  trying 
the  kaiser.  It  may  be  that  even  one  or  more  of  the 
principal  Powers  hoped  that  Holland  would  refuse  to 
comply  with  the  request,  inasmuch  as  the  former  kaiser 
would  only  be  dangerous  in  their  hands.  How  much 
better  it  would  have  been  for  the  world  if  royal  fugitives 
had  always  escaped,  and  had  not  been  so  stupid  as  to 
fall  into  the  hands  of  their  enemies  ! 

However  that  may  be,  the  extradition  of  a  person 
charged  with  crime  results  only  from  a  treaty  between 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  241 

the  nations  involved,  with  the  further  condition  that  the 
offense  for  which  extradition  is  asked  is  a  crime  by  the 
laws  of  both  countries.  But  treaties  of  extradition  ex- 
clude political  offenses,  and  by  the  express  language  of 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  the  ex-kaiser's  offense  was 
political,  and  the  decision  of  the  tribunal  in  which  he 
was  to  be  tried  was  to  **be  guided  by  the  highest  motives 
of  international  policy."  Not  one  of  the  principal  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  had  a  treaty  with  Holland  for 
the  extradition  of  a  person  charged  with  a  political 
offense.  It  therefore  followed  that  neither  one  nor  all 
together  could  claim  the  kaiser  as  a  right.  Holland  may 
have  suspected  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  satisfied  with 
the  provisions  in  the  treaty  putting  the  kaiser  on  trial, 
and  that  a  refusal  would  answer  his  purpose.  He  had 
done  the  best  he  could,  and  he  was  not  to  blame  if  Hol- 
land would  not  give  up  the  kaiser.  Holland  certainly 
knew  that  at  least  two  of  the  principal  Powers — the 
United  States  and  Japan — were  opposed  to  the  whole 
miserable  business.  However,  the  Httle  country  stood 
firm.  It  was  not  to  be  "bullied"  into  compliance.  It 
refused  to  surrender  the  kaiser,  and  he  is  likely  to  stay 
there,  where  he  is  well  off,  especially  as  no  country — 
not  even  his  own — seems  to  want  him. 

Here  the  story  might  end,  but  it  is,  perhaps,  fairer  to 
the  Alhed  Powers  to  let  them  state  in  part  the  reasons 
why  they  made  the  demand  upon  Holland,  and  it  is 
fairer  to  Holland  to  let  the  government  of  that  country 
state  in  its  own  way  the  reasons  which  caused  it  to  reject 
the  Allied  demand,  notwithstanding  the  apparent  ear- 
nestness and  consciousness  of  superior  Justice  with  which 
it  was  pressed. 

On  January  15,  1920,  the  supreme  council,  represent- 


242    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

ing  itself  and  claiming  to  represent  the  Allies  in  the 
war  with  Germany,  addressed  an  official  demand  to  the 
Government  of  the  Netherlands,  *'to  deliver  into  their 
hands  William  of  HohenzoIIern,  former  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many, in  order  that  he  may  be  judged." 

After  referring  to  Article  227  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, whereby  the  kaiser  was  to  be  arraigned  for  a 
supreme  offense  against  international  morality  and  the 
sanctity  of  treaties,  the  note  proceeds  to  lecture  Holland 
as  to  its  duty  in  the  premises.  "The  Netherlands  Gov- 
ernment," it  is  stated,  "is  conversant  with  the  incon- 
trovertible reasons  which  imperiously  exact  that  pre- 
meditated violations  of  international  treaties,  as  well  as 
systematic  disregard  of  the  most  sacred  rules  and  rights 
of  nations,  should  receive  as  regards  every  one,  includ- 
ing the  highest-placed  personalities,  special  punishment 
provided  by  the  Peace  Congress." 

The  note  taxes  the  kaiser  with  at  least  moral  respon- 
sibility, expresses  the  inability  of  the  Powers  to  conceive 
that  the  Government  of  the  Netherlands  "can  regard 
with  less  reprobation  than  themselves  the  immense  re- 
sponsibility of  the  former  Emperor,"  and  that  "Holland 
would  not  fulfil,"  to  quote  the  exact  language  of  the  note, 
"her  international  duty  if  she  refused  to  associate  her- 
self with  other  nations  as  far  as  her  means  allow  in  un- 
dertaking, or  at  least  not  hindering,  chastisement  of  the 
crimes  committed." 

In  endeavoring  to  impose  a  duty  upon  Holland  and 
to  bring  that  country  to  a  realization  of  this  duty,  as 
the  supreme  council  saw  it,  the  note  dwelt  upon  the 
peculiar  nature  of  the  offense,  and  in  so  doing  supplied 
Holland  with  an  answer  which  would  defeat  the  pur- 
pose, if  indeed  the  Allied  Governments  wished  at  this 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  243 

time  the  surrender  of  the  former  German  kaiser.  Thus 
the  note  continued:  "In  addressing  this  demand  to  the 
Dutch  Government  the  powers  believe  it  their  duty  to 
emphasize  its  special  character.  It  is  their  duty  to 
insure  the  execution  of  Article  227  without  allowing 
themselves  to  be  stopped  by  arguments,  because  it  is 
not  a  question  of  a  public  accusation  with  juridical  char- 
acter as  regards  its  basis,  but  an  act  of  high  international 
policy  imposed  by  the  universal  conscience,  in  which 
legal  forms  have  been  provided  solely  to  assure  to  the 
accused  such  guarantees  as  were  never  before  recognized 
in  public  law.'* 

The  supreme  council  was  truly  in  a  morahzing  vein. 
It  was  not  merely  the  duty  of  Holland  to  surrender  the 
ex-kaiser,  but  it  was,  so  the  note  maintains,  "to  the 
highest  interest  of  the  Dutch  people  not  to  appear  to 
protect  the  principal  author  of  this  catastrophe  by  allow- 
ing him  shelter  on  her  territory."  It  is  also  held  to  be 
in  the  highest  interest  of  the  Dutch  people  "to  facihtate 
his  trial,  which  is  claimed  by  the  voices  of  milHons  of 
victims." 

It  was  not  very  difficult  to  reply  to  a  note  of  this 
kind.  The  Dutch  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  speaking 
on  behalf  of  the  Dutch  Government,  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  Holland  was  not  a  party  to  the  Treat}'  of 
Versailles;  that  Article  228  of  the  treaty  did  not  impose 
a  duty  upon  Holland;  that  it  looked  at  this  question, 
therefore,  from  its  own  conception  of  its  duty.  It  was 
not  connected  with  the  outbreak  of  the  war;  it  was  not 
a  party  to  it;  it  was  a  neutral,  and  in  no  way  bound 
"to  associate  itself  with  this  act  of  high  international 
policy  of  the  powers." 

Then  follows  a  very  important  suggestion  which  Hoi- 


244    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

land  took  the  opportunity  of  making,  and  which  will 
be  referred  to  later.  "If  in  the  future  there  should  be 
instituted  by  the  society  of  nations  an  international 
jurisdiction,  competent  to  judge  in  case  of  war  deeds 
qualified  as  crimes  and  submitted  to  its  jurisdiction  by 
statute  antedating  the  acts  committed,  it  would  be  fit 
for  Holland  to  associate  herself  with  the  new  regime." 
In  the  absence  of  an  international  duty  which  would  be 
created  in  this  manner,  the  case  was  to  be  decided  by 
"the  laws  of  the  kingdom  and  national  tradition." 

The  note  ended  with  the  statement  that  "neither  the 
constituent  laws  of  the  kingdom,  which  are  based  upon 
the  principles  of  law  universally  recognized,  nor  the  age- 
long tradition  which  has  made  this  country  always  a 
ground  of  refuge  for  the  vanquished  in  international 
conflicts,  permit  the  Government  of  Holland  to  defer  to 
the  desire  of  the  powers  by  withdrawing  from  the  former 
Emperor  the  benefit  of  its  laws  and  this  tradition." 

The  Dutch  reply  was  not  pleasing  to  the  supreme 
council.  Therefore,  on  the  14th  of  February,  a  second 
note  was  sent  by  the  council  of  ambassadors,  as  suc- 
cessor to  the  supreme  council,  which  had  ceased  to 
exist  on  January  20,  1920,  in  which  that  august  body, 
speaking  in  the  name  of  all  the  Allies,  twenty-six  in 
number,  sought  again,  and  with  no  better  success,  to 
teach  Holland  its  duty;  that  duty  being,  according  to 
the  Allies,  to  make  common  cause  with  them  in  the 
punishment  of  the  former  kaiser. 

Again,  and  in  vain,  the  council  speaks  of  the  crhninal 
acts  whereof  the  kaiser  was  guilty,  and  the  suffering  of 
mankind  because  thereof.  The  Allied  Governments  rep- 
resented by  the  council  of  ambassadors  could  not  "con- 
ceal their  surprise"  at  not  finding  in  the  Dutch  reply  a 
single  word  of  disapproval  of  these  crimes. 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  245 

Apparently  the  council  felt  that  Holland  wa^  not  to 
be  moved,  and  that  it  should  make  the  best  of  a  bad 
situation.  As  the  ex-kaiser  was  not  to  be  delivered,  and 
as  he  was  to  remain  in  Holland,  the  council,  claiming  to 
represent  the  twenty-six  Allied  nations,  which  were  prob- 
ably not  consulted,  reminded  the  Government  of  Hol- 
land that  the  imperial  fugitive  was  allowed  to  reside  too 
near  the  German  frontier,  that  adequate  measures  to 
prevent  his  escape  had  not  been  taken,  and  that  if  he 
should  escape  it  would  impose  upon  Holland  a  heavy 
responsibility. 

But  the  Dutch  Government  was  obdurate.  On  March 
5  a  reply  was  made  to  the  second  Allied  note.  It  was 
shorter  and,  if  possible,  it  was  plainer,  that  Holland 
"would  be  committing  an  act  contrary  to  laws  and  jus- 
tice, and  incompatible  with  the  national  honor  if  it  con- 
sented, at  the  request  of  the  powers,  to  violate  these 
laws  by  abolishing  the  rights  which  they  accord  to  a 
fugitive  finding  himself  within  the  country's  territory.'* 
The  reply  further  stated  that  Holland  appreciated  its  re- 
sponsibility to  take  adequate  measures  to  prevent  the 
departure  of  the  kaiser.  "Mindful  of  its  duties  in  this 
connection,  the  government  has,  and  from  the  begin- 
ning, borne  in  mind  the  obligations  imposed  by  its  duties, 
and  will  continue  to  do  so,  being  in  a  position  in  the  free 
exercise  of  Dutch  sovereignty  to  take  on  the  spot  all 
necessary  effective  measures  of  precaution,  and  to  sub- 
ject the  freedom  of  the  ex-kaiser  to  necessary  limitations." 

The  kaiser  is  still  in  Holland. 

I  am  bold  enough  to  say  that  the  American  commis- 
sion rendered  a  service  to  the  world  at  large  in  standing 
as  a  rock  against  the  trial  of  the  kaiser  for  a  legal  offense. 


246    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

and  that  Holland  has  made  the  world  its  debtor  by  refus- 
ing to  surrender  the  kaiser  for  the  commission  of  an 
offense  admittedly  political.  As  it  is,  the  kaiser  is  being 
punished.  He  has  lost  his  crown,  to  which  he  attached 
much  importance;  he  has  lost  the  respect  of  the  world, 
including  that  of  his  own  people;  and  it  may  be  that 
his  own  self-respect  is  not  what  it  once  was.  In  any 
event,  he  does  not  show  himself  in  public;  he  does  not 
review  his  troops;  he  does  not  change  his  uniforms  with 
the  hours  of  the  day;  he  is  not  photographed  nor  are 
his  features  painted.  His  words  are  not  eaten  up  by 
an  expectant  world,  and  his  views  on  art,  literature, 
music,  rehgion,  assyriology,  and  the  other  fifty-seven 
varieties  of  "ologies,"  as  the  American  advertiser  would 
say — are  of  no  interest. 

One  shudders  to  think  what  might  have  happened  if 
the  British  and  French  commissioners  had  had  their 
way,  for  they  were  the  two  who  really  seemed  set  upon 
getting  the  kaiser.  Heroes  are  sometimes  made  out  of 
very  cheap  stuff,  and  it  apparently  takes  but  little  per- 
secution to  make  a  hero  of  a  monarch.  As  James  Rus- 
sell Lowell  puts  it  in  "The  Bigelow  Papers,"  the  best 
way  to  make  a  goose  a  swan  is  to  cut  its  head  off.  It 
may  be  said  that  the  best  way  to  restore  a  dynasty  seems 
to  be  to  decapitate  its  headless  ruler.  Mary  Queen  of 
Scots,  is  a  heroine,  and  her  son  became  not  merely  king 
of  Scotland  but  of  England  as  well,  succeeding  that  very 
Elizabeth  who  had  her  tried  and  caused  her  death.  The 
male  children  of  Charles  I  succeeded  in  turn  to  the 
British  crown,  and  the  two  brothers  of  Louis  XVI  be- 
came kings  of  France.  Even  the  exile  of  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  seated  his  nephew  upon  the  throne  of  France. 
Stranger  things   could  happen  than  the  restoration  of 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  247 

the  house  of  HohenzoIIern  in  the  person  of  the  kaiser's 
grandson. 

That  German  Boswell,  the  faithful  Busch,  reports  a 
conversation  with  the  great  Bismarck  on  the  14th  of 
October,  1870,  in  which  that  man  of  blood  and  iron  is 
made  to  say  that  he  had  "a  lovely  idea  in  connection 
with  the  conclusion  of  peace."  This  idea  was  to  appoint 
an  international  court  for  the  trial  of  those  who  had 
caused  the  war.  Among  those  to  be  included  was  Napo- 
leon III,  of  whom  he  said: 

He  is  not  quite  so  innocent  as  he  wants  to  make  out.  My  idea 
was  that  each  of  the  Great  Powers  should  appoint  an  equal  number 
of  judges,  America,  England,  Russia,  and  so  forth,  and  that  we 
should  be  the  prosecutors.  But  the  Enghsh  and  the  Russians 
would  of  course  not  agree  to  it,  so  that  the  Court  might  after  all  be 
composed  of  the  two  nations  who  have  suffered  most  from  the  war, 
that  is  to  say,  of  Frenchmen  and  Germans.^ 

It  is  better  for  the  world  that  the  suggestion  of  Bis- 
marck has  not  been  followed. 

So  much  for  the  kaiser.  Now  for  his  erstwhile  civil 
and  military  subjects.  The  case  here  is  different.  A 
sovereign  is  immune  either  because  it  is  deemed  best 
that  he  be  immune,  or  because  sovereigns  made  the 
law,  securing  to  themselves  immunity.  Subjects  or  citi- 
zens are  held  universally  liable  to  municipal  law,  and 
they  are,  in  appropriate  cases,  subject  to  foreign  law. 
They  always  are,  or  should  be,  responsible  to  the  law  of 
nations.  A  breach  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  is  a 
crime.  The  question  is  one  of  the  court  or  tribunal 
before  which  the  accused  shall  be  passed.  But  it  is  com- 
phcated  by  the  question  to  what  extent  a  civil  or  military 

1  Moritz  Busch,  "Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History,"  2  vols..  New 
York,  1898,  vol.  I,  p.  189, 


248     WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

official  committing  a  crime  is  covered  or  protected  by 
the  command  of  his  superior.  The  commission  consid- 
ered this  phase  of  the  subject.  There  is,  however,  no 
mention  of  it  in  the  treaty.  It  need  not  detain  us  here, 
as  it  is  a  question  for  the  court  to  determine. 

The  commission  on  the  responsibility  of  the  authors 
of  the  war  and  enforcement  of  penalties  was  directed, 
among  other  things,  to  inquire  into  and  report  upon 
"the  constitution  and  procedure  of  a  tribunal  appro- 
priate for  the  trial  of  these  offences." 

Without  meaning  to  give  offense  to  the  members  of 
the  commission,  it  may  be  said  that  from  the  American 
view -point  they  committed  a  number  of  errors.  They 
were  wrong  in  holding  that  a  sovereign  could  be  tried. 
But  that  is  out  of  the  way.  They  were  wrong  as  to  their 
jurisdiction.  Being  appointed  to  inquire  into  and  report 
upon  the  facts  as  to  breaches  of  the  laws  and  customs 
of  war,  they  insisted  on  dragging  in  ** offences  against  the 
laws  of  humanity"— a  very  different  thing.  They  were 
wrong  as  to  a  court,  wishing  to  create  out  of  whole  cloth 
a  new  tribunal  which  never  had  any  existence,  and, 
therefore,  could  not  have  had  authority  to  try  the  offenses 
when  committed.  They  were  wrong  in  vesting  that 
court  with  the  power  to  punish  offenses  against  the  laws 
and  customs  of  war  and  the  laws  of  humanity,  when  no 
penalty  had  been  affixed  to  the  breach  thereof  by  the 
law  of  nations. 

The  American  members  of  that  commission  repeatedly 
called  the  attention  of  their  colleagues  to  these  facts. 
They  did  not  claim  to  be  wiser  than  the  other  members. 
They  were,  however,  more  detached,  inasmuch  as  their 
country  had  not  suffered  to  the  same  degree  as  had 
other  countries  by  the  ruthless  conduct  of  the  Germans. 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE  KAISER  249 

Perhaps  the  nature  of  our  government — being  a  union 
of  states,  in  which  there  was  no  federal  law  of  crimes, 
except  what  was  created  by  and  for  the  Union,  and  after 
its  establishment — may  have  led  them  to  note  more 
clearly  and  more  quickly  the  difficulties  of  the  situation. 
In  their  dissenting  opinion,  they  cited  the  leading  case 
of  United  States  v.  Hudson,^  decided  by  the  supreme 
court  of  the  American  states  in  181 2,  in  which  it  is  held 
that  "the  legislative  authority  of  the  Union  must  first 
make  an  act  a  crime,  affix  a  punishment  to  it,  and  declare 
the  court  that  shall  have  Jurisdiction  of  the  offence." 
They  stated  in  their  dissenting  opinion  that  what  was 
true  of  the  American  states  must  be  true  of  this  looser 
union  called  the  Society  of  Nations,  and  they  admitted 
that  they  knew  of  no  international  statute  or  convention 
making  a  violation  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war — not 
to  speak  of  the  laws  or  principles  of  humanity — an  inter- 
national crime,  affixing  a  punishment  to  it,  and  declaring 
the  court  which  has  jurisdiction  over  the  offense.  They 
were,  however,  in  thorough  sympathy  with  the  punish- 
ment of  offenders  against  the  laws  and  customs  of  war. 
They  wanted  them  to  be  punished,  but  insisted  that  it 
should  be  done  according  to  law,  not  according  to  pas- 
sion. Their  purpose,  which  was  misunderstood  at  the 
time,  it  is  believed,  by  most  of  their  colleagues,  was  to 
show  how  violators  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war 
could  be  punished  according  to  law  to  which  was  affixed 
a  penalty,  and  in  a  tribunal  universally  recognized. 
They  had  a  concrete  case  in  mind — that  of  Henry  Wirz, 
commandant  of  the  Confederate  prison  at  Andersonville, 
Georgia,  during  the  Civil  War,  who,  after  that  war,  was 
tried  by  a  military  commission  sitting  in  the  city  of 

^7  Cranch,  32. 


250    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Washington,  for  crimes  contrary  to  the  laws  and  customs 
of  war.  He  was  convicted,  sentenced  to  be  executed, 
and  actually  was  executed,  curiously  enough,  on  the  i  ith 
cf  November,  1865. 

It  would  have  been,  of  course,  a  simple  matter  if  the 
treaty  had  provided  that  Germany  should  try,  in  its 
own  courts,  the  persons  accused  of  breaches  of  the  laws 
and  customs  of  war,  whose  names  the  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Governments  should  submit.  They  would  not 
hear  of  this  then,  although  they  have  heard  of  it  later. 

Without  dwelling  upon  this  matter  further,  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  say  that  the  American  members  filed  a 
memorandum  which,  grudgingly  and  partially  accepted 
by  the  commission,  was  approved,  as  we  shall  see,  by 
the  conference,  and  forms  the  basis  of  Articles  228-229 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  deahng  with  this  subject. 
This  memorandum  is  thus  worded: 

1.  That  the  military  authorities,  being  charged  with  the  interpre- 

tation of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war,  possess  jurisdiction 
to  determine  and  punish  violations  thereof; 

2.  That  the  mihtary  jurisdiction  for  the  trial  of  persons  accused  of 

violations  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  and  for  the  pun- 
ishment of  persons  found  guilty  of  such  offences  is  exercised 
by  military  tribunals; 

3.  That  the  jurisdiction  of  a  mihtary  tribunal  over  a  person  accused 

of  the  violation  of  a  law  or  custom  of  war  is  acquired  when 
the  offence  was  committed  on  the  territory  of  the  nation 
creating  the  mihtary  tribunal  or  when  the  person  or  prop- 
erty injured  by  the  offence  is  of  the  same  nationality  as 
the  mihtary  tribunal; 

4.  That  the  law  and  procedure  to  be  apphed  and  followed  In  deter- 

mining and  punishing  violations  of  the  laws  and  customs 
of  war  are  the  law  and  the  procedure  for  determining  and 
punishing  such  violations  estabhshed  by  the  mihtary  law 
of  the  country  against  which  the  offence  is  committed;  and 

5.  That  in  case  of  acts  violating  the  laws  and  customs  of  war 

involving  more  than  one  country,  the  mihtary  tribunals 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  251 

of  the  countries  affected  may  be  united,  thus  forming  an 
international  tribunal  for  the  trial  and  punishment  of  per- 
sons charged  with  the  commission  of  such  offences. 

Let  US  now  turn  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  Article 
228  has  this  to  say  on  jurisdiction: 

The  German  Government  recognises  the  right  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  to  bring  before  mihtary  tribunals  persons  accused 
of  having  committed  acts  in  violation  of  the  laws  and  customs  of 
war.  Such  persons  shall,  if  found  guilty,  be  sentenced  to  punish- 
ments laid  down  by  law. 

Article  229  deals  with  offenses  which  affect  more  than 
one  nation,  the  first  two  paragraphs  saying: 

Persons  guilty  of  criminal  acts  against  the  nationals  of  one  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers  will  be  brought  before  the  military 
tribunals  of  that  Power. 

Persons  guilty  of  criminal  acts  against  the  nationals  of  more  than 
one  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  will  be  brought  before  mili- 
tary tribunals  composed  of  members  of  the  military  tribunals  of  the 
Powers  concerned. 

Article  228  has  an  additional  phrase  which  should  be 
quoted,  to  the  effect  that  ''proceedings  or  prosecution 
before  a  tribunal  in  Germany  or  in  the  territory  of  her 
allies "  were  not  a  bar  to  Jurisdiction  of  the  military  tri- 
bunal, and  the  last  paragraph  of  Article  229  provides 
that  the  accused  should,  in  every  case,  be  entitled  to 
name  his  counsel. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  kaiser,  so  in  the  case  of  his  sub- 
jects— the  rabbit  must  first  be  caught.  If  a  person 
accused  of  violating  the  laws  and  customs  of  war — for 
the  conference  rejected  the  heresy  of  the  majority  of 
the  commission  as  to  the  laws  of  humanity — were  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  he  could  be  passed  before  the  ap- 
propriate military  tribunal,  but  if  not,  he  should  not  be 


252    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

tried.  Many  of  them  would,  of  course,  be  in  Germany, 
and  Germany  could  be  obliged  to  surrender  its  subjects. 
Thus  the  treaty,  in  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  228, 
requires  that: 

The  German  Government  shall  hand  over  to  the  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Powers,  or  to  such  one  of  them  as  shall  so  request,  all  persons 
accused  of  having  committed  an  act  in  violation  of  the  laws  and 
customs  of  war,  who  are  specified  either  by  name  or  by  the  rank, 
office  or  employment  which  they  held  under  the  German  authorities. 

But  conviction  must  be  based  upon  proof;  hence,  it  is 
provided  in  Article  230  that: 

The  German  Government  undertakes  to  furnish  all  documents 
and  information  of  every  kind,  the  production  of  which  may  be  con- 
sidered necessary  to  ensure  the  full  knowledge  of  the  incriminating 
acts,  the  discovery  of  offenders  and  the  just  appreciation  of  respon- 
sibility. 

Clauses  of  a  like  nature  appear  in  the  other  treaties 
ending  the  war. 

But  how  about  the  Germans  who  imitated  the  kaiser 
and  took  refuge  in  neutral  countries.  Can  they  be  ex- 
tradited? Not  unless  the  treaty  of  extradition  between 
the  country  making  the  request  and  the  country  in  which 
the  fugitive  was  found  contains  an  obligation  to  sur- 
render persons  accused  of  what,  for  want  of  a  better 
name,  may  be  called  "war  crimes." 

These  articles  of  the  treaty  were  naturally  offensive 
to  the  Germans.  They  did  not  hke  to  have  their  armed 
forces  accused  of  the  commission  of  crimes;  they  did  not 
want  to  have  them  tried  by  military  tribunals  of  the 
enemy.  To  these  they  would  have  preferred  inter- 
national tribunals  composed  of  neutral  members,  or  tri- 
bunals with  a  sprinkling  of  neutrals.  They  preferred,  of 
course,  their  own  courts,  and  after  much  hagghng  the 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  253 

Allied  and  Associated  Powers  have  made  lists  of  persons 
whose  names  have  been  submitted  to  the  German  author- 
ities. These  persons  are  to  be  tried  before  the  supreme 
court  at  Leipzig.  Each  country  (with  the  exception  of 
the  United  States  and  Japan,  which  refused  to  present 
lists)  had  a  very  imposing  list,  and  thousands  might 
have  been  put  on  trial.  When,  after  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty,  the  first  list  was  presented  to  the  German 
representative  in  Paris,  he  refused  to  receive  it,  and 
rather  than  transmit  it  he  resigned  his  position.  Inas- 
much as  Germany  has  been  "scotched,"  not  killed,  it 
apparently  seemed  more  prudent  to  allow  the  Germans 
to  punish  the  accused  in  their  own  way,  provided  they 
punished  them.  If  they  were  found  guilty,  it  would 
reflect  credit  upon  the  German  authorities.  If  they 
were  acquitted  they  were  innocent,  or  the  Germans 
were  to  be  blamed. 

Here  are  some  of  the  "chief  offenders"  in  a  list  pub- 
lished in  the  London  Times  for  February  2,  1920: 

Ex-Crown  Prince  Rupprecht  of  Bavaria. 

Duke  of  Wiirtemberg. 

General  von  Kluck. 

General  von  Biilow. 

Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen. 

Admiral  von  Capelle. 

Field-Marshal  von  Sanders. 

In  the  Times  for  February  28  of  the  same  year  the 
following  names  appeared: 

General  von  LudendorfF. 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz. 
General  von  Falkenhayn. 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg. 
Hindenburg. 


254    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

According  to  the  Times  for  February  9,  1920,  Great 
Britain  presented  a  fairly  representative  list  of  admirals 
and  submarine  commanders. 

One  does  not  need  to  be  a  prophet  to  divine  what 
would  happen  if  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  had 
insisted  on  passing  persons  like  these  before  their  tri- 
bunals. We  can  imagine  the  feelings  of  the  American 
people  if  the  fortunes  of  war  had  permitted  Germany  to 
demand  that  General  Pershing,  commander-in-chief  of 
the  American  armies  should  be  handed  over  to  the 
enemy.     Let  Shakespeare  answer  for  us: 

O,  it  is  excellent 
To  have  a  giant's  strength;  but  it  is  tyrannous 
To  use  it  like  a  giant. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  kaiser,  we  might  stop  here.  It 
is,  however,  better  to  set  forth  the  correspondence  pass- 
ing between  the  German  Government  and  the  Allied 
Powers,  by  which  an  agreement  was  reached  to  try  the 
accused  in  Germany. 

On  February  3,  1920,  the  council  of  ambassadors 
drafted  a  note  to  Baron  von  Lersner,  then  the  president 
of  the  German  peace  delegation  at  Paris,  calling  the 
attention  of  Germany  to  its  obligation  to  surrender  for 
trial  Germans  accused  of  violations  of  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  war,  who,  by  Article  228  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles were  to  be  specified  either  by  name  or  by  the 
rank,  office,  or  employment  which  they  held  under  the 
German  authorities."  The  list  of  persons,  amounting 
in  all  to  about  900,  was  presented  on  behalf  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  Belgium,  Poland,  Rumania,  and 
the  kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes.  In 
addition,  proof  which  might  be  necessary  and  which 
was  in  the  possession  of  Germany  was  demanded. 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  255 

The  list,  large  as  it  was,  was  not  final,  and  the  presi- 
dent of  the  conference,  on  behalf  of  the  powers,  reserved 
the  right  to  demand  the  extradition  of  further  persons. 
Baron  von  Lersner  refused,  as  has  been  said,  to  transmit 
the  list,  and  resigned  his  position.  Therefore,  it  was 
sent  by  special  messenger  to  the  German  chancellor  at 
Berlin. 

The  commotion  in  Germany  was  great  and  immediate. 
A  meeting  of  the  council  of  ministers  was  held  and  the 
unanimous  conclusion  was  reached  and  given  to  the 
press  that  it  would  not  comply  with  the  Allied  demands. 
Before  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  and 
before  as  well  as  after  the  deposit  of  ratifications  at 
Paris,  on  January  10,  1920,  the  German  Government 
had  stated  that  it  was  impossible  to  comply  with  these 
provisions. 

In  anticipation  of  the  demand  Germany  had  prepared 
a  note,  dated  January  25,  1920,  to  the  president  of  the 
peace  conference,  stating  that  for  political  as  well  as 
economic  reasons  it  could  not  surrender  the  persons 
accused  of  war  crimes,  but  that  it  was  willing  to  try  them 
before  the  supreme  court  at  Leipzig.  This  note  reads 
in  part  as  follows : 

The  German  Government  is  willing  to  instruct  the  German  legal 
authorities  immediately  to  take  proceedings  based  upon  the  material 
to  be  transmitted  against  all  the  Germans  who  are  named  by  the 
Entente  as  guilty  of  offences  against  the  laws  and  usages  of  war.  It 
will  suspend  all  the  laws  which  might  stand  in  the  way  of  such  pro- 
ceedings, and  will  go  so  far  as  to  suspend  the  existing  amnesty  law. 

The  highest  German  Court,  the  Imperial  Court  in  Leipzig,  shall  be 
authorized  to  conduct  the  trial.  Furthermore,  tiie  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Governments  which  are  concerned  in  each  particular  case 
will  be  given  the  right  directly  to  participate  in  the  proceedings. 
Judgments  given  by  the  Imperial  Court  will  be  published  immedi- 
ately together  with  the  grounds  on  which  they  were  given. 


256    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

The  situation  was  indeed  serious.  Germany  either 
would  not  or  could  not  surrender  its  subjects  for  trial. 
It  offered,  however,  to  try  them,  and  to  allow  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Governments  to  assist  in  their  trial. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  Allied  Powers  accepted 
the  proposal  of  the  German  Government  contained  in 
its  note  of  January  25,  1920. 

In  a  note  of  the  council  of  ambassadors,  dated  Febru- 
ary 13,  1920,  it  was  stated  that: 

The  prosecution  which  the  German  Government  itself  purposes 
immediately  to  institute  in  this  manner  is  compatible  with  Article 
228  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  and  is  expressly  provided  for  at  the  end  of 
its  first  paragraph. 

This  was  a  lucky  discovery,  as  it  enabled  the  Allied 
Powers  to  withdraw  from  an  embarrassing  position,  and 
put  Germany,  as  it  were,  upon  trial  and  upon  its  good 
behavior.  This  they  did  by  refusing  to  participate  in 
the  proceedings  of  the  supreme  court  at  Leipzig,  reserv- 
ing the  right  to  pass  upon  the  findings  of  the  court,  and 
specifically  reserving  themselves  their  right  under  the 
treaty  to  constitute  their  own  tribunals  and  to  try  any 
and  all  Germans  accused  of  war  crimes,  if  the  Allied 
Governments  should  be  convinced  that  justice  had  not 
been  done  by  the  German  court. 

The  Allied  Powers  created  a  mixed  inter-AIIied  com- 
mission to  examine  and  to  communicate  to  Germany  the 
details  of  the  charges  brought  against  each  of  those 
whose  guilt  should  be  estabhshed  by  the  investigations 
of  this  commission. 

This  commission  got  to  work,  and  from  the  many 
cases  before  them,  picked  out  forty-six  which  might  be 
called  test  cases.     Of  these  Belgium  presented  fifteen. 


THE  TRIAL  OF  THE   KAISER  257 

France  twelve,  Great  Britain  seven,  Italy  five,  Rumania 
three,  Poland  three,  Serbia  one.  It  will  be  observed 
that  there  were  none  from  the  United  States  and  Japan. 

Should,  however,  the  nations  decide  that  violators  of 
the  laws  and  customs  of  war  should  be  brought  to  trial 
and  punishment,  they  can  take  action  now,  and  in  so 
doing  anticipate  the  future. 

A  committee  of  the  assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations 
has  just  reported  to  the  assembly  that  "there  is  not  yet 
any  international  penal  law  recognised  by  all  nations, 
and  that,  if  it  were  possible  to  refer  certain  crimes  to 
any  jurisdiction,  it  would  be  more  practical  to  establish 
a  special  chamber  in  the  Court  of  International  Justice." 
On  the  1 8th  of  December,  1920,  the  assembly  approved 
this  report. 

This  means  that  there  is  no  international  penal  law, 
but  if  there  were,  questions  arising  under  it  should  be 
submitted  to  a  court  already  in  being,  not  one  to  be 
constituted  specifically  and  after  the  commission  of  the 
acts. 

It  is  well  for  our  common  humanity  that  every  war  of 
which  we  have  the  record  teaches  us  that  the  reports  of 
crime  and  of  cruelty  are  grossly  exaggerated,  and  we 
know  from  our  own  experience  in  ordinary  life  that 
people  laboring  under  excitement  and  smarting  under  a 
sense  of  injustice  are  not  in  a  position  to  see  things  as 
they  do  later,  when  they  have  recovered  their  balance 
and  poise. 

We  should  have  sympathy  with  those  who  have  suf- 
fered, and  we  should  not  criticise  them  for  wishing  to 
bring  to  punishment  those  who  have  been  the  architects 
of  their  misery.  Our  allies  were  disappointed  at  the 
time  that  the   kaiser  was  not  tried  and  that  an  inter- 


258    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

national  tribunal  was  not  created  for  the  trial  and  pun- 
ishment of  persons  accused  of  breaches  of  "the  laws  and 
customs  of  war  or  the  laws  of  humanity."  The  time 
will  come  when  they  will  be  glad  that  they  did  not  suc- 
ceed. Perhaps  it  has  come  already.  "La  nuit  porta 
conseil.** 


XI 

REPARATIONS 

BY   THOMAS    WILLIAM    LAMONT 

The  subject  of  reparations  caused  more  trouble,  con- 
tention, hard  feeling,  and  delay  at  the  Peace  Conference 
than  any  other  point  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  There 
was,  of  course,  difficulty  on  the  question  of  boundaries; 
there  was  grave  controversy  over  the  Polish  frontiers  and 
Danzig;  the  question  whether  German  Austria  should  be 
allowed  to  join  with  Germany  was  of  serious  concern;  the 
disposal  of  the  Saar  Basin  coal-fields  brought  about  a 
savage,  personal  attack  by  M.  Clemenceau  on  President 
Wilson,  and  there  were  other  topics,  too,  that  were  dis- 
posed of  with  the  utmost  difficulty.  But,  taking  it  all 
in  all,  the  question  of  how  much  reparation  Germany 
should  be  compelled  to  pay,  how  she  should  pay  it,  and 
what  sanctions  should  be  exacted  to  insure  the  payment, 
was  the  hardest  of  the  lot. 

The  Conference  set  about  the  reparations  question  in 
the  same  manner  that  it  did  the  various  other  topics  that 
were  up  for  adjustment,  namely,  by  the  appointment  of 
a  commission  made  up  of  leading  members  from  the  vari- 
ous delegations,  including  in  the  number,  together  with 
the  alternates,  for  Great  Britain,  Lords  Sumner  and 
Cunliffe,  J.  M.  Keynes,  of  the  British  treasury,  and  E.  S. 
Montagu;  for  France,  MM.  Klotz  and  Loucheur,  of  the 
Clemenceau  cabinet;  for  Italy,  Signors  Crespi  and  Chiesa; 
for  Japan,  MM.  Tatsumi  and  Mori;  and  for  the  United 

259 


26o    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

States,  Messrs.  Norman  Davis,  B.  M.  Baruch,  Vance 
McCormick,  and  myself. 

This  plenary  commission  upon  reparations  held  its  first 
session  on  February  3,  1919,  and  resolved  itself  into  three 
important  subcommissions.  Commission  No.  i  treated 
the  question  of  categories;  that  is  to  say,  its  purpose  was 
to  define  the  character  and,  in  general,  the  scope  of  the 
reparations  for  which  Germany  and  the  enemy  states 
were  responsible.  Commission  No.  2  was  to  determine 
what  was  Germany's  capacity  to  pay  and  how  payment 
should  be  arranged.  Commission  No.  3  charged  itself 
with  the  duty  of  suggesting  sanctions  or  guarantees  by 
which  the  payments  by  Germany,  when  determined  upon, 
should  be  enforced.  The  work  of  commissions  i  and  2 
was  bound  to  prove,  as  it  did,  of  the  greatest  importance. 
That  of  No.  3  became  less  important  as  time  went  on, 
and  I  am  not  aware  that  that  subcommission  ever  made 
to  the  Peace  Conference  any  final  report. 

The  work  of  subcommission  No.  i,  to  determine 
of  the  categories  of  damage,  was,  of  course,  dependent 
upon  what  principles  should  be  adopted  on  the  whole 
question  of  reparations,  these  principles  being  determined 
and  defined  by  the  main  commission  itself.  Subcom- 
mission No.  2,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  so  dependent 
for  its  work  upon  the  general  scheme  that  might  be  laid 
down  by  the  plenary  commission,  by  reason  of  the  fact 
that  the  subcommission's  investigation  and  determination 
of  Germany's  capacity  to  pay  could  be  made  quite  inde- 
pendently of  any  other  question  involved. 

The  Controversy  over  War  Costs 

I  shall  go  back  directly  to  describe  in  some  detail  the 
workings  of  these  important  subcommissions,  but,  briefly, 


REPARATIONS  261 

I  may  explain  that,  before  the  plenary  commission  as  a 
whole,  the  chief  principle  involved  was  as  to  whether  or 
not  the  costs  of  war  (aside  from  material  damage  done) 
incurred  by  the  Alhes  should  be  inchided  in  the  amount 
that  Germany  was  to  pay.  The  controversy  on  this 
point  was  a  long  and  bitter  one,  and  it  was  finally  deter- 
mined— in  accordance  with  the  American  principle — that 
war  costs  should  be  exchided.  When  this  principle  had 
once  been  determined,  the  chief  work  of  the  plenary  com- 
mission had  been  accomplished. 

Thereafter  the  work  of  subcommission  No.  i  on  the 
question  of  categories  became,  of  course,  of  decided  and 
continuing  importance,  but  not  of  such  great  moment  as 
that  of  subcommission  No.  2,  around  whose  work  the 
prolonged  controversies  of  the  Conference  centred.  For 
it  soon  became  apparent  that,  regardless  of  the  im- 
portant principles  laid  down  by  the  main  commission, 
and  regardless  of  the  detailed  categories  of  damage  that 
might  be  filed  and  accepted,  Germany  must,  perforce,  pay 
reparations  to  the  utmost  extent  of  her  capacity.  What- 
ever that  extent  was,  it  was  bound  to  fall  far  below  the 
amount  of  damage  that  she  had  caused  for  which  she 
could  properly  be  adjudged  responsible. 

Therefore  it  became  manifest  that  whatever  was  deter- 
mined as  Germany's  total  capacity  to  pay  would  nat- 
urally be  fixed  as  the  amount  she  must  pay.  So  that  the 
real  question  that  was  waged  with  such  fierceness  from 
early  in  February  almost  up  to  the  signing  of  the  treaty 
at  the  end  of  June  was,  "How^  much,  at  her  utmost  capac- 
ity, can  Germany  pay?"  All  factions  were  agreed  that 
whatever  sum  that  might  prove  to  be,  was  the  sum  that 
Germany  must  pay. 

After  long  weeks  of  argument,  proof,  and  counter-proof 


262    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

on  this  question  of  what  Germany's  capacity  to  pay  was, 
and  of  trying  to  determine  the  definite  capital  sum  that 
she  should  have  to  pay — the  so-called  "experts'*  still 
continuing  to  be  wide  apart  in  their  estimates — the  chiefs 
of  state  finally  determined  that,  politically,  it  was  unwise 
at  the  time  of  the  peace  settlement  to  fix  any  definite  sum. 
Al.  Clemenceau  was  the  first  of  the  premiers — prompted 
in  this  instance  by  his  minister  of  the  treasury,  M.  Klotz 
— to  make  the  declaration  that  whatever  sum  the  **  ex- 
perts" might  finally  compromise  and  agree  upon  as  the 
sum  to  demand  from  Germany,  that  would  still  fall  far 
short  of  the  expectations  of  the  French  populace;  that 
no  government  accepting  such  a  sum  as  final  could  endure. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who  never  lent  a  deaf  ear  to  political 
considerations,  readily  fell  in  with  this  point  of  view. 
There  had,  in  his  election  campaign  of  191 8,  been  made 
such  excessive  estimates  as  to  the  amount  that  Ger- 
many would  pay,  that  he  felt  that  if  the  figures,  as  de- 
termined upon,  fell — as  they  were  bound  to — far  short  of 
his  campaign  promises,  then  he  too  would,  hke  Clemen- 
ceau, be  tipped  out  of  office.  To  Orlando,  the  premier 
of  Italy,  the  question  was  comparatively  unimportant. 
He  could  readily  accept  the  solution  of  an  immediate 
sum  to  be  fixed  or  the  indemnity  programme  that  was 
finally  adopted.  Therefore,  it  became  of  prime  impor- 
tance to  M.  Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  con- 
vince President  Wilson  of  the  correctness  of  their  position. 

America  Argues  for  a  Fixed  Sum 

Now  from  the  start  the  contention,  not  only  of  the 
American  delegates  upon  commission  No.  2,  organized 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  Germany's  capacity  to 


REPARATIONS  263 

pay,  but  of  the  whole  American  delegation,  was  that  a 
fixed  sum  should  speedily  be  determined  upon  and  noti- 
fied to  Germany  as  the  amount  of  Germany's  indebted- 
ness which  she  should  be  required  to  pay.  The  American 
delegation  consistently  urged  this  course  of  procedure, 
not  as  being  particularly  advantageous  to  America,  be- 
cause America's  material  interest  in  the  actual  amount 
of  reparations  was,  in  any  event,  slight;  but  because, 
chiefly,  a  definite  settlement  of  the  question  would  soonest 
bring  about  settled  financial  conditions  in  Europe  and 
soonest  yield  improved  credit  and  financial  stability  to 
France,  Belgium,  and  such  other  Aflied  states  as  were, 
in  part,  dependent  upon  German  reparations  for  the 
balancing  of  their  budget. 

Moreover,  the  American  delegation  asserted  that  until 
she  knew  the  amount  of  her  debt  Germany  would  never 
properly  and  vigorously  address  herself  to  her  own  task 
of  working  out  the  reparation  payments.  This  attitude, 
however,  on  the  part  of  the  American  delegation,  although 
it  was  cordially  shared  in  by  several  leading  members  of 
the  British,  Italian,  and  Belgian  delegations — and  even, 
in  their  private  utterances,  by  certain  members  of  the 
French  delegation — was,  as  a  whole,  obnoxious  to  the 
French.  Oppressed,  as  indeed  they  were  justified  in  be- 
ing, by  the  terrible  devastation  that  Germany  had  ruth- 
lessly wrought  throughout  northern  France,  by  the 
destruction  of  their  coal-mines,  by  the  deliberate  looting 
of  their  factories,  by  the  laying  waste  of  their  farms  and 
orchards,  the  French,  in  general,  felt  that  any  suggestion 
which  seemed  for  a  moment  to  relieve  Germany  of  the 
necessity  of  paying  every  penny  of  the  damage  caused, 
was,  in  eff'ect,  favoring  Germany  at  the  expense  of 
France. 


264    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

Of  course,  no  such  thought  had  for  even  a  moment 
been  in  the  minds  of  the  Americans.  We  simply  wanted 
to  be  practical,  not  visionary;  we  simply  realized,  as 
many  of  the  French  did  not  seem  to  do,  that  it  was 
impossible  to  pick  up  Germany's  static  wealth,  like  her 
railways,  and  transfer  them  bodily  to  France;  that, 
therefore,  France  would  benefit  most  by  taking  every- 
thing that  she  possibly  could,  by  taking  it  quickly  and 
writing  off  the  balance. 

The  points  of  view,  though  they  were  so  divergent, 
seemed  gradually,  after  many  weeks  of  argument,  to  be 
drawing  toward  a  solution,  when  M.  Clemenceau  be- 
came, as  I  have  said,  concerned  over  the  political  situa- 
tion, and  he  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  made  the  proposition 
of  postponing  the  determination  of  the  question.  They 
then  undertook  to  convert  President  Wilson  to  their 
point  of  view.  He,  naturally,  was  skeptical,  but  his 
difficulty  was  that  it  was  quite  impossible  for  him  to 
determine  the  attitude  of  M.  Clemenceau's  and  Mr. 
Lloyd  George's  constituencies.  He  could  not  have  the 
temerity  to  declare  to  these  statesmen  that  they  were  all 
wrong;  that  if  they  adopted  a  common-sense  course  of 
determining  upon  a  fixed  sum,  disappointing  as  it  might 
be  to  their  constituents,  still  they  could  make  a  sound 
and  proper  defense  of  it,  and,  therefore,  would  not  lose 
their  seats. 

Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George,  with  the  utmost  grav- 
ity, declared  the  contrary.  They  asserted  that  they  were 
almost  certain  to  be  called  to  an  immediate  accounting, 
and  to  be  turned  out  of  office.  They  pointed  out  the 
serious  consequences  of  any  such  step.  It  would  mean 
the  reconstitution  of  the  British  and  French  delegations; 
it  would  mean  that  the  Peace  Conference  would  have  to 


REPARATIONS  265 

start  all  over  again.  Such  a  course  was  unthinkable. 
Therefore,  no  matter  how  much  he  might  disagree  with 
them  in  their  judgment,  President  Wilson  was  bound  to 
bow  to  this  political  crisis,  as  it  was  insisted  upon  by  M. 
Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George;  and  inasmuch  as 
America's  direct  interests  were  not  greatly  involved,  to 
agree  with  them  in  the  postponement  of  fixing  the  sum 
of  German  reparations. 

The  Power  of  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George 

It  sounds  absolutely  unwarranted  for  me  to  place  my 
opinion  against  those  of  two  chiefs  of  state  hke  Clemen- 
ceau and  Lloyd  George;  yet  I  am  convinced,  as  I  was  at 
the  time,  that  they  were  wrong,  that  they  entirely  mis- 
read their  own  constituencies  when  they  believed  that 
if  they  adopted  the  business  course  of  fixing  the  German 
indemnity  and  proceeding  to  collect  it  they  would,  be- 
cause of  the  disappointment  of  their  voters,  be  turned 
out  of  office.  Let  me  point  out  that  at  that  time  they 
were  both  at  the  height  of  their  success.  In  France 
Clemenceau  had,  in  the  eyes  of  the  multitude,  won  the 
war.  He  had  come  into  office  late  in  191 7,  at  a  time 
when  France  was  at  a  low  ebb  of  her  fortunes;  when  there 
was  disaffection  in  the  army,  intrigue  at  home,  dismay 
even  in  the  breasts  of  the  faithful.  France's  heroism 
and  gallantry  had  had  a  rude  shock,  her  resources  were 
rapidly  diminishing;  she  was  being  bled  white.  At  that 
crisis  Clemenceau  came  into  power,  and  at  once  he 
stemmed  the  tide  of  disaffection  and  pessimism.  He  was 
like  a  great,  rugged  boulder  in  the  midst  of  swiftly  run- 
ning water.  The  tide  was  bearing  down  upon  him, 
threatening  to  overwhelm   him,   but  there  he  stood,   a 


266    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED   AT  PARIS 

rock  with  all  the  forces  of  dismay  and  despair  breaking 
impotently  against  his  rugged  shoulders  and  flanks !  By 
the  sheer  force  of  personal  will  and  dogged  determination, 
he  stopped  that  running  tide.  Gradually  he  swung  it 
around  until  the  stream  again  was  flowing  back,  fuH  of 
courage  and  of  renewed  hope.  He  lifted  France  from  the 
slough  and  held  her  firm.  To  change  the  figure,  Clemen- 
ceau  became  a  mighty  fortress,  in  and  around  which  the 
hosts  of  France  raflied  and  became  valiant  in  boldness 
and  in  force,  until,  with  their  Aflies,  they  had  smashed 
the  foe  and  won  the  victory. 

Clemenceau  began  the  Peace  Conference  with  afl  this 
prestige  undimmed — with  this  halo  about  his  head.  You 
cannot  tefl  me  that  any  reasonable  decision  that  he  had 
arrived  at  would  not  have  been  accepted  by  the  French 
people  at  that  time.  There  might  have  been  argument, 
there  might  have  been  bitter  debate,  but  Clemenceau 
would  have  carried  his  people  with  him. 

In  like  manner,  though  possibly  not  so  romanticafly, 
Lloyd  George  had  the  backing  of  the  people  of  England. 
He  had  proved  to  be  the  "man  of  the  hour.*'  When  the 
war  began  in  19 14  Lloyd  George  stifl  had,  as  he  has  to- 
day, many  bitter  opponents  in  England.  At  that  time 
he  was  chanceHor  of  the  exchequer,  and  the  business 
community  questioned  his  financial  judgment;  but  imme- 
diately upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war  he  showed  great 
shrewdness  and  foresight  in  mobilizing  the  financial  forces 
of  the  community  under  the  leadership  of  the  Bank  of 
England  and,  through  a  series  of  extraordinarily  wise 
measures,  preserved  the  empire  from  financial  panic. 
This  gave  Lloyd  George  a  great  fiflip  among  the  power- 
ful conservative  and  investment  circles  in  England. 
Then  when  the  munitions  situation  proved  beyond  the 


REPARATIONS  267 

capacity  of  Lord  Kitchener  to  handle  in  connection  with 
the  onerous  duties  of  his  war  ministry  as  well,  Lloyd 
George  became  minister  of  munitions.  At  once  there 
was  an  immediate  change  in  England's  outlook  and 
handhng  of  the  war.  I  can  say  this  of  my  own  personal 
knowledge,  because  the  firm  of  which  I  am  a  member  was 
then  acting  on  a  large  scale  as  purchasing  agents  for 
Great  Britain  in  America.  At  once,  when  Lloyd  George 
became  munitions  minister,  there  was  a  speeding  up,  a 
new  vigor,  a  fresh  drive.  All  England  aw^oke  to  realize 
this  fact.  Then  later,  when,  after  the  question  of  muni- 
tions had  been  remedied,  the  British  handling  of  the  war 
in  general  was  not  going  well,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  came  in 
as  premier.  The  manner  of  his  entry  may  be  criticised — 
I  do  not  know  as  to  that — but  certainly  he  was  the  right 
man  in  the  right  place.  Even  his  worst  enemies  admitted 
it,  and  almost  from  that  time  forward  things  began  to  go 
better.  With  all  the  prestige  that  he  had  thus  gained, 
with  his  tremendous  driving  power  and  his  marvellous 
celerity  in  adjusting  matters  to  changed  circumstances, 
Lloyd  George  could  surely  have  fixed  any  reasonable  sum 
for  German  reparation  and  still,  as  the  phrase  is,  "gotten 
away  with  it." 

At  the  time  when  this  question  of  naming  the  sum  was 
a  burning  one,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  summoned  one  or  more 
of  the  financial  delegates  many  times  into  conference  with 
him  and  his  own  experts,  and  at  one  time  I  thought  he 
had  become  convinced  of  the  utility  of  the  American  pro- 
gramme. Then  he  began  to  turn  the  other  way  to  M. 
Clemenceau's  solution.  We  begged  him  not  to  do  so. 
We  even  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that  if  he  would  go  back 
to  England  and  address  the  House  of  Commons  as  he 
alone  could,   pointing  out  boldly  that  his  pre-election 


268    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

estimates  as  to  Germany's  capacity  to  pay  were  wrong, 
he  would  gain  overwhelming  support  and  a  tremendous 
added  political  prestige.  But  lie  declined  to  do  this — 
and  who  am  I  to  say  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  probably 
the  most  skilful  politician  of  modern  times,  was  in  this 
particular  situation  impolitic?  All  I  feel  is,  if  at  this 
critical  juncture  both  M.  Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  had  had  a  little  more  confidence  in  their  own 
strength  they  would  have  joined  with  President  Wilson 
and  settled  this  question  of  German  indemnity  once 
for  all,  thus  avoiding,  to  a  considerable  measure,  the  ter- 
rible consequences  of  continued  unsettlement  that  have 
plagued  Europe  and  the  whole  world  since  the  Peace 
Conference  adjourned  and  left  the  German  indemnity 
question  open. 

The  Argument  for  War  Costs 

To  return  now  to  the  manner  in  which  the  reparation 
question  was  developed  and  handled  in  the  treaty.  You 
will  recall  that,  first  of  all,  the  plenary  commission  on 
reparations  undertook  to  settle  the  great  question  of 
principle  as  to  what  should  be  included  in  the  phrase 
which  President  Wilson  and  the  Allies  had  set  down,  and 
which,  prior  to  the  armistice,  the  enemy  had  accepted: 
''That  compensation  will  be  made  by  Germany  for  all 
damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and 
their  property  by  the  aggression  of  Germany,  by  land, 
by  sea,  and  from  the  air.  At  once  the  British  delegation, 
under  the  leadership  of  Premier  Hughes,  of  Australia, 
and  of  Lord  Sumner,  undertook  to  argue  that  damage 
to  the  civilian  population  meant  the  actual  costs  of  war. 
They  declared,  in  general,  that  inasmuch  as  the  costs  of 


REPARATIONS  269 

war  fell  upon  the  civil  population  of  each  country,  be- 
coming an  enormous  financial  burden  and  limiting  the 
gainful  occupations  of  the  civilian  population,  therefore 
war  costs  were  a  proper  charge.  In  the  British  conten- 
tion that  the  costs  of  war  should  be  included  in  repara- 
tion, France,  Serbia,  and  other  nations  joined.  This 
attitude  on  the  part  of  France  was  difficult  to  under- 
stand. Germany's  capacity  to  pay  being  limited,  France 
would  naturally  receive  a  higher  proportion  of  the  total 
amount  Germany  did  pay  if  the  costs  of  war,  which  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain  were  heavier  than  those  of 
France,  were  to  be  excluded. 

The  British  contention  went  very  far.  Premier  Hughes, 
for  instance,  declared  that  if  the  little  shepherd  in  Aus- 
tralia had  been  obliged  to  mortgage  his  house  because  of 
distressful  conditions  of  trade  brought  on  by  the  war, 
then  finally,  through  foreclosure,  lost  his  little  roof,  then 
that  loss  to  which  he  had  been  subjected  was  fairly  a  cost 
of  war  and  should  be  reimbursed  to  him  by  Germany. 
On  this  and  similar  points  the  Australian  premier  made 
many  arguments,  and  at  times  bitterly  assailed  the  Ameri- 
can delegation  for  their  contention  that  costs  of  war  could 
not  properly  be  included  in  reparation.  Mr.  Hughes  de- 
claring that  this  contention  was  based,  not  upon  princi- 
ple, but  upon  a  desire  to  favor  Germany.  In  one  of  his 
arguments,  I  remember,  turning  around  and  shaking  his 
finger  at  the  American  delegation,  he  shouted:  "Some 
people  in  this  war  have  not  been  so  near  the  fire  as  wc 
British  have,  and,  therefore,  being  unburned,  they  have 
a  cold,  detached  view  of  the  situation."  At  another  time 
he  spoke  slightingly  of  the  Wilson  notes  which  had  pre- 
ceded the  armistice,  declaring  that  Solf,  the  German 
foreign  minister,  had  outmanoeuvred  Mr.  Wilson,  and. 


270    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

in  shaking  tones,  asserting  that  Solf  had  been  crawling 
through  the  Wilson  notes  "like  a  serpent  through  dead 
leaves." 

To  the  American  delegation  the  whole  point  was  per- 
fectly clear.  Actual  costs  of  war,  military  effort,  and  the 
like,  could  not  by  any  possibility  be  considered  strictly 
as  damage  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allied  states, 
and,  therefore,  could  not  properly  be  included  in  the 
sum  to  be  paid  by  Germany  in  reparation.  For  the 
American  delegation,  Mr.  John  Foster  Dulles,  the  in- 
heritor of  a  name  illustrious  in  American  diplomacy  and 
the  possessor  of  a  mind  of  great  force  and  quality,  made 
the  chief  argument  against  the  inclusion  of  war  costs. 
His  summing  up  was  an  admirable  one,  and  all  those  who 
are  particularly  interested  in  the  detail  of  this  question 
I  refer  to  Mr.  Bernard  M.  Baruch's  excellent  volume, 
**The  Making  of  the  Reparation  and  Economic  Clauses 
of  the  Treaty,"  in  which  Mr.  DuIIes's  arguments  are  given 
in  full. 

It  became  evident,  after  a  fortnight  of  argument  on 
the  question  of  principle,  that  the  delegations  by  them- 
selves could  not  possibly  agree  as  to  the  principle.  At 
this  time  President  Wilson  was  on  the  ocean  returning 
to  America,  and,  accordingly,  in  behalf  of  the  American 
reparation  delegates.  Colonel  House  addressed  a  wire- 
less to  Mr.  Wilson,  stating  the  position  of  the  delegation 
and  asking  for  his  judgment.  The  President  approved 
the  stand  of  the  American  delegation,  declaring  that  the 
contention  on  the  part  of  the  other  delegations  that  war 
costs  should  be  included  "is  clearly  inconsistent  with 
what  we  deliberately  led  the  enemy  to  expect  and  can- 
not now  honorably  alter  simply  because  we  have  the 
power." 


REPARATIONS  271 

The  Inclusion  of  Pensions 

When  the  American  delegation  acquainted  the  other 
chiefs  of  state  with  this  vigorous  declaration  on  the  part 
of  President  Wilson,  they  finally  withdrew  their  conten- 
tion, and  the  great  principle  was,  therefore,  settled  that 
reparation  should  be  limited  to  what  might  actually  be 
called  material  damage.  It  was,  however,  later  deter- 
mined to  include  as  a  part  of  the  reparation  the  costs  for 
separation  allowances  and  pensions  incurred  by  the  Allied 
states.  The  American  delegation  as  a  whole,  while  deeply 
sympathetic,  sentimentally,  with  the  idea  that  pensions 
should  be  included  as  damage  to  the  civilian  population, 
found  it  difficult  to  reconcile  this  contention  with  actual 
principle,  feeling  that  pensions  fell  more  properly  into 
the  category  of  military  costs  of  war.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
however,  advocated  with  great  vigor  and  ingenuity  the 
inclusion  of  pensions  under  the  head  of  damage  to  the 
civilian  population.  Said  he:  "You  mean  to  say  that 
France  is  to  be  compensated  for  the  loss  of  a  chimney 
pot  in  the  devastated  district,  but  not  for  the  loss  of  a 
life?  Do  you  set  more  value  upon  a  chimney  than  you 
do  upon  a  soldier's  life?"  This  argument  was  appeal- 
ing, but  not  necessarily  sound. 

However,  it  was  General  Jan  Smuts  who  finally  pre- 
pared the  argument  which  convinced  President  Wilson 
that  pensions  and  separation  allowances  should  be  in- 
cluded in  the  reparation  bill.  General  Smuts's  summing 
up  was:  "What  was  spent  by  the  Allied  Governments 
on  the  soldier  himself,  or  rather  mechanical  appliances  of 
war,  might  perhaps  not  be  recoverable  from  the  German 
Government  under  the  reservation,  as  not  being  in  a 
plain  and  direct  sense  damage  to  the  civilian  population, 


272     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

but  what  \vas,  or  is,  spent  on  the  citizen  before  he  be- 
came a  soldier,  or  after  he  has  ceased  to  be  a  soldier,  or 
at  any  time  on  his  family,  represents  compensation  for 
damage  done  to  civilians  and  must  be  made  good  by 
the  German  Government  under  any  fair  interpretation 
of  the  above  reservation."  I  well  remember  the  day 
upon  which  President  Wilson  determined  to  support  the 
inclusion  of  pensions  in  the  reparation  bill.  Some  of  us 
were  gathered  in  his  library  in  the  Place  des  £tats  Unis, 
having  been  summoned  by  him  to  discuss  this  particular 
question  of  pensions.  We  explained  to  him  that  we 
couldn't  fmd  a  single  lawyer  in  the  American  delegation 
that  would  give  an  opinion  in  favor  of  including  pensions. 
All  the  logic  was  against  it.  "  Logic  !  Logic  ! "  exclaimed 
the  President,  "I  don't  give  a  damn  for  logic.  I  am 
going  to  include  pensions !"  Now  Mr.  Wilson  was,  least 
of  all  men,  lacking  in  logic.  For  logicians  who  may  stand 
aghast  at  his  offhand  utterance,  I  hasten  to  explain  that 
it  was  not  a  contempt  of  logic,  but  simply  an  impatience 
of  technicality;  a  determination  to  brush  aside  verbiage 
and  get  at  the  root  of  things.  There  was  not  one  of  us  in 
the  room  whose  heart  did  not  beat  with  a  like  feeling. 

Thus  it  was  determined  that  pensions  should  be 
assessed  on  the  French  system  of  calculations,  being 
about  an  average  as  between  the  British  pensions,  which 
were  higher,  and  the  Italian  pensions,  which  were  lower. 
It  was  roughly  figured  at  the  Conference  that  this  pen- 
sions item  would  amount  to  about  fifteen  billion  dollars, 
capital  sum. 

President  Wilson's  Generous  Attitude 

I  am  going  to  take  this  opportunity  to  say  a  word  in 
general  as  to  President  Wilson's  attitude  at  the  Peace 


REPARATIONS  273 

Conference.  He  is  accused  of  having  been  unwilling  to 
consult  his  colleagues.  I  never  saw  a  man  more  ready 
and  anxious  to  consult  than  he.  He  has  been  accused 
of  having  been  desirous  to  gain  credit  for  himself  and  to 
ignore  others.  I  never  saw  a  man  more  considerate  of 
those  of  his  coadjutors  who  were  working  immediately 
with  him.,  nor  a  man  more  ready  to  give  them  credit  with 
the  other  chiefs  of  state.  Again  and  again  would  he 
say  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  or  M.  Clemenceau:  "My 
expert  here,  Mr.  So-and-So,  tells  me  such-and-such,  and 
I  believe  he  is  right.  You  will  have  to  argue  with  him 
if  you  want  to  get  me  to  change  my  opinion."  President 
Wilson  undoubtedly  had  his  disabilities.  Perhaps  in  a 
trade,  some  of  the  other  chiefs  of  state  could  have  "out- 
jockeyed"  him;  but  it  seldom  reached  such  a  situa- 
tion, because  President  Wilson,  by  his  manifest  sin- 
cerity and  open  candor,  always  saying  precisely  what  he 
thought,  would  early  disarm  his  opponents  in  argument. 
President  Wilson  did  not  have  a  well-organized  secre- 
tarial staff.  He  did  far  too  much  of  the  work  himself, 
studying  until  late  at  night  papers  and  documents  that 
he  should  have  largely  delegated  to  some  discreet  aides. 
He  was,  by  all  odds,  the  hardest  worked  man  at  the 
Conference;  but  the  failure  to  delegate  more  of  his  work 
was  not  due  to  any  inherent  distrust  that  he  had  of  men 
— and  certainly  not  to  any  desire  to  "run  the  whole 
show"  himself — but  simply  to  his  lack  of  facility  in 
knowing  how  to  delegate  work  on  a  lar^e  scale.  In  exe- 
cution we  all  have  a  blind  spot  in  some  part  of  our  eye. 
President  Wilson's  was  in  his  inability  to  use  men;  an 
inability,  mind  you,  not  a  refusal.  On  the  contrary, 
when  any  of  us  volunteered  or  insisted  upon  taking  re- 
sponsibility off  his  shoulders  he  was  delighted. 


274    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

Throughout  the  Peace  Conference  Mr.  Wilson  never 
played  politics.  I  never  witnessed  an  occasion  when  I 
saw  him  act  from  unworthy  conception  or  motive.  His 
ideals  were  of  the  highest,  and  he  ckmg  to  them  tena- 
ciously and  courageously.  Many  of  the  so-called  "lib- 
erals" in  England  have  assailed  Mr.  Wilson  bitterly  be- 
cause, as  they  declare,  he  yielded  too  much  to  their  own 
premier,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  to  M.  Clemenceau. 
But  could  he  have  failed  to  defer  to  them  on  questions 
in  which  no  vital  principle  was  involved?  I  well  remem- 
ber his  declaration  on  the  question  whether  the  Allies 
should  refuse,  for  a  period  of  five  years  during  the  time 
of  France's  recuperation,  to  promise  Germany  reciprocal 
tariff  provisions.  What  Mr.  Wilson  said  to  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  M.  Clemenceau  was  this:  "Gentlemen,  my 
experts  and  I  both  regard  the  principle  involved  as  an 
unwise  one.  We  believe  it  will  come  back  to  plague  you. 
But  when  I  see  how  France  has  suffered,  how  she  has 
been  devastated,  her  industries  destroyed — who  am  I 
to  refuse  to  assent  to  this  provision,  designed,  un- 
wisely or  wisely,  to  assist  in  lifting  France  again  to  her 
feet?" 

I  am  not  attempting  to  give  a  technical  description  of 
the  reparation  clauses.  You  can  get  those  from  the 
treaty  of  peace  itself  and  from  books  that  have  already 
been  printed  upon  it.  What  I  am  rather  trying  to  do  is 
to  give  a  sweeping  picture  of  how  the  reparation  question 
was  handled  and  of  the  way  in  which  some  of  the  chief 
figures  connected  with  it  treated  it.  I  have  hitherto 
pointed  out  that  the  first  great  principle  settled  by  the 
plenary  commission  on  reparations  was,  after  long  debate, 
to  exclude  from  the  bill  the  costs  of  war.  I  have  next 
shown  how  it  was  determined  by  the  chiefs  of  state  to 


REPARATIONS  275 

include  the  costs  for  pensions  and  separation  allowances — 
this  item  amounting  to  a  probable  total  of  fifteen  billion 
dollars.  Next  came  the  question  of  categories,  that  is  to 
say,  other  specifications  which  should  be  included  in  the 
bill  of  costs.  To  this  phase  of  the  question  Mr.  Vance 
McCormick  gave  the  most  painstaking  and  intelligent 
attention. 

The  American  engineering  experts  were  the  only  ones 
at  the  time  of  the  Peace  Conference  that  had  made  any 
attempt  to  survey  the  actual  material  damage  that  had 
been  caused  by  Germany's  aggression.  Their  calcula- 
tion was  in  the  neighborhood  of  $15,000,000,000.  French 
estimates,  which,  however,  were  acknowledgedly  rough 
and  approximate,  exceeded  that  figure.  But  here  we 
have,  at  any  rate,  in  the  two  items  of  damage  and  pen- 
sions, a  total  figure  of  not  less  than  $30,000,000,000, 
present  capital  sum,  which  could  be  figured  as  the  sum 
Germany  must  pay. 

As  TO  Germany's  Capacity  to  Pay 

From  this  point  then  we  took  up  the  question  of  Ger- 
many's capacity  to  paj^  the  question  that  was  referred 
to  subcommission  No.  2.  Lord  CunlifFe  of  the  British 
delegation,  was  chairman  of  this  commission,  and,  after 
a  few  sittings,  he  called  upon  the  various  delegations  to 
submit  their  several  estimates  as  to  what  Germany 
could,  with  her  present  economic  and  financial  resources, 
pay.  We  naturally  asked  Lord  CunlifFe  first  to  sub- 
mit the  British  estimate.  This  he  seemed  disinclined 
to  do,  stating  that  he  would  rest  upon  the  figure 
given  out  in  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  pre-election  campaign. 
This  figure  was  24,000,000,000  pounds  sterling — call  it 


276    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

$120,000,000,000 — a  perfectly  absurd  figure  so  far  as  col- 
lectibility was  concerned. 

The  French,  too,  for  political  reasons,  seemed  disin- 
clined to  submit  their  figure.  Consequently,  when  the 
chairman  called  us  together  the  American  delegation, 
just  as  in  other  instances,  was  the  only  one  prepared  to 
make  any  concrete  suggestion.  It,  therefore,  submitted  a 
preliminary  report,  indicating  its  belief  that  if  proper 
steps  to  conserve  Germany's  assets  were  taken,  a  sum  ap- 
proximating $5,000,000,000  might  be  collected  prior  to 
May  I,  1 92 1,  and,  thereafter,  a  capital  sum  might  not  un- 
reasonably be  levied  as  high  as  $25,000,000,000,  always 
provided,  first,  that  the  other  clauses  in  the  treaty  did  not 
too  greatly  drain  Germany's  resources ;  second,  did  not, 
by  tariff  discrimination  and  otherwise,  impair  her  indus- 
trial effectiveness;  and  third,  permitted  her  to  pay  a 
reasonable  part,  say  one-half  of  the  total  sum  in  German 
marks,  which  might,  conceivably,  mean  the  reinvestment 
in  German  domestic  enterprises  by  British  and  French 
recipients  of  their  payments. 

Subcommission  No.  2  then  asked  Lord  Cunliffe,  Minis- 
ter Loucheur,  of  the  French  delegation,  and  myself  to 
draft  a  report  for  the  subcommission's  consideration,  indi- 
cating our  views  as  to  how  Germany  might  pay  such  sum 
as  might  be  assessed  against  her,  and,  in  effect,  asked  the 
three  British,  French,  and  American  delegates  to  concur 
in  their  own  views  as  to  a  definite  sum  before  submitting 
the  report  back  to  the  subcommission.  In  making  the 
first  draft  of  this  report,  from  which  the  final  treaty 
clauses  were  in  part  drawn,  I  inserted  the  same  figure  of 
$30,000,000,000  with  the  same  qualifications  as  hereto- 
fore expressed,  and  then  showed  the  report  to  the  French. 
They  expressed  satisfaction  with  its  form  and   stated 


REPARATIONS  277 

that  if  we  could  revise  our  estimates  up  to  a  figure  of 
$40,000,000,000  they  could  recommend  to  their  chief  of 
state  such  a  figure. 

The  British  delegation  said  that  they  could  not  accept 
a  figure  below  $47,500,000,000,  but  even  this  was  con- 
siderable of  a  come-down  from  the  figure  of  $120,000,- 
000,000  which  they  had  before  stuck  at.  At  this  stage 
of  the  proceedings  it  looked  as  if  the  delegations  could 
probably  agree  upon  some  definite  figure.  While  we 
were  quite  a  distance  apart,  the  difference  did  not  seem 
to  be  irreconcilable. 

Soon  after  this,  however,  pohtical  considerations  began 
to  arise,  and  the  question  became  one  practically  for  the 
chiefs  of  state  themselves  to  finally  determine.  In  an 
endeavor  to  reach  a  solution  of  the  question,  the  chiefs 
of  state  practically  withdrew  the  determination  from  the 
commission  on  reparations  itself,  and  delegated  it  to  an 
informal  commission,  upon  which  a  few  of  us  sat  from 
day  to  day.  We  worked  upon  various  schemes,  one  of 
them  being  that  of  trying  to  establish  a  maximum  and 
a  minimum  figure;  that  is  to  say,  the  minimum  that 
Germany  must  in  any  event  pay  and  the  maximum  up 
to  which  she  might  be  compelled  to  pay  if  circumstances 
permitted. 

A  Permanent  Reparations  Commission 

It  was  in  this  connection  that  the  proposal  of  setting 
up  a  permanent  reparations  commission  for  handling  the 
whole  matter  was  first  made.  This  was  the  idea  of  Mr. 
John  Foster  Dulles  and  was  in  discussion  rapidly  devel- 
oped. As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  especially, 
and  even  M.  Clemenceau,  seized  upon  the  idea  of  a 
permanent  commission  as  an  efficacious  method  to  enable 


278    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

them  to  postpone,  until  the  political  horizon  had  cleared, 
the  decision  of  a  definite  sum  for  Germany  to  pay. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  describe  the  almost  interminable 
discussions  that  continued  on  this  whole  subject:  First, 
the  endeavor  to  effect  a  compromise  upon  a  fixed  sum; 
next,  upon  maximum  and  minimum  fixed  sums,  and 
then,  finally,  the  postponement  of  the  whole  question  to 
the  permanent  reparations  commission.  When  such  prin- 
ciple had  been  determined  upon,  the  constitution  of  the 
commission,  its  powers,  and  its  operations  constituted 
another  topic  requiring  daj^s  of  discussion.  Whenever 
the  informal  committee  in  charge  of  the  matter  reached 
an  impasse,  they  referred  the  matter  to  the  chiefs  of 
state,  who,  perhaps,  after  an  afternoon  of  discussion, 
would  settle  it  for  them,  and  we  would  proceed  with 
our  plans. 

The  final  result  of  all  this  was  embodied  in  the  clauses 
of  the  peace  treaty  itself,  dealing  with  reparation  and 
finance,  and  here  I  shall  give  you  a  brief  summary  of 
those  clauses,  taken  directly  from  Volume  H  of  "The 
History  of  the  Peace  Conference,"  edited  by  H.  W.  V. 
Temperley,  to  the  publication  of  which  I  was  able  to  lend 
my  aid. 

The  summary  is  as  follows: 

First.  Germany  accepts  the  moral  responsibility  for  having  caused 
all  damage  suffered  as  a  consequence  of  the  war. 

Second.  The  treaty  specifies  what  portion  of  this  damage  is  to 
become  a  financial  liability  of  Germany. 

Third.  It  does  this  by  determining  precisely  what  Germany  shall 
pay /or;  it  does  not  determine  in  general  how  much  Germany  shall 
pay  nor  in  what  form  her  obligations  are  to  be  discharged. 

Fourth.  How  much  Germany  is  to  pay  in  all,  both  by  way  of 
reparation  and  on  account  of  other  treaty  claims,  is  left  to  the  deci- 
sion of  the  reparation  commission. 


REPARATIONS  279 

Fifth.  The  amount  is  to  be  determined  by  the  commission  by 
valuation  and  addition  of  claims  conforming  to  the  different  cate- 
gories of  damage  for  which  compensation  is  due  under  the  treaty. 

Sixth.  In  arriving  at  its  decision  the  commission  will  have  no 
regard  to  the  ultimate  total  nor  to  the  capacity  of  Germany  to  pay 
this  total. 

Seventh.  The  decision  is  to  be  notified  to  Germany  by  the  first 
of  May,  1 92 1,  after  the  German  Government  has  been  heard  as  to 
the  admissibihty  and  the  valuation  of  particular  claims. 

Eighth.  The  reparation  commission  will  also  decide  when  pay- 
ment is  to  be  made,  except  that  the  equivalent  of  £1,000,000,000 
must  be  paid  as  a  first  instalment  within  the  period  assigned  to  the 
commission  for  arriving  at  its  decision  as  to  the  total  reparation 
debt. 

Ninth.  How  payment  of  the  first  £1,000,000,000  is  to  be  made 
is  also  a  question  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  commission. 

Tenth.  How  payment  is  to  be  made  after  the  first  of  May,  192 1, 
is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  German  Government,  except  as  regards 
certain  specified  amounts  to  be  paid  in  kind. 

Eleventh.  The  commission  has  no  discretion  to 'abate  its  aggregate 
award  for  reparation,  when  once  it  has  been  arrived  at,  except  with 
the  specific  authority  of  the  several  governments  represented  upon 
the  commission. 

Twelfth.  But  though  it  may  not  vary  the  reparation  debt,  the 
commission  has  a  wide  discretion  over  payments.  It  may  extend 
their  date  and  modify  the  form  even  of  such  payments  as  are  required 
by  the  treaty  to  be  made  in  a  specified  way. 

Thirteenth.  The  sanctions  by  which  the  commission  is  enabled 
to  enforce  its  decisions  are  the  ordinary  international  sanctions  of 
force  supported  by  pubhc  opinion.  It  has  no  special  sanction  to 
support  its  authority  against  Germany. 

The  Priority  for  Belgium 

Before  touching  upon  the  formation  of  the  perma- 
nent reparations  commission  and  upon  its  workings,  I 
must  mention  the  priority  of  $500,000,000  that  was 
arranged  for  Belgium.  A  priority,  without  specifying 
the  amount  of  it,  had,  in  effect,  been  pledged  to  Belgium 
long  before  the  end  of  the  war,  but  nobody  seemed  to 


28o    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

be  very  keen  to  establish  the  priority.  Colonel  E.  M. 
House,  however,  with  the  foresight,  kindliness,  and  wis- 
dom which  he  displayed  throughout  the  entire  Peace 
Conference,  late  in  February  suggested  a  plan  to  Mr. 
Balfour  of  the  British  delegation,  and  M.  Klotz,  of  the 
French  delegation,  granting  Belgium  a  priority  of 
$500,000,000  on  the  German  reparation,  this  sum  being 
sufficient  to  set  Belgium  well  on  her  way  to  recovery. 
There  was,  however,  great  delay  in  getting  fmal  assent  to 
this  priority.  Mr.  Norman  Davis,  the  able  and  leading 
United  States  Treasury  representative,  and  all  the  Ameri- 
can delegation  worked  hard  to  bring  it  about  and  to 
push  the  plan  on  every  occasion,  but  it  still  hung  fire. 
The  Belgian  delegation,  finally  becoming  alarmed,  in- 
sisted on  formally  taking  up  the  question  with  the  Coun- 
cil of  Four.  The  Belgian  delegation,  under  the  leadership 
of  Mr.  Hymans,  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  made  two 
chief  demands,  one  for  the  priority  and  one  for  reimburse- 
ment for  what  the  war  had  cost  her.  To  this  latter  item 
there  was  vigorous  objection  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
inadmissible  to  provide  for  Belgium's  ''costs  of  war*'  and 
not  for  those  of  England,  France,  Italy,  and  the  other 
Allies. 

As  a  compromise  to  meet  the  situation  a  formula  was 
finally  proposed  ina  phrase  to  the  effect  that  Germany  was 
to  be  obligated  especially  "to  reimburse  Belgium  for  all 
the  sums  borrowed  by  Belgium  from  the  Allies  as  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  violation  of  the  treaty  of  1839." 
Inasmuch  as  all  such  sums  borrowed  by  Belgium  were 
used  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  this  phrase  was  sim- 
ply a  euphemism  for  granting  Belgium  the  war  costs 
that  she  had  demanded.  But  it  was  finally  agreed  to 
on  all  hands,  and  the  crisis  was  averted.     It  should  be 


REPARATIONS  281 

noted  that  from  the  beginning  the  American  delegation 
had  claimed  for  Belgium  full  reimbursement  of  war  costs 
on  the  ground  that,  irrespective  of  the  armistice  agree- 
ment, Germany  had  made  herself  liable  for  these  through 
having  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Germany  in 
fact  herself  repeatedly  recognized  her  obligation  to  in- 
demnify Belgium  completely. 

German  Prior  Lien  Bonds  for  Belgium 

In  connection  with  this  priority,  as  arranged  for  Bel- 
gium, three  of  the  chiefs  of  state,  namely.  President 
Wilson  and  Premiers  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau, 
agreed  to  submit  for  the  consideration  of  their  respective 
legislative  bodies  the  proposal  to  accept  German  Govern- 
ment bonds  in  lieu  of  the  various  sums  owed  to  them  by 
the  Government  of  Belgium.  If— in  the  case  of  the 
United  States  Congress — this  proposition  were  approved, 
it  would  mean  that  the  United  States  Treasury  would 
turn  over  the  Belgian  obligations  it  holds,  to  the  amount 
of  approximately  one  hundred  and  seventy  million  dol- 
lars, and  receive  in  place  thereof  an  equivalent  amount 
of  German  Government  bonds.  When  this  proposition 
was  discussed  at  Paris,  and  later  publicity  given  to  it, 
both  there  and  in  the  statement  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
made  in  regard  to  it  in  the  House  of  Commons,  it  was 
pointed  out  that  the  German  bonds,  to  be  received  in 
place  of  the  Belgian  bonds,  were  probably  of  equal,  if 
not  greater,  validity,  owing  to  the  priority  granted  to 
them  under  Article  232  of  the  Treaty,  which  reads  as 
follows : 

In  accordance  with  Germany's  pledges,  already  given,  as  to  com- 
plete restoration  for  Belgium,  Germany  undertakes,  in  addition  to 


282    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  compensation  for  damage  elsewhere  in  this  Part  provided  for, 
as  a  consequence  of  the  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1839,  ^o  make  re- 
imbursement of  all  sums  which  Belgium  has  borrowed  from  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Governments  up  to  November  11,  1918,  together 
with  interest  at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent  (5%)  per  annum  on  such 
sums.  This  amount  shall  be  determined  by  the  Reparation  Com- 
mission, and  the  German  Government  undertakes  thereupon  forth- 
with to  make  a  special  issue  oj  bearer  bonds  to  an  equivalent  amowit 
payable  iti  marks  gold,  on  May  i,  1926,  or,  at  the  option  of  the  Ger- 
man Government,  on  the  first  of  May  in  any  year  up  to  1926.  Sub- 
ject to  the  foregoing,  the  form  of  such  bonds  shall  be  determined 
by  the  Reparation  Commission.  Such  bonds  shall  be  handed  over 
to  the  Reparation  Commission,  which  has  authority  to  take  and 
acknowledge  receipt  thereof  on  behalf  of  Belgium. 

The  reparation  clauses  further  went  on  to  specify 
concrete  methods  by  which  Germany  should  immedi- 
ately begin  to  make  restitution  in  kind.  That  is  to  say 
in  view  of  the  terrific  inroads  which  German  submarine 
warfare  had  caused  in  Great  Britain's  and  France's  mer- 
cantile fleets,  it  was  provided  that  practically  all  of  Ger- 
many's merchant  marine  should  be  surrendered  so  as  to 
make  good,  at  least  to  a  certain  extent,  the  Allies'  terrible 
losses.  Upon  the  whole  question  of  shipping  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  was,  not  unnaturally,  particularly  insistent,  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  for  generations  Great  Britain's 
mercantile  marine  had  been  the  arteries  of  the  empire's 
commercial  life,  and  without  it  England  was  compara- 
tively helpless. 

In  similar  ways  concrete  provisions  were  adopted  pro- 
viding for  the  delivery  of  large  quantities  of  coal  by  Ger- 
many to  France  and  Italy.  Germany  had  created  such 
havoc  in  the  Lens  coal-fields  of  France,  which  furnished 
fuel  for  all  French  industries  in  the  north,  that,  as  experts 
calculated  that  these  coal-mines  could  not  be  put  back 
into  working  condition  within  five  years,  very  properly 


REPARATIONS  283 

therefore,  in  addition  to  the  coal  supplies  made  available 
to  France  by  means  of  the  settlement  of  the  Saar  Basin, 
further  definite  supplies  were  to  be  allocated  and  dehvered 
to  France,  month  by  month  and  year  by  year,  for  a  period 
of  time.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  capacity  of  the  Germans 
to  deliver  the  specified  amount  of  coal  was  overestimated, 
and  modification  of  the  tonnage  has  been  arranged. 

The  dehvery  of  several  other  items  was  also  specified 
— particularly  that  of  cattle,  horses,  sheep,  goats,  etc. 
Great  outcry  has  been  raised  by  Germany  on  the  score 
that  in  compelling  her  to  dehver  over  milch  cows  to  France 
and  to  Belgium,  the  Allies  were  working  a  cruel  hard- 
ship upon  German  children.  Germany  seems  completely 
to  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  in  the  most  cruel  fashion 
she  drove  over  into  Germany  enormous  herds  of  cattle 
from  both  France  and  Belgium,  and  deliberately  took 
away  draft  horses  and  all  sorts  of  other  useful  animals, 
depriving  both  the  French  and  Belgian  peasant  farmers 
of  their  stock  in  trade.  In  fact,  Germany  did  this  so 
openly  that  before  the  war  was  over  she  boasted  of  her 
possession  of  an  entire  herd  of  famous  French  stallions 
and  brood  mares,  advertising  that,  having  taken  this 
herd,  she  (Germany)  was  now  in  sole  position  to  furnish 
this  valuable  stock  for  the  future. 

As  an  earnest  of  good  faith  in  carrying  out  the  repara- 
tion provisions  of  the  treaty,  it  was  provided  that  Ger- 
many should  deliver  over  to  the  reparation  commission 
forthwith  20,000,000,000  marks  gold  bonds,  not  bearing 
interest,  but  payable  within  the  two-year  period  provided 
for  the  original  payment  of  this  amount.  Of  course,  any 
sums  paid  in  commodities,  or  otherwise,  were  to  apply 
against  the  principal  of  these  bonds.  Further  provision 
was  made  for  delivery  by  Germany  of  40,000,000,000 


284    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

marks  gold  bonds,  bearing  interest  upon  an  ascending 
scale;  and,  within  the  discretion  of  the  reparations  com- 
mission, of  a  still  third  instalment  of  40,000,000,000 
marks  of  gold  bonds,  bearing  interest  at  5  per  cent. 
Thus,  it  was  provided  that  as  a  total  Germany  should,  if 
so  instructed  by  the  reparations  commission,  issue  a  total 
of  100,000,000,000  marks  gold  bonds,  amounting  at  the 
old  rate  of  exchange  to,  roughly,  $25,000,000,000. 

Much  confusion  has  existed  as  to  the  issuance  of  these 
bonds  among  persons  having  the  impression  that  they 
were  over  and  above  the  actual  reparation  which  Ger- 
many should  have  to  pay.  This  is  incorrect.  These 
bonds  were  given  as  a  pledge  of  Germany's  good  faith 
and,  under  certain  circumstances,  could  be  utilized  by 
the  various  countries  just  as  any  financial  obligation 
may  be  utilized.  If  the  total  amount  of  reparation  that 
Germany  finally  paid  was,  say,  $30,000,000,000,  then  any 
outstanding  bonds  that  she  might  have  given,  say,  to  the 
extent  of  $25,000,000,000,  would  be  included  in  the  first- 
named  sum. 

Advantage  of  American  Participation 

The  permanent  reparations  commission,  which  was 
charged  with  the  duty  of  determining  the  amount  of 
material  damage  for  which  Germany's  aggression  was 
responsible,  and  was  also  instructed  to  use  its  discretion 
along  various  lines,  was,  roughly,  to  be  composed  of  five 
members,  representing  respectively  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium,  with,  how- 
ever, a  qualification  that  when  matters  relating  to  ship- 
ping were  under  discussion,  Japan's  delegate  was  to  take 
the  place  of  Belgium's;  when  matters  relating  to  Austria- 


REPARATIONS  285 

Hungary  were  under  discussion,  then  the  Serbian  dele- 
gate was  to  take  the  place  of  Belgium's. 

The  powers  of  this  permanent  reparations  commission, 
as  set  up  in  the  treaty,  were  so  great,  and  the  effect  of 
its  decisions  upon  the  financial  and  commercial  work- 
ings of  all  the  Allied  and  Associated  countries,  including 
America,  was  likely  to  be  so  far-reaching,  that  obviously 
it  was  necessary  that  the  delegates  should  be  men  of  the 
highest  capacity,  courage,  and  wisdom.  Of  course,  at  the 
time  the  constitution  of  this  commission  was  drawn  up 
and  its  powers  granted,  there  was  no  thought  on  the  part 
of  any  one  that  the  United  States  would  fail  to  have  a 
representative  upon  the  commission.  We  all  know  that 
her  failure  in  this  respect  has  been  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  has  not  ratified  the  treaty;  nor  was 
the  Senate  willing  to  accede  to  President  Wilson's  sugges- 
tion that,  temporarily  at  any  rate,  because  of  America's 
interests  in  the  situation,  he  should  be  allowed  to  name 
an  American  representative. 

This  omission  has,  in  my  judgment,  been,  in  consider- 
able measure,  responsible  for  the  lamentable  delay  that 
has  occurred  in  fixing  the  amount  of  the  German  indem- 
nity. The  Americans  w^ere  always  a  moderating  influ- 
ence throughout  the  Peace  Conference.  There  was  no 
reason  why  they  should  not  continue  as  such  in  the  post- 
treaty  deliberations.  They  would  have  occupied  a  posi- 
tion of  peculiar  impartiality  by  reason  of  the  fact  that, 
under  the  action  of  the  reparations  commission  itself, 
the  United  States  expected  to  receive  little  or  no  com- 
pensation. Our  failure  to  name  a  delegate  for  this  com- 
mission has  been  not  merely  a  great  disappointment  to 
our  former  associates  in  the  war,  but  has,  I  believe,  been 
largely  responsible  for  the  continued  economic  unsettle- 


286    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

ment  in  Europe,  with  its  unfortunate  reflex  upon  our  own 
industrial  and  commercial  business. 

The  situation  in  which  we  find  ourselves  to-day  is  this : 
The  determination  of  reparations,  after  dragging  along 
for  eighteen  months,  has  finally  come  to  a  head  in  the 
settlement  agreed  upon  at  Paris  in  February,  1921,  be- 
tween Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  M.  Briand,  under  which 
notification  has  been  made  to  Germany  that,  over  a  series 
of  forty-two  years,  she  will  have  to  pay  a  total  sum  of 
approximately  $56,000,000,000  (at  the  old  par  of  ex- 
change). If,  however,  this  sum  were  to  be  amortized 
at  6  per  cent  and  brought  back  to  present  value,  it  would 
amount  to  a  trifle  under  $18,000,000,000.  Amortized  at 
8>^  per  cent  (which  is  not  an  unfair  rate  to  take,  inas- 
much as  Belgium  and  France  are  paying  at  least  that 
sum  for  their  borrowings  in  America  to-day),  the  capital 
sum  would  be  reduced  to  a  figure  of  about  $13,000,000,000 
plus  whatever  amount  Germany  has  already  paid  **on 
account." 

Now,  even  the  most  moderate  of  the  experts  figuring 
at  Paris  thought  that  Germany  could  pay  a  capital  sum 
of  $10,000,000,000  to  $15,000,000,000,  so  that,  not  count- 
ing in  the  so-called  ** export  tax,"  which  is  a  part  of  the 
recent  Paris  settlement,  the  schedule  arrived  at  does  not 
seem  to  be  unreasonable.  Certain  it  is  that  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  would  be  delighted  to  receive 
as  reparation  a  capital  sum  to-day  of  $13,000,000,000 
rather  than  what  that  sum  would  amount  to  with 
interest  spread  out  over  a  series  of  thirty  or  forty 
years. 

Criticism  has  been  heard  on  the  point  that  the  repara- 
tion payments  may  have  to  be  strung  out  over  a  long 
period  of  years — thirty  or  perhaps  forty.     Of  course,  the 


REPARATIONS  287 

Allies  would  welcome  the  payment  in  a  much  shorter 
time — at  once,  in  fact.  But  their  feeling  is  that,  inas- 
much as  Germany  cannot  pay  all  at  once,  she  should 
continue  to  pay  until  such  time  as  her  debt  is  discharged. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  believe  that  no  one  expects  Ger- 
many to  be  making  reparation  payments  thirty  years, 
hardly  even  ten  years,  from  now.  We  expect  that  before 
many  years  are  past  Germany's  real  capacity  for  con- 
tinued performance  will  have  been  made  so  manifest 
that  some  discounting  or  short-cut  method  of  final  set- 
tlement and  payment,  in  long-term  bonds  or  otherwise, 
will  be  arrived  at  and  the  whole  disturbing  question 
settled  once  and  for  all. 

Germany  Able  to  Pay  Large  Amounts 

The  "export  tax,"  so-called,  to  be  levied  on  Germany 
may  be  difficult  to  defend,  yet  it  is  manifestly  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  the  Allies  to  gauge  their  reparations  some- 
what upon  Germany's  own  prosperity.  It  is  the  same 
principle  that  we  worked  on  so  long  at  Paris  to  establish, 
a  maximum  and  a  minimum  figure.  Whether  or  not  this 
extra  levy  will  work  out  remains  to  be  seen,  but  don't 
let  us  allow  ourselves  to  be  deceived  by  the  protest  and 
outcry  that  come  from  Germany. 

We  have,  in  my  judgment,  rather  fallen  into  the  error 
of  estimating  Germany's  capacity  to  pay  purely  on  a 
basis  of  her  pre-war  exports  and  imports.  We  have  not 
taken  into  account  sufficiently  the  fact  that,  while 
France's  industrial  machinery  was  ruthlessly  destroyed 
by  Germany,  Germany's  factories  are  still  absolutely 
intact.  Germany's  aggression  in  starting  the  war  re- 
sulted, not  only  in  the  frightful  civil  damage  which,  as  I 


288    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

have  stated,  would  amount,  including  pensions,  to  a 
figure  of  at  least  $30,000,000,000  capital  sum  to-day,  but 
has  brought,  in  dollars  and  cents — forgetting,  for  the 
moment,  the  blood  and  suffering — a  staggering  load  upon 
the  world's  shoulders. 

Accountants  now  are  figuring  that  the  total  cost  of  the 
war  to  the  world  has  been  not  less  than  $348,000,000,000. 
While  the  causes  of  the  war  may  be  still  in  dispute,  we 
cannot  reconcile  ourselves  to  any  theory  but  that  Ger- 
many's aggression  was  responsible.  Therefore,  when  the 
Allies  now  propose  that  Germany  shall  pay  a  sum  which, 
capitalized  to-day  at  present  going  rates  of  interest, 
amounts  to  only  about  $13,000,000,000,  it  does  not  seem 
unreasonable. 

And  do  not  let  us  forget  that  it  was  the  German  people 
— not  their  rulers  alone — who  were  responsible  for  the 
war.  Don't  let  us  overlook  the  fact  that  at  the  time 
when  German  fortunes  were  on  the  top  of  the  wave,  her 
people  were  acclaiming  with  glee  the  thought  that  they 
would  be  able  to  impose  an  indemnity  upon  the  Allies  of 
not  less  than  $500,000,000,000. 

Don't  let  us  forget,  too,  when  it  comes  to  actual  com- 
parisons and  estimates  of  Germany's  capacity,  that  fifty 
years  ago,  when  the  world's  industry  and  commerce  were 
on  a  scale  only  a  fraction  of  what  thej'-  are  to-daj^  Ger- 
many compelled  France,  within  a  period  of  two  years, 
to  pay  over  a  sum  of  $1,000,000,000.  If  France  was  able 
to  do  that,  ought  not  Germany,  with  a  population  almost 
twice  as  large — skilful,  able,  industrious,  with  her  indus- 
trial machinery  unimpaired — to  be  able  (unless  the 
Allies  proceed  to  handicap  her  economic  development)  to 
meet  pretty  nearly  the  present  schedule? 


REPARATIONS  289 

No  American  Pledge  as  to  War  Debts 

This  whole  question,  however,  in  my  judgment,  will 
never  be  properly  and  finally  settled — nor  will  the  ad- 
justments be  carried  out  in  a  manner  to  bring  about 
world  restoration — unless,  and  until,  America  has  an 
official  share  in  these  discussions.  America  is  already  in 
the  situation.  She  cannot  disentangle  herself.  Europe 
is  her  greatest  customer,  her  greatest  purchaser  of  grains, 
cotton,  copper,  and  all  other  raw  materials.  If  our  own 
industry  and  commerce  are  to  be  restored,  if  we  are  to 
get  back  to  former  prosperity,  then,  indeed,  must  we 
lend  our  own  efi'orts  to  European  restoration. 

In  this  connection  I  note  constant  reference  to  some 
alleged  secret  understanding  arrived  at  in  Paris  between 
President  Wilson  and  his  advisers  on  one  hand,  and  the 
French  and  British  representatives  upon  the  other,  to 
the  effect  that  Allied  indebtedness  to  the  United  States 
should,  in  whole  or  in  part,  be  cancelled,  or  forgiven. 
There  is  no  such  thing.  From  start  to  finish  of  the 
Peace  Conference  President  Wilson  and  his  advisers, 
without  exception,  opposed  vigorously  and  finally  any 
such  suggestion  or  proposition  of  cancellation.  The  ques- 
tion in  one  form  or  another  constantly  arose.  It  was 
always  "stepped  on"  by  the  American  delegates.  There 
was  no  commitment,  expressed  or  inferred,  near  or  re- 
mote, moral  or  otherwise,  as  to  the  handling  of  the 
Allied  indebtedness  to  the  United  States  Government. 

That  whole  question  of  international  debts  is  a  most 
important  one.  It  is  bound  to  be  the  subject  of  discus- 
sion. The  American  people  must,  in  the  last  analysis, 
determine  it  upon  the  principle  of  what  course  is  best 
calculated   to   benefit  the  world  as  a  whole,   including 


290    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

America.  And  so  far  as  the  Peace  Conference  or  any 
implied  understanding  there  is  concerned,  the  American 
people,  in  arriving  at  their  decision,  are  as  free  and  un- 
trammelled as  air. 

We  must,  of  course,  give  to  our  brethren  abroad — 
with  whom  shoulder  to  shoulder  we  fought  for  Ger- 
many's defeat — we  must  give  to  them  our  counsel,  our 
wisdom,  our  help.  In  no  way  can  we  do  it  otherwise 
than  by  sitting  in  with  them,  day  by  day;  by  discussing 
with  them  these  problems;  by  showing  them  a  moderate, 
dispassionate  point  of  view;  by  trying  to  realize  their 
own  terrible  difficulties,  the  disasters  through  which  they 
are  passing,  and  thus  arrive  with  them  upon  a  common 
basis  of  sympathy,  of  permanent  understanding,  of  good- 
will, and  of  abiding  friendship. 


XII 

THE  ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT 

BY    ALLYN    ABBOTT    YOUNG 

Half  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  is  made  up  of  economic 
provisions.  These  provisions  comprise  literally  hundreds 
of  separate  and  distinct  stipulations.  Read  them  with 
any  care  and  imagination  and  you  will  construct  for 
yourselves,  I  venture  to  say,  a  better  picture  of  how  the 
treaty  was  made — of  how  it  must  inevitably  have  been 
made — than  you  will  get  from  most  of  the  published 
accounts  of  the  Peace  Conference. 

No  four  men,  you  will  decide,  wrote  those  clauses. 
Undoubtedly  the  members  of  the  Council  of  Four  con- 
sidered them,  passed  upon  them,  altered  them  at  certain 
points,  and  of  necessity  assumed  a  final  responsibility 
for  them.  Undoubtedly,  too,  a  number  of  particularly 
knotty  points,  on  which  agreement  was  difficult,  must 
have  been  referred  to  them  for  solution.  And  back  of 
these  hundreds  of  clauses,  it  will  occur  to  you,  there 
must  have  been  a  thousand  complex  facts — facts  of  his- 
tory, of  geography,  of  international  law,  of  precedents,  of 
past  or  existing  treaties,  of  faith  to  be  kept,  of  economic 
needs,  of  national  interests  and  policies,  and  of  domestic 
politics.  Many  men,  you  will  conclude,  must  have  had 
a  hand  in  the  making  of  the  treaty,  and  for  that  task 
they  must  have  needed  all  the  knowledge  and  all  the 
preparation  they  could  command. 

This  much,  I  think,  is  no  more  than  a  fair  inference 

291 


292     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

from  a  careful  study  of  the  economic  sections  of  the 
treaty.  So  far  as  it  goes  it  is  wholly  right.  But  while, 
on  the  one  hand,  it  corrects  a  too  prevalent  notion  that 
the  details  of  the  treaty  were  evolved  through  a  process 
of  debate  by  the  Council  of  Four,  it  fails,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  suggest  the  full  importance  of  the  share  that 
President  Wilson  and  his  immediate  associates  had  in 
its  making.  It  is  clear,  of  course,  that  most  of  the  larger 
matters  of  the  treaty  had  to  be  handled  by  the  President. 
This  is  especially  true  of  what  may  be  called  the  major 
strategic  points,  upon  which  opposing  interests  and  poli- 
cies focussed.  And  then,  as  I  have  suggested,  there  were 
many  difficult  problems  upon  which  the  groups  of  dele- 
gates who  framed  the  different  economic  sections  of  the 
treaty  found  it  impossible  to  agree.  These  sections  came 
before  the  Council  of  Four  for  review  with  American,  or 
British,  or  French,  or  other  "reservations"  attached  to 
particular  clauses.  In  the  Council  of  Four  agreement 
had  to  be  reached  in  some  way.  Some  one  had  to  yield. 
The  president  had  to  decide  in  each  case  whether  the 
matter  was  one  on  which  the  American  position  must  be 
maintained  at  whatever  cost,  or  whether  it  was  one  on 
which  a  concession  might  be  made  to  an  opposing  view. 
It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  the  President,  like  the 
other  American  plenipotentiaries,  was  frequently  con- 
sulted by  the  American  economic  representatives,  as 
when  the  American  policy  on  any  matter  of  large  impor- 
tance was  being  formulated,  or  when  unforeseen  obsta- 
cles were  encountered.  It  should  be  remembered,  too, 
that  each  of  the  American  plenipotentiaries  (including  the 
President)  was  a  member  of  at  least  one  of  the  different 
commissions  which  drafted  the  different  sections  of  the 
treaty. 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  293 

I  do  not  want  you  to  infer  from  what  I  have  just  said 
that,  in  respect  of  the  economic  clauses,  there  was  ever 
any  serious  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  American 
policy  ought  to  be.  The  President  had  made  what  we 
were  proud  to  call  American  principles  luminously  clear. 
In  the  actual  work  of  framing  the  economic  clauses  there 
was  rarely  any  doubt  as  to  what,  in  the  light  of  these 
principles,  the  American  attitude  should  be.  This,  I 
think  you  will  grant,  is  a  remarkable  and  significant  fact. 
The  practical  difficulty  always  was  to  determine  just  how 
far,  as  a  last  resort,  it  was  justifiable  and  wise  to  accede 
to  a  departure  from  those  principles  in  order  to  secure 
agreement.  In  the  work  of  the  subordinate  commis- 
sions this  problem  always  took  a  particular  form.  With 
reference  to  some  matter  it  would  become  clear  that  the 
commission  simply  could  not  or  would  not  agree  to  a 
solution  that  the  American  delegates  could  whole- 
heartedly accept.  Should  the  American  delegates  do 
the  best  they  could  to  secure  a  compromise  that  de- 
parted as  little  as  might  be  from  what  they  believed  to 
be  fundamentally  right?  Or  should  they  stand  by  their 
guns,  refuse  any  concession,  and  increase  the  President's 
burden  by  sending  the  disagreement  up  to  the  Council 
of  Four?  Always,  I  repeat,  the  problem  before  the 
American  representatives  on  the  various  commissions 
which  dealt  with  economic  matters  was  a  problem  of 
just  what  was  the  best  practicable  solution  of  an  actual, 
concrete,  and  pressing  situation.  Never  was  there  much 
doubt  as  to  the  solution  they  preferred.  They  knew 
what  sort  of  a  treaty  the  President  and  his  colleagues 
wanted.  They  believed,  as  I  must  still  believe,  that 
such  was  also  the  sort  of  treaty  the  American  people 
wanted. 


294     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

There  are  two  definite  impressions  I  have  tried  to  con- 
vey in  what  I  have  just  said.  To  make  the  first  of  these 
points  clear,  let  us  admit  that  there  may  have  been  cer- 
tain defects  in  the  formal  organization  of  the  American 
Commission  to  Negotiate  Peace.  Very  likely  there  were. 
I  do  not  believe  they  affected  the  character  of  the  out- 
come. They  were  negligible  as  compared  with  the  unity 
of  spirit  and  of  purpose  that  characterized  the  work  of 
the  whole  organization.  It  is  easy  to  see  differences. 
They  stand  out  and  obtrude  themselves.  The  full  sig- 
nificance of  agreement,  of  unity,  of  co-operation,  is  not 
so  easily  seen.  Even  those  who  were  at  Paris  hardly 
reahzed  the  significance  of  this  unity.  They  merely 
accepted  it.  They  had  a  common  cause  and  a  common 
loyalty  to  high  leadership. 

I  have  also  emphasized — and  this  is  my  second  point — 
the  element  of  compromise,  concession,  mutual  give-and- 
take,  in  the  economic  clauses.  Just  here  is  where  the 
critics  of  these  clauses  find  their  opportunity.  The  critic 
is  prone  to  think  in  terms  of  clear-cut  general  principles, 
of  absolute  right  and  wrong.  Compromise  is  a  departure 
from  principle.  It  is  easy,  then,  to  find  serious  flaws  in 
these  economic  clauses,  reached  as  they  were  through 
compromise  and  agreement.  You  may  believe  that  Ger- 
many should  have  been  more  severely  dealt  with,  or  you 
may  believe,  as  I  do,  that  the  economic  clauses,  as  a 
whole,  are  unwisely  harsh  and  exacting.  In  either  case 
the  clauses  depart  from  your  standards  of  what  they 
ought  to  be. 

But  not  one  of  the  critics,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  ever 
dealt  with  the  matter  with  complete  candor.  Not  one 
of  them  has  squarely  faced  the  alternatives.  What  would 
they  have  had  the  President  do,  when  he  saw  that  although 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  295 

the  great  and  essential  Interests  of  the  peace  could  be 
safeguarded,  there  were  a  good  many  important  points  in 
the  economic  settlement  upon  which  agreement  could  be 
had  only  through  concession?  Would  they  have  had  the 
American  representatives  abandon  the  Conference  and 
return  to  the  United  States?  Or  would  they  have  had 
the  President  and  his  associates  dictate  the  economic 
terms  and  force  them  down  the  throats  of  our  Allies? 
The  two  alternatives  are  equally  unthinkable.  Left  to 
themselves,  with  the  firm,  persistent,  steadying  pressure 
from  America  withdrawn,  the  various  conflicting  forces 
at  Paris,  if  perchance  they  could  have  been  brought  into 
any  sort  of  agreement,  could  have  produced  only  a  treaty 
that  would  have  delivered  the  world  over  to  militarism, 
imperialism,  and  economic  suicide.  On  the  other  hand, 
peace  terms  dictated  to  our  Allies  might  have  been  signed 
but  would  not  have  been  accepted.  Either  course  would 
have  meant  prolonged  bitterness  and  misunderstanding, 
new  dissensions  in  Europe,  the  overturning  of  govern- 
ments, and  a  clear  field  for  militarism — or  worse. 

Look  the  facts  squarely  in  the  face,  and  there  is  no 
other  conclusion  than  that  the  only  way  out  and  the  only 
way  forward  was  and  is  through  international  agreement 
and  understanding.  And  as  things  were — and  remain — 
agreement  and  understanding  among  the  Allies  were — 
and  are — the  indispensable  prerequisites  to  any  larger 
and  more  inclusive  agreements.  There  is  no  other  road 
to  the  maintaining  of  peace  or  to  the  mending  of  the 
wrecked  economic  structure  of  Europe.  A  refusal  to  see 
in  the  situation  any  questions  save  those  of  absolute 
economic  right  and  wrong  is  not  far  removed  from  sheer 
intolerance. 

These  things  are  not  said  by  way  of  apology  or  extenua- 


296    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

tion.  I  am  merely  trying  to  restore  a  right  perspective 
to  matters  that  have  become  obscured  and  distorted  by 
controversy. 

I  shall  return  to  that  subject  again.  But  I  must 
record  here  my  emphatic  dissent  from  the  notion  that 
the  economic  clauses  were  made  harsh  and  intolerable 
through  unnecessary  concessions  yielded  by  President 
Wilson  because  he  was  misled  and  outmanoeuvred  by  his 
colleagues  in  the  Council  of  Four.  In  the  first  place,  those 
who  were  associated  with  the  President  at  Paris  will  tell 
you  how  supremely  quick  and  alert  he  was  in  discussion 
or  conference,  and  how  easily  and  accurately  he  pene- 
trated to  the  heart  of  the  most  comphcated  proposal.  In 
the  second  place,  the  notion  which  I  am  trying  to  dispel 
conveys  a  false  impression  of  the  way  the  treaty  was 
made. 

The  Council  of  Four  was  not  a  debating  club.  Its  func- 
tions were  to  make  decisions,  to  reach  agreements,  and 
to  give  a  sanction  to  agreements  that  had  already  been 
reached  in  one  way  or  another.  Naturally,  its  method 
was  that  of  discussion.  Proposals  were  made  and  inter- 
preted. Attitudes  and  points  of  view  were  explained 
and  defended.     But  it  was  not  a  game  of  fence. 

The  Peace  Conference,  has  been  overdramatized.  In- 
terpretation of  it  in  terms  of  tactics  and  strategy  and  dra- 
matic incidents  is  superficial.  Mere  cleverness  had  very 
little  to  do  with  it,  one  way  or  the  other.  Judgment, 
courage,  and  understanding  were  the  qualities  that 
counted  for  most. 

Then  there  has  been  some  curious  gossip  to  the  effect 
that  the  economic  clauses  and  other  parts  of  the  treaty 
failed  fully  to  represent  the  American  position  because 
the  President,  in  some  way,  had  lost  **his  control  of  the 


THE  ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  297 

situation."  This  is  wrong  in  two  or  three  different  ways. 
In  particular  it  gives  a  false  suggestion  of  what  the  situa- 
tion was.  Taking  only  the  immediate  personal  situation 
into  account,  I  suspect  that  the  President,  from  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end,  had  more  power  than  he  thought  wise 
to  use.  But  the  whole  situation,  in  its  larger  aspects, 
w^as  an  immovable  and  unchangeable  fact,  beyond  the 
control  of  the  President  or  of  any  other  man. 

That  situation,  of  course,  was  highly  complex,  but  in 
it  there  were  two  outstanding  factors.  One  was  a  matter 
of  contract:  the  pre-armistice  agreement  made  with  the 
defeated  foe,  embodying,  with  certain  reservations,  the 
Fourteen  Points.  This  furnished  the  basis  of  the  Ameri- 
can programme  at  Paris.  The  other  was  psychological: 
the  state  of  mind  of  the  peoples  of  Europe. 

The  task  was  peace;  the  state  of  mind  was  one  that 
war  had  evoked.  It  even  seemed  that  the  defeat  of  the 
enemy  had  released  a  fresh  flood  of  war  passions.  The 
final  victory  of  the  war  was  to  be  the  peace. 

This  state  of  mind  was  not  confined  to  any  one  coun- 
try. It  was  not  even  peculiar  to  Europe.  It  manifested 
itself  in  America.  With  us,  if  one  may  trust  its  visible 
signs,  it  was  hardly  more  than  an  undercurrent  of  feeling 
among  a  rather  small  minority.  But  even  here  it  was 
the  kind  of  thing  unscrupulous  or  reckless  leaders  might 
have  seized  upon,  guided,  developed,  and  used  to  advance 
some  disastrous  purpose.  This  state  of  mind,  however, 
was  more  nearly  dominant  in  some  countries  than  in 
others,  just  as  everywhere  it  was  more  prevalent  among 
certain  classes  of  the  community  than  among  others. 
But  so  far  as  its  bearing  upon  the  economic  clauses  of  the 
treaty  is  concerned,  the  important  thing  about  this  state 
of  mind  is  that  it  was  expressed  in  the  French  attitude  at 


298    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

the  Peace  Conference.  For  reasons  that  must  be  clear  to 
any  sympathetic  understanding  that  state  of  mind  which 
saw  in  the  peace  a  crowning  act  of  retribution  and  Judg- 
ment was  particularly  common  in  France.  More  than 
that,  it  was  perhaps  the  most  important  single  factor  in 
the  French  domestic  poHtical  situation.  And  it  was 
built  upon  and  used  for  political  purposes. 

What,  then,  was  the  French  attitude  at  Paris?  At  its 
best  it  was  the  attitude  of  Clemenceau  and  of  his  ablest 
lieutenants.  France  could  not  be  exposed  to  the  danger 
of  another  unprovoked  attack  like  that  of  1 914.  In  some 
way,  in  whatever  way,  France  had  to  be  secured  against 
that  danger.  All  other  things  were  subsidiary  to  that 
end.  But  I  do  not  think  that  Clemenceau  had  any  illu- 
sions respecting  the  wisdom  or  the  practicability  of  the 
more  extreme  economic  proposals  his  ministers  urged 
upon  the  Peace  Conference. 

At  its  worst  the  French  attitude  was  that  of  a  few 
men  who  seemed  to  be  less  interested  in  the  ultimate 
effects  of  the  economic  provisions  of  the  treaty  than  in 
its  immediate  use  as  an  instrument  of  painful  humilia- 
tion. They  would  have  filled  the  treaty  full  of  little 
poisoned  darts  that  would  have  stung  and  rankled,  but 
could  not  have  advanced  the  interests  of  France,  and 
would  very  certainly  have  tended  to  reduce  the  measure 
of  her  moral  advantage  over  Germany.  Very  few  of 
these  unfortunate  proposals  got  into  the  treaty.  Getting 
rid  of  them  took  a  good  deal  of  time  and  effort  on  the 
part  of  both  British  and  American  delegates.  But  it  is 
right  to  say  that  they  had  the  generous  and  effective 
co-operation  of  Frenchmen  with  a  broader  and  clearer 
view  of  the  interests  of  their  own  country. 

Occupying  yet  another  position  were  those  Frenchmen 


THE  ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  299 

who,  like  every  one  else,  wanted  France's  safety  to  be 
assured,  but  could  see  safety  in  nothing  short  of  her  com- 
plete supremacy  in  Europe.  On  its  political  and  mili- 
tary side  this  supremacy  was  to  be  secured  through 
spheres  of  influence  and  military  alliances,  coupled  with 
the  partitioning  of  the  enemy  states.  Economic  suprem- 
acy was  to  be  attained  by  repressing  the  trade  and  indus- 
try of  the  enemy  states,  by  sapping  the  roots  of  their 
economic  life.  Never  was  there  a  purpose  more  tragi- 
cally blind.  No  nation  can  gather  strength  from  the 
weakness  of  other  nations. 

This  is  true  in  a  special  way  of  the  states  of  Europe, 
with  their  dense  population,  their  highly  specialized  in- 
dustries, and  their  dependence  on  each  other  and  on  the 
outside  world  for  markets  and  for  food  and  raw  materials. 
I  do  not  see  how  there  can  be  any  sound  plan  for  the 
economic  rehabilitation  of  Europe  that  does  not  take  its 
economic  solidarity  into  account. 

The  care  of  French  interests  in  the  economic  sections 
of  the  treaty  was  assigned  to  different  ministers  at  Paris. 
Their  more  important  proposals,  taken  as  a  whole,  seemed 
to  embody  the  extreme  and  suicidal  economic  policy  I 
have  just  described.  Especially  when  they  were  coupled 
with  other  French  proposals,  it  was  easy  to  read  into 
them  a  purpose  to  destroy  the  foundations  of  the  eco- 
nomic life  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  of  Germany  in 
particular.  Militarism  and  economic  policy  seemed  to 
have  joined  hands. 

I  am  convinced,  however,  that  these  proposals  had  no 
such  calculated  purpose.  In  the  first  place,  the  French 
ministers  were  men  of  political  experience  and  sagacity, 
and  they  had  able  advisers — although  the  best  economists 
in  France  were  not  among  them.     They  must  have  known 


300    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

the  futility  of  some  of  the  things  they  proposed.  In  the 
second  place,  some  of  their  demands  were  inconsistent 
one  with  another.  This  is  obviously  so  of  the  exagger- 
ated bill  for  reparation  payments  as  contrasted  with 
the  proposals  to  reduce  Germany's  export  trade,  upon 
which  her  ability  to  make  reparation  payments  de- 
pends. 

In  the  third  place — and  this  is  the  consideration  to 
which  I  attach  most  importance — in  the  discussion  and 
modification  of  these  proposals  their  true  character  was 
revealed.  They  were,  I  believe,  essentially  political. 
Their  ultimate  effect  upon  the  economic  situation  of  Ger- 
many counted  for  less  than  their  immediate  reception 
by  the  French  press,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  the 
French  voters. 

I  do  not  mean  that  these  proposals  were  consciously 
insincere — that  they  were  merely  staged.  Probably  the 
motives  and  purposes  back  of  them  were  mixed.  I  mean 
that  when  the  issue  was  pressed  the  sound  and  fury  of 
them  seemed  to  be  cherished  even  more  than  their  effec- 
tive content.  The  French  Government  at  that  time  was 
riding  on  the  surface  of  a  perilous  sea  of  popular  feeling. 
The  ship  had  to  be  steered  according  to  the  waves  and 
the  wind,  regardless  sometimes  of  the  true  direction  of 
the  port. 

I  do  not  pretend  to  a  knowledge  of  the  inwardness  of 
French  politics,  but  from  this  distance  it  appears  that 
the  cabinets  that  have  been  set  up  in  France  since  the 
Peace  Conference  have  been  following  the  same  compass- 
less  course.  The  situation  as  a  whole  remains  built  on 
the  illusions,  the  expectations,  and  the  state  of  mind 
created  during  the  war.  One  cabinet,  balked  by  the 
practical  difficulties  it  encounters,  gives  way  to  a  sue- 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  301 

cessor  willing  to  try  to  salvage  a  little  more  of  the  eco- 
nomic fruits  of  victory. 

The  new  reparations  proposals,  discussed  at  the  re- 
cent London  conference,  are  a  case  in  point.  They  are 
much  more  exacting  than  the  reparations  clauses  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.  I  cannot  explain  them  except  in 
times  of  political  exigencies  in  France,  with  Lloyd  George 
assenting  for  some  inscrutable  reasons  of  his  own.  Even 
with  the  best  will  in  the  world  (and  that  is  not  reason- 
ably to  be  expected)  Germany  could  not  meet  the  pay- 
ments demanded  of  her.  Competent  French  and  British 
experts  must  know  that  such  is  the  case.  And  the  critics 
who  have  been  clamoring  for  a  revision  of  the  reparation 
terms  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  and  who  have  complained 
that  these  terms  did  not  absolutely  fix  a  maximum  rep- 
arations sum,  must  now  understand  that,  wholly  desirable 
and  right  as  it  would  have  been,  the  fixing  of  a  maximum 
sum  that  would  have  been  anywhere  within  the  bounds 
of  reason  was  definitely  impossible. 

There  has  been  measurable  economic  progress  in 
France  since  the  war,  but  any  substantial  recovery  must 
probably  wait  until  the  French  people  have  been  told 
the  whole  truth  about  the  position  of  the  nation's  finances 
— the  drastic  measures  that  will  be  necessary  to  balance 
the  budget  and  restore  the  currency  to  a  position  where 
industry  and  foreign  trade  will  be  on  a  dependable  basis 
— and  about  the  relatively  small  sum  that,  can  be  obtained 
from  Germany  by  way  of  reparation. 

I  have  experienced  much  the  same  difficulty  in  saying 
these  things  about  the  French  attitude  that  the  American 
delegates  at  Paris  felt  in  opposing  the  French  economic 
proposals.  They  knew  that  the  grounds  of  their  objec- 
tions would  be  misunderstood.     In  fact,  more  than  once 


302     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

their  motives  were  sharply  challenged.  But  they  tried 
to  take  full  account  of  the  difference  between  France's 
experience  in  the  war  and  ours.  There  was  sympathetic 
understanding,  I  know,  of  the  inevitable  effect  which 
living  for  four  years  under  the  shadow  of  imminent 
national  disaster  must  have  upon  the  attitude  of  men. 
There  was  full  consciousness  of  the  world's  immeasurable 
debt  to  France.  But  in  loyalty  to  what  they  believed 
to  be  the  interests  of  France  and  of  the  world,  they  had 
to  refuse  to  accede  to  many  of  the  French  economic  pro- 
posals. It  is  right  to  stop  a  man  who  is  bent  on  com- 
mitting suicide. 

If  the  attitude  of  the  French  ministers  at  the  Confer- 
ence was  based  in  any  large  measure  on  political  consid- 
eration, that  fact  must  be  reflected  in  the  character  of 
the  clauses  that  were  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 
Read  these  clauses  carefully  with  this  suggestion  in  mind, 
weigh  their  real  significance,  and  you  can  hardly  fail  to 
decide  that  such  is  in  fact  the  case. 

Take,  for  example,  the  reparations  clauses.  Germany 
signs  a  blank  check  to  cover  all  the  injuries  she  had 
done  to  civilians  and  to  civilian  property.  Except  for 
the  inclusion  of  the  questionable  item  of  the  cost  of 
military  pensions,  this  is  clearly  a  reiteration  of  the  pre- 
armistice  agreement.  Without  the  military  pensions  the 
blank  check  may  be  assumed  to  cover  a  sum  as  large  as 
$15,000,000,000  or  $20,000,000,000  in  capital  value;  in- 
cluding military  pensions  probably  doubles  that  figure. 
But  this  blank  check  is  a  political  exhibit.  The  specific 
obligation  imposed  upon  Germany  was  for  the  payment  of 
a  sum  of  not  over  $15,000,000,000,  in  terms  of  present 
worth,  an  amount  which  could  not  be  increased  except  in 
the  really  impossible  event  that  Germany  should  be  found 
to  be  able  to  pay  more,  and  then  only  by  unanimous  vote 


THE   ECONOMIC   SETTLEiMENT  303 

of  the  reparations  commission.  The  new  reparations 
proposals,  it  is  possible,  may  have  been  prompted  by  the 
fact  that  the  "blank  check"  was  beginning  to  lose  its 
value  as  a  pohtical  exhibit. 

It  is  especially  hard  to  see  anything  but  a  political 
motive — a  regard  for  the  expectations  of  the  French 
people — in  the  French  delegates'  advocacy  of  the  incki- 
sion  of  war  costs  in  the  reparations  bill,  and  their  later 
acceptance  of  the  item  of  military  pensions.  This  de- 
creased France's  proportionate  share  in  the  claims  against 
the  reparation  payments,  and  on  any  reasonable  view  of 
the  total  amount  Germany  can  pay,  it  reduces  the  amount 
France  is  likely  to  receive. 

Then  take  the  commercial  clauses.  A  number  of  them 
impose  definite  obligations  upon  Germany  with  respect 
to  the  treatment  she  is  to  accord  to  the  citizens,  the  trade, 
and  the  shipping  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers.  In 
most  cases  there  are  no  assurances  of  reciprocal  treatment 
of  German  citizens,  trade,  and  shipping,  these  matters 
being  left  for  the  different  Powers  to  decide  for  them- 
selves. But  these  one-sided  obligations,  for  the  most 
part  reasonable  in  themselves,  hold  for  only  a  few  years 
— generally  five.  Then  they  stop,  except  that  in  some 
cases  their  prolongation  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

Or  consider  the  following  clause: 

Each  of  the  Allied  or  Associated  Powers,  being  guided  by  the 
general  principles  or  special  provisions  of  the  present  Treaty,  shall 
notify  to  Germany  the  bilateral  treaties  or  conventions  which  such 
Allied  or  Associated  Power  wishes  to  revive  with  Germany.  .  .  . 
The  date  of  the  revival  shall  be  that  of  the  notification. 

This  rather  unusual  but  really  necessary  provision 
leaves  the  matter  wholly  in  the  hands  of  the  Allied 
Powers.     Germany  has  no  voice  in  the  revival  or  non- 


304     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

revival  of  her  commercial  treaties  with  these  Powers. 
But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  by  the  term^s  of  these  treaties 
themselves  Germany  is  able  to  abrogate  them  by  giving 
due  notice. 

More  examples  could  be  given,  but  these  will  suffice. 
My  purpose  has  been  to  show  you  that  the  treaty  is  not, 
in  reality,  the  disguised  instrument  of  economic  oppres- 
sion that  it  sometimes  has  been  held  to  be.  If  any  are 
deceived  by  its  economic  clauses,  it  is  those  who  have 
been  counting  on  its  use  as  just  such  an  instrument. 

It  is  a  hard  and  exacting  document — it  could  and 
should  have  been  nothing  else — and  makes  some  regret- 
table but  necessary  concessions  to  the  prevailing  state 
of  mind  in  Europe,  and  especially  to  the  political  exigen- 
cies of  the  situation.  There  were  times  at  Paris  when 
that  situation  seemed  like  an  impenetrable  wall,  blocking 
the  way  to  any  tolerable  or  even  possible  solution  of  the 
economic  problems  of  the  peace.  But  the  very  fact  that 
the  situation,  while  in  part  natural  and  inevitable,  was 
also  in  part  political  and  artificial,  made  it  possible  to 
fmd  a  way  through. 

Many  of  the  economic  clauses  of  the  treaty  are  parts 
of  a  temporary  scaffolding  set  up  to  hold  things  in  place 
until  a  more  enduring  structure  can  be  erected.  The 
treaty  does  not  purpose  to  settle  the  economic  relations 
of  the  European  states  for  all  time.  It  is  a  forward- 
looking  document.  It  leaves  the  way  open  for  new  and, 
it  is  to  be  hoped,  better  adjustments  just  as  soon  as  the 
political  situation  in  Europe  makes  those  adjustments 
possible.  In  the  long  run  the  economic  settlement  will 
be  just  what  the  world  makes  of  it. 

There  is  one  criticism  which  may  rightly  be  made  of 
the  economic  provisions  as  a  whole.     They  are  too  minute 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT 


D^i) 


and  detailed,  and  there  are  too  many  of  thcni.  Reading 
them  you  are  likely  to  say  that  nothing  that  could  have 
been  thought  of  was  left  out.  That  is  not  quite  true. 
More  proposals  were  left  out  than  were  put  in,  but  the 
provisions  as  they  stand  are  a  formidable  array.  Leave 
to  one  side  the  larger  matters,  such  as  the  clauses  relating 
to  reparations,  finance,  and  the  disposition  of  German- 
owned  foreign  property,  and  the  multitude  of  stipulations 
that  remain  give  the  impression  not  so  much  of  severity 
as  of  unnecessary  and  meticulous  concern  for  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Allied  Powers. 

This  is  again  a  more  or  less  inevitable  outcome  of  the 
concrete  situation.  A  large  number  of  Powers  were 
jointly  determining  the  terms  on  which  peace  should  be 
made  with  a  relatively  small  group  of  enemy  Powers. 
Their  outlooks  and  interests  differed.  To  one  delegation 
certain  proposals  seemed  to  provide  for  matters  that 
were  clearly  essential.  Other  delegations  attached  more 
importance  to  other  sets  of  proposals.  Then  there  were 
the  limited  or  special  interests  of  the  individual  Powers. 
Some  of  these  interests  were  wholly  legitimate;  that  is,  it 
was  proper  and  necessary  that  they  be  safeguarded.  But 
in  practice  it  is  hard  to  recognize  any  special  interests 
without  recognizing  others.  The  representatives  of  the 
smaller  states,  in  particular,  sometimes  explained  that 
they  would  be  accused  at  home  of  having  been  inatten- 
tive to  their  country's  interests  if  they  failed  to  secure 
special  provisions  corresponding  to  what  had  already 
been  conceded,  properly  enough,  on  the  insistence  of 
some  other  state.  Such  things  as  these  sometimes  led 
to  difficult  and  perplexing  situations,  calling  for  tact  and 
patience  on  the  part  of  those  who  had  the  broader  and 
more  general  interests  of  the  treaty  at  heart.  Generally 
those  difficulties  were  finally   resolved   in  a  reasonable 


3o6    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

way  and  without  undue  concessions  to  special  national 
interests. 

It  is  easy,  however,  to  exaggerate  the  real  importance 
of  this  large  group  of  detailed  economic  specifications. 
With  very  few  exceptions  each  one  taken  by  itself  is 
defensible,  and  most  of  them  are  necessary.  The  Ameri- 
can delegates  believed,  however,  that  much  the  same  or 
better  results  might  have  been  obtained  through  simpler 
and  more  general  provisions. 

Much  has  been  written  of  the  Council  of  Four,  and 
much  emphasis — perhaps  too  much  emphasis — has  been 
put  on  the  clash  of  personalities  and  purposes  in  its  coun- 
cil room.  If  space  permitted,  I  should  want  to  try  to 
fill  in  some  of  the  details  that  may  be  wanting  in  the  pic- 
ture of  the  Peace  Conference  at  work  by  describing,  as 
concretely  as  I  could,  the  way  in  which  the  business  of 
the  various  commissions  and  subcommissions  that  dealt 
with  economic  matters  was  handled.  But  I  shall  have 
to  confine  myself  to  saying  a  word  about  the  men  who 
composed  them.  Here  I  have  especially  in  mind,  merely 
because  I  know  it  best,  the  economic  commission,  which 
dealt  with  commercial  relations  and  the  status  of  eco- 
nomic treaties,  of  pre-war  debts  and  contracts,  of  seques- 
tered or  liquidated  enemy  property,  and  of  patents  and 
other  forms  of  industrial  property. 

One  had  to  give  ungrudging  admiration  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  British  economic  delegates  and  technical 
advisers,  a  number  of  whom  were  Board  of  Trade  officials. 
Highly  competent  in  all  technical  matters,  always  care- 
fully prepared,  they  were  never  without  an  easy  mas- 
tery of  the  subject  in  hand.  Keenly  alive  to  British 
interests,  they  always  had  also  at  heart  the  general  inter- 


THE   ECONOMIC   SETTLEMENT  307 

ests  of  the  treaty.  Despite  some  sharp  differences  of 
opinion,  the  American  delegation  is  indebted  to  them 
for  a  large  amount  of  helpful  and  generous  co-operation. 

Among  the  French  representatives  there  were  more 
varied  shades  of  personal  attitude.  Those  who  repre- 
sented the  Ministry  of  Commerce  had  a  carefully  prepared 
programme  which  they  upheld  with  ability  and  tenacity. 
I  should  be  doing  this  particular  group  of  men  an  injus- 
tice if  I  did  not  record  their  patient  courtesy  under  con- 
ditions that  must  sometimes  have  been  trying,  and  their 
generous  comprehension  of  other  points  of  view. 

There  were  distinctly  able  men  among  the  Italian 
economic  delegates,  but  they  seemed  to  be  rather  closely 
bound  by  instructions  from  their  government,  and  less 
free  to  make  decisions,  even  on  matters  of  distinctly 
minor  importance.  Among  the  economic  delegates  from 
other  states,  I  venture  to  single  out  the  representatives 
of  Belgium  and  of  Brazil  as  conspicuous  in  respect  of 
ability,  technical  knowledge,  and  breadth  of  view.  The 
Belgian  delegates,  I  am  sure,  did  not  weaken  Belgium's 
cause  because  they  added  to  their  solicitude  for  her  wel- 
fare a  manifest  ambition  that  the  treaty  as  a  whole 
should  establish  a  just  peace. 

The  selection  of  the  heads  of  our  war  boards  and  of 
representatives  of  the  treasury  to  take  charge  of  Ameri- 
can interests  in  the  economic  sections  of  the  treaty  was 
an  obvious  one  to  make.  Mr.  Baruch,  Mr.  McCormick, 
Mr.  Davis,  and  Mr.  Lamont  had  all  been  concerned  with 
the  common  economic  problems  and  policies  of  the  Allies 
during  the  period  of  our  participation  in  the  war.  They 
had  become  familiar  with  many  of  the  matters  that  were 
to  come  up  for  discussion  at  Paris;  they  understood  the 
different  points  of  view  of  the  other  Powers;  they  had 


3o8    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS      ' 

earned  the  confidence  of  the  country.  In  addition  to 
their  responsibilities  in  connection  with  the  treaty,  they 
had  to  deal  with  important  and  pressing  current  matters 
of  economic  relations  and  economic  policy.  For  this 
purpose  a  new  body,  the  Supreme  Economic  Council, 
superseding  various  agencies  of  Interallied  co-operation 
that  had  been  developed  during  the  war,  was  set  up  at 
Paris.  Mr.  Hoover,  an  important  member  of  the  Supreme 
Economic  Council,  was  not  officially  associated  with  the 
drafting  of  the  treaty.  This  does  not  mean,  however, 
that  his  counsel  was  not  frequently  sought. 

Adequate  sources  of  information  were  available  to  the 
American  delegates.  Care  had  been  taken  to  anticipate 
the  economic  problems  that  might  be  discussed  and  prep- 
arations had  been  made  accordingly.  It  was  inevitable 
that  information  should  have  been  gathered  on  many 
matters  that  did  not  come  up  for  discussion.  It  was  im- 
possible to  foresee  the  precise  course  events  would  follow. 
The  important  thing  was  that  whatever  information  was 
needed  should  not  be  wanting.  Supplementing  the  large 
accumulations  of  information  that  were  in  the  hands  of 
the  war  boards,  a  fairly  large  amount  of  useful  material 
had  been  brought  together  by  The  Inquiry.  Much  of  it 
bore  upon  the  territorial  rather  than  the  more  general 
economic  problems  of  the  peace.  Agriculture,  mining, 
industry,  commerce,  transportation  routes,  and  the  like, 
had  been  studied  with  special  reference  to  their  bearing 
upon  the  shifting  of  boundaries,  the  creation  of  new 
states,  and  the  reorganization  of  colonial  systems. 
Through  the  co-operation  of  the  United  States  Geological 
Survey  there  was  available  the  most  complete  and  accu- 
rate body  of  information  respecting  the  location  and 
magnitude  of  the  mineral  reserves  of  the  world  that  had 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  309 

ever  been  brought  together.  Various  bureaus  of  the 
Department  of  Agriculture  and  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce also  compiled  economic  statistics  or  prepared  eco- 
nomic maps  for  the  use  of  the  American  delegation.  The 
United  States  Tariff  Commission  had  supplied  a  very 
complete  index  and  digest  of  the  commercial  treaties 
of  the  world.  A  small  statistical  organization  was  main- 
tained at  Paris,  so  that  facts  could  quickly  be  put  into 
usable  form.  A  group  of  American  army  engineers,  it 
should  also  be  said,  had  made  careful  studies  in  the 
field  which  gave  a  reasonably  accurate  notion  of  the 
amount  of  damages  for  which  Germany  was  liable  under 
the  terms  of  the  pre-armistice  agreement. 

The  matters  I  have  just  been  discussing  have  taken  us 
away  from  our  main  theme — the  influences  which  deter- 
mined the  shaping  of  the  economic  clauses  of  the  treaty. 
I  have  reserved  two  of  the  most  important  factors  in  the 
situation  for  the  last. 

In  June,  1916,  before  the  United  States  had  entered 
the  war,  an  economic  conference  of  the  Allies  was  held 
at  Paris,  A  common  economic  policy  after  the  war  was 
agreed  upon.  During  the  period  of  reconstruction  im- 
ports from  enemy  countries  were  to  be  restricted  or  even 
prohibited,  and  enemy  subjects  were  to  be  excluded  from 
industrial  and  professional  activities  within  the  Allied 
countries.  Some  measure  of  discrimination  against  the 
enemy  countries,  it  was  suggested,  might  be  continued 
as  a  permanent  policy. 

In  most  quarters  the  resolutions  of  the  Paris  economic 
conference  were  not  taken  very  seriously.  They  were 
interpreted  as  an  aimless  release  of  war  passions,  as  a 


310    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

gesture  of  intimidation,  or  at  the  most  as  an  attempt  to 
organize  the  economic  advantages  of  the  Allies  so  that 
they  could  be  bargained  with  to  best  advantage  when 
peace  came  to  be  made.  A  year  ago  two  of  the  British 
delegates  said  these  resolutions  were  a  reply  to  an  earlier 
declaration  of  economic  war  by  the  Central  Powers. 

Even  before  the  armistice  the  Paris  resolutions  had 
become  well-nigh  forgotten — at  any  rate  in  the  United 
States.  I  recall  them  here  merely  because  they  were 
revived,  in  effect,  at  the  Peace  Conference,  in  proposals 
made  by  the  French  Ministry  of  Commerce  for  a  special 
economic  regime  for  the  period  of  reconstruction.  They 
had  lost,  of  course,  most  of  their  military  significance. 
The  emphasis  was  now  put  upon  the  special  needs  and 
deserts  of  the  countries  which  had  suffered  most  from 
the  war,  and  especially  upon  the  injustice  of  permitting 
German  industry  to  gain  an  advantage  at  the  start  over 
the  industries  that  had  to  be  rebuilt  because  the  German 
armies  had  wantonly  destroyed  them.  Much  was  said, 
in  other  countries  as  well  as  in  France,  about  the  neces- 
sity of  "priorities'*  in  supplies  of  raw  materials  and  in 
allocation  of  shipping. 

There  were  some  who  went  even  further  and  urged 
that  the  whole  world  situation  was  such  as  to  compel  a 
complete  supervision  of  the  distribution  of  raw  materials 
and  the  necessaries  of  life  among  the  different  nations. 
The  ordinary  forces  of  the  market,  it  was  held,  were 
inadequate.  Allocations  should  be  based  on  fundamental 
needs  rather  than  on  present  ability  to  buy.  Those  who 
wanted  priorities  with  a  view  to  special  national  interests 
and  those  who  urged  a  world  system  of  priorities  in 
which  immediate  national  interests  should  be  disregarded 
wanted  the  same  general  sort  of  system,  although  un- 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  311 

doubtedly  it  would  have  operated  very  differently  in  the 
one  case  and  the  other. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  some  of  these  proposals  made 
a  telling  appeal  to  the  sense  of  justice.  Their  wisdom 
and  their  practicability  were  other  matters.  It  is  far 
from  clear  that  they  would  have  afforded  any  real  mea- 
sure of  relief  or  that  they  would  have  been  as  effective  as 
unimpeded  private  enterprise.  The  arguments  back  of 
them  rested  in  part  upon  exaggerated  estimates  of  world 
shortages  in  raw  materials  and  shipping.  In  most  in- 
stances "priorities"  would  have  been  meaningless,  for, 
given  effective  methods  of  distribution,  there  was  more 
than  enough  to  go  around.  In  the  arguments  for  special 
priorities  for  the  industries  of  the  devastated  regions, 
there  was  a  general  tendency  to  underestimate  the  extent 
to  which  German  industries,  likewise,  had  been  stripped 
for  the  benefit  of  the  German  armies,  as  well  as  to  forget 
the  direct  connection  between  Germany's  ability  to  export 
goods  and  her  ability  to  make  reparation  payments. 

But  quite  apart  from  the  wisdom  of  the  proposed  tran- 
sitional regime,  it  would  have  encountered  insuperable 
practical  difficulties.  In  the  first  place,  it  would  not  of 
itself  have  removed  the  chief  obstacle  to  the  speedy  eco- 
nomic rehabilitation  of  the  countries  that  might  have 
been  granted  priorities.  I  mean  the  financial  obstacle. 
Priorities  are  valueless  unless  they  are  accompanied  by 
ability  to  buy.  It  should  be  said,  however,  that  these 
proposals  for  priorities  were  often  associated  with  finan- 
cial propositions,  such  as  pooling  the  war  debts  of  the 
Allies,  or  pooling  the  proceeds  of  special  war  taxes  to  be 
imposed  in  all  of  the  Allied  states,  or  the  joint  under- 
writing of  the  reparations  payments. 

In  the  second  place  special  restrictions  upon  Germany's 


312     WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

export  trade,  coupled  with  priorities  for  the  needs  of  the 
industries  of  the  devastated  regions,  would  have  made 
it  necessary  to  continue  not  only  the  machinery  of  inter- 
allied economic  co-operation,  but  also  an  effective  na- 
tional control  of  trade  in  each  Allied  country.  And  that 
was  a  practical  political  impossibility. 

Finally,  let  us  turn  to  another  proposal — and  one  of  a 
very  different  sort.  The  proposal  to  which  I  refer  was 
made  by  President  Wilson  on  January  8,  1918.  The 
third  of  the  Fourteen  Points  called  for  "The  removal,  so 
far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barriers  and  the  establish- 
ment of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions  among  all  nations 
consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for 
its  maintenance." 

The  words  '*the  removal  of  economic  barriers"  gave 
rise  to  some  real  or  pretended  misgivings  in  American 
political  circles.  Our  protective  tariff  is  an  "economic 
barrier."  Was  it  the  President's  purpose  that  it  should 
be  removed  ?  Finally  the  President  was  forced  to  explain 
that  of  course  he  "meant  to  suggest  no  restriction  upon 
the  free  determination  of  any  nation  of  its  own  economic 
policy,  but  only  that  whatever  tariff  any  nation  mJght 
deem  necessary  for  its  own  economic  service,  be  that 
tariff  high  or  low,  it  should  apply  equally  to  all  foreign 
nations;  in  other  words,  there  should  be  no  discrimina- 
tion against  some  nations  that  did  not  apply  to  others." 
The  President's  explanation  further  made  it  clear  that 
what  most  of  all  he  meant  should  be  done  away  with 
was  the  exertion  of  economic  discrimination  for  hostile 
purposes.  This  proposal,  then,  was  closely  linked  to  his 
other  proposal  that  the  economic  weapon  should  be 
intrusted  solely  to  the  League  of  Nations.     The  passing 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  313 

of  the  power  to  discriminate  against  the  trade  of  some 
particular  nation  or  nations  was  to  be  like  the  reduction 
of  national  armaments. 

The  full  significance  of  this  proposal  is  not  easily  seen 
by  Americans,  accustomed  to  tariff  schedules  definitely 
set  by  Act  of  Congress.  Not  that  our  tariff  system  is 
wholly  without  its  discriminatory  features,  but  these  are 
not  what  give  it  its  special  character.  In  continental 
Europe,  however,  legislation  fixes  two  (or  in  some  cases 
more)  sets  of  tariff  schedules,  or  fixes  the  upper  and 
lower  limits  of  the  duties  that  may  be  put  into  effect. 
Each  country,  then,  in  principle  at  least,  is  in  a  position 
to  refuse  to  make  tariff  concessions  to  countries  which 
do  not,  in  turn,  give  favorable  treatment  to  its  own 
trade. 

Under  this  system  a  discriminatory  tariff  is  to  one 
state  a  necessary  means  of  defense  against  possible  dis- 
crimination on  the  part  of  other  states.  But  defensive 
weapons  are  prone  to  be  used  for  offense.  And  this  is 
true  of  differential  tariffs.  The  most  systematic  and 
consistent  development  of  such  tariffs  has  been  in  France, 
but  Germany  was  the  first  state  to  grasp  their  full  possi- 
bilities as  methods  of  controlling  and  dictating  the  com- 
mercial policy  of  other  states.  Even  in  supposedly  sober 
and  scientific  discussions  the  German  tariff  was  not  in- 
frequently referred  to  as  an  instrument  of  Machlpolitik, 
as  a  means  of  "imposing  Germany's  will"  on  other  states. 

The  European  commercial  system  before  the  war  was 
held  together  by  commercial  treaties.  Generally  these 
specified  the  tariff  schedules  which  should  apply  as  be- 
tween the  two  contracting  states.  They  also  contained 
most-favored-nation  clauses,  which  assured  to  each  state 
the  advantages  of  any  further  concession  either  of  them 


314     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

should  make  to  a  third  state.  As  a  result,  the  revision 
of  an  important  commercial  treaty  was  likely  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  sweeping  changes  in  European  tariffs. 

I  imagine  that  the  *' equality  of  trade  conditions," 
which  President  Wilson  proposed  would  mean  in  prac- 
tice something  like  a  general  or  multilateral  commercial 
treaty,  in  which  the  signatory  Powers  would  guarantee 
to  each  other  equal,  i.  e.,  most-favored  nation,  treatment 
in  respect  of  tariffs  and  other  commercial  matters. 

Whether  colonial  tariffs  of  the  sort  which  give  free 
trade  or  reduced  duties  to  the  home  states  and  discrimi- 
nate against  but  not  among  other  states,  are  to  be  deemed 
infringements  of  equality  of  trade  conditions,  is  a  more 
difficult  question.  It  depends,  I  suppose,  upon  the 
degree  to  which  a  state  and  its  colonies  may  be  consid- 
ered a  unified  political  system,  with  one  centre  of  sov- 
ereignty. It  is  probably  wiser  to  consider  this  matter 
of  the  open  door  in  colonies  as  a  distinct  and  separate 
problem.  The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  it 
will  be  remembered,  provides  for  the  open  door  in  all 
regions  that  are  to  be  administered  by  mandatories. 

There  are  other  important  aspects  to  equality  of  trade 
conditions.  What  I  have  said  merely  suggests  the  gen- 
eral nature  of  the  problem.  The  matter  was  not  thrashed 
out  at  Paris.  The  immediate  and  all-absorbing  task  was 
to  determine  the  terms  of  peace  with  the  enemy  Powers, 
rather  than  adjust  the  commercial  relations  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  of  Nations.  But  the  proposal  was 
not  forgotten  or  put  aside.  In  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  is  this  clause: 

Subject  to  and  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  international 
conventions  existing  or  hereafter  to  be  agreed  upon,  the  Members  of 
the  League  will  make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  315 

communications  and  of  transit  and  equitable  treatment  for  the  com- 
merce of  all  members  of  the  League.  In  this  connection,  the  special 
necessities  of  the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914-1918 
shall  be  borne  in  mind.^ 

In  the  summer  of  1920  some  attempts  were  made  to 
raise  an  alarm  by  urging  that  this  clause  looks  toward 
free  trade  among  the  members  of  the  League.  It  is  not 
even  necessary  to  show  that  the  words  of  the  clause  can- 
not possibly  be  tortured  into  such  a  meaning.  Any  one 
who  has  any  knowledge  of  the  history  or  present  status 
of  the  protective  tariff  policies  of  European  states  will 
realize  how  impossible  it  is  that  any  clause  to  which  such 
a  meaning  might  be  attributed  could  have  passed  the 
watchful  scrutiny  to  which  every  word  in  the  treaty  was 
subjected. 

In  one  way,  it  must  frankly  be  admitted,  the  treat- 
ies framed  at  Paris  create  new  "economic  barriers." 
In  eastern  Europe  the  treaties  shift  and  multiply  po- 
litical boundaries.  Following,  for  the  most  part,  lines 
of  cleavage  between  nationalities,  these  boundaries  cut 
across  established  channels  of  economic  intercourse  and 
sever  territories  that  have  been  and  remain  economically 
dependent  one  on  another.     In  part  the  old  economic 

1  In  the  reply  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  to  the  observations  of  the 
German  delegation  on  the  conditions  of  peace,  there  is  further  reference  to  the 
matter: 

"The  principles  which  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  desire  to  bring  into 
application  when  the  world  returns  to  normal  conditions,  are  those  which  Presi- 
dent Wilson  has  enunciated  on  various  occasions  in  his  speeches,  and  which  are 
embodied  ...  [as  above]  ...  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  .  .  . 
After  the  necessary  period  of  transition  is  over,  and  when  a  reformed  Germany 
is  admitted  to  membership  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  will  be  able  to  co-operate  with  her  in  arriving  at  a  more  permanent 
arrangement  for  the  establishment  of  an  equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce 
of  all  nations." 


3i6    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

systems  in  eastern  Europe  were  artificial.  Agriculture 
and  industry  had  grown  up  inside  of  high-tariff  walls  and 
had,  perforce,  found  their  markets  very  largely  within 
those  same  walls.  But  if  artificial,  the  old  system  of 
market  relations  was  none  the  less  real.  It  cannot  sud- 
denly be  upset  without  a  shock  greater  than  the  new 
states,  in  their  present  weakened  condition,  can  safely 
absorb. 

If  the  treaties  had  been  drafted  by  a  group  of  despots, 
irresponsible  but  benevolently  inclined,  some  measure  of 
compulsory  economic  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the 
states  of  eastern  Europe  might  very  easily  have  been 
insisted  upon.  But  as  things  were,  compulsory  customs 
unions  or  similar  arrangements  were  outside  the  field  of 
possibilities.  There  was  some  fear,  justified  or  not,  that 
economic  unions  might  pave  the  way  to  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  old  political  systems.  But  the  real  obstacle 
was  the  highly  nationalistic  attitude  of  the  new  states 
themselves,  showing  itself  in  an  insistence  on  economic 
autonomy  and  independence.  The  best  that  could  be 
done  was  to  give  the  new  states  power  to  reduce  or 
remove  certain  economic  barriers  in  their  own  discretion. 
Thus  at  any  time  within  three  years  Austria,  Hungary, 
and  the  Czecho-SIovak  state  may  enter  into  special 
customs  arrangements.  The  Czecho-SIovak  state  may 
choose  between  such  a  customs  union  and  one  with 
Poland.  Poland,  in  turn,  is  left  free  to  enter  into  special 
customs  arrangements  with  Russia  or  with  states  whose 
territories  were  formerly  parts  of  Russia.  But  Poland 
cannot  give  exceptional  tariff  concessions  to  Austria  or 
Hungary  or  Germany. 

These  provisions  are  not  adequate.  They  recognize 
the  problem  and  its  importance,  and  probably  go  as  far 


THE   ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENT  317 

toward  a  solution  of  it  as  was  humanly  possible  under 
all  the  conditions  that  existed  at  Paris.  They  afford  a 
temporary  and  tentative  solution.  More  permanent  ar- 
rangements will  have  to  be  reached  under  the  guidance 
of  the  League  of  Nations  when  the  political  situation  in 
eastern  Europe  makes  such  arrangements  possible. 

But  it  is  absurd  to  believe  that  the  treaties  are  in  any 
way  responsible  for  the  economic  plight  of  Europe  or  of 
any  part  of  it.  Nothing  has  happened  that  has  lifted 
that  responsibility  from  the  place  where  from  the  begin- 
ning it  has  rested,  and  that  is  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
former  governments  of  the  territories  that  were  once  the 
Central  Powers.  It  is  hard  to  be  patient  with  men  who 
point  to  the  economic  dissolution  war  has  wrought,  and 
say:  "There  are  the  fruits  of  your  peace." 

I  have  tried  to  give  a  candid  account  of  the  economic 
clauses  of  the  treaties.  I  have  not  tried  to  gloss  over 
their  imperfections,  or  to  pretend  that  they  afford  a  final 
settlement  of  all  the  matters  with  which  they  are  con- 
cerned. But  I  trust  I  have  made  it  clear  that  they  are 
not  the  outcome  of  secret  arrangements  and  understand- 
ings; that  they  were  worked  out  slowly,  clause  by  clause, 
in  the  face  of  formidable  and  sometimes  discouraging 
difficulties. 

I  have  emphasized  the  element  of  compromise  and 
concession  in  these  economic  clauses.  No  one  of  these 
compromises  represents  a  capitulation  on  the  part  of  the 
American  delegation.  Every  one  of  them,  I  believe, 
embodies  a  large  concession  to  the  principles  for  which 
the  American  delegation  stood.  From  one  point  of  view 
every  compromise  represents  the  partial  defeat  of  a 
principle.     From  another  point  of  view  every  compro- 


3i8     WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

mfse  in  the  treaties  is  a  recognition  of  another  principle, 
a  step  forward  in  that  path  of  international  agreement 
and  understanding  which  is  the  only  road  left  to  the 
world. 


XIII 

THE  LABOR  CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY 

BY    SAMUEL   GOMPERS 

American  labor  did  not  leave  the  Peace  Conference  in 
Paris  with  all  it  felt  it  ought,  in  justice,  to  have  secured, 
but  it  left  with  all  it  was  possible  to  get.  American  labor 
felt  then,  as  it  feels  now,  that  the  proper  course  was  to 
make  the  best  fight  possible,  and  to  work  during  the 
ensuing  years  for  the  securing  of  amendments. 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  a  treaty  satisfactory  to 
every  nation,  or  all  the  people  of  any  nation,  could  be 
secured  in  the  Paris  Conference.  Those  who  had  eyes 
to  see  knew,  also,  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  secure 
a  treaty  written  in  the  spirit  of  America's  participation 
in  the  war,  because  there  were  present  in  Paris  those  who 
were  selfish  and  those  who  were  in  reahty  the  emissaries 
of  the  old  condemned  order  of  things. 

In  miy  opinion  there  are  serious  defects  in  the  labor 
provisions  of  the  treaty.  But  I  also  know  that  those 
defects  could  not  be  removed  in  Paris,  because  every 
possible  effort  was  made  to  secure  their  removal. 

The  direct  opening  for  the  insertion  of  a  labor  clause 
in  the  treaty  was  provided  in  the  original  draft  of  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Article  20  pro- 
vided as  follows: 

The  high  contracting  parties  will  endeavor  to  secure  and  maintain 
fair  and  humane  conditions  of  labor  for  men,  women  and  children, 
both  in  their  own  countries  and  in  all  countries  to  which  their  indus- 

319 


320    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

trial  and  commercial  relations  extend;  and  to  that  end  agree  to 
establish  as  part  of  the  organization  of  the  League  of  Nations  a  per- 
manent bureau  of  labor. 

To  give  effect  to  Article  20  the  supreme  council  rep- 
resenting the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  at  Paris 
created  the  commission  on  international  labor  legislation. 
I  had  the  honor  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  a  mem- 
ber of  that  commission,  and  later  by  the  commission  to 
be  elected  its  president. 

Due  to  a  number  of  circumstances,  one  of  which  was 
that  many  nations  did  not  see  fit  to  name  a  true  repre- 
sentative of  labor  to  membership  on  this  commission, 
much  of  the  time  I  found  myself  in  the  position  of  being 
the  sole  representative  of  trade-union  thought.  It  may 
be  of  interest  to  say  that  some  countries  appointed  So- 
ciaHsts  to  membership,  and  that  the  struggle  to  secure 
consent  of  these  Socialists  to  constructive  proposals  was 
as  difficult  and  discouraging  as  it  was  to  secure  the  con- 
sent to  similar  proposals  from  government  representa- 
tives. It  is  a  just  indictment  of  these  political  party 
spokesmen  that  they  obstructed  constructive  work  and 
that  they  seemed  unable  to  bring  themselves  to  deal 
with  definite  relations  of  men  and  nations.  They  con- 
stantly were  of  assistance  to  those  who  were  trying  to 
weaken  the  labor  provisions  that  were  to  be  written  into 
the  treaty. 

I  have  had  much  experience  with  politicians  who 
claimed  to  speak  in  the  name  of  labor  and  who  claimed 
to  be  revolutionary  and  uncompromising  for  labor's 
cause.  I  have  not  had  any  more  enlightening  experience 
than  that  in  Paris,  nor  any  that  was  more  convincing  in 
regard  to  the  lack  of  understanding  possessed  by  such 
people.     It  is  due  to  the  fact  that  proposals  favored  by 


THE  LABOR  CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY    321 

the  European  Socialists  were  defeated,  and  proposals  op- 
posed by  them  were  finally  driven  through,  that  Ameri- 
can labor  was  able  to  indorse  overwhelmingly  the  treaty 
and  the  labor  provisions.  During  the  darkest  days  in 
Paris  this  prospect  seemed  so  unlikely  that  the  American 
labor  mission,  of  which  I  was  chairman,  thought  seriously 
of  departing  for  home  in  despair  of  being  able  to  serve 
the  cause  of  humanity  by  remaining. 

But  it  was  my  duty  to  make  the  fight  as  long  as  there 
was  opportunity  and  it  was  possible  finally  to  secure  a 
completed  work  that  could  be  accepted,  not  grudgingly, 
but  whole-heartedly  and  with  enthusiasm. 

The  commission  held  thirty-five  sessions.  The  Ameri- 
can members  made  every  effort  to  secure  ample  op- 
portunity for  the  public  to  be  informed  as  the  work 
progressed,  but  we  were  compelled  to  submit  to  the  pre- 
vaiHng  system  of  communiques  which  kept  the  public 
informed  of  essential  developments,  but  conveyed  nothing 
of  the  surrounding  conditions. 

The  report  of  the  commission,  submitted  to  the  peace 
commissioners,  was  in  two  parts.  The  first  part  was  a 
draft  convention  creating  a  permanent  organization  for 
international  labor  legislation.  The  second  part  con- 
tained the  labor  clauses,  known  as  "Labor's  Bill  of 
Rights,"  consisting  of  nine  essential  clauses  expressing 
fundamentals  for  insertion  in  the  treaty  of  peace. 

The  draft  convention  provided  for  the  establishment 
of  a  permanent  labor  organization,  adherence  to  this 
organization  to  be  obligatory  upon  all  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties.  Acceptance  of  the  principles  enun- 
ciated in  Labor's  Bill  of  Rights  was  to  be  a  part  of  the 
act  of  approval  of  the  treaty  as  a  whole. 

The  international  labor  organization  itself  is  divided 


322    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED   AT  PARIS 

into  two  parts.  One  of  these  parts  is  the  international 
labor  eonference  and  the  other  is  the  international 
labor  oflice,  eontrolled  by  a  governing  body  selected 
annually. 

The  composition  of  the  international  labor  confer- 
ence was  one  of  the  points  upon  which  there  was  serious 
difference  of  opinion.  The  provision  in  this  regard  is 
that  for  each  nation  there  shall  be  one  delegate  selected 
by  the  recognized  labor  organization,  one  by  the  most 
representative  organization  of  employers  and  two  by 
the  government.  This  makes  it  possible  for  a  combina- 
tion of  employer  and  government  delegates  to  outvote 
the  labor  delegates  on  any  question,  a  contingency  which, 
in  the  American  view,  was  improper,  inadvisable,  and 
indefensible.  Obviously,  under  such  circumstances  it  is 
only  by  courtesy  that  a  conference  can  be  called  a  labor 
conference.  It  may  be  that  there  will  never  be  such  a 
combination,  but  the  fact  remains  even  now  that  such 
a  combination  is  possible.  The  American  view  on  this 
question  was  supported  by  the  French,  Italian,  and 
Cuban  delegations.  Some  of  the  foremost  Socialists  of 
the  world  were  members  of  the  Conference  and  fought 
and  voted  to  sustain  the  provision  giving  governments 
this  disproportionate  representation.  Their  view-point 
was  egotistical  and,  therefore,  perhaps  characteristic.  It 
was  to  the  effect  that  Socialists  shortly  would  be  in 
control  of  most  of  the  governments  of  the  w^orld,  and 
therefore  the  workers  would  have  the  majority  in  all 
international  labor  conferences. 

If  the  hope  of  the  working  people  of  the  world  had 
found  in  Paris  no  more  substantial  support  than  the 
support  of  the  Socialists  who  were  given  membership  on 
the  commission  empowered  to  draft  the  labor  proposals 


THE  LABOR  CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY    323 

of  the  treaty,  that  hope  would  have  been  a  most  forlorn 
one. 

I  may  say  with  candor,  and  with  many  a  memory  of 
those  days  still  fresh  in  my  mind,  that  the  contest  against 
reaction  and  misunderstanding  and  wilfulness  and  Uto- 
pian foolishness  was  one  of  the  most  difficult  of  my  life. 
Striving  day  after  day  against  all  of  these  conditions 
and  these  forces,  in  order  to  bring  into  existence  a  docu- 
ment having  in  it  something  of  constructive  thought, 
something  of  worthy  and  workable  purpose,  was  an  ex- 
perience through  which  I  have  no  desire  to  pass  again, 
though  that  is  not  to  say  that  I  would  not  if  human 
welfare  demanded  it. 

The  compensation  came  when  we  were  able  to  report 
to  the  peace  commissioners  a  document  that  did  measur- 
ably meet  the  requirements  of  justice  and  freedom  and 
that  did  measurably  come  up  to  the  standards  set  by  the 
American  labor  movement,  standards  which  I  unhesitat- 
ingly set  down  as  the  highest  standards  presented  by  la- 
bor anywhere  during  the  Peace  Conference.  The  Amer- 
ican labor  movement  carried  the  foremost  banner  of 
freedom  and  human  progress  into  that  great  discussion, 
and  it  succeeded  in  planting  that  banner  at  a  position 
far  more  advanced  than  seemed  possible  at  the  outset. 

The  adoption  of  the  bill  of  rights  as  adopted  by  the 
commission  on  international  labor  legislation  was  moved 
at  the  plenary  session  of  the  Peace  Conference,  April  28, 
1 919,  whereupon  the  following  redraft  was  moved  as  an 
amendment,  adopted  and  inserted  in  the  treaty  of  peace 
(Article  427) : 

The  high  contracting  parties,  recognizing  that  the  well-being, 
physical,  moral  and  intellectual,  of  industrial  wage-earners  is  of 
supreme  international  importance,  have  framed  a  permanent  ma- 


324    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

chinery  associated  with  that  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  further  this 
great  end.  They  recognize  that  differences  of  climate,  habits  and 
customs  of  economic  opportunity  and  industrial  tradition  make 
strict  uniformity  in  the  conditions  of  labor  difficult  of  immediate 
attainment.  But  holding,  as  they  do,  that  labor  should  not  be 
regarded  merely  as  an  article  of  commerce,  they  think  that  there  are 
methods  and  principles  for  regulating  labor  conditions  which  all 
industrial  communities  should  endeavor  to  apply  so  far  as  their 
special  circumstances  will  permit. 

Among  these  methods  and  principles  the  following  seem  to  the 
high  contracting  parties  to  be  of  special  and  urgent  importance: 

First.  The  guiding  principle  above  enunciated  that  labor  should 
not  be  regarded  merely  as  a  commodity  or  article  of  commerce. 

Second.  The  right  of  association  for  all  lawful  purposes  by  the 
employed  as  well  as  by  the  employers. 

Third.  The  payment  to  the  employed  of  a  wage  adequate  to 
maintain  a  reasonable  standard  of  life  as  this  is  understood  in  their 
time  and  country. 

Fourth.  The  adoption  of  an  eight  hours'  day  or  a  forty-eight 
hours'  week  as  the  standard  to  be  aimed  at  where  it  has  not  already 
been  obtained. 

Fifth.  The  adoption  of  a  weekly  rest  of  at  least  twenty-four 
hours,  which  should  include  Sunday  whenever  practicable. 

Sixth.  The  abolition  of  child  labor  and  the  imposition  of  such 
limitations  on  the  labor  of  young  persons  as  shall  permit  the  con- 
tinuation of  their  education  and  assure  their  proper  physical  devel- 
opment. 

Seventh.  The  principle  that  men  and  women  should  receive  equal 
remuneration  for  work  of  equal  value. 

Eighth.  The  standard  set  by  law  in  each  country  with  respect 
to  the  conditions  of  labor  should  have  due  regard  to  the  equitable 
economic  treatment  of  all  workers  lawfully  resident  therein. 

Ninth.  Each  state  should  make  provision  for  a  system  of  inspec- 
tion in  which  women  should  take  part  in  order  to  insure  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  laws  and  regulations  for  the  protection  of  the  employed. 

Without  claiming  that  these  methods  and  principles  are  either 
complete  or  final,  the  high  contracting  parties  are  of  opinion  that 
they  are  well  fitted  to  guide  the  policy  of  the  League  of  Nations  and 
that  if  adopted  by  the  industrial  communities  who  are  members  of 
the  league  and  safeguarded  in  practice  by  an  adequate  system  of 
such  inspection,  they  will  confer  lasting  benefits  upon  the  wage-earner 
of  the  world. 


THE   LABOR   CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY     325 

The  labor  section  of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Ger- 
many (Part  Xni)  upon  the  absohite  and  uncompromis- 
ing insistence  of  the  American  delegation  was  made  to 
include  a  provision  completely  safeguarding  the  advanced 
standards  of  living  of  countries  like  our  own.  The  pro- 
vision which  gives  us  that  safeguard  is  this  (Article  405, 
last  paragraph) : 

In  no  case  shall  any  of  the  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  be 
asked  or  required,  as  the  result  of  the  adoption  of  any  recommenda- 
tion or  draft  convention  by  the  conference  (the  international  labor 
conference),  to  lessen  the  protection  afforded  by  its  existing  legisla- 
tion to  the  workers  concerned. 

I  think  it  important  briefly  to  clear  up  some  miscon- 
ceptions and  misapprehensions  regarding  the  labor  sec- 
tion of  the  treaty. 

The  international  labor  conference  cannot  impose  its 
will  upon  any  nation.  It  has  none  of  the  functions  of  a 
superparliament.  It  cannot  compel  any  nation  to  lower 
its  existing  standards,  or  to  improve  them.  It  cannot 
punish  member  nations  for  non-adoption  of  recommen- 
dations or  draft  conventions  agreed  upon. 

The  whole  organization  for  labor  created  by  the  treaty 
is  nothing  more  than  a  moral  force  which  has  the  power 
to  bring  truth  into  the  light  and  give  reason  and  justice 
an  opportunity  to  be  heard. 

The  procedure  with  regard  to  recommendations  or 
draft  conventions  is  this:  The  international  labor  con- 
ference may  agree  that  certain  standards  should  he  set 
up.  It  may  put  these  proposed  standards  in  the  form  of 
(a)  a  recommendation  to  be  submitted  to  the  members 
for  consideration  with  a  view  to  effect  being  given  them 
by  national  legislation  or  otherwise,  or  (b)  of  a  draft 
international  convention  for  ratification  by  the  members. 


326    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

The  only  binding  agreement  between  the  members 
is  that  each  will,  in  no  case  later  than  eighteen  months 
from  the  closing  of  the  session  of  the  conference,  bring 
such  recommendations  or  draft  conventions  as  are  adopted 
by  the  Conference  before  the  authority  or  authorities 
within  whose  competence  the  matter  lies,  for  the  enact- 
ment of  legislation  or  other  action. 

If  on  a  recommendation,  no  legislative  or  other  action 
is  taken,  or  if  the  draft  convention  fails  to  obtain  the 
consent  of  the  proper  authorities,  no  further  obligation 
shall  rest  upon  the  member. 

Furthermore,  our  states'  rights  were  fully  protected  by 
the  insertion  of  a  paragraph  providing  that  in  the  case 
of  a  federal  state,  the  power  of  which  to  enter  into  con- 
ventions on  labor  matters  is  subject  to  limitations,  it 
shall  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  government  to  treat  a 
draft  convention  as  a  recommendation  only.  Thus  it 
will  be  seen  that  member  nations  may  enact  laws  giving 
effect  to  recommendations  or  draft  conventions.  They 
also  may  refuse.  If  they  refuse  there  is  no  power  of 
punishment  or  coercion  or  blockade  or  influence  of  any 
kind  beyond  the  moral  efl'ect  of  the  world's  opinion. 
Nations  have  only  opinion  to  fear,  and  they  may  elect  to 
meet  that  opinion  with  whatever  course  seems  to  them 
wisest,  most  Just,  or,  if  they  so  desire,  most  deceptive. 

The  bill  of  rights,  as  it  appears  in  the  treaty  (Article 
427)  is  not  the  bill  of  rights  as  reported  to  the  Peace 
Conference  by  the  commission  on  international  labor 
legislation.  It  is  not  exactly  what  American  labor 
wanted.  Nor  was  the  bill  of  rights,  as  reported  by  the 
commission  itself  just  what  American  labor  wanted. 
But  let  me  say  this:  If  American  labor  had  been  able  to 
get  in  a  conference  where  twenty-eight  nations  were  rep- 


THE  LABOR   CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY    327 

resented  all  that  it  wanted  it  would  have  been  an  achieve- 
ment beyond  that  of  any  other  section  of  the  Peace 
Conference.     It  was  not  possible. 

There  has  been  some  criticism  of  the  use  of  the  word 
** merely"  in  the  bill  of  rights,  in  that  section  which 
specified  that  labor  must  be  regarded  "not  merely  as 
an  article  of  commerce,"  and  it  has  been  said  that  the 
word  is  used  in  a  disparaging  sense. 

This  is  the  criticism  of  prejudiced  and  unthinking 
minds.  The  bill  of  rights  appears  in  the  labor  section  of 
the  treaty  as  a  resolution  which  must  be  interpreted  as  a 
whole.  The  preamble  cannot  be  left  out  of  account.  In 
this  case  the  preamble  makes  a  definite,  high-minded, 
and  progressive  declaration  for  the  increasing  freedom 
of  labor,  and  on  that  foundation  the  treaty  declares  that 
labor  must  no  longer  be  regarded  merely  as  a  commod- 
ity. What  is  clearly  the  language  and  the  spirit  of  the 
paragraph  and  of  the  whole  section  is  that  the  hour  has 
struck  when  labor  is  and  must  be  regarded  by  the  world 
as  something  far  above  commodity  classification,  when 
labor  must  be  undisputed  in  its  possession  of  the  free- 
dom and  the  rights  that  go  with  manhood  and  woman- 
hood and  citizenship. 

It  stands  to  the  everlasting  credit  of  America  that  the 
thought  of  American  labor  is  the  guiding  thought  ex- 
pressed throughout  the  whole  labor  section  of  the  treaty. 
American  labor,  the  freest  and  most  truly  progressive  in 
all  the  world,  wrote  into  the  labor  section  the  heart  and 
soul  of  that  section.  What  others  were  able  to  do  was 
to  soil  in  some  measure  the  garb,  the  expression.  The 
heart  and  soul  are  to  that  extent  deprived  of  their  present 
opportunity  to  be  expressive  of  the  full  meaning  which 
was  given  to  them  by  the  workers  of  this  country. 


328    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

For  the  sake  of  full  comparison,  I  quote  here  the  bill 
of  rights,  with  the  preamble,  as  reported  to  the  Peace 
Conference  by  the  commission  on  international  labor 
legislation: 

The  high  contracting  parties  declare  their  acceptance  of  the  fol- 
lowing principles  and  engage  to  take  all  necessary  steps  to  secure 
their  reahzation  in  accordance  with  the  recommendations  to  be  made 
by  the  International  Labor  Conference  as  to  their  practical  apph- 
cation: 

First.  In  right  and  in  fact  the  labor  of  a  human  being  should  not 
be  treated  as  merchandise  or  an  article  of  commerce. 

Second.  Employers  and  workers  should  be  allowed  the  right  of 
association  for  all  lawful  purposes. 

Third.  No  child  should  be  permitted  to  be  employed  in  industry 
or  commerce  before  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  in  order  that  every 
child  may  be  insured  reasonable  opportunities  for  mental  and  physi- 
cal education. 

Between  the  years  of  fourteen  and  eighteen  young  persons  of 
either  sex  may  only  be  employed  on  work  which  is  not  harmful  to 
their  physical  development,  and  on  condition  that  the  continuation 
of  their  technical  or  general  education  is  insured. 

Fourth.  Every  worker  has  a  right  to  a  wage  adequate  to  main- 
tain a  reasonable  standard  of  life,  having  regard  to  the  civihzation  of 
his  time  and  country. 

Fifth.  Equal  pay  should  be  given  to  women  and  to  men  for  work 
of  equal  value  in  quantity  and  quaHty. 

Sixth.  A  weekly  rest,  including  Sunday  or  its  equivalent,  for  all 
workers. 

Seventh.  Limitation  of  the  hours  of  work  in  industry  on  the 
basis  of  eight  hours  a  day  or  forty-eight  hours  a  week,  subject  to  an 
exception  for  countries  in  which  climatic  conditions,  the  imperfect 
development  of  industrial  development  or  industrial  organization 
or  other  special  circumstances  render  the  industrial  efficiency  of  the 
workers  substantially  different. 

The  International  Labor  Conference  will  recommend  a  basis  ap- 
proximately equivalent  to  the  above  for  adoption  in  such  countries. 

Eighth.  In  all  matters  concerning  their  status  as  workers  and 
social  insurance  foreign  workmen  lawfully  admitted  to  any  country 
and  their  families  should  be  insured  the  same  treatment  as  the 
nationals  of  that  country. 


THE   LABOR   CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY     329 

Ninth.  All  states  should  institute  a  system  of  inspection  in  which 
women  should  take  part,  in  order  to  insure  the  enforcement  of  the 
laws  and  regulations  for  the  protection  of  the  workers. 

Because  it  is  brief  and  because  I  believe  you  will  want 
to  know  the  views  of  the  working  people  of  our  own 
country,  I  present  to  you  the  bill  of  rights  presented  by 
the  American  delegation.  It  is  then  possible  to  see  the 
three  stages  of  development.  The  American  proposals 
follow : 

The  high  contracting  parties  declare  that  in  all  states  the  follow- 
ing principles  should  be  recognized,  estabhshed  and  maintained: 

First.  That  in  law  and  in  practice  it  should  be  held  that  the 
labor  of  the  human  being  is  not  a  commodity  or  article  of  commerce. 

Second.  That  involuntary  servitude  should  not  exist  except  as 
a  punishment  for  crime  whereof  the  party  shall  have  been  duly  con- 
victed. 

Third.  The  right  of  free  association,  free  assembly,  free  speech 
and  free  press  should  not  be  denied  or  abridged. 

Fourth.  That  the  seamen  of  the  merchant  marine  shall  be  guar- 
anteed the  right  of  leaving  their  vessels  when  the  same  are  in  safe 
harbor. 

Fifth.  That  no  article  or  commodity  should  be  shipped  or  deliv- 
ered in  international  commerce  in  the  production  of  which  children 
under  the  age  of  sixteen  years  have  been  employed  or  permitted  to 
work. 

Sixth.  That  no  article  or  commodity  should  be  shipped  or  deliv- 
ered in  international  commerce  in  the  production  of  which  convict 
labor  has  been  employed  or  permitted. 

Seventh.  It  should  be  declared  that  the  workday  in  industry  and 
commerce  should  not  exceed  eight  hours  a  day,  except  in  case  of 
extraordinary  emergency,  such  as  danger  to  life  or  to  property. 

Eighth.  It  should  be  declared  that  an  adequate  wage  should  be 
paid  for  labor  performed — a  wage  based  upon  and  commensurate 
with  the  standard  of  life  conforming  to  the  civilization  of  the  time. 

Ninth.  That  equal  wages  should  be  paid  to  women  for  equal  work 
performed. 

Tenth.  That  the  sale  or  use  for  commercial  purposes  of  articles 
made  or  manufactured  in  private  homes  should  be  prohibited. 


330     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

The  amendment  of  the  bill  of  rights  as  reported  to  the 
Peace  Conference  by  the  commission  on  international 
labor  legislation  requires  some  explanation.  The  com- 
mission made  its  report  to  the  Peace  Conference,  thus 
concluding  its  labors  and  completing  the  period  of  its 
existence.  This  having  been  the  case,  I  returned  with 
my  colleagues  to  the  United  States.  At  the  time  the 
report  of  the  commission  came  before  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence for  adoption  I  was  not  only  in  the  United  States, 
but,  as  the  result  of  an  accident,  I  was  in  bed,  unable  to 
attend  to  any  business  or  to  have  any  business  brought 
before  me. 

When  I  had  partially  recovered  from  the  accident, 
and  while  the  convention  of  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor  was  in  session  in  Atlantic  City,  I  sent  the  follow- 
ing cablegram  to  President  Wilson: 

Atlantic  City,  N.  J.,  June  i6,  1919. 
Hon.  Frank  L.  Polk, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Because  of  its  importance  and  urgency,  will  you  please  transmit 
the  following  message  to  the  President: 

"Upon  my  advice  executive  council  of  the  American  Federation 
of  Labor  has  recommended  to  the  convention  of  the  American  Fed- 
eration of  Labor,  now  in  session,  the  indorsement  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  including  the  labor  provisions. 

"Reports  published  here  indicate  that  the  labor  provisions  have 
been  so  changed  and  weakened  as  to  practically  nulhfy  effectiveness. 

"I  cannot  ask  the  convention  or  the  rank  and  file  of  labor  to 
indorse  propositions  which  have  been  or  may  be  made  valueless. 

"The  convention  must  necessarily  take  up  consideration  of  the 
matter  on  or  before  Friday,  June  20,  1919,  and  I  urgently  request 
full  and  definite  information  upon  the  subject,  together  with  copy  of 
provisions  affecting  labor  as  now  framed." 

Samuel  Gompers, 

President  American  Federation  of  Labor. 


THE   LABOR  CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY     331 

To  the  above  I  received  the  following  cabled  reply 
from  the  President: 

Samuel  Gompers,  Esq.,  Washington.  D.  C,  June  21.  1919. 

Hotel  Alamac, 

Atlantic  City,  N.  J. 

Following  message  for  you  from  the  President: 

"Comparison  between  your  draft  labor  convention  as  reported  to 
the  plenary  conference  and  the  labor  provisions  as  they  now  appear 
in  the  treaty  of  peace  shows  the  following  categories  of  changes: 
First,  redraft  of  what  is  called  in  commission's  report  'clauses  for 
insertion  in  treaty  of  peace.'  In  actual  treaty  they  appear  under  the 
title  'general  principles'  and  read  as  follows:  'The  high  contracting 
parties  recognizing  that  the  well-being,  physical,  moral  and  intellec- 
tual, of  industrial  wage-earners  is  of  supreme  international  impor- 
tance, have  framed  in  order  to  further  this  great  end  the  permanent 
machinery  provided  for  in  section  i  and  associated  with  that  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  They  recognize  that  difference  of  climate, 
habits  and  customs  of  economic  opportunity  and  industrial  tradition 
m.ake  strict  uniformity  in  the  conditions  of  labor  difficult  of  imme- 
diate attainment,  but  holding  as  they  do  that  labor  should  not  be 
regarded  merely  as  an  article  of  commxcrce,  they  think  there  are 
methods  and  principles  for  regarding  labor  conditions  which  all 
industrial  communities  should  endeavor  to  apply  so  far  as  their 
special  circumstances  will  permit.  Among  these  methods  and  prin- 
ciples the  following  seem  to  the  high  contracting  parties  to  be  of  a 
special  and  urgent  importance: 

"'First,  the  guiding  principle  above  enunciated  that  labor  should 
not  be  regarded  merely  as  a  commodity  or  article  of  commerce;  sec- 
ond, the  right  of  association  for  all  lawful  purposes  by  the  employed 
as  well  as  by  the  employers;  third,  the  payment  to  the  employed  of 
a  wage  adequate  to  maintain  a  reasonable  standard  of  life  as  this  is 
understood  in  their  time  and  country;  fourth,  the  adoption  of  an 
eight-hour  day  or  a  forty-eight-hour  week  as  the  standard  to  be 
aimed  at  where  it  has  not  already  been  obtained;  fifth,  the  adoption 
of  a  weekly  rest  of  at  least  twenty-four  hours,  which  should  include 
Sunday  wherever  practicable;  sixth,  the  abolition  of  child  labor  and 
the  imposition  of  such  limitations  of  the  labor  of  young  persons  as 
shall  permit  the  continuation  of  their  education  and  assure  their 
proper  physical  development;  seventh,  the  principle  that  men  and 
women  should  receive  equal  remuneration  for  work  of  equal  value; 
eighth,  the  standard  set  by  law  in  each  country  with  respect  to  the 


332    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

conditions  of  labor  should  have  due  regard  to  the  equitable  economic 
treatment  of  all  workers  lawfully  resident  therein;  ninth,  each  state 
should  make  provision  for  a  system  of  inspection  in  which  women 
should  take  part  in  order  to  insure  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  and 
regulations  for  the  protection  of  the  employed. 

'"Without  claiming  that  these  methods  and  principles  are  either 
complete  or  final,  the  high  contracting  parties  are  of  opinion  that 
they  are  well  fitted  to  guide  the  policy  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
that  if  adopted  by  the  industrial  communities  who  are  members  of 
the  league,  and  safeguarded  in  practice  by  an  adequate  system  of 
such  inspection,  they  will  confer  lasting  benefits  upon  the  wage- 
earners  of  the  world.' 

"The  second  part  of  your  cable  seven  has  been  transferred  into 
body  of  the  convention  and  now  appears  under  Article  405  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  under  clause  19  of  your  report.  I  am  convinced  that 
except  for  changes  in  wording,  which  do  not  affect  the  substance  and 
spirit  of  these  clauses,  they  remain  the  same;  second,  likewise  your 
protocol  to  Article  i  has  been  transferred  to  body  of  treaty  under 
Article  405.  The  'resolutions'  adopted  by  the  commission  do  not 
appear  in  the  treaty,  inasmuch  as  they  were  merely  proposals  of  sep- 
arate delegations  and  no  part  of  the  report  as  unanimously  adopted 
for  incorporation  in  the  treaty.  Third,  a  number  of  changes  of  form 
have  been  made  in  draft  convention  to  make  it  conform  in  phrase- 
ology with  the  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  redrafted  by 
the  League  of  Nations  commission.  For  example,  the  words  'the 
high  contracting  parties'  now  read  'member?,'  and  other  similar 
unimportant  changes.  Fourth,  on  April  11  at  the  plenary  confer- 
ence, which  adopted  the  report  of  the  labor  commission,  Sir  Robert 
Borden  made  the  following  remarks:  'This  convention  is  linked  in 
many  ways  by  its  terms  to  the  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  I  think  it  desirable  to  make  it  perfectly  plain  that  the  character 
of  its  membership  and  the  method  of  adherence  should  be  the  same 
in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.'  He  then  offered  the  following  reso- 
lution, which  was  unanimously  adopted  by  the  conference:  'The 
conference  authorizes  the  drafting  committee  to  make  such  amend- 
ments as  may  be  necessary  to  have  the  convention  conform  to  the 
covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  character  of  its  member- 
ship and  in  the  method  of  adherence.' 

"In  pursuance  of  this  resolution  the  following  changes  were  made: 
Article  i,  your  commission  reports,  together  with  the  first  two 
clauses  of  your  Article  35,  together  with  Article  36,  have  been  com- 
bined as  Article  387  of  the  treaty  to  read,  'a  permanent  organization 
is  hereby  established  for  the  promotion  of  the  objects  set  forth  in 


THE   LABOR  CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY    333 

the  preamble;  the  original  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall 
be  the  original  members  of  this  organization  and  hereafter  member- 
ship of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  carry  with  it  membership  of  the 
said  organization.' 

"As  you  doubtless  have  in  mind,  the  changes  have  the  effect  of 
giving  the  British  dominions  and  colonies  separate  representation 
on  the  general  conference.  When  you  give  your  final  judgment  upon 
the  importance  of  these  changes,  I  earnestly  urge  you  to  entertain 
the  following  considerations:  one,  that  Borden  could  not  go  back 
to  the  Canadian  people,  who  occupy  a  position  of  considerable  im- 
portance in  the  industrial  world,  and  tell  them  that  they  were  not 
entitled  to  representation  on  the  general  labor  conference  at  Ver- 
sailles; two,  that  the  changes  did  in  fact  bring  the  labor  convention 
into  harmony  with  the  League  of  Nations'  covenant;  three,  that  the 
changes  are  not  substantially  important,  inasmuch  as  every  labor 
convention  adopted  by  the  conference  must  be  submitted  to  our  gov- 
ernment for  ratification;  thus  the  choice  of  acceptance  or  rejection 
lies  in  our  own  hands,  irrespective  of  the  constitution  of  the  general 
conference;  four,  that  the  problems  of  the  chief  British  colonies  and 
dominions  are  much  more  our  own  than  like  Great  Britain's  so  that 
their  representation  will  be  a  source  of  strength  to  our  point  rather 
than  an  embarrassment;  five,  that  in  my  opinion  the  changes  do  not 
introduce  any  weakness  or  threaten  particular  weakness  in  the 
labor  provisions.  They  stand  still,  thanks  to  your  efforts  and  gui- 
dance, as  one  of  the  great  progressive  achievements  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  something  from  which  peoples  the  world  over  may 
take  courage  and  hope  and  confidence  in  a  better  future.  I  am  sure 
that  you  will  agree  that  nothing  could  be  more  fatal  to  first  aspira- 
tion than  any  failure  to  indorse  these  provisions.  I  count  upon  your 
support  and  sponsorship."  P^^^^  L.  Polk. 

It  will  be  seen  that  finally  the  very  best  that  could  be 
had  was  secured;  and  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
amendment  and  improvement  wait  only  upon  the  pro- 
gressive thought  and  energy  of  the  nations  that  are 
party  to  the  treaty  of  peace  and  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  It  is  a  fact,  patent  to  all,  but  seem- 
ingly denied  by  some,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  make 
progress  in  agreement  with  the  world  any  more  rapidly 
than  agreement  can  be  had.     In  the  labor  section  as  it 


334    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

stands  we  have  got  the  utmost  to  which  agreement  was 
possible.  I  need  not  tell  this  audience,  but  it  has  been 
necessary  to  tell  some,  that  unless  all  parties  agree  there 
is  no  agreement.  The  task  of  those  who  look  forward 
now  is  to  strive  onward  to  secure  agreement  upon  a  still 
higher  plane  to  still  more  perfect  expression. 

I  want  to  say  a  word  to  those,  not  necessarily  present 
in  this  assemblage,  who  have  protested  that  progress 
and  justice  were  jeopardized  by  the  granting  of  a  vote 
to  each  of  the  British  dominions.  The  fact  is,  in  my 
opinion,  that  progress  is  safeguarded  by  the  British  pos- 
sessions having  been  given  the  vote.  These  common- 
wealths, Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa, 
and  so  on,  went  into  the  Peace  Conference  as  states.  I 
am  convinced  that  they  were  entitled  to  that  status  in 
the  Conference,  and  that  they  are  entitled  to  it  in  the 
various  bodies  set  up  by  that  Conference. 

It  was  my  experience,  and  I  look  upon  it  as  something 
of  a  dependable  guide,  that  the  votes  of  the  representa- 
tives of  these  dominions  and  commonwealths  were  more 
often  with  the  United  States  than  with  England,  and 
that  they  were  more  often  with  progress  than  against  it. 
There  is  more  than  a  little  significance  in  this.  With 
but  a  few  exceptions,  the  view-point  of  the  American 
labor  movement,  constructive,  democratic,  uncontami- 
nated  by  any  of  the  philosophies  that  are  cousin  to  Bol- 
shevism, is  shared  only  by  the  labor  movements  of  these 
self-governing  dominions  and  commonwealths.  I  com- 
mend that  fact  to  the  consideration  of  thoughtful  Ameri- 
cans. 

With  all  the  drawbacks  that  there  were  in  Paris,  with 
all  the  appetites  that  came  there  to  be  satisfied,  with 
all  the  ambitions  that  grouped  themselves  about  the  Peace 


THE  LABOR  CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY     335 

Conference,  here  still  was  an  idealism  and  a  determina- 
tion that  would  not  be  denied.  Let  not  all  of  us  forget 
that  America  gave  to  that  idealism  and  determination 
its  great  leadership. 

A  fact  of  paramount  importance  in  gauging  the  integ- 
rity of  the  Peace  Conference  was  the  fact  that  millions  of 
people  were  hberated  and  set  up  under  independent  gov- 
ernments of  their  own  choosing. 

The  Paris  Conference  sought,  as  no  other  peace  con- 
ference ever  has  sought,  to  reach  into  the  mind  of  the 
people  and  write  into  definite  terms  the  deepest  and  best 
thought  to  be  found  there. 

So  it  was  that  the  interests  of  the  world's  toilers  came 
to  be  considered.  This  was  truly  an  epoch-making  step. 
The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  the  written 
verdict  and  agreement  of  the  civihzed  world  that  until 
justice  is  done  to  those  who  work,  justice  has  been  done 
only  in  part. 

Not  even  the  most  ardent  advocate  of  the  League  of 
Nations  Covenant  or  of  the  labor  section  of  the  treaty 
of  peace  will  contend  that  perfection  is  to  be  found  in  it. 
The  Paris  Conference  did  not  produce  a  perfect  docu- 
ment and  did  not  give  a  prefect  expression  to  the  high 
ideals  that  animate  the  civilized  world  to-day. 

The  Conference  did  produce  a  document  that  measur- 
ably expresses  the  best  and  most  constructive  thought 
of  the  world,  and  that  opens  the  way .  absolutely  to  a 
complete  expression  of  the  highest  ideals  which  mankind 
may  have. 

The  treaty  of  peace  establishes  no  barrier  to  progress 
anywhere. 

It  opens  the  way  to  progress  everywhere. 


XIV 

THE  ECONOMIC  ADMINISTRATION  DURING  THE 
ARMISTICE 

BY    HERBERT    HOOVER 

During  the  course  of  the  war  itself  the  economic  diffi- 
culties in  every  direction  were  dominant  factors  in  its 
conduct.  With  the  moment  of  the  armistice  we  were 
confronted  with  a  host  of  new  and  unprecedented  diffi- 
culties. These  difficulties  flowed  not  only  from  the  over- 
night reversal  in  the  whole  alignment  of  economic  ma- 
chinery built  up  steadily  during  the  war,  but  also  from 
the  added  burden  of  our  being  confronted  with  economic 
and  social  currents  from  the  enemy  countries  that  threat- 
ened immediately  to  overwhelm  Europe  in  chaos.  The 
danger  to  civilization  from  militarism  was  at  once  re- 
placed by  the  imminent  danger  from  economic  collapse. 
I  propose  to  enumerate  some  of  the  major  problems  that 
lay  before  us. 

A.  Some  160,000,000  people  in  liberated  and  enemy 
nations  were  face  to  face  with  the  most  terrible  famine 
since  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  when  a  third  of  the  people 
in  those  areas  died.  Their  food-supplies  had  steadily 
degenerated  through  the  war,  by  blockade  and  diversion 
of  man-power,  until  the  consequent  breakdown  of  morale 
in  the  civil  population  had  contributed  more  than  any 
other  one  factor  to  their  revolutions  and  subsequent  sur- 
render. 

All  the  four  old  empires  were  in  the  midst  of  revolu- 
tion, from  which  fourteen  states  emerged  in  a  month. 

336 


THE   ECONOMIC   ADMINISTRATION      337 

Many  of  the  new  states  started  without  even  the  most 
rudimentary  machinery  of  government-  All  had  estab- 
lished representative  governments  in  replacement  of  the 
former  monarchies,  and  in  each  case  these  were  of  neces- 
sity directed  largely  by  men  with  little  experience  in  gov- 
ernment. 

Except  for  parts  of  Russia,  all  of  these  fragmentary 
states  were  highly  industrialized,  intimately  interdepen- 
dent as  regards  raw  materials  and  supplies,  with  railway 
systems  and  communications  built  up  to  serve  economic 
frontiers  now  suddenly  shifted.  In  the  explosion  lead- 
ing to  this  separation  of  states  and  these  new  govern- 
ments the  racial  hatreds  of  centuries  reached  white-heat, 
and  in  this  atmosphere  each  state  grabbed  for  every 
movable  economic  resource,  and  proceeded  to  erect 
physical  and  economic  barriers  against  the  other  along 
ill-defmed  borders  which  not  only  dismembered  trans- 
portation systems,  but  also  paralyzed  such  production 
and  interchange  of  commodities  as  could  have  been  car- 
ried on. 

With  impending  famine,  food-hoarding  became  a 
mania  with  almost  every  farmer,  every  village,  every 
city,  and  every  state.  The  discipline  and  regulations  of 
war  suddenly  relaxed  and  the  control  of  distribution 
seemed  lost.  Agricultural  populations  in  the  main  were 
able  to  support  themselves,  but  cities  and  towns — the 
centre  points  of  social  danger — were  in  acute  need.  The 
production  of  coal  and  other  essential  industrial  com- 
modities, maintained  during  the  war  under  a  strong  mili- 
tary arm,  immediately  collapsed.  Strikes,  seizure  of  pri- 
vate property  by  governments,  the  general  let-down  of 
discipline,  and,  above  all,  the  socialistic  background  of 
much  of  the  revolutionary  movement,  contributed  to  the 


i;S     WIIAI     Kl  Al  I  ^     IIAIMM  Nl  I)    A  I     IRAKIS 

»l<-m(»inll/.'ili(Mi.  1  lu  whole  ma.'.:.  <»l  iiil>aii  Iminanily 
r..iimil\  iiii(l<i  (ii(iii\  tl(>miunli(Hi  •.(•(•iimmI  hcjidcd  (liicilly 
|.>i  K..l.li(\  I'.m,  ni  niiaicliy  Intm  uliu  li  llicic  coiiM  In* 
IK  •  Ii(>|  >»•  <  »l    I  )r.'U'c. 

li.  Ntw  i>i(»i>l«"ms  Miosc  In  llu*  l''.m(»|)c.'m  Alli<"(l  toun- 
1 1  ic.  in  ai  It  III  inn  In  llinsc  w  liicli  came  I  mm  eminy  snnrees. 
i'loin  llie  «li\(i';inn  nl  man  pnwei  In  wai  |>ni|)n'.e'.  llie 
Allit".  Ii.'kI  I  liinn;',l\nnl  llie  wai  Ixioiiie  ineieaMii}'.lv  «le- 
ixinleiil  ii|>nn  iin|)nil-.  nl  looil  and  lexliie-.  Iinin  nveiseas. 
()\vmj'.  In  (lie  Insse?;  ol"  sln|)|)ln|.'.  and  In  llie  \a'.l  lnima|'.e 
leqniM'd  l«»  lianspoil  (lie  Ameiiean  aiiny.  il  liad  Ixeniiu' 
nrcossaiv  l*>  ahaiuinn  llie  Iniij-.  \(»ya|',es  In  llw  Innd  |>i<»- 
diiein}'.  aieas  nl  llie  sniilliein  liemispliei  e.  pimeipallv  (he 
Ai|-'.(nline  and  Anslialia.  llu-  Imiden  nl  mi|»|)Iv  ni'-,  llie 
Allie-.,  and  In  a  laij'.e  evieni  llu-  neiilials.  had  ihns  lallen 
iil»nM  Nnilh  Ameiiea,  ihe  neaie:.l  inaiLel  and  ihe  |)ninl 
e»»nneited   l>y    I  he  '.ale. I    innles. 

In  ineel  ihis  (hinand.  we  in  Ameiii'M  lhi()lij.;h  ihe 
e\|i;i  exeilinn  nl  niii  laimer.  and  ihe  saN  iHj'.s  nl  nni 
wnmeii  had  al  (he  ainiisliee  piepauil  a  Miiplns  nl  some 
,»*>,nnn.n(tn  h)!!-;  nl"  Innd  ami  le\lile  *.n| >|)lie;.  the  inmimnm 
iunnniil  iieee'.-.aiy  In  have  eaiiied  llie  l.nin|>ean  Allies 
ill    ihe   wai    niilil    ihe  haiAt'st    nl    »()H). 

In  didei  In  'aimnlale  |>indnelinn  m  ihe  Ihnled  Slales 
;nid  In  iiieil  llie  «-eniinmle  levels  icsnllin|'.  Iinm  AIIuhI 
i>nyin;\  ixinie  w<-  eaine  min  llu-  wai,  we  had  j'.ixcn  mnial 
|)leilj.',es  and  in  some  eases  le|'al  pledj-es  to  nni  laimers 
that  they  shnnM  leali/e  I'eilain  hasle  piiees  loi  their 
pnMlnee.  'Ihe  piiee  Ie\  cIs  al  the  armistlee  in  the  isolated 
luaiLets  of  the  sonlhein  hemi.pheie  wcie  seaieely  one- 
hall  ihnse  in  tin-  I'niled  Slates,  ami  the  Allies  natniallv 
wished  to  al)andi)n  nni    maikel. 

The    mntinn    nl"    this    swollen    stream    nl    snpplu-.    ihal 


THE   ECONOMIC   ADMINISTRAl  ION      339 

passed  froni  the  farmhouse,  through  the  manufacturer, 
to  the  American  seaboard  could  not  be  Interrupted  by 
a  diversion  such  as  the  Allies  contemplated  without  a 
price  collapse,  thus  not  only  betraying  the  assurances 
given  to  American  farmers  but  bringing  a  complete 
financial  crash  to  the  whole  of  our  interior  banks-  for 
they,  in  loans  to  the  farmer  and  manufacturer,  had  given 
confidence  in  the  stability  of  prices. 

While  stocks  of  food-supplies  and  textiles  had  accumu- 
lated in  the  southern  hemisphere  fdue  to  their  isolation), 
the  totality  of  supplies  available  to  the  increased  num- 
bers to  be  fed  and  clothed  was  barely  enough  to  get  all 
hands  through  until  the  harvest  of  1919,  even  with  the 
most  careful  and  just  distribution  over  the  whole  of  Eu- 
rope. 

C  The  tension  upon  world  shipj^ing  was  in  no  sense 
relaxed  with  the  armistice,  for  while  some  relief  was  ob- 
tained by  reason  of  the  fact  that  it  was  no  longer  neces- 
sary to  continue  tlie  shipment  of  troops  and  munitions 
abroad,  the  Allies  and  ourselves  were  immediately  faced 
with  the  necessity  of  the  repatriation  of  some  6,000,000 
men  from  overseas,  and  we  had  further  to  find  the  ton- 
nage with  which  to  transport  the  vast  amount  of  supplies 
required  to  stem  the  famine  in  liberated  and  enemy  ter- 
ritory. 

To  add  to  our  difficulties,  shipping  and  port  strikes 
became  epidemic  and  greatly  reduced  the  carrying  ca- 
pacity of  the  mercantile  ficet. 

D.  None  of  the  liberated  countries — Poland,  Finland, 
Esthonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Czechoslovakia,  Jugo-Slavia, 
Serbia,  Roumania,  Belgium,  or  Armenia  prjssesscd  a 
pound  of  commodities  or  a  dollar  of  securities  or  gold 
with  which  to  pay  for  supplies  for  their  civil  populations. 


340    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

Therefore  credits  from  our  own  and  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments had  to  be  created  to  enable  them  to  live.  Beyond 
these  financial  necessities,  continued  credits  were  re- 
quired by  the  Allies,  particularly  Italy,  until  they  could 
in  a  measure  restart  productive  life.  The  enemy  states, 
Germany,  Hungary,  and  Bulgaria,  possessed  gold  and 
securities,  but  Austria  had  nothing  but  hunger. 

E.  The  coal  situation  was  a  series  of  calamities  in  it- 
self. In  Central  Europe,  the  failure  of  production  in 
the  three  states  possessing  coal-mines,  endangered  the 
municipalities  and  railways  of  a  dozen  other  states. 
Therefore,  production  had  to  be  reorganized  and  coal 
distributed  from  producing  states  to  critical  areas  out- 
side their  borders,  even  though  hardship  resulted  to  the 
producing  states  by  reducing  their  own  consumption 
below  real  need.  Added  to  this  was  the  dependence  of 
France  and  Italy  upon  British  coal,  of  which  the  produc- 
tion steadily  decreased  in  the  general  let-down  and  strikes 
following  the  armistice. 

F.  At  the  time  of  the  armistice,  the  enemy  areas  were 
under  vigorous  blockade  and  the  neutral  countries  were 
all  under  restrictions  as  to  exports  and  imports,  either 
for  the  purpose  of  pressing  the  enemy  or  to  save  shipping. 
The  blockade  was  more  than  a  naval  blockade — it  was 
an  effective  control  penetrating  back  to  every  seaboard 
country  in  the  world  with  a  vast  bureaucracy^  that  did 
not  easily  yield  to  the  sudden  change  in  direction. 

G.  During  the  whole  progress  of  the  war,  every  gov- 
ernment in  the  world  had,  to  a  greater  or  less  degree, 
been  compelled  to  assume  the  direction  and  control  of 
economic  life  amongst  its  peoples.  With  the  armistice, 
there  was  the  insistent  necessity  for  all  countries  to  turn 
their  production   from  munitions  to  civil  supplies  and 


THE   ECONOMIC  ADMINISTRATION      341 

to  restore  business  to  normal.  To  do  this  it  was  first 
essential  to  free  business  and  enterprise  from  stifling 
restraints  and  to  secure  an  enormous  shift  of  labor  from 
armies  and  the  production  of  war  material.  Freedom 
of  business  and  industry  demanded  a  rapid  expansion 
of  free  shipping  for  commerce,  and  this  in  the  face  of 
increased  demand  for  primary  supplies. 

H.  The  economic  problems  were  inextricably  en- 
tangled in  the  social  problems.  The  misery  of  war 
famine,  the  weakening  of  institutions  because  of  revolu- 
tion, furnished  the  fertile  grounds  of  social  desperation 
for  the  resulting  propaganda  of  a  Bolshevist  and  An- 
archistic order.  Had  this  propaganda  been  successful, 
no  peace  vv^ould  have  been  possible  nor  could  intensive 
production  have  been  stimulated  to  that  degree  neces- 
sary to  lay  the  foundation  of  support  to  the  excessive 
urban  populations.  Furthermore,  it  would  have  been 
impossible  for  us  to  expect  even  to  maintain  the  Allied 
or  our  own  institutions  if  Central  Europe  had  suc- 
cumbed to  this  sort  of  chaos. 

With  all  these  problems,  the  first  issue  was  to  secure 
co-operation  in  action  by  which  each  of  the  principal 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments  should  bear  its  re- 
sponsibility in  the  necessary  readjustments.  At  the 
same  time,  essential  liberty  of  action  of  each  country 
could  not  be  subordinated  to  the  will  of  others,  for  the 
United  States  could  not  place  her  resources  under  the 
control  of  others.  For  this  purpose,  all  of  the  various 
inter-AIIied  war  committees,  which  co-ordinated  finance, 
shipping,  food,  coal,  and  blockade  during  the  war  were 
grouped  together  under  one  common  committee  of  some- 
what shifting  character,  but  ultimately  known  as  the 
Supreme  Economic  Council. 


342     WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

The  American  point  of  view  was  that  the  solution  of 
the  major  economic  problems  required  some  very  direct 
and  positive  steps:  First,  that  the  blockade  should  be 
removed;  second,  each  nation  should  contribute  its 
share  of  shipping  to  be  devoted  to  the  movement  of 
primary  commodities  such  as  food  and  coal,  even  against 
the  clamor  for  higher  earnings  to  be  made  in  the  world's 
trade;  third,  that  some  2,000,000  tons  of  enemy  shipping 
in  enemy  and  neutral  ports  should  at  once  be  placed  in 
service  of  supplies  and  repatriation  of  troops;  fourth, 
that  the  stream  of  American  food-supplies  should  be 
absorbed  by  the  Allies,  pending  their  diversion  into  the 
enemy  area;  fifth,  that  assistance  should  be  given  in  the 
erection  of  the  necessary  economic  functions  of  new  gov- 
ernments, that  they  might  restore  transportation,  sup- 
press hoarding,  secure  the  distribution  of  imported 
supplies  within  their  own  frontiers;  sixth,  that  ports 
be  opened,  transportation  across  liberated  and  enemy 
states  be  recreated  by  both  rail  and  canal,  that  the  inter- 
change of  vital  commodities  such  as  coal,  salt,  oil,  etc., 
should  be  resumed,  that  seeds  and  animals  be  distributed; 
seventh,  that  the  production  of  coal  should  be  revived 
and  its  distribution  equitably  arrived  at,  even  though 
it  brought  hardship  upon  the  nations  possessing  the  coal- 
mines; eighth,  that  minimum  credits  should  be  extender' 
to  the  liberated  nations  upon  which  they  could  cover 
their  immediate  necessities;  ninth,  that  enemy  people 
should  pay  for  their  supplies  in  cash;  tenth,  that  pro- 
vision for  the  unemployed,  pending-  resumption  of  pro- 
duction, should  be  established,  in  order  that  suffering 
and  social  disorder  might  be  mitigated;  eleventh,  that 
special  charitable  relief  to  the  masses  of  orphan  waif 
children,  and  measures  in  combat  of  contagious  disease 


THE   ECONOMIC   ADMINISTRATION      343 

sweeping  Europe  should  be  at  once  organized;  twelfth, 
that  every  possible  step  should  be  taken  to  demobilize 
government  control  of  industry,  not  alone  to  revive  in- 
dividual initiative,  but  to  demobilize  hatred  through  re- 
placement of  governmental  economic  contact  by  the 
softening  processes  of  individual  business. 

While  these  steps  were  clear  enough  at  the  outset,  and 
while  they  were  all  ultimately  accomplished  in  the  end, 
unity  of  view  as  to  their  necessity  and  their  accomplish- 
ment was  not  secured  in  a  single  day. 

In  the  first  instance  the  Allies  insisted  that  the  changed 
situation  at  the  armistice  should  be  utilized  to  secure  a 
general  reduction  in  price  levels  of  overseas  supplies; 
they  felt  that  their  populations  could  not  be  rightly  called 
upon  to  pay  the  higher  price  levels  of  the  United  States, 
when  they  could  obtain  cheaper  supplies  from  the  south- 
ern hemisphere,  at  greatly  reduced  prices. 

We  Americans,  on  the  other  hand,  were  compelled  to 
insist  that  we  could  not  have  a  break  in  the  level  which 
we  had  assured  our  farmers  and  our  manufacturers  in 
order  to  secure  production  on  Allied  behalf.  We  ulti- 
mately succeeded  in  preventing  a  break  by  using  the 
resources  made  available  under  our  own  war  powers  in 
purchase  of  food-supplies,  and  we  were  able  to  tide  over 
the  readjustment  period  without  a  debacle  in  the  United 
States. 

We  also  insisted  that  the  blockade  on  neutrals  and 
liberated  peoples  should  be  withdrawn,  and  the  blockade 
of  enemies  should  be  steadily  and  rapidly  reduced,  so  as 
to  allow  food-supplies  to  move  inward,  and  industrial  life 
to  recuperate.  This  insistence  was  based,  first,  upon 
the  inhumanity  of  continuing  a  food  blockade  after  sur- 
render— that  we  had  no  fight  with  women  and  children; 


344    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

second,  upon  the  necessity  to  fight  famine  as  the  mother 
of  anarchy;  and,  last,  to  secure  the  return  of  enemy 
populations  to  productivity,  in  order  to  have  world  relief 
from  starvation  and  the  disorders  that  must  daily  flow 
from  it. 

Unfortunately,  the  militaristic  view  of  dominated  com- 
merce and  continued  mobilization  of  economic  power 
over  the  enemy  died  hard  in  Europe.  The  Allied  mili- 
tary authorities  contended  that  it  was  vital  to  maintain 
the  blockade  until  peace  was  signed,  lest  the  enemy 
might  revive  its  military  strength  and  might  be  less  dis- 
posed to  accept  dictated  terms  of  peace.  The  Ameri- 
cans' answer  to  this  contention  was  that  it  was  always 
within  the  power  of  the  Allies  to  reimpose  the  blockade, 
that  its  terrors  would  be  multiplied  tenfold  if  the  popu- 
lation had  once  appreciated  the  value  of  its  relaxation, 
that  the  primary  necessities  of  civilization  required  its 
abandonment. 

After  a  compromise  allowing  the  relaxation  of  the 
blockade  on  the  import  of  food  had  been  agreed  to,  new 
contentions  arose  out  of  the  insistence  of  the  Americans 
that  enemy  countries  should  pay  for  their  supplies  by 
shipment  of  commodities  or  by  negotiable  securities  or 
gold.  Some  of  the  Allies  felt  that  the  removal  of  large 
quantities  of  gold  and  liquid  securities  reduced  the  ability 
of  Germany  to  pay  indemnity  and  became  their  particu- 
lar loss.  The  view  was  advanced  that  America  should 
furnish  supplies  to  the  enemy  on  credit,  as  being  a  func- 
tion of  the  establishment  of  peace.  Aside  from  the  legal 
impossibility  of  such  an  undertaking  the  American  eco- 
nomic representative  did  not  believe  such  calls  upon  the 
American  taxpayer  could  be  justified,  and  that  we  were 
indeed  carrying  as  heavy  a  burden  as  could  be  asked  by 


THE   ECONOMIC  ADMINISTRATION      345 

furnishing  the  Allies  and  liberated  countries  supplies  on 
credit  for  a  long  period  after  the  armistice. 

Aside  from  securing  unity  of  view  amongst  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Governments  as  to  these  measures,  it  was 
necessary  to  secure  co-operation  of  the  Germans  and 
Austrians  in  their  execution.  It  was  finally  agreed  with 
them  that — as  a  condition  of  supplies — they  should  for 
reasonable  hire  hand  over  to  the  Associated  Governments 
their  entire  merchant  shipping.  Incidentally,  this  re- 
sulted in  a  three  months'  earlier  return  of  the  American 
army  than  would  have  been  otherwise  possible.  It  was 
not  until  the  end  of  March  that  a  final  agreement  with 
regard  to  Germany  was  consummated  in  Brussels  on  the 
24th  of  that  month,  and,  indeed,  furnished  one  of  the 
dramatic  episodes  of  the  war.  Here,  to  that  city  which 
had  suffered  so  terribly  of  famine  under  the  iron  hand  of 
the  German  staff",  came  the  representatives  of  the  revo- 
lutionary German  government  in  plea  to  the  Allies — in- 
cluding the  Belgians — for  food. 

Germany  was  the  last  of  the  countries  with  whom 
arrangements  were  completed.  Supplies  had  been  long 
in  motion  to  Finland,  the  Baltic  States,  to  Poland,  to 
Bulgaria,  to  Czechoslovakia,  to  Roumania,  to  Austria,  to 
Jugo-SIavia,  to  Armenia,  and  elsewhere  in  Russia.  The 
blockade  had  been  relaxed  v4th  respect  to  the  neutral 
countries,  and  the  steady  stream  of  supplies  had  been 
maintained  to  the  Allies.  Coal-mines  in  parts  of  Europe 
were  placed  in  control  where  necessary;  railways  were 
placed  under  the  command  of  American  directors. 

Measures  had  been  established  by  which  the  philan- 
thropy of  America  should  advance  its  regiments  of  mercy 
across  Europe,  until  provision  had  been  made  for  the 
children  and  helpless  of  twenty  nations.     At  its  maxi- 


346    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

mum  load,  America  alone  was  providing  in  charity,  food 
and  shelter  for  over  7,500,000  children  of  Allied  and  lib- 
erated races.  The  Allied  Governments  established  un- 
employment allowances  to  their  stagnant  labor  and  other 
governments  were  induced  to  do  so.  At  one  moment 
15,000,000  families  in  Europe  were  receiving  such  allow- 
ances— 75,000,000  people  living  on  charity. 

This  is  no  occasion  to  recount  the  difficulties  and  de- 
tails of  negotiation,  the  great  masses  of  statistics  of  dis- 
tribution, the  minutiae  of  organization,  the  method  in  the 
control  of  shipping,  the  control  and  stimulation  of  pro- 
duction and  distribution  of  coal,  the  operation  of  rail- 
roads, opening  of  canals  and  ports,  establishment  of  the 
functions  of  many  new  governments,  the  vast  financial 
operations  that  flowed  from  all  these  acts.  They  will 
furnish  the  historical  student  material  for  thought  during 
the  next  hundred  years. 

In  one  item  alone — the  feeding  of  Germany — some 
$250,000,000  of  gold  had  to  be  managed,  and  between 
all  governments  the  movement  of  some  35,000,000  tons 
of  commodities  of  one  kind  or  another  had  to  be  arranged, 
consummated,  and  settled  for. 

It  is  sufficient  for  this  occasion  to  say  that  America 
bore  the  major  burden  in  negotiating  these  arrange- 
ments, and  that  her  disinterestedness,  her  sense  of  ser- 
vice, carried  Europe  through  this — the  most  terrible 
period  of  its  history. 

Despite  all  these  efforts,  at  one  time  or  another  Bol- 
shevism succeeded  in  planting  itself  in  Western  Europe 
in  temporary  control  of  a  number  of  large  cities;  but  the 
stability  given  to  other  parts  made  possible  its  isola- 
tion and  eradication.  At  times  the  maintenance  of  so- 
cial order  during  the  overprolonged  peace  negotiations 


THE   ECONOMIC  ADMINISTRATION      347 

seemed  hopeless,  for  the  very  processes  of  peacemaking, 
its  use  as  an  excuse  for  military  interference,  contributed 
every  stimulant  to  instability  and  interfered  with  eco- 
nomic rehabilitation.  As  great  and  important  as  were 
the  steps  toward  reconstruction  under  united  action  these 
controls  could  not  go  on  without  developing  from  them- 
selves great  sources  of  friction,  and  the  signature  of 
peace  came  none  too  soon. 

The  final  signing  of  peace  marked  a  great  turning  of 
the  political  and  economic  forces  from  disintegration  and 
destruction  on  the  one  hand,  toward  freedom  of  com- 
merce, of  production  and  of  renewed  hope  on  the  other. 


XV 

THE   ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN   THE   GREAT  WAR 

BY    HENRY   THOMAS    MAYO 

For  nearly  three  years  after  the  beginning  of  the  war 
in  Europe  our  country  was  neutraL  The  desire  of  the 
administration  and  of  the  country  was  to  avoid  being 
drawn  into  the  war.  And  the  idea  prevailed  largely  that 
even  should  this  country  be  brought  into  the  war,  our 
participation  would  largely  consist  of  furnishing  money 
and  supplies.  No  one  even  dreamed  of  an  American 
army  of  2,000,000  men  in  Europe. 

Of  course  these  ideas  changed  rapidly.  Congress,  in 
August,  1 9 16,  had  passed  the  three-year  programme  for 
increase  of  the  navy,  the  largest  and  most  costly  pro- 
gramme ever  considered,  and  also  had  authorized  a 
material  increase  in  number  of  personnel  and  provided 
for  the  development  of  a  naval  reserve  force.  Our  entry 
into  the  war  came  too  soon  after  the  passage  of  this  navy 
bill  for  the  service  afloat  to  have  felt  any  of  its  effect. 

The  navy  had  not  been  asleep  nor  unmindful  of  what 
was  going  on  in  the  world.  On  the  contrary,  the  progress 
of  the  war  abroad  was  closely  followed,  every  item  of 
information  received  was  carefully  considered,  and  all 
that  the  navy  itself  could  do  to  keep  up  with  new  devel- 
opments was  done  in  the  fleet.  This  was  especially  so 
after  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  in  May,  191 5,  which 
indicated  that  sooner  or  later  we  would  have  to  engage 
in  the  war.  The  result  was  a  closer  attention  to  everj^- 
thing  pertaining  to  battle  efficiency. 

348 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN   THE  WAR    349 

On  February  3,  191 7,  when  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany  were  broken,  the  active  Atlantic  Fleet  was  at 
Guantanamo,  Cuba.  The  fleet  consisted  of  fourteen 
battleships,  sixteen  destroyers,  three  mine-layers,  four 
tugs,  used  as  mine-sweepers,  an  aeroplane  ship,  and  the 
train  consisting  of  supply  and  fuel  ships.  The  destroyer 
force  included  a  cruiser,  used  as  a  flag-ship,  and  mother 
ships  fitted  with  repair-shop  facilities.  No  submarines 
were  with  the  fleet.  As  it  seemed  plain  that  war  must 
follow,  the  fleet  was  at  once  placed  on  a  war  footing. 
The  base  was  shifted  to  Guacanayabo  Bay,  where  more 
room  was  available.  Little  apprehension  of  a  German 
attack  was  felt,  but  it  was  essential  that  officers  and  men 
should  become  accustomed  to  w^ar  routine  and  war  pre- 
cautions. These  were  at  once  put  into  efl'ect,  while  the 
usual  drills  and  target  practices  were  carried  on.  When 
the  fleet  went  north  late  in  March,  191 7,  there  existed  a 
general  feeling  of  confidence.  The  work  done  by  the 
destroyer  and  mine  forces  prior  to  the  war  showed  in  the 
results  achieved  as  the  war  progressed. 

In  March  the  administration  decided  that  the  situation 
demanded  that  United  States  merchant  vessels  be  armed. 
Accordingly,  the  fleet  was  cafled  upon  to  supply  the  nec- 
essary officers  and  gun's  crews.  This  was  the  start  of  a 
continuous  demand  on  the  fleet  for  trained  gun's  crews, 
and  it  became  necessary  to  use  special  methods  for  their 
intensive  training.  The  reports  of  encounters  with  Ger- 
man submarines  during  the  war  show  how  successful  was 
this  training  and  how  exceflently  these  men  maintained 
the  spirit  and  traditions  of  the  service.  The  fleet  reached 
Hampton  Roads  late  in  March  and  the  fleet  base  was 
transferred  to  York  River,  Virginia. 

In  April,  191 7,  the  AHied  navies  had  command  of  the 


350    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

sea,  except  as  regards  enemy  submarine  operations  against 
merchant  ships.  German  sea  commerce  had  ceased,  and 
German-armed  ships  had  been  driven  from  the  sea,  but 
the  menace  of  the  submarine  remained  serious.  The 
German  high-sea  fleet  kept  in  the  security  of  its  harbors, 
its  morale  dwindling  by  inaction,  until,  when  it  was 
desired  to  make  a  final  forlorn-hope  effort,  the  personnel 
revolted.  Upon  the  unrestricted  submarine  campaign 
had  been  placed  the  main  German  reliance  for  destroying 
sea  communications  and  isolating  Great  Britain;  in  the 
spring  of  191 7  these  efi"orts  appeared  increasingly  suc- 
cessful. The  monthly  destruction  of  tonnage  mounted 
to  alarming  proportions.  The  anti-submarine  measures 
taken  were  not  sufficient  and  the  cry  was  "ships — more 
ships,"  in  the  hope  of  keeping  pace  with  the  sinkings  and 
maintaining  the  supply  of  food  and  materials  for  the 
Allies.  Early  in  April  the  Navy  Department  directed 
the  organization  of  a  patrol  force.  The  mission  assigned 
to  the  force  was  "to  give  the  maximum  possible  protec- 
tion to  the  transatlantic  commerce  of  the  United  States 
and  of  friendly  powers  in  the  area  to  seaward  of  and 
contiguous  to  the  areas  guarded  by  naval  district  forces." 
It  became  apparent  that  protection  of  commerce  against 
submarine  and  raider  operations  could  not  be  made  efl'ec- 
tive  by  continuous  sea  patrol.  Therefore,  the  patrol  forces 
soon  disintegrated  until  but  one  squadron  remained. 
This  did  duty  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean 
throughout  the  war. 

War  was  declared  on  April  6.  On  April  10  Rear- Ad- 
mirals Browning,  R.  N.,  and  Grasset,  F.  N.,  command- 
ers-in-chief of  their  countries'  naval  forces  on  the  North 
American  station,  arrived  at  Hampton  Roads,  where 
they  were  met  by  the  chief  of  operations.  United  States 


THE   ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN  THE   WAR     351 

navy,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Atlantic  fleet,  and 
the  commander  of  the  newly  organized  patrol  force. 
They  stated  the  kind  of  assistance  the  United  States 
navy  might  give  and  asked  us  what  we  were  prepared  to 
do.  The  conference  reconvened  the  following  day  in 
Washington,  with  the  secretary  of  the  navy  presiding 
and  with  the  general  board  present.  At  this  conference 
the  representatives  of  the  British  and  French  navies  were 
assured  of  full  co-operation  by  our  navy,  and  appeared 
entirely  satisfied  with  the  result.  The  United  States 
navy  assumed  responsibility  for  patrol  of  nearly  all  of 
the  western  Atlantic,  and  agreed  to  furnish  small  vessels 
as  rapidly  as  possible  for  work  on  the  French  coast,  and 
to  send  a  division  of  destroyers  to  operate  off  the  English 
Channel.  The  request  for  these  destroyers  seemed  to  be 
based  on  the  desire  that  our  navy  should  appear  in  con- 
nection with  the  anti-submarine  operations  rather  than 
on  any  idea  that  we  could  or  should  send  destroyers  in 
great  number.  Admiral  Browning  stated  that  the  moral 
effect  of  even  one  United  States  destroyer  operating  with 
those  of  Great  Britain  would  be  excellent.  Destroyer 
Division  8  accordingly  sailed  for  Queenstown,  Ireland,  on 
April  18.  This  is  the  division  whose  commander — Taus- 
sig— reported  on  arrival  "ready  now,"  when  asked  how 
much  time  he  wanted  to  prepare  for  active  operations. 
These  destroyers  were  followed  at  frequent  intervals  by 
others  as  rapidly  as  they  could  be  made  ready. 

All  naval  vessels  were  being  rushed  into  commission, 
together  with  hundreds  of  yachts,  tugboats,  small  craft 
for  district  work,  and  vessels  of  every  kind.  These  all 
demanded  men  and  officers,  and  the  demand  for  trained 
gun's  crews  for  merchant  ships  was  constant.  Although 
the  navy  expanded  in  numbers  very  rapidly,  growing  to 


352     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

a  total  in  October,  191 8,  of  nearly  33,000  officers  and 
497,000  men,  yet  these  were  almost  entirely  untrained, 
and  the  demand  was  for  trained  men.  Officers  and  men 
for  new  vessels  of  the  navy  proper  were  also  to  be  trained. 

The  fleet  in  commission  contained  practically  all  the 
trained  men  available.  Upon  it  constant  drafts  were 
made,  especially  in  the  commissioning  of  the  chief  war- 
rant and  warrant  officers  and  large  numbers  of  the  best 
petty  officers.  The  Atlantic  fleet  thus  became  a  great 
training  force  and  source  of  supply  for  personnel;  thou- 
sands of  men  were  turned  out  sufficiently  trained  to  be 
able  to  perform  regular  duty  on  the  many  vessels  which 
the  navy  had  to  operate.  This  hard  training  work  was 
continued  through  the  war  period. 

Just  prior  to  our  entrance  into  the  war  Rear-Admiral 
W.  S.  Sims  had  been  sent  abroad  to  get  into  touch  with 
Allied  naval  authorities,  especially  British,  and  obtain 
information  which  would  be  useful  to  us  when  war  came. 
The  first  vessels — destroyers — sent  over  were  ordered  to 
report  to  him.  This  was  also  done  as  others  were  sent, 
and  he  was  soon  designated  as  **  commander  of  United 
States  naval  forces  in  European  waters,"  all  these  forces 
being  nominally  part  of  the  United  States  Atlantic  fleet, 
but  operating  as  a  detached  force.  However,  it  was  re- 
quired that  the  commander-in-chief  be  informed  in  regard 
to  all  these  forces  sufficiently  for  him  to  take  immediate 
control  in  case  the  course  of  events  should  require  that 
fleet  operations  be  undertaken  or  that  the  United  States 
and  British  fleets  be  combined. 

The  office  of  the  "commander  of  United  States  naval 
forces  in  European  waters"  was  in  London  and  his  duties 
there — which  constantly  increased  during  the  progress  of 
the  war — were  so  multifarious  and  important,  and  re- 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN   THE   WAR    353 

quired  him  to  be  in  such  close  touch  with  the  admiralties 
of  the  Allies,  that  it  was  a  practical  impossibility  for  him 
to  exercise  more  than  a  general  command  over  the  whole. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  insure  full  co-operation,  all  our 
vessels  were  operated  by  the  senior  officer  of  each  com- 
bined force.  On  the  French  coast,  however,  Admiral 
Wilson,  United  States  navy,  by  arrangement  with  the 
French  commander-in-chief,  operated  his  own  forces. 
The  United  States  mine  force  was  operated  by  Admiral 
Strauss,  although  he  was  obliged  to  arrange  his  mining 
** excursions"  to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  British  grand  fleet,  being  dependent  upon 
him  for  details  of  ships  for  escort  and  protection  during 
mine-laying  operations. 

During  the  month  of  May,  19 17,  the  destroyer  force  of 
the  Atlantic  fleet  disintegrated — as  a  force — all  suitable 
destroyers  being  designated  for  duty  abroad.  The  com- 
mander, Rear-Admiral  Cleaves,  was  detached  and  ordered 
to  New  York  to  assume  charge  of  convoy  operations, 
being  later  designated  as  "Commander  of  Cruiser  and 
Transport  Force,  Atlantic  Fleet." 

In  June  a  squadron  of  patrol  vessels — armed  yachts — • 
was  despatched  for  duty  on  the  French  coast.  They 
were  followed  by  other  vessels  of  various  classes — yachts, 
mine-sweepers,  tugs,  repair  ships,  salvage  ships.  A  patrol 
force  of  gunboats,  coast-guard  ships,  and  armed  yachts 
was  also  sent  to  Cibraltar,  together  with  destroyers  from 
the  Philippines;  later  a  small  force  of  destroyers  and  sub- 
marines was  based  on  the  Azores. 

In  May,  191 7,  the  major  part  of  the  Pacific  fleet  under 
Admiral  Caperton  came  through  the  Panama  Canal  and 
took  charge  of  the  patrol  of  the  South  Atlantic.  Admiral 
Caperton   also   had   duties   of  a   somewhat   diplomatic 


354    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

nature   on    the   Atlantic   and    Pacific   coasts   of  South 
America. 

In  August,  191 7,  the  commander-in-chief,  Atlantic 
fleet,  was  sent  abroad  to  attend  a  conference  in  London 
with  naval  representatives  of  the  nations  associated  in 
the  war,  and  with  the  added  purpose  of  getting  into  per- 
sonal touch  with  the  foreign  officers  with  whom  he  would 
co-operate  in  case  of  joint  fleet  operations.  At  this  time 
the  commander-in-chief  took  up  with  the  British  admir- 
alty the  subject  of  a  mine  barrage  in  the  North  Sea. 
Returning  to  the  United  States,  he  advised  that  the 
North  Sea  mine-barrage  project  be  pushed,  that  a  divi- 
sion of  battleships  be  sent  to  the  British  grand  fleet,  and 
that  all  forms  of  assistance  to  nations  with  whom  we 
were  associated  in  the  war  be  extended  and  expedited, 
stressing  the  importance  of  the  time  element.  But  it 
was  not  until  the  chief  of  naval  operations  had  himself 
visited  London,  a  short  time  later,  that  it  was  decided 
to  send  the  battleships  to  the  grand  fleet. 

On  our  entering  the  war,  it  was  wisely  decided,  in  view 
of  the  special  demand  for  anti-submarine  craft,  not  to 
push  the  larger  vessels  authorized  by  the  19 16  programme, 
but  to  concentrate  shipbuilding  facilities  upon  the  con- 
struction of  anti-submarine  craft.  The  building  of  222 
destroyers,  20  submarines,  442  subchasers,  51  mine- 
sweepers, 6  coast  submarines,  20  sea-going  tugs,  30  har- 
bor tugs,  and  16  motor  tugs  was  authorized  and  pro- 
ceeded; 100  subchasers  for  France  were  included.  Later 
the  construction  of  60  of  the  so-called  Eagle  boats  by 
Henry  Ford  was  agreed  upon.  The  active  war  ended 
before  any  of  the  Eagle  boats  were  finished  and  tested. 
The  subchasers  were  rapidly  turned  out  and  did  useful 
service.     These  little  craft,  only   no  feet  long,  crossed 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN  THE   WAR    355 

the  Atlantic  and  did  good  work  as  patrols  in  the  Irish 
Sea,  English  Channel,  on  the  French  coast,  and  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  in  northern  Russia  in  1919. 

Convoy 

When  the  Germans  began  their  unrestricted  submarine 
warfare,  on  February  i,  191 7,  the  question  of  convoys 
began  to  be  seriously  considered.  Our  first  troop  convoy 
sailed  in  June,  and  by  July  we  were  fully  committed  to 
the  convoy  system.  It  proved  very  successful,  most  of 
the  objections  disappearing  upon  actual  trial.  Many 
German  merchant  steamers  had  been  in  United  States 
ports  since  1914.  These  ships — 103  of  them — were  taken 
over  by  our  government  and  placed  under  the  shipping 
board.  Sixteen  of  the  largest  and  best  were  turned  over 
to  the  navy  to  be  used  as  troop  transports,  followed  by 
eighteen  more  for  use  as  freight  transports.  It  was  found 
that  in  every  ship  the  machinery  had  been  disabled  by 
the  German  crews,  the  injuries  being  principally  the 
breaking  of  cast-iron  parts,  cylinders,  pump  casings,  etc. 
Those  executing  the  destructive  work  believed  that  repair 
was  impossible  and  that  new  castings  could  hot  be  made 
and  installed  within  a  year  at  least,  especially  as  all  plans 
of  the  ships  and  machinery  were  missing.  The  repair  of 
this  machinery  by  the  navy,  using  the  electric  welding 
process,  was  one  of  the  great  successes  of  the  war — and 
to  this  success  was  largely  due  the  navy's  ability  to 
transport  troops  to  France  in  the  spring  of  191 8,  in  num- 
bers greater  than  had  been  thought  possible.  It  has 
been  stated  that  this  work  saved  a  year's  time  and 
$20,000,000,  and  also  that  it  was  so  well  done  that  there 
was  not  a  single  instance  of  a  defective  weld  developing. 
The  success  of  the  first  trials  caused  the  shipping  board 


356    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

to  turn  over  to  the  navy  twenty  more  ships  for  repair 
and  return. 

The  convoy  system,  once  started,  rapidly  developed. 
The  convoys  were  made  up  according  to  speed  of  ships, 
and  the  escort  work  was  participated  in  by  English, 
French,  and  American  cruisers.  Certain  large  and  fast 
ships,  like  the  Leviathan  and  Olympic,  were  sent  without 
ocean  escort,  but  were  met  by  destroyers  and  escorted 
through  the  submarine  danger  zone  and  into  port.  The 
convoy  system  was  a  material  factor  in  combating  the 
submarine  efforts,  although  it  was  but  one  factor.  In- 
creased efFiciency  and  experience  of  the  destroyers  and 
other  anti-submarine  craft,  the  depth  charge  and  means 
for  handling  it,  the  use  of  submarines  against  submarines, 
mystery  ships,  aviation  patrols,  zigzagging  tactics,  arm- 
ing of  merchant  ships,  smoke-boxes,  and  the  instruction 
and  increased  experience  of  shipmasters  in  proper  hand- 
ling of  their  ships  in  convoy  and  under  attack,  all  were 
factors.  One  other  factor  should  be  mentioned,  the 
method  of  keeping  track  of  the  movements  of  submarines 
practically  from  the  time  of  leaving  German  ports  until 
their  return,  which  was  brought  to  a  high  state  of  effi- 
ciency by  the  British,  and  enabled  proper  routing  orders 
to  be  issued. 

The  convoy  system  continued  with  little  change  until 
the  summer  of  191 8,  when,  fearing  that  the  Germans 
might  attempt  operations  against  troop  convoys  with 
battle  cruisers  or  swift  raiders,  the  older  battleships  were 
assigned  to  escort  duty  with  troop  convoys.  Under  con- 
voy approximately  2,000,000  Americans  were  transported 
to  France,  without  a  single  man  being  lost  while  under 
escort  of  United  States  vessels.  No  navy  troop  trans- 
ports were  torpedoed  on  east-bound  trips.     Four  were 


THE   ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN   THE   WAR     357 

torpedoed  on  west-bound  (return)  trips.  Of  these  the 
Antilles,  President  Lincoln,  and  Covington  were  sunk, 
while  the  Mount  Vernon,  although  badly  damaged,  was 
able  to  return  under  her  own  steam  to  Brest.  One  hun- 
dred and  thirty-eight  lives  were  lost  in  these  ships. 

Battleships 

In  November,  191 7,  the  ninth  division  of  the  Atlantic 
fleet  was  formed,  and  sent  to  join  the  British  grand 
fleet.  It  operated  for  the  rest  of  the  war,  until  after 
the  surrender  of  the  German  fleet,  under  the  orders  of 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  grand  fleet,  being  desig- 
nated as  the  sixth  battle  squadron  of  that  fleet.  In 
organization,  up-keep,  and  gunnery,  our  ships  were  found 
satisfactory  and,  indeed,  were  able  in  some  respects  to 
give  points  to  their  British  associates. 

In  midsummer,  1918,  it  was  feared  that  the  Germans 
might  attempt  successfully  to  get  battle  cruisers  or  fast 
raiders  to  sea  to  operate  against  our  transports.  The 
sixth  division  of  our  battleship  force  was,  therefore,  sent 
in  August  to  Bantry  Bay,  Ireland,  to  be  in  position  to 
combat  the  situation  if  it  developed,  the  eighth  division 
of  superdreadnaughts  being  held  in  readiness  to  base  on 
Halifax  if  required,  and  the  older  battleships  were  assigned 
to  escort  duty  with  troop  convoys. 

While  the  ninth  division,  operating  with  the  grand 
fleet,  engaged  in  no  fleet  action,  it  certainly  had  aH  sorts 
of  war  experience,  including  North  Sea  cruising,  convoy 
escort  work,  and  encounters  with  submarines,  in  which 
several  times  torpedoes  were  narrowly  avoided. 

Destroyers 
Our  destroyer  list  at  the  entrance  into  the  war  con- 
sisted of  fifty-one  destroyers,  of  which  only  sixteen  were 


358    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

in  full  commission  with  the  fleet.  Others  were  in  com- 
mission with  reduced  complements  and  many  had  been 
on  neutrahty  duty  at  our  principal  ports  up  to  the  out- 
break of  war.  As  destroyers  were  prepared  they  were 
sent  overseas  until  we  had  destroyers  operating  from 
Queenstown,  Brest,  Gibraltar,  and  the  Azores.  Twenty- 
eight  had  sailed  for  Queenstown  by  May  28.  The  num- 
ber at  each  base  varied,  but  the  maximum  reached  at 
each  port  was  about  forty-four  at  Queenstown,  thirty- 
eight  at  Brest,  six  at  Gibraltar,  and  four  at  the  Azores. 
The  work  of  these  ships  was  arduous  and  constant. 
While  at  sea  they  were  engaged  in  escort  duty  and  in 
patrolling  and  hunting  for  submarines,  and  during  their 
so-called  "rest"  days  in  port  they  were  hard  at  work 
overhauling  machinery,  fuelling,  and  generally  preparing 
for  going  to  sea  again.  They  kept  the  sea  in  all  weathers, 
and  winter  cruising  was  by  no  means  a  picnic.  But  they 
were  always  efi'ective  and  reliable,  and  the  German  sub- 
marines grew  to  fear  them.  The  Cassin  had  her  stern 
blown  ofl'  by  a  torpedo  from  a  German  submarine,  the 
Jacob  Jones  was  sunk  by  a  torpedo,  the  Chauncey  was 
sunk  by  collision,  and  the  Shaw  was  cut  down  b\^  the 
Aqmtania,  which  she  was  escorting,  but  she  made  port. 
Admiral  Bayley,  R.  N.,  under  whom  the  Queenstown 
destroyers  served,  praised  their  work  in  no  uncertain 
terms.  The  destroyers  accounted  for  several  German 
submarines,  the  number  being,  as  it  always  will  be, 
somewhat  uncertain;  but  their  great  work  was  in  pro- 
tecting other  vessels,  especially  the  convoys.  The  same 
kind  of  work  was  also  performed  on  our  own  coast,  al- 
though it  was  not  as  strenuous  and  constant  as  similar 
work  abroad. 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN  THE   WAR    359 

The  Mine  Force 

In  the  spring  of  191 7  the  mine  force  of  our  Atlantic 
fleet  consisted  of  two  old  cruisers  and  one  gunboat,  which 
had  been  converted  to  mine-layers,  and  four  fleet  tugs 
fitted  for  mine-sweeping.  While  this  force  was  entirely 
too  small  to  mine  extensively,  it  had  sufficed  for  practice 
work  and  to  develop  a  system  and  doctrine  which  later 
enabled  a  large  and  efficient  mine  force  to  be  rapidly 
improvised. 

The  Naval  Bureau  of  Ordnance  had,  even  before  we 
entered  the  war,  considered  the  possibility  of  anti-sub- 
marine mine  barrage  in  the  North  Sea  or  off"  the  German 
coast.  Our  entrance  into  the  war  brought  increased 
interest  in  this  subject.  In  April,  191 7,  Mr.  Ralph  C. 
Browne,  of  Salem,  Mass.,  brought  to  the  bureau  an  in- 
vention which  he  called  ''The  Brown  Submersible  Gun." 
This  was  not  considered  practicable  in  its  proposed  form, 
but  the  electric  principle  involved  was  at  once  applied  to 
mines,  and  in  it  was  seen  the  possibility  of  a  suitable  mine 
for  a  deep-sea  mine  barrage.  By  July,  the  tests  were  so 
successful  that  the  bureau  confidently  urged  the  plan  for 
a  North  Sea  barrage.  While  attending  the  naval  con- 
ference in  London,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Atlan- 
tic fleet  pushed  the  project  and  secured  a  tentative  agree- 
ment w^ith  the  British  admiralty,  who  at  once  sent  a 
naval  mining  expert  to  the  United  States  to  witness  tests 
and  obtain  details  of  the  mine  and  its  operation.  The 
mine  barrage  as  agreed  upon  extended  from  about  ten 
miles  off"  the  Orkney  Islands — the  ten-mile  passage  being 
heavily  patrolled — to  the  Norwegian  coast.  The  Nor- 
wegian coast  waters,  inside  the  three-mile  limit,  were 
mined  by  Norway. 


36o    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

The  British  admiralty  was  somewhat  doubtful  regard- 
ing the  project.     But  since  the  United  States  offered  the 
mines,  estimated  to  cost  $40,000,000,  as  well  as  the  ships 
to  lay  them  in  by  far  the  largest  area,  the  proposition 
was  agreed  to.     The  manufacture  of  the  mines  and  acces- 
sories was  rushed.     Eight  merchant  steamers  were  pur- 
chased and  converted  to  mine-layers.     The  experience  of 
the  small  mine  force  of  the  Atlantic  fleet  was  utilized, 
with  the  result  that  our  mine-laying  vessels  in  the  North 
Sea  carried,  on  a  much  smaller  displacement,  many  more 
mines  than  the  British  mine-layers  and  were  able  to  lay 
their  mines  with   greater  rapidity.     Parties  were  sent 
ahead  and  established  mine  depots  and  assembly  plants 
in  Scotland  at  Invergordon  and  Inverness,  bases  17  and 
18.     The  procedure  was  to  ship  mines  to  Corpach  and 
Lyie  on  the  west  coast  of  Scotland,  thence  by  the  Cale- 
donian Canal  and  by  rail  to  bases  17  and  18.     At  these 
bases  the  assembly  was  completed,  after  which  they  were 
loaded  on  the  mine-layers  preparatory  to  planting.     The 
Baltimore,  in  April,  laid  about  900  mines  in  assisting  the 
British  mine  force  off  the  north  coast  of  Ireland,  and  part 
of  the  mine  squadron  made  two  mine-laying  excursions. 
The  entire  force,  however,  was  not  ready  until  the  end 
of  June,  1 91 8.     Mine-laying  then  proceeded  rapidly,  and 
the  barrage  soon  began  to  show^  effectiveness,  although  it 
was  worked  up  to  the  time  of  the  armistice.     A  total  of 
56,611  American  and  13,600  British  mines  were  laid  in 
depths  ranging  from  40  to  160  fathoms. 

The  actual  submarine  losses  due  to  the  mine  barrage 
w^ill  probably  never  be  exactly  known,  but  it  is  probable 
that  at  least  ten  submarines  were  destroyed  and  others 
damaged,  and  the  effect  was  to  close  the  North  Sea  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  make  exit  or  entrance  difficult  and 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN   THE  WAR    361 

dangerous  to  enemy  submarines.  The  laying  of  the 
North  Sea  barrage  ranks  among  the  big  undertakings  of 
the  Great  War.  It  was  equalled  by  the  task  of  destroy- 
ing it  after  the  armistice.  In  this  work  about  ninety 
vessels  were  employed,  two  being  lost  and  many  badly 
damaged,  and  eleven  lives  lost.  The  whole  operation 
was  successful,  and  by  September  30,  1919,  Rear- Admiral 
Strauss  was  able  to  report  the  work  completed. 

Naval  Overseas  Transportation  Service 

To  insure  the  expedition  and  regular  supply  of  our 
naval  forces  abroad  and  to  assist  in  the  supply  of  the 
army,  the  naval  overseas  transportation  service  was 
established  in  January,  191 8.  The  navy  was  called  on 
to  man  ships  acquired  by  the  shipping  board.  This  was 
a  new  task  and  made  a  new  demand  for  trained  officers 
and  men.  But  it  was  cheerfully  assumed  and  efficiently 
performed.  In  ten  months  this  service  grew  to  about 
320  vessels,  with  a  tonnage  of  2,800,000,  and  requiring 
about  3,000  officers  and  29,000  men. 

Aviation 

The  development  of  the  navy's  aeronautical  service 
during  the  World  War  was  remarkable.  In  April,  191 7, 
the  navy's  aviation  group  totalled  38  officers  and  163 
men,  their  equipment  being  only  45  machines  of  various 
types,  mainly  for  training.  During  the.  war  about  2,800 
officers  were  assigned  to  aviation  and  about  46,000  men. 
Of  these  more  than  1,200  officers  and  19,000  men  were 
sent  abroad.  At  the  date  of  the  armistice  we  had  some 
2,100  planes  and  about  300  lighter-than-air  craft.  Five 
hundred  and  seventy  aircraft  had  been  sent  abroad.  A 
naval  aviation  group  of  7  officers  and  122  men  was  the 


362    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

first  organized  force  from  the  United  States  to  land  in 
France.  The  advent  of  our  young,  enthusiastic  aviation 
personnel,  the  information  as  to  our  extensive  plans,  and 
observation  as  to  the  thorough  way  in  which  the  execu- 
tion of  these  plans  was  started,  had  a  very  beneficial 
effect  at  a  time  when  there  were  many  indications  of  a 
faltering  morale  among  the  Allies.  As  the  work  pro- 
gressed information  regarding  its  intended  scope  must 
have  reached  the  Germans,  where  it  also  had  its  effect. 
Our  navy  established  and  placed  in  commission  abroad 
twenty-eight  operating  aviation  stations,  two  training 
aviation  stations,  and  six  bases.  These  were  distributed 
in  England,  Ireland,  France,  and  Italy,  and  included  a 
marine  aviation  station  in  the  Azores. 

The  entire  aviation  service  had  to  be  built  up,  materiel 
and  personnel,  on  the  assumption  that  the  war  might 
last  several  years.  A  story  of  this  work  would  be  a 
volume  in  itself  It  is  hard  to  say  just  what  direct  effect 
our  aviation  efforts  had  on  the  suppression  of  the  sub- 
marine. The  records  show  a  probability  of  over  forty 
attacks  on  submarines  from  our  aircraft.  A  measure  of 
the  efficient  work  of  our  aircraft  is,  perhaps,  to  be  found 
in  the  immunity  from  attack  enjoyed  by  vessels  passing 
close  to  the  Allied  coast  under  escort  of  aircraft.  Our 
aviators  patrolled  the  coasts,  searched  for  submarines 
and  mines,  convoyed  vessels,  took  part  in  bombing  expe- 
ditions from  stations  in  northern  France  against  German 
centres,  and  from  Italian  stations  against  Austrian  ports. 
Most  of  the  aircraft  used  were  bought  abroad,  but  before 
the  armistice  the  force  was  fairly  well  equipped  with 
American  materiel  for  serious  and  extensive  work.  It  is 
claimed  that  fifteen  enemy  vessels  were  sunk  or  dam- 
aged through  the  efforts  of  United  States  aviators. 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN   THE   WAR    363 

The  Railway  Battery 

In  November,  191 7,  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  recom- 
mended that  some  of  our  naval  14-mch  guns  be  utilized 
on  shore  on  the  western  front.  They  were  50-caIiber 
guns,  that  is,  nearly  60  feet  long,  weighing  90  tons  each, 
with  projectiles  of  1 ,400  pounds,  containing  88  pounds  of 
explosive,  and  having  a  range  of  over  25  miles.  Use  of 
these  guns  on  railway  mounts  was  approved,  and  design- 
ing of  mounts  and  accessories  was  begun.  By  working 
night  and  day,  complete  plans  and  specifications  were 
ready  on  January  25,  1918.  The  first  mount  was  com- 
plete, ready  for  firing,  April  25,  191 8,  and  the  last  of  the 
five  on  May  25,  191 8.  Each  unit  consisted  of  the  gun 
car,  a  locomotive,  and  twelve  other  cars;  besides  the  five 
battery  units  a  staff  train  was  provided.  To  design  and 
build  the  above  called  for  and  received  the  complete  co- 
operation of  the  Navy  Department,  American  railroad 
men,  and  manufacturers.  The  work  was  rushed  with 
patriotic  speed.  The  first  ship-load  of  materiel  left  on 
June  29.  It  was  unloaded  and  assembled  at  St.  Nazaire, 
France,  and  on  August  11,  the  first  unit  was  ready  to 
leave  for  the  front.  On  September  16,  the  entire  group 
of  naval  railway  batteries  was  ready  for  action  on  the 
western  front.  The  force  was  manned  and  operated 
entirely  by  naval  personnel.  In  general,  batteries  Nos. 
I  and  2  operated  with  the  French  armies,  and  Nos.  3,  4, 
and  5  with  the  American  army  near  Verdun. 

For  two  months  preceding  the  armistice  the  navy  had 
in  action  the  five  largest  mobile  guns  on  the  western 
front.  No.  2  battery  on  September  6,  191 8,  fired  the 
first  American  shell  from  an  American  gun  manned  by 
Americans  on  the  western  front.     These  batteries  were 


364    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

very  effective  against  the  German  railroad  communica- 
tions and  centres,  and  were  therefore  of  importance  in 
convincing  the  Germans  that  only  surrender  or  an  armi- 
stice could  prevent  complete  disaster. 

Communications 

During  the  war  the  naval  communication  service  was 
expanded  until  it  included  England,  Scotland,  Ireland, 
France,  Belgium,  Gibraltar,  Italy,  Corfu.  To  insure 
transatlantic  communication  for  our  army  the  navy 
began  the  building  of  the  Lafayette  radio  station  in 
France,  which  has  been  completed  since  the  armistice 
and  turned  over  to  the  French  Government.  The  navy 
also  took  over  the  operation  and  censorship  of  all  com- 
mercial radio  stations  in  the  United  States,  the  inspection 
and  sealing  of  radio  apparatus  of  all  merchant  vessels 
which  arrived  in  United  States  ports,  the  furnishing  of 
operators  to  United  States  merchant  vessels,  the  censor- 
ship of  radio  and  cable  communications.  The  above  was 
in  addition  to  the  carrying  out  of  the  primary  mission  of 
naval  communications — that  of  maintaining  efficient 
communication  for  United  States  vessels  at  sea,  includ- 
ing the  transports.  After  the  armistice  the  navy  handled 
the  communications  for  the  President  and  our  delega- 
tion at  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris. 

German  Submarines  on  Our  Coast 
In  1 9 16  the  German  commercial  submarine  Deutschland 
twice  visited  United  States  ports,  and  October  7,  191 6, 
the  U-SZ,  a  strictly  naval  vessel,  appeared  at  Newport, 
R.  I.  The  voyages  of  the  Deutschland  were  apparently 
for  purely  commercial  purposes.  That  of  the  t/-53  was 
in  the  nature  of  a  path-finding  expedition,  and  may  also 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN  THE  WAR    365 

have  had  the  purpose  of  warning  the  United  States  as 
to  what  we  might  expect  if  we  engaged  in  the  war.  The 
day  after  leaving  Newport  the  C/-53  sank  three  British 
and  two  neutral  steamers  off  Nantucket  Light  vessel. 

In  191 8  German  submarines  appeared  offensively  on 
our  Atlantic  coast.  Warning  of  their  probable  arrival 
had  been  received  from  London.  Inchiding  all  that  came 
west  of  40  degrees  west  longitude,  six  German  submarines 
operated  off  our  Atlantic  coast  between  May  and  Octo- 
ber, 1 91 8,  and  destroyed  seventy-nine  United  States  ves- 
sels, most  of  which  were  of  small  size,  by  bomb  or  gun- 
fire, and  fourteen  vessels  by  torpedoes.  These  included 
steamships,  sailing  vessels,  motor-boats,  barges,  and  one 
light  vessel,  ranging  from  a  19-ton  motor-boat  to  a 
io,ooo-ton  tanker;  they  also  included  one  west-bound 
transport,  the  Ticonderoga.  The  submarines  also  planted 
mines  in  seven  different  areas  in  the  track  of  commerce 
on  the  coast.  By  these  mines  seven  vessels  were  dam- 
aged or  destroyed,  among  them  the  steamship  San 
Diego,  which  was  sunk,  and  the  United  States  battle- 
ship Minnesota,  which  proceeded  into  port.  The  others 
were  merchant  steamships.  Although  the  fact  was 
never  verified,  the  belief  exsted  that  the  L^-151  suc- 
ceeded in  cutting  two  cables,  on  May  28,  191 8. 

The  United  States  was  not  stampeded  by  the  submarine 
operations.  Transports  and  cargo  vessels  for  Europe 
sailed  as  usual,  and  coastwise  traffic  soon  proceeded  regu- 
larly, although  naturally  great  care  was  exercised  in  rout- 
ing vessels.  When  German  submarine  operations  began, 
the  offensive  was  at  once  taken  by  our  patrol  vessels,  by 
submarines  already  distributed  for  the  purpose,  by  flo- 
tillas of  subchasers  and  by  converted  yachts  armed  with 
small  guns  but  provided  with  depth  charges.     Despite 


366    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  number  of  vessels  destroyed,  the  German  submarine 
campaign  on  our  coast  was  a  failure.  It  neither  inter- 
rupted the  despatch  of  vessels  to  Europe  nor  succeeded 
in  leading  us  to  recall  destroyers  from  Europe  or  even 
to  retain  vessels  designated  for  duty  in  Europe. 

Our  Submarines 

Prior  to  the  war  our  submarines  were  not  regarded  as 
more  than  coast  submarines,  with  limited  radius  of 
action.  They  were  therefore  utilized  on  our  own  coast 
only,  until  in  October,  191 7,  a  division  of  the  L-boats 
left  to  take  station  at  the  Azores  as  an  anti-raider  and 
anti-submarine  force.  They  remained  there  for  the  rest 
of  the  war.  They  had  no  contacts  with  the  enemy,  but 
their  mere  presence  prevented  enemy  raiders  and  sub- 
marines from  operating  near  the  Azores.  One  division  of 
four  K-boats  voyaged  from  Hawaii  through  the  canal 
and  to  Key  West,  F!a.,  and  took  up  patrol  duty  in  the 
Straits  of  Florida  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  In  Decem- 
ber, 191 7,  the  fifth  submarine  division  of  seven  L-boats 
proceeded  via  the  Azores  to  Ireland.  After  a  hard, 
stormy  passage  they  arrived  at  Bantry  Bay,  and  began 
training  in  British  methods  of  anti-submarine  work.  Our 
submarines  soon  were  able  to  take  their  part  in  the  anti- 
submarine patrol  off  southwest  Ireland  and  in  St.  George's 
and  Bristol  channels,  which  continued  for  the  rest  of  the 
war.  Numerous  contacts  were  made,  but  no  sinkings  of 
enemy  craft  so  far  as  known.  The  boats  had  exciting 
experiences  in  being  depth-charged  and  fired  upon  by 
friendly  destroyers  and  airplanes,  which  believed  them 
to  be  enemy  submarines. 

The  eighth  submarine  division  of  eight  0-boats  started 
for  duty  in  European  waters  in  the  fall  of  191 8,  but  had 
only  reached  the  Azores  when  the  armistice  was  declared. 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN   THE   WAR    367 

Subchasers 

When  we  entered  the  war  the  great  need  was  for  vessels 
to  undertake  anti-submarine  operations.  Hence  the  des- 
patch of  our  destroyers  to  assist  in  the  English  Channel. 
For  such  work  on  our  own  coast  other  vessels  of  the 
speed  and  handiness  required  were  not  existent,  although 
large  numbers  of  yachts  were  armed  and  flocks  of  small 
motor-boats  provided  for  use  off  our  principal  ports. 
Then  the  no-foot  subchasers  were  devised  and  built. 
They  were  equipped  with  gasolene  engines,  had  a  speed 
of  about  fifteen  knots,  and  were  armed  with  almost  any- 
thing that  could  be  found  in  the  way  of  small  guns. 
Later  they  vvere  given  depth  charges.  They  proved  to 
be  excellent  sea-boats  and  valuable  in  the  emergency,  al- 
though such  a  type  would  have  no  permanent  place  in 
the  navy.  Many  of  them  crossed  the  ocean — having 
some  rather  tough  experiences  en  route — and  did  good 
service  in  operations  from  Queenstown  and  Plymouth, 
and  from  Corfu  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  French  were 
much  pleased  with  the  boats  built  for  them. 

The  Marine  Corps 

A  marine-corps  unit  reached  France  with  the  first 
expedition  of  American  troops  and  a  total  of  nearly 
32,000  officers  and  men  were  sent  overseas  as  part  of  the 
American  expeditionary  forces.  This  includes  1,540  offi- 
cers and  men  who  did  duty  in  Europe  with  naval  units 
ashore. 

From  June,  191 7,  to  November  11,  191 8,  marines 
served  1 37  days  at  the  actual  front,  of  which  66  were  in 
active  sectors.  They  were  represented  in  eleven  differ- 
ent divisions.     The  fourth  brigade  of  marines — a  unit 


368    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

of  the  second  division — was  in  actual  battle  in  eight  dis- 
tinct operations.  We  all  remember  Belleau  Wood  and 
the  part  taken  by  our  marines  in  checking  the  German 
advance  toward  Paris.  A  total  of  2,453  ofFicers  and  men 
were  killed  in  battle  or  died  from  wounds  (or  gas)  received 
in  action,  while  8,529  were  wounded,  and  the  total  casual- 
ties, from  all  causes,  of  marines  in  France  reached  12,285. 
The  fifth  and  sixth  regiments  of  marines  were  cited  three 
times  in  French  army  orders,  the  sixth  machine-gun  bat- 
talion twice,  and  the  fourth  brigade  once.  Marines  re- 
ceived 763  American  decorations,  including  14  medals  of 
honor  and  1,721  foreign  decorations.  They  served  in 
both  army  and  navy  aviation  operations,  on  board  our 
battleships  in  the  grand  fleet  and  at  Bantry  Bay,  and  in 
the  crews  of  cruisers  and  other  vessels  doing  escort  duty, 
as  well  as  in  the  vessels  of  our  main  fleet. 

Other  Activities 

A  small  force  which  gave  excellent  service  consisted  of 
four  ships  which  constituted  the  American  cross-channel 
transport  force.  It  was  found  necessary  to  have  this 
force  when,  in  the  spring  of  191 8,  our  army  in  France  was 
being  rapidly  increased  and  men  were  sent  by  every  pos- 
sible vessel.  Many  were  landed  in  English  ports,  more 
than  the  already  overtaxed  British  cross-channel  ships 
could  handle.  Ships  were  therefore  purchased  and  rushed 
over  to  perform  this  duty,  which  continued  to  the  close 
of  hostilities. 

A  naval  pipe-line  unit  was  organized,  sent  over,  and 
constructed  a  fuel-oil  pipe-line  across  Scotland. 

The  bureau  of  medicine  and  surgery  provided  hospital 
facilities  in  connection  with  every  naval  activity  abroad. 
These  were  so  excellent  as  to  excite  the  admiration  of 


THE  ATLANTIC   FLEET   IN  THE  WAR    369 

the  Allied  services.  Our  hospital  outfits  and  facilities  on 
board  ship  have  always  been  to  foreign  officers  something 
of  a  source  of  wondering  admiration. 

In  the  fall  of  1918  the  U.  S.  S.  Olympia  was  sent  to 
northern  Russia,  arriving  at  Archangel  October  28,  and 
during  the  year  following  three  other  cruisers,  two  gun- 
boats, three  Eagle  boats,  and  three  subchasers  were,  at 
various  times,  in  these  waters  looking  out  for  American 
interests  in  various  ways,  operating  on  the  coast  and  in 
the  rivers. 

Some  of  the  greatest  activities  of  the  navy  have  not 
been  commented  on,  nor  is  there  space  to  do  so.  They 
were  numerous  and  extensive.  The  expansion  of  train- 
ing-stations and  the  opening  of  new  ones;  the  taking  over 
and  fitting  out  of  vessels  of  all  sorts;  the  commandeering 
and  operation  of  numerous  commercial  activities;  the 
handling  of  supplies  for  ships  at  home  and  abroad  and 
for  shore  establishments;  the  research  laboratories;  the 
great  expansion  of  work  in  the  Navy  Department  and 
its  bureaus,  all  deserve  to  be,  and  will  be,  part  of  the 
history  of  the  war.  A  knowledge  of  these  activities  will 
indicate  how  great  is  the  general  question  of  prepared- 
ness for  war. 

Prior  to  the  war  many  had  feared  that  patriotism  was 
lessening,  that  the  feeling  of  individual  responsibility,  of 
duty  owed  to  country,  was  dying  out,  and  that  instead 
we  thought  usually  of  what  the  country  owed  to  a  class 
or  to  the  individual.  The  war  showed  that  patriotism 
was  still  alive,  that  individual  responsibility  did  exist. 
The  spirit,  patriotism,  adaptability,  and  general  intelli- 
gence of  the  young  men,  and  women,  also,  of  our  country 
was  amply  demonstrated. 


XVI 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT 

BY    TASKER    HOWARD    BLISS 

The  problem  of  the  limitation  of  armaments  differs, 
in  one  important  aspect,  from  all  the  other  important 
problems  of  the  Paris  peace  conference.  Those  other 
problems,  however  much  they  affected  for  good  or  ill  the 
relations  of  the  world  at  large,  primarily,  and  many  of 
them  mainly  if  not  entirely,  concerned  the  nations  that 
were  then  making  peace.  They  were  created  by  the  war 
itself,  or  were  those  for  the  solution  of  which  the  war  was 
fought.  And  the  general  line  of  their  sohition  was  a 
foregone  conchision  the  moment  it  became  evident  with 
which  side  victory  would  rest.  The  factors  were  known; 
the  case  could  be  concretely  expressed;  waiving  differ- 
ences of  opinion  as  to  the  relative  value  of  these  factors, 
some  sort  of  a  solution  could  be  arrived  at  without  great 
difficulty.  And  a  discussion  of  them  is,  largely,  a  his- 
torical statement  of  these  factors,  the  various  opinions 
expressed  as  to  their  value,  and  the  conchisions  reached. 

But  the  problem  of  the  limitation  of  armaments  differs 
from  all  these.  It  did  not  grow  out  of  the  World  War,  but 
long  antedated  it.  That  war  accentuated  it  but  did  not 
create  it.  Its  factors  are  vague  and  complex,  growing 
from  the  very  roots  of  national  policies  and  intertwined 
in  the  growth  of  these  policies.  The  failure  to  solve  it 
made  such  a  war  as  the  recent  one  possible,  and  directly 
brought  it  on.  This  all-important  one  is  still  unsolved, 
and  until  it  is  solved  other  such  wars  are  as  certain  to 

370 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      371 

come  as  the  sun  is  to  rise,  with  their  grim  threat  of  de- 
struction of  our  civilization.  It  underlies  the  possibility 
of  the  existence  of  an  association  of  nations  for  the 
maintenance  of  international  peace,  and  the  successful 
operation  of  an  international  court  of  Justice  and  arbitral 
court. 

The  conference  recognized  the  existence  of  this  prob- 
lem but  made  no  direct  attempt  to  solve  it.  I  think  that, 
whether  consciously  or  not,  the  national  representatives 
there  assembled  realized  that  it  must  be  discussed  by  a 
conference  differently  constituted  from  that  one;  that 
while  a  world  problem,  its  sohition  depended  upon  a 
workable  agreement  between  only  a  small  number  of  the 
nations;  that  an  atmosphere  in  which  the  elements  of 
war  and  violence  were  still  muttering  amid  the  clouds 
hovering  over  the  ravages  of  the  recent  storm  was  not 
serene  enough  to  permit  the  clear  vision  necessary  to  see 
and  fix  in  substantial  form  this  dim  phantom  of  hope  that 
has  mocked  men  so  long.  The  peace  conference  recog- 
nized a  limitation  of  national  armaments  as  the  very 
cornerstone  of  the  foundation  that  it  was  attempting  to 
lay  for  a  lasting  peace,  and  in  two  very  important  chapters 
of  its  final  treaty  it  pledged  itself  to  do  what  could  be 
done  to  bring  it  about.  In  the  first  of  these  it  provides 
that  the  nations  forming  the  League  "recognize  that  the 
maintenance  of  peace  requires  a  reduction  of  national 
armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national 
safety."  This,  of  itself,  is  vague;  but  that  some  sort  of 
reduction  was  contemplated  appears  from  the  provision 
that  plans  shall  be  formulated  "for  such  reduction  for  the 
consideration  and  action  of  the  several  governments." 
In  the  other  chapter  appears  a  more  definite  statement. 
It  recognizes  the  belief  universally  expressed  before  the 


372    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

war,  and  during  it,  that  it  was  the  German  armaments 
which  forced  the  world  to  adopt  that  country's  system, 
and  that  with  its  drastic  modification  the  rest  of  the 
world  could  then  do  the  same.  Thus  the  preamble  to 
the  military  peace  terms  in  the  treaty  provided  that, 

**/n  order  to  render  possible  the  initiation  of  a  general 
limitation  of  the  armaments  of  all  nations,  Germany  un- 
dertakes strictly  to  observe  the  military,  naval  and  air 
clauses  which  follow." 

Now  you  will  note  that  when  Germany  affixed  her  sig- 
nature to  one  side  of  the  last  page  of  that  document, 
twenty-seven  other  nations  of  the  earth,  including  all 
the  great  Powers,  signed  it  on  the  other  side.  Therefore, 
in  all  good  faith  and  honor  these  nations  have  pledged 
themselves  to  initiate,  as  soon  as  practicable,  a  general 
limitation  of  armaments  after  Germany  shall  have  com- 
plied with  her  first  obligation.  Germany  is  compelled  to 
limit  her  armament  in  order  that  the  other  nations  may 
be  able  to  do  likewise.  It  will  be  interesting  to  note, 
later,  what  we  compelled  Germany  to  do,  as  throwing 
light  on  what  it  was  hoped  that  all  the  rest  of  the  world 
might  do  as  rapidly  as  is  practicable. 

And  so  the  problem  has  been  thrown  by  the  peace 
conference  in  the  face  of  the  world  as  one  yet  unsolved. 
As  such,  it  is  open  to  discussion  in  a  sense  that  does  not 
apply  to  others. 

In  such  a  discussion  the  first  question  that  will  be 
asked  is  this:  "Why  has  the  problem  suddenly  become  so 
urgent?  The  world  may  never  see  such  another  war  as 
the  one  we  have  recently  passed  through;  it  may  jog 
along,  as  before,  for  generations  or  centuries,  with  limited 
international  struggles,  upon  which  the  larger  part  of  the 
world  looks  with  more  or  less  indifference,  and  without 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      373 

any  special  dislocation  of  its  normal  energies."  The  an- 
swer to  this  goes  to  the  very  root  of  the  question  of  ex- 
cessive armaments  and  will  throw  much  hght  on  a  pos- 
sible remedy,  if  a  remedy  can  be  found. 

The  problem  is  now  urgent  because,  for  the  first  time 
in  modern  history,  we  are  confronted  by  war  of  a  nature 
that  threatens  the  continuity,  if  not  the  existence,  of  our 
civilization.  This  is  due  to  one  primary  cause  and  cer- 
tain inevitable  resulting  tendencies  of  it. 

The  primary  cause  is  the  radical  change  in  the  char- 
acter of  war,  due  entirely  to  the  modern  doctrine  of  the 
"nation  in  arms." 

What  is  the  nation  in  arms?  It  is  a  nation  with  all  its 
dynamic  forces — physical,  material,  moral — trained  and 
controlled  in  time  of  peace,  some  of  these  forces  entirely, 
all  of  them  to  a  large  extent,  for  eventual  use  in  war; 
and  directed  in  war  so  that  all  this  concentrated  force 
may  be  brought  to  bear  in  one  blow  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  its  adversary.  Nations  which  must  depend  for 
their  security  upon  their  individual  preparedness  for  war 
cannot  be  content  with  measures  taken  merely  for  the 
training  and  equipment  of  armed  forces.  The  recent 
war  demonstrated  the  absolute  necessity  for  each  bellig- 
erent to  mobilize  all  its  civil  activities  for  the  purposes  of 
war.  But  we  learned  the  bitter  lesson  that  one  can- 
not mobilize  for  war  unless  prepared  for  it  in  peace. 
Mobilization  means  nothing  else  than  the  making 
promptly  available  on  the  outbreak  of  war  all  the  agen- 
cies necessary  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  We  know 
now  that,  even  if  it  be  necessary  only  to  give  help  to  a 
friend,  we  cannot  rely  upon  our  preparedness  unless  we 
conduct  these  activities  in  time  of  peace  with  a  view  to 
their  best  employment  in  war.     How  will  it  be  if  we 


374    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

should  ever  have  to  fight  for  our  life?  We  find  that 
military  utility  must  be  a  large  and  often  a  controlling 
factor  in  determining  the  nature  of  our  industries,  the 
training  of  our  workmen,  and  even  the  use  of  our  land 
for  agricultural  purposes. 

And  so  a  nation  in  arms  is  a  nation  of  combatants,  men, 
women,  and  children — some  drafted  to  the  front,  the 
labor  of  others  commandeered  and  directed  to  maintain 
the  former  at  the  front.  In  this  first  and  only  war  of  the 
nations  in  arms  that  we  have  had,  it  was  abundantly 
proved  that  the  morale  of  the  army  was  nothing  unless 
supported  by  that  of  the  people  at  home.  Every  military 
and  political  leader  gave  more  thought  to  the  latter  than 
to  the  former.  And,  therefore,  each  belfigerent  employed 
every  available  agency  of  war  to  destroy  the  moral  re- 
sistance of  his  adversary  at  home  quite  as  much  as  to 
destroy  his  physical  and  material  resistance  at  the  front. 

Now  there  are  certain  inevitable  tendencies,  I  may  say 
almost  inevitable  consequences,  of  the  general  applica- 
tion of  this  doctrine  of  the  nation  in  arms.  They  have  a 
direct  bearing  upon  the  statement  that  a  war  between 
two  such  nations  will  begin  at  once  to  drag  the  others 
into  it  until  it  becomes  a  world  war. 

The  first  of  these  consequences  is  the  necessity  of  alli- 
ances. In  times  not  long  since,  when  one  of  the  great 
powers  expected  to  have  to  put  into  the  field  a  maximum 
army  of  half  a  million  men,  or  thereabouts,  it  had  no  ap- 
prehension as  to  lack  of  man-power.  It  could  still  call 
out  another  half  a  million,  and  then  another.  Mean- 
while there  was  always  the  possibility  of  a  conclusion 
long  before  the  total  man-power  was  seriously  touched, 
and  terms  of  peace  for  the  loser  which,  however  onerous, 
would  not  be  destructive. 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      375 

But  see  what  happens  when  a  nation,  after  straining 
every  nerve  during  long  years,  and  bearing  many  of 
the  burdens  of  war,  has  trained  the  last  of  its  avail- 
able man-power,  and  sees  that  man-power  not  increas- 
ing, has  accumulated  all  the  costly  material  for  equip- 
ment, scrapping  much  of  it  from  time  to  time  for  the 
products  of  new  invention — when,  after  all  that,  it 
finds  itself  confronted  by  potential  or  probable  enemies 
with  still  more  millions  of  trained  man-power,  grow- 
ing year  by  year.  The  weaker  nation  can  then  have 
no  hope  except  in  an  alliance  that  will  at  least  restore  the 
balance.  And  what  is  true  of  the  single  nations  is  true 
of  the  alliances  themselves.  When  one  is  formed,  and 
then  another,  every  addition  to  the  one  side  must  be 
met  by  an  added  counterbalance  on  the  other.  That 
was  the  condition  in  Europe  for  some  time  before  1914. 
And  it  was  the  fact  that  every  possible  combination  in 
the  way  of  alliances  and  entente  seemed  to  have  been 
made  that  convinced  many  military  students  that  the 
Great  War  was  near  at  hand.  If  you  will  study  the  mili- 
tary journals  of  Europe  for  the  three  or  four  years  pre- 
ceding the  war,  you  will  find  this  as  a  growing  conviction. 

We  know  now  that  neither  the  individual  preparedness 
of  nations  nor  the  alliances  of  nations  so  prepared  pre- 
vented war.  They  delayed  it,  but  the  inevitable  end 
was  only  the  more  terrible  because  the  delay  was  only 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  as  nearly  as  possible  every 
ounce  of  the  world's  energy  for  the  struggle.  Now  that 
it  is  over,  what  are  you  going  to  do  about  it?  Is  it  to  be 
more  preparedness  and  more  alliances?  If  there  is  the 
one  there  must  be  the  other.  With  them  can  you  give 
any  more  assurance  for  the  future  than  for  the  past?  It 
is  just  this  which  makes  such  a  tremendous  problem  for 


376    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT  PARIS 

us,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  which  we  mustt 
for  our  own  personal  interest,  do  our  share  in  solving. 
Some  believe  that  the  United  States  should  make  a  solemn 
declaration  that  in  the  event  of  another  war  in  Europe 
threatening  civilization,  we  shall  immediately  take  part 
to  protect  civilization.  But,  gentlemen,  I  maintain  that 
in  the  conditions  of  this  modern  world  a  war  cannot  be- 
gin between  two  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe  without 
threatening  civiHzation.  And  if  it  should  come  within 
this  generation  I  doubt  if  civilization  could  stand  the 
added  strain. 

Such  a  declaration  as  I  spoke  of  would  constitute  a 
moral  alliance  of  the  United  States  with  an  unnamed  and 
unknown  nation,  or  group  of  nations.  Because,  what- 
ever be  its  threat  against  civilization,  no  one  now  knows 
who  will  begin  the  next  war,  nor  with  whom  it  will  begin. 

It  was  my  fortune  while  in  France  to  hear  many  dis- 
cussions of  prominent  men  in  private,  where  men  speak 
their  minds,  at  a  time  when  France  was  basing  large 
hopes  upon  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  And  I  never  heard  other  than  one  conclusion, 
which  was  this :  France  must  have,  in  the  event  of  such 
another  war,  from  2,000,000  to  4,000,000  men  available 
for  her  assistance,  part  of  them  immediately,  the  rest  as 
rapidly  as  transportation  can  get  them  there.  And 
these  men  must  be  constantly  reinforced.  Nor  did  they 
think  there  would  be  any  moral  force  in  an  agreement 
that  was  not  supported  by  the  physical  force  necessary 
to  make  it  good.  We  often  say  that  the  moral  force  of 
a  declaration  by  the  United  States  that  she  would  sup- 
port France  against  Germany  would  have  prevented  the 
latter's  invasion  in  1914.  From  the  military  point  of 
view  I  do  not  think  that  Germany  would  have  begun 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      377 

the  war  with  France  when  she  did  had  she  not  firmly 
believed  that  it  would  have  been  won  within  from  six 
to  eight  weeks,  during  which  time  she  would  have  no  fear 
of  what  the  United  States  might  do. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  I  agree  with  the  French  themselves 
that  in  the  event  of  such  another  war  France  can  have 
little  hope  without  an  alliance;  and  if  war  must  come, 
then,  whether  as  the  result  of  a  moral  alliance  or  not,  I 
earnestly  hope  that  my  country  will  go  more  promptly 
than  before  not  only  to  her  assistance,  but  to  that  of 
any  nation  whose  downfall  would  be  a  menace  to  civiliza- 
tion. If  the  present  military  policy  of  the  world  is  to 
continue,  such  a  war  will  come  and  we  must  bend  our 
backs  to  carry  the  load  of  preparation.  Is  it  or  is  it  not 
better  to  minimize  the  cost  of  insurance  of  our  civihza- 
tion  by  putting  out  a  little  of  the  fire  that  threatens  it? 
Instead  of  contemplating  the  possibility  of  being  forced 
into  such  another  war,  is  it  not  better,  in  our  own  inter- 
ests, that  we  should  at  least  try  to  effect  a  modification 
of  the  systems  and  policies  that  alone  make  such  wars 
probable  or  possible? 

The  second  consequence  of  the  doctrine  of  the  nation 
in  arms  is  the  accumulation  of  the  enormous  amount  of 
costly  material  for  its  man-power.  Although  every  able- 
bodied  man  in  a  nation  be  trained  to  arms,  his  services 
are  ineffective  unless  he  and  the  military  organization  to 
which  he  is  to  belong  have  at  once  ready  all  the  initial 
equipment  which  he  and  his  organization  require.  There 
must,  therefore,  be  immediately  ready  not  only  a  vast 
accumulation  of  infantry  arms  and  ammunition,  but 
artillery  of  every  kind,  tanks,  aeroplanes,  motor-trucks. 
These  require  years  to  obtain;  yet  there  is  always  the 
chance  that  some  new  invention  may  throw  much  of  it 


378     WHAT    REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

on  the  scrap  pile.  But  that  chance  must  be  taken  if 
there  is  to  be  preparedness  when  the  emergency  comes. 
A  nation  may  train  every  man  within  its  borders,  but, 
without  the  necessary  material  at  the  outbreak  of  war, 
it  may  find  that,  in  the  temper  of  people  of  this  modern 
work!,  in  addition  to  a  war  abroad  it  will  have  a  revolu- 
tion at  home. 

Note  another  thing  that  tends  to  bring  about  the  alli- 
ances that  will  make  future  wars  more  formidable.  The 
antagonism  growing  out  of  opposing  commercial  interests 
or  out  of  racial  difl'erences  is  no  longer  confined  to  any 
two  nations.  These  interests  bind  them  together  in  groups 
on  each  side.  The  result  is  great  alliances  bound  to  stand 
together  until  changed  conditions  result  in  new  alliances, 
because  the  interest  of  one  is  the  interest  of  all.  By  the 
very  necessities  of  war,  one  side  or  each  of  them  begins 
to  put  restrictions  on  neutrals  with  a  tendency  toward, 
sometimes  with  the  object  of,  forcing  them  into  it.  When 
the  relations  of  all  kinds  between  the  nations,  especially 
the  great  ones,  were  not  so  close  as  now,  when  war  meant 
generally  a  relatively  small  indemnity,  with  or  without  a 
relatively  small  loss  of  territory  for  the  defeated  side, 
other  nations  found  it  not  difficult  to  keep  out  of  it.  But 
now  the  war  of  two  nations  in  arms  is  so  serious  that  the 
victor  feels  he  must  leave  his  enemy  powerless  for  genera- 
tions to  come.  It  becomes  a  war  almost,  if  not  literally, 
for  life  and  death.  Some  nations  may  think  they  have 
an  interest  in  bringing  this  about  for  one  or  the  other 
of  the  contestants.  But  there  are  others  who  are  vitally 
interested  in  preventing  it.  So  there  is  a  tendency  to 
bring  one  after  another  into  the  maelstrom,  until,  as  I 
have  said,  the  war  of  two  nations  in  arms  becomes  one 
of  the  World  in  Arms. 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAjMENT      379 

A  third  consequence  is  the  rigid  blockade.  The  recent 
war  showed  that  when  the  man-power  of  a  nation  is  in 
the  field,  the  surest  way  to  defeat  it  is  to  break  the 
morale  of  the  people  at  home.  It  is  not  possible  for  any 
nation,  even  one  with  the  most  abundant  and  varied 
resources,  to  store  up  in  peace  the  supplies  necessary  for 
the  enormous,  immediate,  and  continued  demand  in  war. 
There  is  ahvays  something  that  must  be  obtained  from 
abroad.  And  the  withdrawal  of  men  from  productive 
labor  makes  it  more  and  more  difficult  for  a  nation  to 
utihze  its  own  resources.  Science  may  do  much  to  pro- 
vide substitutes  for  lacking  material;  but  in  war  there 
are  time  limits,  even  if  no  other,  to  the  operation  of 
science.  It  was  this  which  forced  a  more  and  more 
stringent  blockade,  regardless  of  previous  rules  or  of 
national  interpretations  of  them,  much  to  the  irritation 
of  the  United  States,  and  which  continued  until  the 
United  States  learned  that  the  ruthless  blockade  was  to 
her  own  interest  as  well  as  to  that  of  European  Allies. 

And  the  character  of  this  latest  and,  probably,  of 
future  wars  justifies  the  extreme  blockade.  It  will  make, 
and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  it  will  make,  future  wars  more 
difficult  in  their  inception,  because,  unless  the  whole 
world  accepts  this  new  rule,  it  will  require  a  nation  or 
an  alhance  strong  enough  to  defy  the  rest  of  the  world, 
in  order  to  block  all  avenues  of  commercial  access  to  the 
nation  with  which  it  is  at  war.     But  it  will  do  it  if  it  can. 

You  will  now  see  why  it  is  that  in  a  war  of  **  nations 
in  arms"  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  for  any  nation, 
with  however  little  original  interest  in  the  matter,  to 
maintain  its  neutrality.  Modern  agencies  of  warfare 
have  already  made  it  impossible  to  blockade  directly  and 
close  at  hand,  with  any  certainty,  enemy  ports  and  coasts. 


38o    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

Therefore,  when  it  has  become  necessary,  in  order  to 
effect  our  purpose,  to  blockade  whole  seas  and  oceans; 
when,  to  stop  all  trade  of  every  kind  whatsoever  with  an 
enemy  country,  to  prevent  every  possible  pound  of  food 
or  supplies  of  any  kind  from  leaking  through  a  neutral 
country  to  an  enemy  country,  whether  their  borders  are 
contiguous  or  not,  it  has  become  necessary  to  put  those 
neutrals  on  short  rations  of  food,  of  clothing,  of  fuel,  of 
everything — then  these  neutrals  can  escape  many  of  the 
hardships  of  war  only  by  joining  in  it  on  one  side  or  the 
other.  And  it  may  be  that  some  will  join  a  side  because 
they  think  it  will  win  rather  than  because  they  think 
it  is  right. 

The  basic  reason  for  the  ruthless  blockade  is  not  far 
to  seek.  With  the  modern  nation  in  arms  every  woman, 
old  and  young,  who  can  knit  a  woollen  sock  for  the  soldier 
at  the  front,  every  child  able  to  knit  a  mitten,  every  old 
man  who  can  cultivate  a  bushel  of  potatoes  or  wheat 
beyond  his  own  needs — each  of  them  is  a  soldier;  their 
work  is  commandeered  and  directed  by  the  government 
for  the  purposes  of  the  war.  The  merchant  deals  in  the 
goods  that  the  government  permits  him;  the  farmer  sows 
the  crops  that  the  government  orders  him.  Every  one 
is  drafted  for  the  war.  The  tendency  has  been  to  abolish 
the  distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants, 
to  treat  all  as  soldiers — the  mother  rocking  the  cradle  at 
home,  as  the  husband  or  son  in  the  trenches.  And  it  is 
to  be  feared  that  it  will  be  as  bad,  or  worse,  in  the  next 
war,  unless  the  good  God  gives  us  sense  at  least  to  try 
some  plan  by  which  warfare  may  be  made  impossible. 

Again,  a  characteristic  of  modern  war  is  its  startling 
suddenness.  When  nations,  whether  singly  or  in  alli- 
ances, arm  to  the  limit  against  each  other,  and  each  side 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      381 

knows  that  the  armament  of  the  other  has  no  use  against 
any  other  than  itself,  we  can  all  see  that  when  one  has 
reached  its  limit  and  knows  that  the  other  is  capable  of 
still  further  expansion,  war,  without  warning,  is  inevitable. 

Finally,  the  new  warfare  is  marked  by  the  ruthless  use 
of  every  possible  agency  for  destruction  of  life  and  mate- 
rial. When  the  Hague  Convention  pronounced  against 
the  use  of  toxic  or  asphyxiating  gases  and  the  dropping 
of  bombs  from  aeroplanes,  these  agencies  were  regarded 
merely  as  irritants,  making  the  struggle  more  bitter,  and 
accomplishing  nothing  in  the  attainment  of  the  ends  of 
the  war.  But  no  agency,  however  terrible,  has  continued 
to  be  unlawful  from  the  moment  it  is  discovered  to  be 
practical  and  effective  in  determining  the  course  of  a 
battle  or  in  bringing  the  war  to  an  end.  The  use  of 
gas  has  been  legalized  by  war,  as  is  shown  by  the  prep- 
arations for  its  further  use  made  by  all  the  great  armed 
nations.  In  every  nation  in  Europe  it  is  expected  that 
the  use  of  aeroplanes  for  the  bombing  of  cities  in  the 
next  great  war  will  be  on  a  scale  without  precedent  in 
the  last  one.  And  all  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  a  war 
of  nations  in  arms  is  in  reality  one  of  life  and  death,  in 
which  each  will  and  must  do  what  it  can  to  save  itself 
and  destroy  its  adversary. 

Now,  I  think  we  can  accept  the  following  statement 
of  facts  : 

First,  that  it  is  a  world  war,  as  distinguished  from  the 
old-time  warfare,  that  constitutes  a  menace  to  our  exist- 
ing civilization. 

Second,  such  a  war  depends  upon  a  few  so-called  great 
Powers. 

Third,  a  war  between  any  two  01  them,  which  formerly 
created,  relatively,  only  a  ripple  on  the  surface  of  world 


382    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

politics,   now  has  an.  irresistible  tendency  to  draw  them 
all  into  the  roaring  maelstrom. 

Fourth,  to  meet  this,  these  few  nations  must  stagger 
under  an  increasing  burden  during  years  of  armed  peace, 
solely  to  train  what,  if  they  can  find  some  other  method 
satisfactory  for  their  purpose,  is  an  unnecessary  number 
of  men  in  purely  destructive  arts,  and  to  accumulate 
enormous  quantities  of  costly  material,  which  does  not 
add  a  penny  to  their  permanent  wealth,  and  which  when 
used  for  the  only  purpose  for  which  it  can  be  used,  is 
finally  represented  by  an  atmosphere  of  stinking  gas 
and  by  the  destruction  of  every  form  of  real  and  other- 
wise permanent  wealth. 

Fifth,  such  wars,  resulting  in  the  application  of  every 
ounce  of  accumulated  energy  on  both  sides,  must  result 
in  the  practical  destruction  of  one  by  the  other,  even  if 
both  are  not  ruined. 

Sixth,  such  wars,  necessarily  characterized  by  an  inten- 
sity of  national  passions  heretofore  unknown,  come  to  be 
regarded  by  each  side  as  wars  for  life  or  death,  in  w^hich 
each,  to  save  his  life  and  destroy  his  adversary,  will  use 
every  agency  of  destruction  available  to  him;  that,  there- 
fore, such  agencies  as  the  absohite  blockade  to  starve 
people  who  heretofore  were  regarded  as  non-combatants, 
noxious  gases,  night  and  day  bombing  of  cities  from 
aeroplanes,  the  submarine,  have  come  to  stay  until  re- 
placed by  more  destructive  agencies. 

Seventh,  various  causes  will  operate  to  draw  neutrals 
into  the  struggle. 

Eighth,  when  such  war  comes  it  will  be  without  warning 
and  every  one  must  be  ready. 

Ninth,  all  of  this  is  due  to  the  acceptance  by  a  few 
governments  of  the  mihtary  doctrine  of  the  nation  in 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      383 

arms;  to  their  belief  that  no  way  can  be  found  to  guaran- 
tee their  rights  except  universal  preparedness,  no  guar- 
antee against  a  general  war  except  a  general  preparation 
for  it. 

And,  lastly,  with  all  that  staring  us  in  the  face,  is  the 
fact  that  after  the  last  ounce  of  strength  has  been  accu- 
mulated and  the  last  combination  of  the  Powers  has 
been  made,  one  side  or  the  other  must  strike  or  forfeit 
every  dollar  and  every  hope  bound  up  in  its  preparation. 

That,  I  think,  is  a  fair  summary  of  the  war  through 
which  we  have  recently  passed.  First  was  a  period  of 
individual  preparation.  Then,  as  nations  began  to  fore- 
see the  limits  of  their  possibility  for  preparation,  and  in 
the  hope  that  by  joining  forces  with  others  they  need 
not  go  to  their  limit  but  could  save  some  of  their  energy 
for  other  purposes,  came  the  formation  of  alliances  fol- 
lowed by  ententes.  In  that  status  of  things,  the  general 
war  broke  out,  although  for  forty  years  the  great  nations 
had  been  bleeding  themselves  white  in  the  belief  that  by 
getting  ready  for  it  they  would  prevent  it.  Six  of  the 
eight  great  Powers  entered  it  at  once,  followed  shortly 
after  by  the  seventh,  and  finally  by  the  eighth.  And 
many  minor  neutrals,  from  one  cause  and  another,  were 
successively  brought  in.  The  blockade  came,  at  first 
relatively  mild,  then  more  and  more  stringent;  the  grad- 
ually growing  ruthless  use  of  the  submarine  for  the  alleged 
purpose  of  establishing  a  counter-blockade;  the  use  of 
toxic  gases  to  break  what  seemed  to  be  a  strangle-hold 
which  each  adversary  had  of  the  other,  all  the  other 
accompaniments  and  results  of  the  war  which  you  know 
only  too  well. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  speak  in  vague  terms  about 


384    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

such  a  war  being  a  menace  to  civilization,  because  it 
was  a  war  of  civilization  against  itself,  or,  rather,  a 
civil  war  between  two  parts  of  it.  It  involved  every 
one  of  the  great  civihzed  Powers.  It  has  set  one 
great  nation  on  the  road  to  an  atheistic  anarchy.  It 
has  weakened  others  in  their  powers  of  resistance  to  the 
seeping  poison.  It  has  destroyed,  for  a  time  at  least, 
one  great  barrier  between  Oriental  civilization  and  the 
narrow  strip  of  Latin  and  Anglo-Saxon  civilization  cling- 
ing to  the  western  coast  of  Europe.  Uncivilized  races 
took  part  in  it  only  to  learn  our  arts  of  war,  perhaps  in 
time  to  be  used  against  us.  And  the  pity  of  it  is  ap- 
parent from  this:  If  we  exclude  Russia  but  include  many 
peoples  scarcely  deserving  it,  our  civilization  in  2,000 
years  has  now  less  than  500,000,000  adherents.  It  seems 
a  far  cry,  and  it  probably  is  a  far  cry,  to  a  struggle  be- 
tween our  own  and  an  alien  civilization;  but  in  consid- 
ering our  problem,  I  think  it  is  our  duty  to  view  it  in 
terms  of  generations  or  centuries,  to  regard  ourselves  not 
as  conservers  of  the  relatively  petty  interests  of  to-day 
and  to-morrow,  but  as  guardians  of  the  ages  to  come. 

The  menace  to  civilization  of  the  kind  of  war  that  I 
have  been  referring  to  consists  in  the  magnitude  of  its 
shock.  A  structure  that  steadily  withstands  the  impact 
of  frequent  blows  of  a  lesser  force  may  crumble  under 
one  blow  of  those  forces  combined.  The  modern  system 
of  preparedness  has  undoubtedly  made  wars  rarer;  but 
when  they  come  it  is  with  the  accumulated  shock  of  many 
lesser  wars.  A  few  figures  will  illustrate  this:  In  all  of 
the  wars  waged  between  the  years  1790  and  191 3,  the 
total  death  loss  was  4,449,300.  An  approximate  esti- 
mate of  their  cost  to  the  world  I  have  not  been  able  to 
obtain.    In  the  recent  World  War,  lasting  from  August  of 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      385 

1914  to  November  of  1918,  the  total  death  loss  in  battle 
was  9,998,771 .  The  number  of  wounded  was  20,297,55 1 ; 
prisoners  and  missing,  5,983,600.  If  we  accept  the  usual 
estimate  of  the  dead  in  the  list  of  prisoners  and  missing, 
we  have  a  total  death  list  of  12,991,000.  To  this  total 
there  must  be  added  the  many  more  millions  of  people 
— old  men,  women,  and  children — who  died  from  hard- 
ships and  deprivation  as  a  direct  result  of  the  war.  To 
produce  the  energy  necessary  to  kill  and  wound  this  num- 
ber of  men,  to  destroy  property,  and  to  occasion  the 
other  costs  of  the  war,  it  cost  the  nations  concerned  a 
total  of  $337,946,179,657.  **The  figures  presented  in 
this  summary  are  both  incomprehensible  and  appalling, 
yet  even  these  do  not  take  into  account  the  effect  of  the 
war  on  life,  human  vitality,  economic  well-being,  ethics, 
morality,  or  other  phases  of  human  relationship  and 
activities  which  have  been  disorganized  and  injured."^ 
Who  can  deny  that  such  a  war  was  a  greater  shock  to 
our  civiHzation  than  the  many  lesser  wars  of  many  pre- 
ceding generations  could  have  been? 

Now,  assuming  for  the  moment  that  this  analysis  of 
causes  of  the  kind  of  war  that  the  civihzed  world  has 
most  to  dread  is  approximately  correct,  is  there  any 
remedy?  If  I  were  an  unreasoning  radical  I  would  an- 
swer: "Yes;  the  universal  abolition  of  the  system  which 
is  the  concentration  of  all  the  causes."  But  that  is  im- 
possible. Is  there  any  single  step  that  can  be  taken, 
with  the  reasonable  hope  that  it  may  in  time  be  followed 
by  others,  that  will  greatly  minimize  the  chances  of  a 
general  war?  Yes,  there  are  more  than  one;  and  if  the 
five  great  Powers  really  want  peace,  it  ought  to  be  only 
a  question  of  a  fair  conference  to  decide  which  step,  from 

1  "Preliminary  Economic  Status  of  the  War,"  No.  24,  Carnegie  Endowment. 


386    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

the  point  of  view  of  all  of  them,  it  is  most  practicable  to 
take  first. 

To  get  a  clew  to  these  steps,  let  us  take  an  extreme 
case,  and  consider  what  was  done  to  Germany  by  the 
peace  treaty,  and  the  reasons  for  it. 

As  you  know,  the  armistice  of  November  1 1  was,  in 
accordance  with  its  own  provisions,  twice  renewed  for 
successive  periods  of  thirty  days.  When  the  third  time 
approached,  there  were  many  who  perceived  serious  dan- 
gers in  this  course.  The  supreme  war  council  therefore 
decided  that  it  should  be  renewed  for  an  indeterminable 
but  short  time,  during  which  the  peace  conference  should 
draw  up  the  final  military,  naval,  and  air  terms  which  it 
was  intended  to  embody  in  a  preliminary  treaty  of  peace 
with  Germany.  Accordingly,  in  February  of  191 9,  the 
conference  appointed  a  committee  charged  with  the  work 
presided  over  by  Marshal  Foch.  Its  task  was  promptly 
completed,  but,  due  to  various  causes,  action  on  it  by 
the  conference  was  delayed;  the  final  terms  appeared  in 
the  complete  treaty  of  June  28. 

The  first  question  before  the  committee  concerned  the 
number  of  effectives  that  should  be  left  for  a  German 
army.  That  country  was  still  in  the  throes  of  the  revo- 
lution which  had  followed  the  armistice.  A  government 
was  in  nominal  power  that  had  in  it  the  possibilities  of 
democratic  development.  The  world  at  large  had  every 
interest  in  the  maintenance  of  this  government  unless 
and  until  a  better  one  should  present  itself.  It  was  being 
fought  by  monarchist  reactionaries  and  Spartacist  Com- 
munists. Disorder  reigned  in  all  the  great  centres  of 
population  and  industry.  Manifestly,  it  was  better  that 
a  democratic  government  should  be  permitted  to  grow 
stronger  by  its  own  successful  efforts  to  maintain  and 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      387 

develop  itself  than  that  it  should  go  to  pieces,  a  contin- 
gency which  would  necessitate  occupation  of  the  country 
by  large  alien  armies  for  the  indefinite  future. 

It  was  unanimously  agreed  that  the  force  must  be 
reasonably  sufficient  to  maintain  internal  order,  and  yet 
too  weak  for  external  aggression.  This  number  was  not 
capable  of  mathematical  demonstration.  But  it  was 
unanimously  agreed  that  the  number  should  be  200,000 
men,  provided  that  they  were  to  be  raised  by  conscrip- 
tion with  a  very  short  term  of  service,  and  a  much  smaller 
number  if  they  were  to  be  long-service  men  under  volun- 
tary enlistment. 

The  issue  thus  raised  by  differences  of  opinion  as  to 
short-term  conscription  and  long-term  voluntary  enlist- 
ment is  the  very  heart  of  the  great  question  of  the  limita- 
tion of  armaments.  It  may  seem  a  curious  thing  that 
the  military  men  of  those  nations  that  had  had  most 
reason  to  fear  Germany  should  favor  conscription  and 
short  service.  But  it  was  natural  enough.  The  total 
force  proposed  to  be  allowed  for  Germany  was  so  small, 
in  the  scale  of  existing  European  armaments,  that  they 
had  no  fear  of  it  so  long  as  their  own  were  maintained. 
Nor  did  any  of  them  advocate  reduction  in  their  own 
for  an  indefinite  future.  But  the  fear,  guardedly  ex- 
pressed, was  this:  The  common  people  will  say,  **For 
forty  years  w^e  have  patiently  and  loyally  endured  a 
blighting  military  system  because  we  believed  it  neces- 
sary in  order  to  meet  the  menace  of  the  German  system. 
We  have  cheerfully  withdrawn  from  productive  labor, 
year  in  and  year  out,  a  great  number  of  our  best  men 
and  have  borne  the  burden  of  constantly  increasing  taxa- 
tion falling  on  the  reduced  productive  labor.  Now  we 
have  crushed  the  Germany  that  originated  the  evil  system 


388    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT  PARIS 

and  we  have  crushed  her  system.  Why  should  we  bear 
it  any  longer?  Under  the  guise  of  a  penalty  you  have 
bestowed  upon  Germany  the  blessing  that  we  have  longed 
for  and  we  demand  a  share  in  it,  too."  So  it  is  natural 
enough  that  men  who  beheved  it  unwise  for  their  govern- 
ments to  change  their  present  military  systems  should 
hesitate  to  put  such  an  argument  in  the  mouths  of  their 
people,  which  perhaps  those  governments  could  not 
withstand. 

This  difference  of  opinion  had,  finally,  to  be  decided 
by  the  council  of  the  Powers,  which  wisely,  in  my  opinion, 
ruled  in  favor  of  the  army  of  100,000  men,  of  vohmtary 
enlistment,  and  the  abolition  of  conscription. 

The  remaining  matters  involved  no  difficulty.  In  order 
to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  military  system  it  was 
provided  that  universal  military  service  and  training 
shall  be  abofished. 

It  was  provided  that  there  should  be  only  the  amount 
of  arms,  ammunition,  and  equipment  necessary  for  the 
small  authorized  army  to  perform  its  function  of  main- 
taining internal  order. 

The  accumulation  of  stocks  of  arms  and  munitions  of 
any  kind  was  prohibited.  This  provision  alone  makes 
impossible  international  war  on  a  large  scale  on  the  part 
of  Germany.  The  immense  stocks  of  costly  munitions 
and  other  apparatus  formerly  accumulated  by  that  na- 
tion, and  which  the  other  nations  are  still  accumulating, 
presupposes  a  war  of  the  ** nations  in  arms"  in  which  it 
must  be  possible  for  every  able-bodied  man  to  receive 
his  initial  equipment,  together  with  the  enormous  reserves 
of  material,  the  destruction  of  which  will  at  once  begin. 

The  material  permitted  to  be  on  hand,  which  is  to  be 
sufficient  only  to  replace  the  annual  waste,  must  be  stored 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      389 

at  points  of  which  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
approve.  All  other  material  must  be  delivered  to  com- 
missions of  those  Pov/ers  for  destruction. 

The  manufacture  of  war  material  of  any  kind  whatso- 
ever, except  of  the  kind  and  in  the  amounts  permitted 
by  the  treaty,  is  absohitely  prohibited.  Their  permitted 
manufacture  can  be  carried  on  only  in  establishments 
that  are  approved  by  the  Powers.  "All  other  establish- 
ments," says  the  treaty,  "for  the  manufacture,  prepara- 
tion, storage  or  design  of  arms,  munitions,  or  any  war 
material  whatever,  shall  be  closed  down." 

In  subsequent  clauses  the  German  navy  was  reduced 
to  a  force  sufficient  only  for  a  coast  guard,  and  sufficient 
for  that,  it  may  be  remarked,  only  in  case  other  navies 
should  be  similarly  reduced.  No  submarines  are  allowed. 
All  war  vessels  not  authorized  must  be  delivered  to  the 
Powers  or  broken  up.  No  new  war  vessel  can  be  con- 
structed or  acquired  except  to  replace  those  that  are 
allowed.  Further  to  guard  this  restriction,  no  vessel  can 
be  replaced  unless  it  has  been  totally  lost  in  the  hazards 
of  the  sea  or  otherwise,  or  unless,  for  one  class  of  vessels, 
it  has  been  in  service  for  twenty  years,  and  for  the  other 
class,  for  fifteen  years.  All  fortifications  commanding 
the  maritime  routes  between  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic 
shall  be  demolished,  nor  shall  any  such  be  hereafter 
erected. 

Finally,  says  the  treaty,  "the  armed  forces  of  Germany 
must  not  include  any  mihtary  or  naval  air  forces." 

There  were,  of  course,  numerous  clauses  relating  to  de- 
tails and  methods  of  execution. 

The  committee  wrote  nothing  but  the  straightforward, 
cold-blooded  clauses.  It  was  not  their  business  to  do 
more.     But  when  the  peace  conference  approved  them 


390    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED   AT  PARIS 

it  added  the  very  significant  preamble  which  I  have  al- 
ready quoted: 

"  In  order  to  render  possible  the  initiation  of  a  general 
limitation  of  the  Armaments  of  all  Nations,  Germany 
undertakes  strictly  to  observe  the  mihtary,  naval  and 
air  clauses  which  follow." 

Now,  what  did  w^e  require  Germany  to  do  that  we 
would  not  gladly  do  ourselves,  provided  that  every  other 
nation  loyally  did  the  same,  to  our  assured  knowledge, 
and  at  the  same  time  as  ourselves?  I  can  think  of  no 
other  answer  than— Nothing.  But  that  is  now  impos- 
sible.    It  is  the  dream  of  the  ideahst. 

It  will  be  a  long  time  before  the  nations  will  be  relieved 
of  a  certain  fear  of  each  other;  a  fear  which  undoubtedly 
exists  in  varying  degree  is  largely  bred  out  of  the  existence 
of  excessive  and  necessarily  unequal  armaments,  and 
which  resuhs  in  continuing  them.  And  it  is  this  fear, 
whether  unreasoning  or  not,  that  must  be  taken  into  ac- 
count in  any  attempt  to  come  to  an  agreement  about  these 
armaments.  Fear  results  in  armaments,  and  the  arma- 
ments are  simply  a  concrete  expression  of  national  policies. 
It  is  because  they  are  so  completely  interwoven  with  the 
growth  of  these  national  pohcies  that  any  question  of 
their  limitation  is  the  most  complicated  one  that  confronts 
the  world.  It  is  not  true  that  armaments  on  their  present 
scale  have  been  maintained  solely  for  defense  against 
wanton  and  unprovoked  attack.  It  is  because  national 
leaders  know  that  their  policies  may  invite  or  even  pro- 
voke attack,  or  because  they  know  that  these  pohcies 
may  force  themselves  to  attack. 

Now,  if  any  business  man  has  a  competitor  who,  in 
some  senseless  form  of  competition,  is  not  only  cutting 
his  own  throat  but  is  forcing  you  to  do  the  same,  you 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      391 

are  not  going  to  any  third  party  to  discuss  the  mat- 
ter; sooner  or  later  you  will  have  to  go  to  him  to  see 
whether  you  can  arrive  at  any  better  modus  vivendi.  If 
it  is  true  that  certain  nations  are  needlessly  burdening 
their  peoples  in  a  competitive  race  for  this  or  that  form 
of  armament,  they,  and  no  one  else,  must  get  together  in 
a  fair  discussion  of  the  problem  to  see  if  they,  too,  can 
find  a  better  iiiodus  viveiidi.  When  the  legislators  of 
various  nations  have  before  them  the  question  of  taxing 
their  people  for  the  great  sums  necessary  to  maintain 
and  expand  their  mihtary  and  naval  establishments,  you 
may  be  sure  that  in  their  secret  discussions  they  justify 
these  expenses  on  the  gound  of  a  fear  of  some  other  na- 
tion's policy.  And  these  policies  are  those  of  only  some 
five  or  six  Powers.  It  is  they,  therefore,  that  must  come 
together.  The  nations  will  get  nowhere  in  asking  their 
military  and  naval  experts:  "Can  we  safely  reduce  our 
expenses  for  building  programmes?  Can  we  safely  de- 
cide not  to  adopt  the  military  doctrine  of  the  nation  in 
arms?"  Their  answer  must  be :  '* No,  not  until  the  other 
nations,  our  rivals  in  this  business,  do  the  same."  There- 
fore, sooner  or  later,  these  questions  must  be  asked  of 
the  nations  the  results  of  whose  policy  we  fear. 

And  so  the  first  step  in  the  solution  of  our  problem 
must  be  a  conference  of  the  Powers  concerned.  It  need 
not  include  more  than  five.  It  must  be  free  and  un- 
pledged. It  must  not  be  composed  of  military  and  naval 
men  but  of  the  most  far-sighted  statesmen.  It  were 
better  held  in  our  own  country,  where  the  other  nations 
can  more  clearly  realize  what  confronts  them  if  they  force 
us  into  military  competition  with  them. 

Assume  such  a  conference  to  be  assembled.  Naturally, 
the  representatives  of  the  other  Powers  may  say  that  as 


392     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

we  have  called  the  conference  it  is  incumbent  on  us  to 
submit  the  first  proposition  for  their  consideration. 
What  attitude  might  patriotic  American  representatives 
take?  It  seems  to  me  that  the  following  would  be  such 
an  attitude  for  these  representatives  and  result  in  a 
reasonable  basis  for  discussion  with  some  hope  of  good 
result. 

They  will  declare  that  the  United  States  will  not  lay 
up  a  single  ship,  nor  cease  building  them,  will  not  disarm 
a  single  soldier,  will  not  cease  or  diminish — but  rather  in- 
crease— its  efforts  at  preparedness,  except  as  the  result 
of  an  agreement  between  all  the  great  Powers  to  do  the 
same. 

They  will  divide  national  armaments  into  their  three 
component  parts : 

(a)  Land  fortifications; 

(6)  Navies; 

(c)  Universal  training  of  a  nation  for  war,  together 
with  the  manufacture  and  accumulation  of  all  the  ma- 
terial necessary  for  international  war. 

It  will  be  noted  that  these  component  parts  of  arma- 
ment increase  in  cost  from  the  first  to  the  third,  and  that, 
in  the  same  progression,  they  increase  the  menace  to  the 
common  peace.  The  first  menaces  this  peace  not  at 
all,  and  imposes  the  least  financial  burden;  the  third  is 
a  perpetual  menace  to  international  peace  and  imposes 
the  greatest  burden.  The  subsequent  discussions  of  the 
conference  must  be  solely  devoted  to  determining  whether 
there  is  any  possible  modification  in  any  or  all  of  these 
three  parts  of  national  armaments  that  will  materially 
relieve  the  people  of  their  burden  and  give  more  assured 
peace. 

As  a  preliminary  to  these  discussions  the  American 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      393 

representatives  could  well  accept  the  following  basic  as- 
sumptions : 

First,  it  is  as  impossible  to  have  equality  in  the  limited 
armaments  as  it  is  to  have  equality  in  the  present  exces- 
sive armaments.  And  it  would  seem  that  nations  which 
have  had  to  endure  the  one  inequality  ought  to  endure 
very  patiently  the  other. 

Second,  no  government  can  be  expected  willingly  to 
face  the  possibility  of  its  own  destruction.  Therefore, 
it  must  have  whatever  force  it  finds  necessary  to 
maintain  itself  against  the  forces  of  disorder  and  disrup- 
tion. 

Third,  before  complete  progress  can  be  made  there 
must  be  a  radical  change  in  the  Russian  situation. 

Fourth,  under  the  mandates  over  uncivilized  peoples 
granted  by  a  league  of  nations,  the  United  States,  whether 
it  has  anything  to  do  with  a  league  or  not,  should  demand 
as  its  right,  and  the  right  of  civilization,  that  under  the 
guise  of  such  mandates  millions  of  men  of  savage  races 
shall  not  be  trained  to  take  part  in  possible  wars  of  civi- 
lized nations.  If  civilization  wants  to  destroy  itself  it 
can  do  it  without  barbarian  help. 

Then,  in  this  parley  between  the  Powers,  we  must  re- 
member that  the  other  nations  are  looking  to  us,  not  to 
take  the  first  step,  but  to  suggest  one  which  none  can  re- 
fuse to  take  along  with  the  others.  They  are  saying  to 
us:  "We  want  your  help  in  world  affairs,  because  with- 
out you  there  can  be  no  continued  peace."  We  are  say- 
ing to  them:  "The  help  you  want  of  us  will  not  make  for 
our  peace,  but  war."  Why  should  we  not  take  them  at 
their  word  and  test  what  it  means  ?  Why  should  we  not 
say  to  them,  and  give  them  a  chance  to  accept  or  refuse, 
something  like  this:  "Will  you,  the  nations  that  signed 


394    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

the  preamble  to  the  military  peace  terms  with  Germany, 
sign  this  further  document  with  us? 

***We  will  agree  with  you  that  each  nation  that  so  de- 
sires shall  keep  and  build  whatever  frontier  and  coast 
fortifications  it  wishes.  Fortifications  cannot  stride  across 
the  earth,  devastating  fields  and  destroying  cities. 

**'We  will  agree  with  you  that  each  nation  may  main- 
tain its  navy.  No  navy  without  an  army  can  conquer 
and  hold  foreign  territory. 

'*'We  will  agree  with  you  on  a  date  when  we  shall 
simultaneously  begin  to  abolish  any  military  system 
which  is  solely  necessary  for  international  war,  so  long 
as  no  other  nation  retains  it. 

"*We  will  agree  with  you  on  a  date,  as  remote  as  the 
existing  conditions  make  absohitely  necessary,  when  we 
shall  begin  the  gradual  reduction  of  our  armed  forces. 
In  coming  to  an  agreement  about  this  we  will  accept  any 
reasonable  just  principle  of  proportion,  but  admitting  in 
advance  that  reduced  armaments  can  no  more  be  equalized 
than  excessive  ones.  We  will  trust  to  the  ultimate  good 
sense  of  the  common  peoples  of  the  nations,  who  suffer 
most  from  excessive  armaments,  to  see  to  it  that  when 
the  movement  has  once  begun  it  is  pushed  as  rapidly  as 
may  be  to  its  proper  limit. 

"*We  will  agree  with  you  on  the  proper  amounts  of 
material  to  be  kept  on  hand  for  the  reduced  forces.  And 
we  will  further  agree  with  you  to  cease  the  manufacture 
of  material  until  the  amounts  now  on  hand  are  reduced 
to  what  we  agree  upon  as  necessary  for  the  reduced 
forces . 

Are  these  propositions  reasonable?  And  if  agreed 
upon  will  they  accomplish  anything  in  the  maintenance 
of  international  peace? 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      395 

Manifestly,  they  do  not  guarantee  against  war,  and  1 
know  of  nothing  that  now  will.  But  they  will  undoubt- 
edly have  a  tendency  to  deter  any  nation  from  under- 
taking international  war.  And  they  will  uhimately 
minimize  the  chances  of  the  occurrence  of  another  war 
such  as  the  last  one.  Because,  I  repeat  and  insist,  that 
such  a  war  is  only  possible  with  the  entire  male  popula- 
tion of  the  nations  trained  to  war,  and  with  the  enormous 
accumulation  of  material  for  that  population  when  called 
to  arms. 

But  they  will  tide  over  the  long  period  of  mutual  fear 
that  will  exist  before  the  nations  understand  that  they 
can  be  menaced  by  no  sudden  war  in  which  defeat  means 
death.  Nations  will  retain  as  long  as  they  choose  their 
material  defenses  on  land  and  sea.  They  will  be  left 
with  gradually  reducing  mihtary  forces.  And  this  reduc- 
tion being  made  at  simultaneous  periods,  they  may  gain 
a  gradually  increasing  confidence  in  each  other's  good 
faith.  They  will  not  destroy  their  present  vast  stocks 
of  material,  but  will  agree  to  stop  the  manufacture  of 
any  new  material.  France  and  England  and  Italy,  dur- 
ing this  period  of  reduction  and  for  long  thereafter,  need 
have  no  mihtary  fear  of  Germany,  due  to  a  reduction  in 
their  forces  and  stoppage  of  manufacture  of  material. 
Because,  while  there  are  now  millions  of  young  men  in 
civil  life  on  both  sides  trained  in  the  recent  war,  on  the 
one  side  there  will  be  ample  reserves  of  the  present 
material  for  these  millions,  if  called  to  arms,  while  on 
the  other  side  there  will  be  none  at  all.  But,  above  all, 
we  will  have  gradually  accomplished  a  radical  change  in 
a  system  which  alone  is  a  standing  threat  to  international 
peace. 

I  admit  that  perhaps  the  greatest  difficulty  will  be  in 


396    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

coming  to  an  agreement  with  European  Powers  as  to  the 
reasonable  force  that  each  nation  requires  to  maintain 
internal  order.  But  I  do  not  believe  that  this  difficulty 
is  insurmountable.  Underlying  this  question  with  them, 
is  the  latent  fear  of  Germany.  Under  present  conditions 
we  can  hardly  understand  this.  None  can,  except  those 
who  have  lived  under  this  dread  for  a  long  generation. 
Nevertheless,  I  see  no  reason  why  an  agreement  cannot 
be  reached.  They  all  admit  that  a  large  part  of  their 
forces  have  been  maintained  solely  because  of  the  men- 
ace of  the  German  system.  With  that  menace  removed 
— removed  not  only  as  coming  from  Germany  but  from 
anywhere  else — the  peoples  themselves  are  not  likely  to 
allow  any  excessive  number  under  the  guise  of  preserving 
order. 

No  one  can  tell  what  would  be  the  conclusion  of  such 
a  conference.  One  thing  is  certain;  we  need  not  accept 
anything  that  we  do  not  like.  And  another  thing  is 
certain;  if  the  government  of  the  United  States  were 
to-day  to  transmit  an  open  telegraphic  note  to  those  of 
the  four  other  great  Powers,  a  note  that  to-morrow  would 
be  published  in  all  the  newspapers  of  the  world,  inviting 
them  to  a  free,  unpledged  conference  on  the  subject  of 
armaments,  there  would  be  an  immediate  favorable  re- 
sponse. Further,  should  such  a  conference  meet,  and 
should  a  fair  abstract  of  its  discussions  be  published  to 
the  world,  its  propositions  and  the  objections  to  them 
and  who  make  the  objections,  the  common  peoples  of 
the  five  nations  would  not  permit  that  conference  to  sep- 
arate until  it  were  prepared  to  show  them  at  least  the  first 
step  toward  a  practicable  solution  of  the  problem.  For 
the  first  time  in  two  generations  the  psychological  mo- 
ment is  here  and  now,  but  it  will  rapidly  pass.     We 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT      397 

have  a  world,  appalled  by  the  magnitude  of  its  losses, 
desirous  of  finding  some  way,  any  way,  that  will  in 
some  degree  help  its  recovery  from  them  and  minimize 
the  chances  of  their  recurrence;  a  world  that  realizes, 
for  the  time  at  least,  that  the  great  insurance  company 
in  which  it  had  invested  has  failed.  We  have  the  assur- 
ance for  the  present  that  the  great  exponent  of  the  sys- 
tem which  has  brought  the  world  to  the  verge  of  ruin  is 
itself  crushed  and  ruined;  and  we  have  the  possibility  of 
replacing  it,  in  due  time,  by  a  law-abiding  democratic 
member  of  the  family  of  nations.  Is  it  not  the  time  for 
us  to  cease  asking  ourselves,  helplessly  and  hopelessly, 
the  question,  ''Can  it  be  done?"  and  at  least  attempt 
to  do  something? 

I  have  often  heard  it  asked:  "Has  the  United  States 
failed  to  attain  its  ideal  in  the  war?"  Not  if,  as  the 
result  of  it,  the  United  States  can  show  the  world,  and 
prevail  on  it  to  take,  one  assured  step  toward  the  pre- 
vention of  its  recurrence.  Surely,  among  the  small 
number  of  nations  concerned  there  must  be  some  men 
wise  enough  to  work  out  a  plan  designed,  not  to  give 
this  or  that  its  "place  in  the  sun,"  but  one  that  will  set 
us  all  on  the  path  to  the  sun.  If  not,  then  you  and  your 
sons  and  brothers  did  not  fight  to  destroy  an  overgrown 
militarism,  but  only  German  mihtarism.  You  will  have 
killed  one  giant  only  to  set  up  five  more  in  his  place. 


XVII 

THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

BY   DAVID   HUNTER   MILLER 

My  discussion  of  the  making  of  the  League  of  Nations 
is  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  party  to  the  proceedings. 
The  historian  of  the  subject  will  hereafter  be  able  to 
bring  together  the  many  threads  of  the  fabric,  to  trace 
the  motives  of  all  the  figures  in  the  scene,  to  show  not 
only  what  they  did,  but  why.  My  present  purpose  is  to 
tell  a  part  of  the  story,  rather  than  to  recount  the  his- 
tory, to  testify  rather  than  to  pronounce  Judgment. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Conference  of  Paris  was  the 
adoption  at  its  opening  session  on  January  25,  19 19,  of  a 
resolution  declaring  that  a  League  of  Nations  should  be 
created,  that  the  League  should  be  treated  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  and  that  a  commission  of 
the  Conference  should  work  out  the  details  of  its  consti- 
tution and  functions. 

But  history  does  not  begin  with  a  resolution. 

The  whole  world  had  agreed  without  any  dissent,  or 
at  least  without  any  expressed  dissent,  that  some  plan 
for  the  preservation  of  future  peace  should  emerge  from 
the  chaos  of  the  World  War.  Many  statesmen  in  many 
countries  had  long  preached  such  a  result.  President 
Wilson  had  declared  that  a  league  of  nations  was  one 
of  the  essential  terms  of  the  settlement,  although,  curi- 
ously enough,  the  phrase  which  the  President  employed 
in  his  most  important  utterance,  the  phrase  which  is 

398 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE         399 

found  in  the  Fourteen  Points,  is  not  "league  of  nations," 
but  *' association  of  nations,"  a  phrase  which  has  since 
come  into  somewhat  prominent  use  by  others  who  are, 
perhaps,  unaware  of  its  origin. 

Indeed,  the  declaration  in  the  Fourteen  Points  for  the 
establishment  of  an  association  of  nations  had,  as  shown 
by  the  note  of  our  government  of  November  5,  191 8, 
formally  become  one  of  the  bases  of  the  peace  terms  with 
Germany;  so  that  the  resohition  of  the  Peace  Conference, 
a  resolution  drafted  by  the  British  delegation,  simply 
looked  toward  carrying  out  a  part  of  the  bargain  with 
Germany  which  ended  the  fighting. 

Furthermore,  the  provision  of  the  resolution  that  the 
League  should  be  ** treated  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
General  Treaty  of  Peace,"  was  itself  of  the  substance  of 
the  pre-armistice  agreement.  It  was  the  right  of  Ger- 
many to  insist  upon  the  establishment  of  a  league  of 
nations  for  her  own  protection.  The  German  delegates 
presented  their  plan  for  such  an  organization  and  the 
absence  of  any  such  plan  from  the  treaty  would  justly 
have  been  regarded  by  Germany  as  a  gross  breach  of 
faith;  indeed,  Germany  always  vigorously  insisted  that 
President  Wilson's  words,  "a  general  association  of  na- 
tions," meant  not  only  an  association  framed  by  the 
treaty,  but  an  association  of  which  Germany  should 
be  at  once  and  forthwith  a  member. 

The  idea,  once  widely  prevalent,  that  the  writing  of 
the  Covenant  into  the  treaty  delayed  the  proceedings  of 
the  Conference,  has,  of  course,  long  since  been  exploded. 
The  Paris  negotiations  did  not  commence  until  January, 
1 919,  after  the  results  of  the  British  elections  were  known. 
The  conditions  of  peace  were  presented  to  the  German 
delegation  on  May  7,  some  four  months  later.     Even 


400    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

if  this  could  be  considered  a  lengthy  period  for  the  dis- 
cussions and  work  involved  in  the  preparation  of  a  legal 
document  of  some  hundred  thousand  words  or  more, 
that  work  was  delayed  by  well-known  differences  of  view 
in  regard  to  reparations  and  other  questions  quite  remote 
from  the  Covenant. 

But  it  was  one  thing  to  agree  upon  the  general  prin- 
ciple of  a  league  of  nations  and  quite  another  to  formu- 
late its  details.  For  no  agreement  as  to  those  latter 
had  been  reached  except  that  the  association  should  be 
constituted  with  **  mutual  guarantees  of  political  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small 
states  alike";  that  detail,  as  a  part  of  the  Fourteen 
Points,  had  been  agreed  upon  between  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  and  Germany.  Strangely  enough, 
those  words,  which  constituted  the  only  prehminary 
point  of  definite  agreement  about  the  League,  became, 
when  incorporated  almost  literally  in  Article  lo  of  the 
present  Covenant,  the  point  chiefly  disputed  after  the 
treaty  was  signed. 

And  while  the  resolution  of  the  Peace  Conference  stated 
generally  some  purposes  of  the  League,  declared  that  it 
should  be  open  to  every  civilized  nation  which  could  be 
relied  upon  to  promote  its  objects,  and  that  it  should 
meet  periodically  and  have  a  permanent  organization 
and  secretariat,  almost  any  structure  could  be  built 
around  those  phrases,  which  indicate  perhaps  by  their 
silences  a  fear  of  going  too  far  rather  than  of  not  going 
far  enough. 

So  the  work  of  preparing  the  agreement  of  the  League 
of  Nations  was  intrusted  by  the  Peace  Conference  to  a 
commission,  or,  as  we  would  say,  a  committee;  but  there 
were  very  many  advisers,  official  and  unofficial,  in  and 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE         401 

out  of  Paris,  who  were  willing,  even  anxious,  to  antici- 
pate the  work  of  the  committee  by  the  preparation  of 
drafts  in  advance.  The  number  of  such  drafts  was  very 
great;  the  number  of  them  which  it  is  necessary  to  men- 
tion is  very  small. 

Before  mentioning  any  of  them,  I  shall  allude  to  what 
I  believe  to  be  the  fact,  that  the  work  and  the  utter- 
ances of  Lord  Grey  had  a  deep  influence  upon  the  minds 
of  all  the  official  and  semi-official  draftsmen,  even  upon 
those  who  were  unconscious  of  that  influence;  the  mem- 
orandum of  Lichnowsky  had  compelled  even  the  ene- 
mies of  Lord  Grey  to  admit  that  his  efforts  to  prevent 
the  war  had  been  unselfish  and  sincere;  the  frantic  con- 
fusion of  the  diplomatic  telegrams  of  the  latter  part  of 
July,  19 1 4,  through  which  the  threatened  tragedy  stum- 
bled bfindly  into  reafity,  had  convinced  most  people  of 
the  vital  importance  of  at  least  some  change  in  the 
machinery  of  diplomacy,  so  that  we  would  be  rid  of  the 
dangerous  absurdity  of  a  telegram  about  what  Vienna 
had  wired  to  Belgrade,  sent  by  London  to  Paris,  with 
the  hope  of  averting  hostifities  between  Berlin  and  Petro- 
grad.  Every  one  who  has  examined  the  various  colored 
books  of  the  different  governments  regarding  the  events 
of  1 91 4,  has  sought  in  vain  to  decipher  even  the  exact 
chronological  order  of  all  the  despatches;  it  was  Lord 
Grey's  splendid  failure  which  produced  in  the  minds  of 
all  the  reaction  in  favor  of  a  system  of  meetings  face  to 
face  of  the  representatives  of  important  countries  when- 
ever there  was  anything  important  to  discuss.  Almost 
every  plan  for  a  league  of  nations  had  some  form  for 
such  meetings,  large  and  small,  the  Assembly  and  the 
Council,  whether  called  by  those  names  or  by  others. 

Now,  international  committees  are  not  unlike  other 


402    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

committees  in  one  respect.  As  soon  as  it  is  determined 
that  a  paper  is  to  be  drafted,  the  member  of  the  com- 
mittee who  presents  a  definite  scheme  will  certainly  have 
many,  even,  perhaps,  most  of  his  ideas  accepted. 

The  history  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
presents  a  striking  illustration  of  this  principle.  If  you 
compare  the  paper  first  laid  before  the  League  of  Nations 
commission  with  the  final  text  of  the  Covenant  in  the 
treaty,  you  will  find  that  the  latter  is  very  difi"erent  from 
the  former  in  its  language;  you  will  find  that  it  contains 
quite  numerous  additions  of  the  utmost  importance;  but 
you  will  also  find  that  with  the  exceptions  of  one  article 
recast  and  of  one  other  omitted,  everything  that  is  in 
the  first  paper  appears  in  substance  in  the  last. 

So  the  first  important  question  to  be  decided  by  the 
commission  on  the  League  of  Nations,  to  state  it  in  the 
language  of  diplomacy,  was:  What  draft  should  be 
adopted  as  the  basis  of  discussion?  And  while  a  decision 
of  this  question  in  effect  was  made  before  the  commission 
met,  it  was  not  made  until  a  few  hours  before  the  time 
of  that  meeting. 

President  Wilson  had  prepared  at  least  one  draft  of  a 
covenant  some  time  before  he  went  to  Europe.  And 
General  Smuts,  who  was  one  of  the  two  British  members 
of  the  League  of  Nations  commission,  had  prepared,  with 
the  collaboration,  I  believe,  of  some  of  the  "Round 
Table"  group,  what  he  called  "a  practical  suggestion.'* 
By  direction  of  Mr.  Lansing,  secretary  of  state.  Doctor 
James  Brown  Scott,  and  myself,  as  legal  advisers  of  the 
American  Commission,  had  formally  submitted  a  draft 
early  in  January,  19 19,  and  in  point  of  time  this  had 
been  preceded  by  some  suggestions  of  my  own  submitted 
to  Colonel  House  while  I  was  acting  as  legal  adviser  of 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE   LEAGUE         403 

his  mission  before  the  arrival  in  Paris  of  the  American 
delegation  to  the  Peace  Conference. 

Doubtless  influenced  to  some  extent  by  the  views  of 
General  Smuts,  President  Wilson  prepared  and  had 
printed  at  Paris  a  new  draft  of  his  own,  which  was  re- 
printed a  few  days  later  with  some  changes  and  additions, 
and  was  subsequently  made  public  at  the  hearings  before 
the  Senate  committee  on  foreign  relations.  Lord  Robert 
Cecil,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  League  of  Nations  sec- 
tion of  the  British  delegation,  had  prepared  a  draft  of  his 
own,  and  this  was  the  basis  of  the  official  British  draft. 
How  much  attention  Mr.  Lloyd  George  paid  to  the 
League  of  Nations  question,  I  do  not  know.  It  always 
seemed  to  me  that  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  although  not  a 
member  of  the  British  Government,  had  authority  to  go 
ahead  "on  his  own,"  and  proceeded  accordingly;  but  he 
undoubtedly  gave  much  weight  to  the  views  of  the  British 
colonial  representatives  at  Paris,  whose  interest  in  the 
League  of  Nations  was  profound.  Indeed,  the  question 
of  colonial  representation  in  the  League  was  distinctly 
understood  and  agreed  to  between  President  Wilson  and 
Lord  Robert  Cecil  before  the  League  of  Nations  com- 
mission first  met. 

There  were  only  two  instances  in  which  I  knew  that 
decisions  as  to  policy  in  the  matter  of  the  League  were 
referred  to  the  British  prime  minister,  and  from  that  fact 
I  have,  perhaps  wrongly,  inferred  that  other  decisions 
were  not.  Those  two  instances  were  the  Japanese  pro- 
posals regarding  racial  equality  and  the  American  pro- 
posals regarding  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Lord  Robert  Cecil  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  com- 
manding figures  at  Paris.  With  a  character  of  almost 
austere  simplicity  he  had  a  winning  charm  of  manner. 


404     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

and  the  force  which  was  behind  his  observations  rested 
largely  upon  his  almost  incredible  frankness  and  his 
obvious  sincerity.  His  mental  attitude  is  an  extraordi- 
nary combination  of  the  conservative,  the  practical,  and 
the  idealistic.  He  conservatively  felt,  wrongly  I  beheve, 
that  the  Great  Powers  would  have  to  be  the  real  directors 
of  the  League  for  it  to  be  a  success.  He  very  practically 
doubted  the  advisability  of  Article  lo,  and  opposed  the 
French  scheme  for  an  international  general  staff.  But 
he  was  an  idealist  as  to  a  new  era  in  international  affairs, 
he  favored  the  admission  of  Germany  into  the  League, 
and  he  believed  in  disarmament  and  arbitration. 

As  no  other  delegation  except  the  British  had  prepared 
any  detailed  draft  plan  at  all,  the  question  which  was 
presented  in  January,  191 9,  to  Colonel  House,  who  was 
in  charge  of  the  whole  matter  on  behalf  of  the  President, 
was  how  to  reach  an  agreement  upon  a  draft  between  the 
British  and  ourselves.  With  this  end  in  view,  Colonel 
House  brought  about  conferences  between  Lord  Robert 
Cecil  and  myself  during  the  latter  part  of  January. 
While  those  conversations  were  based  upon  President 
Wilson's  draft  and  the  British  draft,  they  were  not 
wholly  limited  by  those  papers;  any  agreement  reached 
could  only  be  tentative;  my  instructions  were  not  rigid 
in  regard  to  questions  having  a  legal  aspect;  under  such 
circumstances  modifications  of  view  were  inevitable  and 
substantial  agreement  was  not  found  difficult. 

The  results  of  those  talks  were  then  discussed  at  a 
meeting  between  the  British  and  American  members  of 
the  League  of  Nations  commission,  that  is  to  say.  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  Colonel  House,  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  and 
General  Smuts,  a  meeting  at  which  I  was  present.  Sev- 
eral important  decisions  were  taken  at  that  meeting. 


THE   MAKING  OF  THE   LEAGUE         405 

One  of  them  was  that  owing  to  the  Italian  opposition,  it 
was  impossible  to  attempt  to  abolish  conscription.  An- 
other was  that  the  plan  should  contain  a  general  provi- 
sion, without  specific  details,  for  the  creation  of  a  Per- 
manent Court  of  International  Justice.  It  was  also  de- 
cided that  a  new  draft  should  be  drawn  by  Mr.  Hurst, 
the  legal  adviser  of  the  British,  and  myself,  and  that  any 
questions  upon  which  Mr.  Hurst  and  I  did  not  agree 
should  be  referred  for  consideration  to  Colonel  House 
and  to  Lord  Robert  Cecil  as  representing  the  two  gov- 
ernments. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Hurst  and  myself,  having 
before  us  the  results  of  the  previous  discussions  and  drafts, 
did  agree  upon  a  composite  draft,  which  was  completed 
on  the  day  before  the  League  of  Nations  commission  first 
met.  This  draft,  accepted  by  President  Wilson  and  sub- 
mitted by  him,  became  the  basis  of  discussion  before  the 
League  of  Nations  commission.  Thus  it  marked  the  end 
of  the  first  of  the  three  stages  in  the  history  of  the  Cov- 
enant at  Paris.  The  second  was  completed  by  the  text 
first  reported  to  the  Peace  Conference,  the  one  President 
Wilson  brought  back  to  this  country  in  February,  and  the 
third  by  the  paper  in  its  present  form,  the  form  in  which 
it  finally  became  part  of  the  treaty. 

This  first  draft,  the  Hurst-Miller  draft,  to  give  it  a 
name  it  bore  at  Paris,  was  drawn  under  conditions  which 
made  it  impossible  that  it  should  be  wholly  satisfactory 
to  anybody.  Its  acceptance  by  President  Wilson  was  a 
great  surprise  to  me,  for  on  the  very  evening  before  its 
presentation  by  him  to  the  commission,  he  had  expressed 
dissatisfaction  with  it  and  a  preference  for  his  own  draft 
with  some  modifications.  Certainly,  from  my  point  of 
view,  the  text  was  subject  to  criticism,  both  for  things 


4o6    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

omitted  and  for  things  contained;  the  most  important 
of  the  former  was  that  it  said  nothing  about  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  On  this  point,  at  least,  my  Paris  conscience  is 
clear.  I  had  brought  up  the  question  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  the  observations  which  I  submitted  to 
Colonel  House.  I  had  verbally  proposed  a  Monroe  Doc- 
trine clause  to  Mr.  Lansing.  Such  a  clause  was  con- 
tained in  the  draft  submitted  by  Doctor  Scott  and  my- 
self, and  my  views  in  general  on  the  question  had  been 
more  emphatically  expressed  in  a  rather  severe  confiden- 
tial criticism  of  President  Wilson's  plan,  which  I  prepared 
in  Paris. 

This  criticism  has  been  made  public.  A  copy  of  it  was 
obtained  at  Paris  by  one  of  the  personnel  attached  to 
the  American  Commission,  and  was  delivered  to  the 
Senate  committee  on  foreign  relations;  and  as  the  paper 
had  been  widely  quoted  from,  particularly  during  the 
late  political  campaign,  I  think  it  only  fair  to  my  asso- 
ciates at  Paris  to  say  that  it  was  wholly  my  own  work, 
and  that  no  one  else  had  even  an  opportunity  to  con- 
sider the  paper  during  the  week  in  which  it  was  pre- 
pared or  until  after  it  was  printed  and  dehvered. 

One  other  chief  objection  to  the  original  draft  of  the 
Covenant  was  that  it  contained  a  clause  regarding  relig- 
ious equality,  an  article  which  President  Wilson  favored, 
but  which  was  afterward  dropped  because  of  the  practi- 
cally unanimous  view  of  the  League  of  Nations  commis- 
sion that  it  would  be  utterly  impossible  to  adopt  general 
language  in  regard  to  the  subject  which  would  not  un- 
warrantedly  interfere  with  the  internal  policies  of  certain 
countries;  even  in  Great  Britain,  for  example,  a  Catholic 
is  exckided  from  the  succession  to  the  crown.  The 
principle  of  the  article  was  subsequently  applied  in  sep- 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE   LEAGUE         407 

arate  treaties  with  particular  countries,  looking  toward 
the  protection  of  minorities. 

In  matter  of  form,  too,  the  paper  left  much  to  be  de- 
sired; but  this  was  unavoidable  under  the  circumstances 
and  was  unimportant  in  view  of  the  later  opportunities 
for  redrafting;  and,  despite  its  defects,  it  was  this  paper 
which  became  the  basis  of  the  existing  Covenant;  which, 
indeed,  with  certain  notable  additions  and  changes,  and 
after  much  rewriting  and  rearrangement,  was  moulded 
into  the  text  now  contained  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

The  second  phase  of  the  Covenant  comprised  its  con- 
sideration by  the  League  of  Nations  commission  of  the 
Peace  Conference,  resulting  in  the  report  to  the  Peace 
Conference  of  a  draft  Covenant  on  February  14,  191 9. 

During  the  period  which  commenced  on  Monday,  Feb- 
ruary 3,  and  ended  on  Thursday,  February  13,  the  League 
of  Nations  commission  held  ten  meetings.  This  meant 
a  meeting  nearly  every  day  and  sometimes  twice  a  day. 
The  average  length  of  the  meetings  was  more  than  three 
hours,  so  that,  with  their  other  duties,  the  members  of 
the  committee  spent  a  pretty  busy  ten  days,  and  those 
who  were  attending  them  in  their  labors  were  occupied 
almost  continuously,  in  a  very  literal  sense  of  that  word. 

Aside  from  the  Council  of  Four  and  the  Council  of  Ten, 
this  commission  was  undoubtedly  the  most  notable  body 
of  the  Conference  of  Paris.  Not  only  was  it  presided 
over  by  President  Wilson,  but  many  of  the  other  mem- 
bers were  statesmen  of  world-wide  reputation.  Among 
them  was  Signor  Orlando,  the  Italian  premier,  who  had 
a  most  virile  and  attractive  personality.  He  lacked  a 
knowledge  of  English,  but  combined  a  practical  com- 
mon-sense view  with  a  profound  learning  in  matters  of 
international  law,  and  was  one  of  the  impressive  figures 


4o8    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

of  the  meetings.  Other  lawyers  of  distinction  and  cul- 
ture were  M.  Vesnitch,  of  Jugo-SIavia,  and  M.  Kramarz, 
of  Czecho-SIovakia.  And  of  the  same  profession  was  the 
brilliant  and  eloquent  but  erratic  Hymans,  the  foreign 
minister  of  Belgium,  who,  during  his  speeches,  was  some- 
times so  carried  away  by  his  thought  that  he  changed 
abruptly  from  English  to  French.  What  I  saw  of  Mr. 
Venizelos  did  not  seem  to  me  to  bear  out  his  very  great 
reputation  as  a  statesman,  but  his  opinions  were  treated 
with  much  respect.  Mr.  Venizelos  was  responsible  for 
the  language  at  the  end  of  what  is  now  Article  15  of  the 
Covenant,  which  has  been  so  much  criticised  here  in 
connection  with  the  votes  of  the  British  Dominions  in 
the  Assembly.  One  of  the  ablest  of  the  debaters  was 
Mr.  Wellington  Koo,  of  China,  who  made  one  of  the 
really  brilliant  speeches  of  the  meetings  on  the  subject 
of  the  rights  of  small  states.  The  Japanese  delegates 
spoke  comparatively  seldom  and  were  perhaps  listened 
to  with  all  the  more  interest  and  attention  on  that  ac- 
count. Nor  was  General  Smuts  very  often  heard,  as 
Lord  Robert  Cecil  usually  spoke  for  the  British  Govern- 
ment. And  the  observations  of  President  Pessoa,  of 
Brazil,  while  impressive,  were  not  very  frequent. 

But  of  all  the  nineteen  members  of  the  commission, 
the  one  heard  least  of  all  was  an  American.  Colonel 
House  spoke  only  at  one  meeting,  and  that  was  an  occa- 
sion when  the  President  was  away  and  a  few  words  from 
a  representative  of  the  United  States  were  necessary. 
But  a  pilot  does  not  have  to  talk,  if  he  steers  well.  And 
the  final  agreement  of  the  commission,  its  rejection  of 
the  proposals  which  would  have  sunk  the  ship  and  its 
acceptance  of  those  changes  which  were  necessary  to 
obtain  unanimity,  were  due  to  the  confidence  which  the 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE         409 

representatives  of  Great  Britain,  of  France,  of  Japan, 
and  of  other  less  important  Powers  had  in  Colonel  House, 
and  to  the  extraordinary  influence  which  he  exerted,  sup- 
ported as  he  was  by  the  authority  of  the  President. 

The  meetings  of  the  commission  lost  their  original 
character  of  informality  as  they  progressed.  At  the  very 
beginning  there  were  no  secretaries  present  at  all.  In- 
deed, President  Wilson  said  to  the  commission  that  he 
hoped  the  meetings  would  be  informal,  as  he  wanted  to 
be  able  to  change  his  views  without  having  somebody 
quote  to  him  what  he  had  said  before — a  rather  curious 
statement  to  be  made  by  a  man  who  has  been  supposed 
never  to  change  his  mind  at  all.  While  some  of  the  gen- 
tlemen on  the  commission  did  not  speak  English,  its 
proceedings  were  really  more  in  English  than  they  were 
in  French.  The  proposed  draft  of  the  Covenant,  the 
basis  of  discussion,  was  an  English  paper,  and  while 
French  translations  of  the  various  documents,  amend- 
ments, and  the  like,  were  usually  prepared,  the  time  be- 
tween meetings  was  so  short  that  a  finished  translation 
was  almost  always  impossible,  and  sometimes  it  was 
physically  impracticable  to  have  any  translation  at  all. 

Of  course  the  members  of  the  commission  spoke  in 
French  or  English,  as  they  saw  fit.  The  experiment  of 
having  remarks  translated  from  one  language  to  the 
other  after  their  delivery,  was  very  soon  given  up,  and, 
instead,  a  secretary  or  attache  sat  behind  the  French 
and  Italian  delegations,  and  translated  in  a  whisper  the 
speeches  made  in  English.  A  corresponding  service  in 
regard  to  the  French  speeches  was  performed  for  the 
President  and  Colonel  House,  usually  either  by  Mr. 
Frazier  or  by  Colonel  Bonsai. 

While  most  of  the  members  of  the  commission  spoke 


410    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

sometimes  in  French  and  sometimes  in  English,  only  the 
Portuguese  delegate,  M.  Reis,  seemed  to  me  to  be  as 
wholly  at  home  in  one  as  in  the  other.  The  head  of  the 
French  delegation,  M.  Bourgeois,  the  president  of  the 
French  Senate,  spoke  frequently,  with  great  deliberation 
and  impressiveness  and  with  equal  fluency.  His  col- 
league, Professor  Larnaude,  spoke  less  often,  but  took  a 
very  active  part  in  the  detailed  framing  of  the  text,  par- 
ticularly in  regard  to  questions  of  law.  Professor  Lar- 
naude's  felicity  of  expression  and  his  diction  were  well- 
nigh  perfect;  his  choice  of  words  was  in  the  utmost 
degree  precise;  and  whether  one  agreed  or  not  with  what 
he  said,  it  was  impossible  not  to  grasp  exactly  what  his 
beautifully  clear  language  meant. 

And  while  the  result  of  the  February  meetings  of  the 
commission  was  the  adoption  of  a  paper  having  many 
similarities  to  the  first  draft,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that 
the  deliberations  were  at  all  perfunctory.  There  was 
very  decided  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  majority  of 
the  commission  to  the  provisions  of  the  original  draft 
regarding  the  Council,  which  made  that  body  little  more 
than  a  committee  of  the  Great  Powers;  this  opposition 
carried  its  point  and  made  the  Council  what  it  now  is,  a 
body  on  which  four  of  the  smaller  Powers  are  ahvays 
represented. 

The  French  programme  for  an  international  military 
force  or  staff  of  some  kind  met  with  very  little  support 
from  other  delegations  but  provoked  a  great  deal  of 
debate.  It  was  as  a  slight  concession  to  the  French  pro- 
posal that  provision  was  made  for  an  advisory  military 
commission,  and  that  the  last  sentence  of  Article  lo  as  it 
now  reads  w^as  added  to  the  text. 

The  guarantees  of  Article  lo  represented  the  ideas  of 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE   LEAGUE         411 

President  Wilson,  but  he  was  by  no  means  alone  in 
those  ideas.  The  same  principle  was  expressed  in  the 
official  British  draft;  but  that  draft,  as  well  as  the  Paris 
draft  of  President  Wilson,  contained  clauses  looking 
toward  future  boundary  changes  under  some  form  of 
supervision  by  the  League  of  Nations;  any  such  idea 
always  seemed  to  me  impossible;  it  would  invite  per- 
petual agitation  for  boundary  changes  all  over  the  w^orld, 
particularly  along  frontiers  where  a  jumble  of  peoples  of 
different  bloods,  of  different  religious  and  of  different 
economic  interests  make  impossible  any  final  impartial 
judgment  as  to  a  boundary  theoretically  correct.  And  the 
supporters  of  such  ideas  were  thinking  of  eastern  Europe 
only,  and  forgot  that  any  such  principle  declared  gen- 
erally would  be  as  applicable  to  the  boundary  between 
France  and  Spain,  or  even  to  that  between  Montana  and 
Saskatchewan  as  to  any  other. 

Even  when  limited  to  attack  by  a  foreign  Power,  the 
territorial  guarantees  of  Article  10,  while  defensible  in 
principle,  went  farther  than  pubhc  opinion  on  this  side 
of  the  Atlantic  was  willing  to  go;  and,  indeed,  the  most 
forcible  argument  against  Article  10,  an  argument  supe- 
rior in  my  judgment  to  that  of  any  critic  here,  was  sub- 
mitted in  Paris  by  Sir  Robert  Borden. 

I  cannot  even  mention  all  the  other  changes  of  im- 
portance made  at  the  February  meetings  of  the  commis- 
sion. One  was  the  dropping  of  the  article  regarding 
religious  equafity,  to  which  I  have  alluded,  which  did 
not  find  support  from  any  delegation  represented  except 
our  own,  although  the  Japanese  attempted  to  use  it  as 
a  sort  of  peg  on  which  to  hang  their  proposal  for  racial 
equality.  And  the  article  about  mandates,  which  is 
now  Article  22,  was  not  wTitten  by  the  League  of  Nations 


412     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

commission  at  all,  except  for  its  last  clauses.  It  was  a 
resolution  which  had  been  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ten 
on  January  30,  the  history  of  which  has  been  told  else- 
w^here.  While  its  idea  was  bitterly  opposed  by  Mr. 
Hughes,  of  Australia,  and  although  it  was  not  liked  by 
the  French,  it  did  not  go  as  far  as  President  Wilson 
wished;  but  he  accepted  it  as  being  a  decided  improve- 
ment over  the  former  colonial  system. 

The  ending  of  this  second  stage  in  the  history  of  the 
Covenant  marked  the  beginning  of  public  discussion. 
The  world  now  had  for  criticism  not  an  idea  but  a  pro- 
posal. This  was,  indeed,  one  purpose  in  completing  for 
the  time  being  the  work  of  the  commission.  It  would 
have  been  too  much  to  suppose  at  that  time  that  its 
work  was  final.  And  while,  of  course,  the  paper  was  not 
such  as  any  one  delegation,  or  even  any  half-dozen  dele- 
gations, would  have  written,  nobody  was  seriously  dis- 
appointed with  it  except  the  French,  and  the  reason  for 
their  disappointment  was  that  the  French  attitude, 
speaking  broadly,  was  different  from  the  attitude  of 
nearly  every  other  country.  Nearly  everybody  thought 
that  any  league  of  nations  was,  after  all,  a  novel  experi- 
ment, and  that  the  danger  of  any  novel  experiment  was 
in  going  too  far.  If  it  was  found  to  work,  agreement  to 
go  farther  would  not  be  very  difficult  to  obtain,  but  to 
go  too  far  at  the  beginning  would  perhaps  wreck  the 
whole  scheme.  But  the  French  wanted  to  go  farther, 
very  much  farther.  The  French  visualized  a  league  of 
nations  as  a  sort  of  an  extension  of  the  combination  of 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  by  taking  in  the  neu- 
trals. The  sole  idea  to  which  all  French  officialdom  was 
devoted,  was  the  idea  of  safety  for  France  against  Ger- 
many, and  while  different  views  led  to  great  divergence 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE         413 

in  French  thought  as  to  how  that  safety  was  to  be  ob- 
tained, shown  most  notably,  perhaps,  by  the  breach  be- 
tween Clemenceau  and  Foch,  there  was  no  serious  ele- 
ment of  French  political  opinion,  except  the  extreme 
left,  which  conceived  of  a  league  of  nations  without  a 
background  of  force,  as  any  possible  protection  to  France 
at  all.  It  is  not  difficult  to  criticise  the  French  view- 
point. It  is  more  difficult  not  to  sympathize  with  it.  The 
French  never  abandoned  their  view  at  Paris;  traces  of  it 
may  be  found  in  the  treaty,  even  in  the  Covenant;  but 
they  never  obtained  for  it  any  decided  support,  for  the 
world  at  large  was  of  a  different  opinion  then,  and  remains 
unconvinced  now. 

The  third  and  final  stage  of  the  drafting  of  this  docu- 
ment was  ahead.  The  opinion  of  the  neutrals,  the 
opinion  of  America,  of  the  leaders  of  thought  in  this 
country  other  than  President  Wilson,  was  to  make  itself 
felt,  and  the  most  determined  contests  over  what  the 
Covenant  was  to  contain  or  to  omit  were  yet  to  be  fought. 

The  visit  of  President  Wilson  to  Paris,  the  first  visit 
of  an  American  president  to  Europe,  had  undoubtedly, 
on  the  whole,  been  an  enormous  success.  He  had  been 
in  Europe  two  months;  long  enough  to  show  that  his 
influence  was  almost  unbounded,  and  that  the  prin- 
ciples that  he  had  enunciated  had  sufficient  popular 
support  behind  them  to  make  them  a  vital  force  even  in 
those  governmental  circles  where  they  were  disliked. 
A  draft  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  his 
chief  project,  had  been  completed  for  insertion  in  the 
treaty;  he  left  Europe  in  February,  before  decision  had 
become  strictly  necessary  on  the  detailed  application 
of  his  principles  and  without  having  been  long  enough 
away  from  the  United  States  to  get  out  of  touch  with 


414    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

the  currents  of  opinion  in  this  country.  His  decision  to 
leave  Paris  at  that  moment,  even  if  it  had  not  been  nec- 
essary because  of  the  approaching  end  of  the  session  of 
Congress,  was  wise  and  judicious.  No  admirer  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson  can  regard  his  first  visit  to  Paris  as  other 
than  a  triumph. 

In  the  third  stage  of  the  building  of  the  structure  of 
the  Covenant  there  was  great  difficulty  in  regard  to 
some  of  the  additions  and  changes  that  were  made;  but 
much  greater  difficulty  in  respect  of  the  proposals  which 
were  not  adopted.  The  volume  of  suggestions  which 
had  to  be  seriously  considered  was  large;  various  neutral 
Powers  formally  submitted  their  views  at  great  length, 
but  even  additions  which  seemed  harmless  might  raise 
opposition  in  some  minds;  the  Covenant  had  plenty  of 
critics;  any  changes  in  the  nature  of  fresh  legislation 
would  add  more;  and,  aside  from  certain  matters  of 
detail,  the  American  view-point  was  generally  against 
changes  which  were  not  proposed  and  supported  by 
American  public  opinion. 

The  French  proposals  for  some  international  force, 
some  staff,  or  at  least  some  international  supervision  of 
national  forces  were  pressed  to  the  end.  But  they  were 
doomed  in  advance  to  be  rejected.  Neither  the  British 
nor  ourselves  would  listen  to  them,  and  M.  Bourgeois 
pleaded  in  vain.  The  French  attitude  had  no  substan- 
tial result  except  the  proposed  treaties  of  support  by 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  which  seem  destined 
both  to  fail,  as  each  is  dependent  on  the  ratification  of 
the  other. 

Nor  did  the  Japanese  fare  better  with  their  amend- 
ments for  racial  equality.  Each  successive  proposal 
made  asked  for  less  than  the  one  before,  and  finally  they 


THE   MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE         415 

requested  simply  a  few  words  in  the  preamble.  Their 
negotiations  with  us  in  the  matter  had  been  entirely 
friendly,  for,  even  regardless  of  our  attitude,  the  Japa- 
nese could  not  succeed.  When  their  final  proposal  was 
submitted,  at  the  last  meeting  of  the  commission,  sup- 
ported as  it  was  by  one  of  the  most  impressive  speeches 
I  have  ever  heard,  the  Japanese  called  for  a  vote.  Only 
the  affirmative  vote  was  taken,  and  neither  the  President 
nor  Colonel  House  voted.  The  majority  of  the  commis- 
sion were  in  favor  of  the  seemingly  mild  addition  to  the 
preamble.  But  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  obviously  moved,  de- 
clared formally  that  he  was  instructed  by  his  government 
to  refuse  to  accept  the  proposal  of  their  ally.  The  views 
of  the  dominions  had  prevailed.  Australia  had  more 
influence  with  London  than  had  Tokio. 

There  was  another  and  less  important  struggle  over 
the  attempt  of  the  Swiss  to  obtain  a  special  clause  recog- 
nizing their  neutrality.  This  the  British  supported,  and 
even  Colonel  House  consented.  The  Swiss  representa- 
tive, Professor  Rappard,  labored  eloquently  to  induce  me 
to  advise  President  Wilson  in  accordance  with  the  Swiss 
view;  but  I  feared  the  effect  of  such  a  clause  upon 
neutral  and  American  opinion,  and  the  President  main- 
tained his  position.  While  the  Swiss  obtained  a  recog- 
nition in  the  treaty  of  their  special  position  and  while 
the  Council  has  since  passed  a  resolution  to  the  same 
effect,  the  Covenant  was  not  changed  to  meet  the  opinion 
of  Switzerland. 

The  most  vital  amendment,  from  the  American  stand- 
point, was  doubtless  that  accepting  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Regardless  of  any  quibbling  about  the  special  language 
used,  any  formal  declaration  by  all  the  Powers  of  the 
world  recognizing  the  existence  and  beneficence  of  the 


4i6    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED   AT  PARIS 

Monroe  Doctrine  was  an  enormous  advance  in  the  status 
of  that  polices  and  was  an  advance  that  had  never  before 
even  been  suggested;  nothing  but  the  results  of  the 
World  War  could  have  made  any  such  declaration  even 
remotely  possible. 

It  was  the  pressure  of  American  public  opinion  that 
compelled  the  presentation  and  support  of  such  an 
amendment  by  President  Wilson. 

The  attitude  of  the  British  toward  our  proposal  was 
unknown;  before  the  meeting  of  the  commission  at  which 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  article  was  proposed  and  adopted, 
no  one  in  the  American  delegation,  from  President  Wilson 
down,  was  informed  whether  Great  Britain  would  ven- 
ture an  open  criticism  of  America  or  not.  But  while  the 
British  representatives  acquiesced,  the  French  delegation 
opposed  the  proposal.  They  argued  that  it  meant  a 
renunciation  by  the  United  States  of  its  interest  in  the 
peace  of  the  world,  an  argument  that  seemed  ungracious 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  not 
held  back  an  American  army  from  those  achievements 
on  French  soil  which  ended  at  Sedan.  At  the  close  of 
the  debate,  President  Wilson  replied  to  the  French  in  an 
extempore  speech  of  witching  eloquence — a  speech  made 
after  midnight,  which  left  the  secretaries  gasping  with 
admiration,  their  pencils  in  their  hands,  their  duties  for- 
gotten, and  hardly  a  word  taken  down;  the  proposal  was 
then  adopted. 

But  the  matter  was  not  at  an  end;  for  at  the  next  meet- 
ing, the  last  of  all,  the  French  sought  by  amendment  to 
obtain  some  definition,  some  description  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  that  would  limit  the  right  of  the  United  States 
to  insist  upon  its  own  interpretation  of  that  Doctrine  in 
the  future  as  in  the  past.    The  French  delegates,  hoping 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE         417 

for  some  advantage  for  their  own  proposals,  urged  such 
a  definition;  and  at  that  last  meeting  I  thought  for  a 
moment,  in  despair,  that  President  Wilson  would  yield 
to  the  final  French  suggestion,  which  contained  only  a 
few  seemingly  simple  words;  but  he  stood  by  his  position 
through  the  long  discussion,  and  the  meeting  and  the 
proceedings  of  the  commission  ended  early  in  the  morning 
in  an  atmosphere  of  constraint  and  without  any  of  the 
speeches  of  politeness  customary  on  such  an  occasion. 

Another  contentious  matter  was  the  choice  of  the  seat 
of  the  League.  A  fable  which  has  been  printed  almost 
as  often  as  any  of  ^sop's  is  that  President  Wilson,  by  his 
self-willed  opposition,  prevented  the  choice  of  Brussels. 
The  fact  is  that  aside  from  the  perfunctory  support  of 
the  French,  Brussels  had  no  adherents  outside  of  Bel- 
gium. The  British  were  especially  in  favor  of  Geneva, 
and  the  opinion  that  some  neutral  city  was  advisable 
was  almost  unanimous;  this  made  Geneva  and  The 
Hague  almost  the  sole  possibihties;  and  in  view  of  its 
central  position,  its  climate,  and  the  history  of  neutrality, 
of  democracy,  and  of  peace  that  Switzerland  presented, 
the  balance  swung  very  heavily  in  favor  of  the  choice 
which  was  made. 

Another  problem  which  was  to  be  solved  was  the 
choice  of  the  four  smaller  Powers  to  sit  first  on  the  Coun- 
cil. Clearly,  one  of  these  should  be  a  Latin-American 
country,  and  that  meant  Brazil;  and  one  should  be  a 
neutral,  if  the  League  was  not  to  seem  merely  a  successor 
to  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers;  of  the  neutrals, 
Spain  was  the  largest  and  the  most  natural  choice.  Bel- 
gium was  certainly  entitled  to  the  honor  of  one  of  the 
two  other  places.  For  the  remaining  vacancy,  taking 
into  account  geographical  considerations,  there  remained 


41 


8     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 


in  theory  nine  countries  from  which  to  choose,  but  in 
reality  only  six — five  in  eastern  Europe,  and  China  in 
the  Far  East.  In  view  of  the  confidence  which  Lloyd 
George  and  President  Wilson  had  in  Venizelos,  the  five 
states  in  eastern  Europe  meant  for  this  purpose  only 
one,  and  Greece  was  selected.  By  the  irony  of  fate, 
Venizelos  has  since  fallen,  and  Greece  has  now  been  suc- 
ceeded by  China,  the  only  other  Power  which  was  thought 
of  for  her  place  at  Paris. 

The  question  as  to  what  states  should  be  asked  to 
Join  the  League  presented  no  serious  difficulty.  Coun- 
tries with  governments  not  formally  recognized  by  the 
Powers  generally,  such  as  Russia,  Mexico,  and  Costa 
Rica,  were  omitted.  Otherwise,  the  invitation  was 
quite  general.-  The  immediate  admission  of  Germany 
was  favored  by  America  and  Great  Britain,  but  French 
opposition  necessitated  postponement;  provision  was 
made,  however,  for  a  possible  increase  in  the  Council,  so 
as  to  permit  in  the  future  not  only  membership  in  the 
League,  but  also  representation  on  the  Council  of  both 
Germany  and  Russia. 

Various  changes  deemed  important  by  influential 
opinion  in  this  country  were  agreed  to  with  comparatively 
little  discussion.  Some  of  them,  such  as  the  provision 
that  acceptance  of  a  mandate  is  not  obligatory,  the  state- 
ment that  each  member  of  the  League  has  one  vote  and 
one  vote  only,  and  that  unless  particularly  specified  to 
the  contrary  all  decisions  must  be  unanimous,  were 
merely  declaratory.  But  the  withdrawal  clause  was 
more  important,  and  its  insertion  was  directly  due  to  the 
feeling  in  its  favor  in  the  United  States  Senate.  The 
principle  was  not  liked  by  the  French,  but  it  could  hardly 
be  expected  that   any  state  would  agree  to  be  forever 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE   LEAGUE         419 

bound;  and  the  vague  idea  expressed  in  some  quarters 
that  an  implied  right  of  withdrawal  existed  was  not 
approved  by  the  international  lawyers,  and  if  accepted 
would  have  created  a  dangerous  precedent  as  to  the 
sanctity  of  every  treaty. 

The  fear  that  in  the  League  there  might  exist  some 
jurisdiction  over  what  have  been  called  domestic  ques- 
tions, though  doubtless  not  justified  by  the  text  of  the 
Covenant,  was  wide-spread  in  this  country.  This  timidity 
was  not  felt  by  the  representatives  of  the  other  Powers 
at  Paris,  who  have  as  much  desire  and  reason  to  be 
unrestricted  in  such  matters  as  we  have;  the  British,  for 
example,  with  a  very  serious  domestic  question,  then 
acute  though  less  so  than  now,  had  no  idea  that  their 
rights  of  sovereignty  were  being  infringed;  indeed,  the 
absence  of  such  infringement  has  since  been  criticised 
here;  but  those  who  want  an  international  agreement 
recognizing  all  of  our  rights  and  none  of  those  of  any 
other  country,  will  wait  as  long  for  such  a  paper  as  those 
who  seek  for  an  international  court  which  is  certain  to 
decide  according  to  our  view;  but  certainly  there  was  no 
objection  at  Paris  to  almost  any  sort  of  declaration  which 
recognized  the  exclusion  of  so-called  "domestic  ques- 
tions" from  the  competence  of  the  League. 

Just  before  President  Wilson  left  the  United  States 
for  his  second  visit  to  Europe,  one  of  his  leading  sup- 
porters in  the  Senate  reported  to  him  that  there  were 
six  matters  as  to  which  sentiment  in  the  Senate  favored 
amendment  of  the  Covenant;  and  this  matter  of  "domes- 
tic questions'*  was  thought  by  the  senator  to  be  the 
most  important  of  all.  In  order  to  meet  this  objection, 
President  Wilson  proposed  a  clause  drawn  by  Mr.  Taft 
and  cabled  by  him  to  President  Wilson  on  March   18. 


420    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

In  substantially  the  language  suggested  by  Mr.  Taft,  the 
clause  was  accepted  as  an  amendment  to  Article  15. 
Despite  its  authorship,  the  lawyers  at  Paris  did  not  like 
the  qualified  wording  of  the  clause,  which  was  subse- 
quently severely  criticised  in  the  Senate;  more  simple 
and  more  sweeping  language  would  better  have  antici- 
pated the  efforts  of  the  Senate  reservation  to  meet  the 
difficulties  of  the  question  by  elaborate  enumeration  of 
so-called  "domestic  questions,"  difficulties  which  any 
such  attempt  will  only  increase.  To  assert,  for  example, 
in  the  vague  language  of  the  debates,  that  the  tariff  is  in 
its  nature  a  "domestic  question,"  does  not  get  very  far; 
suppose  a  dispute  arises  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
reciprocity  treaty;  that  is  clearly  an  international  and, 
indeed.  Justiciable  difference  between  states,  despite  the 
fact  that  its  decision  may  touch  the  sacred  ark  of  the 
tariff.  Even  without  Mr.  Taft's  amendment,  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Covenant  followed  in  principle  those  of 
previous  treaties  of  the  United  States;  and  in  regard  to 
compulsory  Judicial  determination  or  arbitration  of  inter- 
national disputes,  the  Covenant  made  no  provision  at  all. 
This  question  of  compulsory  arbitration,  as  it  may  be 
generally  called,  was  much  mooted  at  Paris.  The  neu- 
trals supported  compulsory  arbitration,  and,  as  in  the 
past,  many  smaller  Powers  favored  it  in  principle.  But 
to  open  up  such  an  issue  without  at  the  same  time  dis- 
cussing all  the  difficulties  presented  by  the  framing  of 
an  International  Court  of  Justice  was  not  possible,  and 
no  one  in  Paris  believed  that  all  the  Powers  would  agree 
to  compulsory  arbitration  in  any  form;  recent  history 
demonstrates  the  correctness  of  that  view,  for  the  com- 
pulsory feature  of  the  Root-Phillimore  plan  has  not 
been  accepted,  despite  the  weight  of  the  names  behind  it; 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE         421 

so  that  with  the  addition  of  a  list  of  cases  which  were 
declared  to  be  "generally"  suitable  for  submission  to 
arbitration,  the  clause  of  the  Covenant  providing  for  the 
future  formation  of  an  International  Court  of  Justice 
stood  substantially  as  in  the  earlier  draft;  President  Wil- 
son's plan  for  American  participation  in  that  task  has 
been  realized,  for  when  Sir  Eric  Drummond  asked  in 
Paris  what  American  should  be  a  member  of  the  com- 
mittee on  the  International  Court,  the  name  of  Senator 
Root  was  proposed,  and,  accordingly,  it  was  Senator 
Root  who  sat  as  an  American  representative  on  the  com- 
mittee of  jurists  which  completed  its  labors  last  summer 
at  The  Hague,  and  whose  recommendations  were  in  large 
part  accepted  by  the  Assembly  in  November. 

One  of  the  novelties  of  the  procedure  of  the  League  of 
Nations  commission  toward  the  close  of  its  sessions  was 
the  hearing  of  a  delegation  of  women  leaders  from  various 
countries.  They  urged  an  extension  of  the  functions  of 
the  League  along  what  may  be  called  non-political  lines 
— lines  of  international  co-operation,  and  to  a  very  con- 
siderable extent  their  ideas  are  reflected  in  the  present 
text. 

In  matters  of  international  concern  relating  to  health, 
to  the  suppression  of  the  traffic  in  opium  and  of  the 
white-slave  traffic,  to  the  supervision  of  the  arms  traffic 
with  uncivilized  countries,  to  the  preservation  of  the 
freedom  of  transit  and  of  communications,  the  latter 
most  important  addition  being  the  proposal  of  Colonel 
House,  and  generally  in  matters  of  international  co-opera- 
tion the  League  was  made  the  clearing-house  of  inter- 
national action.  Another  addition  due  to  Colonel  House 
was  the  Red  Cross  article,  which  a  drafting  committee, 
taking  a  very  liberal  view  of  its  powers,  inserted. 


422    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

It  may  be  that  the  historian  of  the  future,  thinking  of 
the  nations  of  the  world  as  aggregations  of  families  rather 
than  as  bands  of  voters  led  by  politicians,  will  regard 
these  less  spectacular  features  of  the  Covenant  as  being 
more  really  mile-stones  of  human  progress  than  its  great 
political  tribunals  and  its  contentious  clauses. 

Even  after  the  commission  on  the  League  of  Nations 
had  ended  its  labors,  the  text  of  the  Covenant  was  not 
absolutely  finished.  The  British  dominions  were  con- 
cerned about  their  status  as  members  of  the  League.  It 
seemed  to  them  that  the  use  of  the  word  "States"  in  cer- 
tain places  in  the  text  limited  their  rights,  particularly  in 
the  matter  of  eligibility  as  members  of  the  Council;  and 
this  view  was  correct,  for  the  language  had  been  very 
carefully  chosen  in  that  regard;  so  the  dominions  urged 
that  the  wording  be  changed.  The  question  was  a  diffi- 
cult one;  that  the  dominions  and  India  should  be  sep- 
arately represented  in  the  League  had  been  early  con- 
ceded; any  other  decision  would  have  been  impossible; 
and,  perhaps  now,  with  a  member  of  his  majestj^'s  oppo- 
sition sitting  in  the  Assembly  as  a  delegate  from  South 
Africa,  and  with  Canada  openly  criticising  the  wishes  of 
London,  no  one  would  deny  that  it  was  wise  from  every 
point  of  view;  to  ignore  the  importance  of  Canada  as 
compared  with  Haiti  would  be  absurd;  but  while  the 
international  status  of  the  British  dominions  has  greatly 
changed  and  is  still  changing,  that  status  could  not  yet 
be  asserted  by  any  lawyer  to  be  technically  that  of  inde- 
pendent states  with  a  common  sovereign.  President 
Wilson  yielded  to  the  wishes  of  the  dominions  against 
the  views  of  some  of  his  advisers,  and  whether  they  were 
right  or  wrong,  it  is  certain  that  Canada,  Austrafia,  and 
the  others  will  never  yield  that  independence  of  position 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE   LEAGUE         423 

in  the  world's  affairs  which  belong  to  them  as  a  com- 
bined result  of  the  war  and  of  the  peace. 

So  the  Covenant  was  finished,  but  it  was  thus  far  fin- 
ished only  in  English.  There  were  various  French  trans- 
lations, but  no  French  text.  The  heart-breaking  labor  of 
making  one  took  several  days,  and,  as  a  matter  of  intel- 
lectual interest,  I  recommend  to  every  student  of  the 
language  of  diplomacy  the  task  of  putting  into  French 
that  specimen  of  President  Wilson's  English  which  is 
found  in  the  preamble  of  the  Covenant;  and  after  the 
student  has  finished  let  him  compare  the  result  with  the 
French  text  of  the  preamble;  that  portion  of  the  French 
text  appears  in  the  treaty  just  as  it  was  written  late  at 
night  or,  rather,  early  in  the  morning  in  Professor  Lar- 
naude's  beautiful  apartment  at  Neuilly,  after  all  previous 
attempts  at  expressing  President  Wilson  in  French  had 
been  rightly  discarded  as  being,  perhaps,  accurate  in 
language  but  certainly  impossible  in  style. 

The  Covenant  has  two  schools  of  critics,  perhaps  three: 
those  who  think  it  goes  too  far,  those  who  think  it  does 
not  go  far  enough,  and  those  who  approve  of  it  but  who 
do  not  like  some  of  the  people  who  wrote  it.  I  am  not 
going  to  discuss  any  of  the  questions  raised  by  those 
various  opinions.  But  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Cov- 
enant is  not  very  old  as  an  international  document,  I 
am  going  to  suggest  that  there  is  one  test  to  be  applied 
to  such  a  paper,  a  test  from  which  the  critics  of  all  schools 
are,  perhaps  happily  for  them,  free.  They  do  not  have 
to  draw  a  paper  with  the  idea  of  its  presentation  to  any 
country  for  acceptance.  But  no  matter  how  beautiful 
a  scheme  for  world  peace  may  appear  to  its  authors,  it 
will  be  worth  little  if  it  is  not  such  that  it  can  be  agreed 
to,  and  even  if  it  is  not  perfect  it  will  be  worth  every- 


424    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

thing  if  it  prove  to  be  the  basis  of  agreement.  Those 
who  framed  the  Covenant  have  seen  it  accepted  by  the 
competent  governmental  authority  of  nearly  every  coun- 
try in  the  world,  and  that  is  the  first  real  test  of  success. 
And  when  I  say  nearly  every  country,  I  include  my  own; 
for  so  far  as  the  Lodge  reservations  made  changes  in  the 
League,  they  were  of  a  wholly  minor  character,  they  left 
its  structure  intact,  and  they  would  have  interfered  with 
its  workings  not  at  all.  Indeed,  if  any  one  thinks  that 
there  is  no  art  in  writing  a  great  treaty  which  eighty 
senators  of  the  United  States  and  forty-eight  govern- 
ments will  accept  in  substance  as  written,  I  suggest  to 
him  to  wait  a  century,  or  perhaps  two,  and  see  how  the 
next  attempt  succeeds. 

Such  is  something  of  the  story  of  the  making  of  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  That  the  men  who 
created  that  paper  were  working  with  a  noble  purpose, 
with  a  wish  for  peace,  and  with  a  singleness  of  heart 
which  is  without  precedent  in  the  annals  of  diplomacy, 
that  I  know.  That  what  they  did  has  changed  the  his- 
tory of  the  world  is  common  knowledge.  But  whether 
their  work  is  lasting,  whether  it  will  bring  the  world 
nearer  to  the  realization  of  the  dream  of  the  prophet: 

"...  and  they  shall  beat  their  swords  into  plowshares, 
and  their  spears  into  pruninghooks:  nation  shall  not  lift 
up  sword  against  nation,  neither  shall  they  learn  war 
any  more." 

no  one  knows,  save  God. 


XVIII 

THE  VERSAILLES  PEACE  IN  RETROSPECT 

BY    EDWARD    M.    HOUSE 

It  was  but  natural  that  the  greatest  of  all  peace  con- 
gresses should  have  followed  the  greatest  of  all  wars. 

While  the  results  fell  short  of  public  expectations,  yet 
it  is  doubtful  whether  more  could  have  been  done,  con- 
sidering the  conditions  existing  after  the  signing  of  the 
armistice.  Theoretically,  "peace  without  victory"  was 
within  the  realm  of  reason,  but  practically  it  was  not. 
Civilization  must  advance  further  than  it  has  at  present, 
before  such  a  peace  is  possible.  The  magnitude  of  the 
war  was  such  that  its  disastrous  consequences  touched 
the  remote  parts  of  the  earth  and  disturbed  every 
human  activity,  thus  bringing  to  bear  upon  the  peace 
many  diverse  and  alien  influences.  Those  who  would 
have  had  the  congress  do  this  or  that  particular  thing 
were  not  present,  or,  if  so,  were  not  conversant  with  its 
inner  workings. 

The  accomplishments  to  which  favorable  attention 
may  be  called  are: 

(i)  The  forming  of  an  organization  for  the  preventing 
of  war. 

(2)  The  sincere  effort  to  give  racial  entities  self-deter- 

mination. 

(3)  The  declaration  of  a  policy  of  trusteeship  in  regard 

to  mandates. 

425 


426     WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED   AT   PARIS 

These  parts  of  the  treaty  mark  a  distinct  advance  in 
international  morals,  and  if  they  fail  of  their  purpose  it 
will  be  because  of  the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to 
accept  the  treaty  in  good  faith  and  to  give  it  her  power- 
ful support — a  support  which  is  essential  to  success. 
Our  people  have  not  passed  upon  the  treaty  per  se,  for 
as  yet  the  question  has  been  almost  wholly  obscured  by 
the  ever-recurrent  controversy  between  the  executive 
and  the  United  States  Senate.  Those  who  believe  in  our 
government  and  its  purposes  look  confidently  forward  to 
its  taking,  in  due  time,  its  place  in  the  Society  of  Nations, 
and  assuming,  without  fear,  all  the  responsibilities  which 
its  commanding  position  in  world  affairs  entails.  One 
cannot  have  power  without  corresponding  responsibility. 

Probably  the  greatest  misfortune  of  the  Conference 
was  that  it  assembled  too  late  and  took  too  long  with 
preliminaries.  This,  however,  was  not  the  fault  of  the 
United  States.  Had  it  convened  immediately  after  the 
armistice,  and  had  it  dealt  promptly  with  Germany,  the 
long  period  of  uncertainty,  disorder,  and  suffering  might 
in  large  part  have  been  avoided.  Then,  too,  no  country 
was  willing  that  its  army  should  be  used  to  police  the 
world,  except  France,  and  what  France  could  properly 
do  was  limited  in  more  ways  than  one.  Soon  after  the 
armistice  the  American  and  British  troops  began  to  be 
demobilized,  and  the  orders  of  the  Conference  were  known 
to  be  based  merely  upon  its  moral  influence,  and  this 
influence  rapidly  declined  as  the  armistice  receded  into 
the  past.  As  a  result,  help  from  the  Conference  was  de- 
spaired of  and  self-help  was  substituted.  In  consequence, 
numberless  little  wars  broke  out,  and  increased  the  misery 
of  people  whose  sufferings  were  ah'cady  all  but  intoler- 
able. 


THE  VERSAILLES   PEACE  427 

Economic  and  Financial  Clauses 

The  economic  and  financial  terms  of  the  peace  should 
have  been  made  as  soon  after  the  armistice  as  possible. 
Delay  was  the  cause  of  much  of  the  friction  at  the  Con- 
ference and  since.  The  failure  to  do  this,  combined  with 
the  crushing  debts  and  disturbed  industrial  conditions 
with  which  all  the  belligerents  are  burdened,  is  largely 
responsible  for  the  present  chaotic  international  situa- 
tion, and,  in  consequence,  there  is  general  distrust,  lack 
of  credit,  and  a  disorganized  and  impossible  rate  of 
exchange. 

While  the  United  States  is  the  principal  creditor  and 
not  indebted  to  any  nation,  it  is  probable  that  our  inter- 
est in  adjusting  and  placing  world  finance  on  a  sound 
basis  is  greater  than  that  of  any  other  Power.  Being 
the  largest  producer,  it  is  obviously  to  our  advantage  to 
bring  back  a  normal  healthy  economic  condition  every- 
where. One  cannot  have  bankrupt  neighbors  and  con- 
tinue to  prosper  for  long. 

After  the  armistice  there  was  a  decided  disinclination 
to  grapple  with  these  questions.  In  order  to  temporize, 
both  France  and  Great  Britain  had  recourse  to  the  cry 
of  making  Germany  pay  the  entire  cost  of  the  war,  and 
there  were  some  financiers  of  international  reputation  in 
both  countries  who  gave  credence  to  the  statement  that 
this  could  be  done.  It  was  a  mad  and  wholly  unwar- 
ranted assumption,  but  the  people  accepted  it  as  an 
easy  way  out  of  one  of  their  many  difficulties. 

In  an  address  to  Congress,  February  11,  1918,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  said:  "There  shall  be  no  annexations,  no 
contributions,  no  punitive  damages."  Because  of  this 
there  was  at  Paris  an  avoidance  of  the  use  of  the  word 


428    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

** indemnity,"  and  the  word  "reparation"  was  substi- 
tuted. But  by  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  could 
"reparation"  cover  the  vast  cost  of  the  war  in  all  its 
ramifications,  and  the  attempt  to  shift  one  of  its  most 
oppressive  burdens  by  advocating  a  plan  so  palpably 
impossible  was  a  subterfuge  unworthy  of  responsible 
statesmen. 

From  a  purely  selfish  standpoint  it  would  have  been 
to  our  advantage  if,  after  the  armistice,  we  had  called  a 
conference  of  the  Allies  and  had  prepared  a  plan,  the 
leading  feature  of  which  should  have  been  a  general  ad- 
justment of  international  indebtedness.  Under  such  a 
process  our  foreign  loans,  instead  of  being  $10,000,000,000 
would  probably  now  have  been  $5,000,000,000 — all  good 
and  interest-bearing.  This,  in  itself,  would  have  reduced 
our  taxes  $250,000,000  a  year,  and  with  the  stimulus 
which  a  sound  financial  situation  abroad  would  have  given 
our  trade  a  diff"erent  story  could  to-day  be  told.  As  it  is, 
we  are  owed  a  nominal  sum  of  $10,000,000,000,  the  value 
of  which  is  exceedingly  doubtful,  and  upon  it  no  interest 
has  yet  been  paid.  Sooner  or  later  some  adjustment 
must  be  brought  about;  it  should  have  been  efi'ected 
immediately  the  war  was  over.  Our  people  would  then 
have  recognized  that  our  foreign  loans  were  not  made  as 
investments,  but  in  order  to  defeat  the  Central  Empires. 
Even  now  they  should  understand  that  these  debts  can- 
not be  collected  except  by  process  of  war,  unless,  indeed, 
the  debtors  choose  otherwise.  Such  conditions  make  for 
bad  foreign  relations,  and  we  shall  awaken  to  this  when 
we  begin  to  press  for  interest  payments. 

But  the  failure  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  to 
readjust  their  own  finances  did  not  end  there;  they  car- 
ried this  policy  through  the  entire  Conference.     It  would 


THE  VERSAILLES   PEACE  429 

have  been  the  part  of  wisdom  to  have  named  immediately 
a  fixed  sum  for  Germany  to  pay  as  reparation.  This 
sum  should  have  been  the  maximum  she  could  pay,  but 
not  an  impossible  sum.  Then  the  bankers  of  the  world 
might,  under  proper  conditions,  have  underwritten  it, 
and  France,  Belgium,  and  Great  Britain  would  have 
obtained  the  needed  stimulus  which  would  more  rapidly 
have  brought  their  economic  conditions  back  to  normal. 
A  part  of  this  sum  might  have  come  to  the  United  States, 
as  we,  in  turn,  cancelled  a  portion  of  the  obligations 
those  countries  owed  us. 

It  is  well  that  the  economic  and  financial  clauses  of 
the  treaty  are  more  or  less  temporary  and  not  perma- 
nent, as  are  the  clauses  covering  boundaries  and  racial 
determination. 

Boundaries  and  Self-Determination 

In  the  matter  of  boundaries  the  Paris  Conference  was 
confronted  with  ahnost  its  most  difficult  problem.  There 
was  no  good  way  out,  and  any  decision  was  certain  to 
displease,  and  in  many  instances  to  do  injustice. 

It  was  easier  to  give  nationality  to  races  bulking  large 
in  numbers  than  it  was  to  make  an  equitable  adjustment 
of  territory  between  two  or  more  contiguous  states, 
where  it  was  difficult  to  decide  whether  the  racial  status 
or  the  natural  boundaries  should  determine.  Italy,  in 
demanding  a  natural  or  strategic  frontier  to  the  north, 
has  included  two  hundred  odd  thousand  Tyrolese,  who 
will  not  be  reconciled  to  the  change  except  through  cen- 
turies of  kindly  treatment  and  good  government. 

An  even  more  uncertain  determination  of  justice, 
reached  after  the  United  States  had  practically  with- 
drawn from  the  Conference,  was  the  shifting  of  boun- 


430    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

daries  between  Bulgaria,  Roumania,  and  Jugo-SIavia, 
the  result  of  which  has  left  much  dissatisfaction.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  any  adjustment  could  have  been  made 
in  this  region  which  would  not  have  left  seeds  of  another 
war.  Those  who  were  present  to  advocate  their  claims 
succeeded  in  expanding  their  boundaries  to  an  astonish- 
ing degree,  but  almost  wholly  at  the  expense  of  their 
defeated  neighbors.  It  requires  but  little  prescience  to 
see  that  it  will  take  a  strong  and  vigilant  League  of 
Nations  to  hold  these  turbulent  Balkan  States  in  leash. 

But  in  spite  of  unfortunate  mistakes  in  details,  it 
remains  true  that  for  the  first  time  in  history  Europe 
enjoys  a  natural  political  map  or,  at  least,  a  fair  approxi- 
mation to  it,  a  map  drawn  in  accordance  with  the  un- 
forced aspirations  and  the  spontaneous  affiliations  of  the 
peoples  themselves.  The  map  of  Europe  drawn  by  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  and  changed  by  later  congresses, 
knew  no  such  principle.  Peoples  were  handed  from  sov- 
ereignty to  sovereignty  like  chattels,  the  determining  fac- 
tors being  the  ambitions,  the  power,  and  the  cunning  of 
sovereigns  and  their  foreign  ministers.  As  they  sowed 
so,  indeed,  did  they  reap,  for  most  of  the  wars  of  the 
nineteenth  century  after  1815  had  their  roots  in  efforts 
on  the  part  of  oppressed  groups  and  peoples  to  throw  off 
alien  rule  and  join  congenial  political  units.  Therefore, 
it  was  not  unnatural  that  the  Paris  Peace  Conference 
should  have  been  carried  away  by  the  popular  demand 
for  self-determination.  It  was  a  slogan  which  stirred 
into  action  the  dormant  dreams  of  many  ancient  peoples. 

When  the  great  empires  east  of  the  Rhine  began  to 
totter,  fulfilment  of  the  cherished  hopes  of  centuries 
sprang  at  once  to  the  fore  in  the  hearts  of  oppressed 
races.     Some  communities  did  not  wait  for  Paris  to  act, 


THE   VERSAILLES   PEACE  431 

but,  with  a  courage  born  of  strong  desire,  severed  the 
political  ties  which  had  bound  them  for  centuries  and 
established  governments  for  themselves  in  which  their 
several  racial  entities  dominated.  It  was  the  gladdest 
and  yet,  in  some  ways,  the  maddest  movement  in  his- 
tory. In  the  endeavor  to  be  free  everything  else  was 
overlooked.  No  tribal  entity  was  too  small  to  have 
ambitions  for  self-determination.  Social  and  economic 
considerations  were  unreckoned  with,  and  the  only 
thought  for  the  moment  was  to  reach  back  to  the  cen- 
turies when  they  were  nomads  and  were  masters  of  their 
own  fortunes  and  desires.  The  sufferings  and  hardships 
of  the  war  seemed  to  fall  from  them  in  this  hour  of  joy, 
and  nothing  appeared  to  matter  if  once  again  they  might 
escape  from  the  domination  of  their  overlords. 

During  the  winter  and  spring  of  191 8- 191 9  Paris  was 
the  Mecca  for  the  oppressed  not  alone  of  Europe  but  of 
the  earth.  Pilgrims  came  in  countless  numbers  to  lay 
their  hopes  and  grievances  at  the  feet  of  those  in  the 
seats  of  the  mighty.  Many  were  in  native  costumes, 
some  charming  and  some  otherwise,  but  all  picturesque 
and  lending  an  air  of  interest  to  the  great  modern 
Babylon. 

There  was  much  that  was  pathetic  in  it  all.  Delega- 
tions would  appear  overnight,  and  then,  after  many 
weary  weeks  of  waiting,  would  disappear  and  would  be 
replaced  by  others.  On  the  other  hand,  some  coming 
from  the  ends  of  the  world  lingered  through  the  greater 
part  of  the  life  of  the  conference.  Nearly  all  had  hear- 
ings, but  these  were  of  necessity  of  a  perfunctory  nature, 
and  were  given  less  to  obtain  real  information  than  to  be 
courteous  to  some  sponsor  among  the  Powers.  Argu- 
ments would  at  times  be  made  in  the  native  language, 


432    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

which  had  to  be  first  translated  into  French  and  then 
into  English.  When  boundaries  were  described  at  great 
length  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  of  those  upon  whom 
the  final  decision  rested  would  have  known  if  the  speaker, 
sensing  the  irony  of  it  all,  had  taken  them  a  thousand 
miles  afield,  and  had  followed  a  line  in  no  way  pertinent 
to  that  which  he  was  supposed  to  prove. 

Much  of  the  time  of  the  Conference  was  wasted  in  this 
grotesque  effort  not  to  offend.  Of  the  visiting  chiefs 
and  potentates  from  far-off  lands,  none  made  a  more 
profound  impression  than  the  Emir  Feisal,  son  of  the 
king  of  the  Hedjaz.  He  spoke  Arabic  only,  but  he  had 
an  able  friend  and  interpreter  in  Colonel  Lawrance,  who 
himself  was  one  of  the  unique  characters  of  the  war. 
The  Arabian  prince,  in  his  native  dress,  was  a  striking 
figure.  He  looked  not  unlike  the  accepted  pictures  of 
the  Christ,  but  there  the  resemblance  ended,  for  Feisal 
had  proved  himself  a  dangerous  foe  on  many  fields  of 
battle,  and  at  Paris  asserted  himself  in  a  way  in  which 
no  signs  of  humility  were  apparent.  He  came  less  like 
a  suppliant  than  any  of  the  others,  for  he  bore  himself 
with  a  kingly  air  and  was  imperious  in  his  demands. 
This  attitude  finally  brought  about  his  undoing  and 
landed  him  in  exile. 

While  many  failed  to  realize  their  aspirations,  yet 
enough  succeeded  to  change  the  map  of  Europe  as  it  has 
never  been  changed  within  the  memory  of  living  man. 
And  now  that  the  theory  of  self-determination  has  been 
so  largely  put  into  practice,  the  question  is,  what  will 
the  outcome  be?  Some  are  already  eager  to  expand 
beyond  the  limits  of  safety,  and  others  are  evincing  an 
unreasonably  selfish  policy  toward  their  neighbors.  There 
is  one  thing  that  seems  essential,  and  that  is  some  under- 


THE  VERSAILLES   PEACE  433 

standing  regarding  customs,  postal  service,  and  the 
monetary  unit.  Without  such  an  understanding,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  these  small  states  can  live  in  comfort 
and  happiness.  Many  of  them  are  landlocked,  and 
some  that  touch  the  sea  have  no  ports  adequate  to  move 
their  commerce.  Few,  if  any,  are  self-supporting,  and  a 
free  interchange  of  commodities  is  necessary  in  order  to 
maintain  a  normal  economic  life.  If  a  common  mone- 
tary unit  is  adopted  and  there  is  no  barrier  to  trade,  it 
will  probably  not  be  long  before  some  sort  of  federation 
will  here  and  there  come  about.  Then,  and  not  until 
then,  will  those  small  states  assume  a  position  of  impor- 
tance and  wield  an  influence  commensurate  with  their 
aspirations. 

Limitation  of  Armaments 

The  Conference  "shunted"  the  question  of  the  limita- 
tion of  armaments,  and  there  was  no  mention  of  it  except 
in  Article  8  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Germany  and  other  enemy  states  were  drastically  dis- 
armed, but  there  was  a  careful  avoidance  of  the  subject 
as  it  related  to  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers. 

There  was  and  is  no  more  crying  need  than  of  some 
general  understanding  regarding  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ment, for  unless  and  until  it  comes  there  can  be  no 
security  for  continued  peace,  and  the  Conference  could 
not  have  done  the  world  greater  service  than  to  have 
reached  a  satisfactory  solution  of  this  troublesome  ques- 
tion. The  exc\ise  given  then  was  that  the  League  was 
the  proper  medium  through  which  it  could  best  be  done, 
but  the  truth,  perhaps,  was  that  most  of  the  European 
states  at  the  Conference  were  unwilling  to  take  it  up  at 
that  time.     It  is  doubtful,  too,  whether  any  agreement 


434    WHAT   REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

could  have  been  reached,  for  neither  France  nor  Italy 
were  then  in  a  mood  to  disarm  on  land,  and  Great  Britain 
was  even  less  willing  to  limit  her  fleet  upon  the  seas. 

During  the  war  one  heard  on  every  side  the  cry  that 
something  must  be  done,  but  the  representatives  of  the 
great  Powers  foregathered  at  Paris  sat  for  the  better 
part  of  a  year,  and  went  away  leaving  things  as  they 
were,  relying  upon  what  might  be  accomplished  through 
the  instrumentality  of  the  League.  There  has  been  more 
than  enough  discussion,  but  it  has  brought  no  result  and 
scarcely  a  plan  worthy  of  consideration.  However,  the 
time  is  near  when  this  question  must  have  its  hearing, 
for  the  people  of  all  debt-laden  countries  are  demanding 
relief,  and  no  relief  can  be  had  until  account  is  taken  of 
the  expenditures  for  war.  One  of  the  needs  of  the  time 
is  for  a  voice  with  an  authority  so  great  that  it  may 
reach  all  lands  and  awaken  into  action  the  dormant 
desires  of  the  masses. 

There  is  no  voice  to-day  which  carries  so  far  and 
which  is  freighted  with  so  much  power  as  that  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States.  No  matter  what  differ- 
ences of  opinion  may  exist  here  regarding  our  taking 
part  in  world  affairs,  there  is  but  little  difference  regard- 
ing the  desirability  of  a  reduction  of  armaments.  A  con- 
ference of  the  principal  Powers  should  be  called  to  dis- 
cuss and  provide  ways  and  means  to  bring  about  limita- 
tion of  armaments  among  themselves,  and  later  to  use 
their  influence  through  the  League  of  Nations  to  make 
it  world-wide.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  President  Harding 
may  do  this  great  and  needful  thing.  Should  he  succeed 
in  bringing  this  about  he  would  place  himself  among  the 
benefactors  of  mankind  and  mark  the  beginning  of  a  new 
era.     Statesmen  could  no  longer  sit  in  seclusion,  hidden 


THE  VERSAILLES   PEACE  435 

behind  doors,  and  formulate  policies  the  enforcement  of 
which  would  necessitate  military  and  naval  strength.  A 
grandiose  foreign  policy  has  been  one  of  the  fruitful 
causes  of  war.  Such  a  policy  and  militarism  are  of  one 
warp  and  woof,  and  when  the  one  goes  the  other  will 
likely  follow. 

In  days  gone  by  the  jingo  and  the  imperialist  appealed 
successfully  to  the  imagination,  and  the  pomp  and  pan- 
oply of  war  stirred  the  emotions,  but  that  day  has  passed, 
let  us  hope,  forever.  We  understand  now  what  such 
policies  entail,  and  never  again  shall  we  submit  to  condi- 
tions which  bring  in  their  train  so  frightful  a  trail  of 
suffering  and  death. 

Publicity 

From  the  American  view -point  and  that  of  the  smaller 
nations — for  the  outlook  and  interests  of  both  were  inuch 
the  same — one  of  the  mistakes  at  Paris  was  the  lack  of 
publicity.  If  the  American  purposes  could  have  been 
known,  a  moral  backing  and  stimulus  would  have  been 
given  our  representatives  which  was  almost  wholly  lack- 
ing. This  sustaining  force  might  have  come  from  the 
entire  world,  and  would  have  had  a  double  effect  inas- 
much as  it  would  have  weakened  the  opposition  and 
strengthened  us. 

We  had  taken  the  position  of  overthrowing  the  old 
order  and  bringing  a  new  and  different  diplomacy  into 
play.  ''Open  covenants,  openly  arrived  at,"  was  one  of 
the  popular  slogans  of  the  day,  and  it  was  clearly  to  our 
advantage,  as  well  as  our  obligation,  to  carry  it  through. 
The  failure  to  do  this  left  us  in  the  attitude  of  reformers 
working  in  the  dark.  Darkness  is  conducive  to  secret 
covenants  secretly  arrived  at,  and  what  we  needed  for 


436    WHAT  REALLY  HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

success  was  light — all  the  light  which  could  properly  be 
thrown  about  the  subjects  proposed  and  discussed. 

It  may  be  entirely  proper  to  have  conferences  in 
groups  of  two  or  more  in  which  no  one  but  those  vitally 
interested  may  appear,  but  when  the  meetings  begin  to 
be  official  and  take  on  an  aspect  of  final  decision,  then 
the  public  should  be  given  the  text  of  the  entire  discus- 
sion. In  this  way,  and  in  this  way  alone,  may  the  pub- 
lic of  every  country  know  and  fairly  assess  the  motives 
of  each  participant  and  bring  to  bear,  if  need  be,  the 
power  of  public  opinion. 

The  League  of  Nations 

The  outstanding  feature  of  the  Paris  congress  which 
difi'erentiated  it  from  other  congresses  was  the  creation 
of  the  League  of  Nations.  This  noble  conception  was 
the  product  of  no  single  brain,  but  was  the  consumma- 
tion of  the  thoughts  and  aspirations  of  the  forward- 
looking  men  of  the  past  and  the  present.  It  was  the 
great  dream  of  the  centuries  which  had  at  last  come 
true. 

While  the  idea  was  not  President  Wilson's,  yet  the 
power  to  make  it  a  real  and  living  thing  was  his.  History 
will  give  him  the  credit  of  using  this  power  to  the  utmost 
to  create  an  instrument  to  make  wars  less  probable. 

In  fairness  to  those  who  opposed  the  Covenant,  as  it 
was  made  in  Paris,  let  it  be  said  that  some  were  frankly 
against  any  such  adventure  on  the  part  of  our  govern- 
ment; others  believed  our  interests  were  not  sufficiently 
safeguarded;  and  there  was  yet  another  group  maintain- 
ing that  there  was  even  a  more  vital  issue  involved — that 
of  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  exercise  its  constitutional 
functions.     It  is  to  be  regretted  that  this  last  group  did 


THE  VERSAILLES   PEACE  437 

not  choose  another  occasion  to  battle  with  the  executive 
for  what  they  declared  to  be  their  rights. 

It  has  been  said  before,  but  it  cannot  be  told  too 
often,  that  another  such  war  will  overturn  what  is  left  of 
civilization.  We  have  built  up  a  structure  the  continua- 
tion of  which  is  dependent  upon  co-operation.  Its  ma- 
chinery is  so  delicate  that  when  jarred  it  all  but  falls  to 
pieces.  We  have  before  us  the  example  of  Russia.  The 
sun  shines  there  as  it  has  always  shone,  the  rains  fall  now 
as  in  the  past,  the  soil  is  there  to  yield  as  abundantly  as 
in  former  years;  and  yet  the  jar  which  came  with  the 
revolution  loosened  the  machinery  of  that  great  co-opera- 
tive society,  and  cold,  hunger,  and  death  stalk  the  land. 

Should  another  such  war  come,  this  same  thing  that 
has  happened  to  the  Russians  may  happen  to  us  all,  but 
the  disorganization  will  be  more  complete  and  the  dis- 
aster more  terrible.  We  are  told  that  such  things  can- 
not occur  in  free  and  prosperous  America.  But  we  were 
told  that  the  Great  War  was  unthinkable.  **  Civilization 
was  too  advanced";  "the  bankers  would  not  permit  it"; 
"at  any  rate,  the  United  States  had  no  entangling  alli- 
ances." But  it  did  come,  and  we  were  helpless  to  pre- 
vent its  spread.  The  bankers  were  as  impotent  as  others, 
for  they  were  caught  in  the  machinery  of  war,  and  car- 
ried along  by  its  irresistible  momentum.  Though  un- 
entangled  by  any  alliance,  the  call  of  right  drew  us  in, 
as  it  would  again. 

And  now,  two  and  a  half  years  after  the  signing  of  the 
armistice,  the  United  States  has  as  yet  failed  to  do  the 
necessary  thing  to  make  successful  the  only  instrument 
which  has  been  devised  to  save  us  from  the  destruction 
another  world  war  would  bring.  It  is  a  melancholy  re- 
flection upon  our  right  to  exist. 


438    WHAT   REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

The  Freedom  of  the  Seas 

It  is  doubtful  whether  there  is  anything  discernible 
upon  the  horizon  of  international  affairs  which  would 
sooner  quicken  a  local  war  into  a  world  war  than  the 
unsettled  question  now  known  as  the  freedom  of  the 
seas.  It  is  especially  provocative  of  danger  to  such 
maritime  Powers  as  the  United  States. 

There  has  been  no  agreement  upon  this  subject  since 
the  Declaration  of  Paris  in  1856,  when  privateering  was 
abohshed  and  the  rights  of  neutrals  were  defined.  The 
Declaration  of  London  of  1909  was  never  ratified  by  all 
the  interested  Powers;  therefore,  when  the  Great  War 
began,  it  was  necessary  to  hark  back  to  the  Declaration 
of  Paris  of  1856,  and  conditions  since  then  had  made 
that  instrument  wholly  inadequate  for  modern  usage. 

The  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States  has  been 
for  the  protection  of  neutrals  and  a  more  Hberal  attitude 
toward  the  freedom  of  trade  upon  the  seas.  The  pohcy 
of  Great  Britain  has  been  the  reverse,  and  at  times  there 
has  been  sharp  disagreement  between  the  two  nations 
upon  ,  this  question.  It  was  never  brought  before  the 
Peace  Conference,  however,  and  in  consequence  the  world 
is  practically  without  laws  governing  blockade,  capture 
at  sea,  contraband,  and  the  use  of  mines  and  sub- 
marines, for  the  Germans  wiped  the  slate  clean  in  their 
violent  attempt  to  destroy  both  enemy  and  neutral 
commerce. 

It  is  quite  clear  why  Great  Britain  should  regard  her 
situation  as  difl'erent  from  that  of  other  Powers,  since  in 
order  to  live  she  must  keep  open  her  sea  communications. 
Again,  she  is  dependent  upon  her  navy  to  protect  her 
colonies  and  dominions,  and  to  keep  them  in  touch  with 


THE  VERSAILLES   PEACE  439 

the  mother  country.  But  it  is  not  so  clear  why  she 
resists  the  grouping  of  all  the  Powers  into  a  pact  to  keep 
the  seas  free  in  war  as  well  as  in  peace.  Such  a  pact 
might  prevent  her  from  using  her  fleet  to  starve  an  enemy 
into  submission,  or  to  wield  its  force  to  drive  an  enemy's 
commerce  from  the  seas,  but  it  would  in  turn  be  a  pro- 
tection that  would  more  than  compensate  her  for  any 
loss  in  these  directions.  She  would  not  only  gain  in  the 
security  of  her  food-supply,  but  her  merchant  marine 
might  sail  the  seas  in  time  of  war  unmolested. 

England's  conservatism,  which  has  been  a  bulwark  of 
strength  in  many  a  crisis,  may  some  time  be  the  cause  of 
her  undoing.  The  world  moves  quickly  now,  both  in 
thought  and  invention,  and  many  of  us  who  wish  this 
great  people  well  hope  to  see  them  look  upon  this  ques- 
tion from  a  broader  point  of  view. 

There  could  be  made  a  code  of  sea  laws  which  would 
remove  many  of  the  causes  leading  to  war,  and  which 
would  materially  lessen  its  horrors.  It  is  fear  of  the 
destruction  of  one's  commerce  at  sea  in  time  of  war 
which  has  given  an  impetus  to  naval  armaments.  Re- 
move this  fear  and  one  of  the  vexatious  questions  of  our 
time  would  be  solved. 

Sufficient  homage  has  not  yet  been  paid  to  the  intrepid 
men  who,  unafraid,  sailed  the  restricted  seas  during  the 
war  and  refused  to  be  terrorized  by  a  relentless  foe. 
For  the  future  protection  of  men  like  them,  and  for  the 
safeguarding  of  women  and  children  who  of  necessity 
must  traverse  a  danger  zone  in  time  of  war,  a  new  and 
more  humane  code  of  sea  laws  must  be  made  and  guar- 
anteed by  the  governments  of  the  world.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  some  time  soon  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  may  together  lead  the  way  in  this  direction,  in 


440    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT   PARIS 

order  that  one  of  the  shadows  still  hanging  over  us  may- 
be lifted  and  that  we  may  at  last  have  the  freedom  of 
the  seas. 

Mandates 

The  question  of  mandates  is  one  in  which  the  American 
people  should  have  much  concern.  It  is  not  alone  a  new 
departure  in  international  ethics,  but  it  is  one  in  which 
we  have  an  economic  interest.  Until  now,  backward 
countries  have  generally  been  controlled  or  exploited  by 
some  Power  for  selfish  purposes,  and  the  good  which  has 
come  from  such  control  or  exploitation  has  been  merely 
incident  thereto.  These  backward  communities  have 
been  a  constant  source  of  friction  between  the  more  civ- 
ilized states,  friction  which  has  often  resulted  in  war. 

Until  the  Paris  Conference  there  had  been  no  attempt 
to  reach  a  general  understanding  or  fixed  policy  between 
the  more  powerful  nations  regarding  the  control  or  bet- 
terment of  such  states  or  territories.  The  system  hith- 
erto practised  was  admittedly  so  bad  that  when  the 
Conference  came  to  the  disposition  of  the  late  German 
colonies  there  was  a  general  agreement  that  a  more 
enlightened  policy  should  be  inaugurated.  In  further- 
ance of  this  desire,  Article  22  was  incorporated  in  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  subsequently 
there  was  a  commission  appointed  to  sit  in  London  dur- 
ing the  summer  of  1919  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  the 
terms  of  the  mandates. 

Upon  this  commission  were  Lord  Milner,  who  had  as 
his  adviser  Lord  Robert  Cecil;  M.  Simon,  French  minis- 
ter for  the  colonies;  Viscount  Chinda,  for  Japan;  Gugli- 
elmo  Marconi,  for  Italy;  and  Edward  M.  House,  with 
the  late  George  Louis  Beer  as  adviser. 


THE  VERSAILLES   PEACE  441 

Following  the  wishes  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers,  as  expressed  in  Article  22,  we  divided  the  man- 
dates into  three  classes:  Form  A  was  to  be  used  for 
"communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish  Empire 
where  their  existence  as  independent  states  could  be  pro- 
visionally recognized  subject  to  the  rendering  of  admin- 
istrative advice  and  assistance  by  the  Mandatory  until 
such  time  as  they  were  able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes 
of  these  communities  must  be  a  principal  consideration 
in  the  selection  of  a  Mandatory." 

The  essential  features  of  Mandate  A,  proposed  as  a 
basis  for  discussion,  were  that  it  provided  for  a  cessation 
of  the  mandate  as  soon  as  practicable;  the  administration 
of  the  government  as  far  as  possible  by  the  native  ele- 
ments; that  no  military,  naval,  or  air  forces  should  be 
raised  or  maintained,  nor  any  fortifications  be  erected  or 
naval  bases  be  established  further  than  a  local  gendar- 
merie for  the  preservation  of  internal  order.  The  com- 
plete freedom  of  conscience  and  the  free  exercise  of  all 
forms  of  worship  were  assumed,  and  no  discrimination  of 
any  kind  should  be  made  between  citizens  on  the  ground 
of  race  or  religion. 

A  provision  of  far-reaching  importance  was  included, 
which  would  compel  the  Mandatory  Power  to  grant  to 
all  citizens  of  states  members  of  the  League  of  Nations 
the  same  rights  as  those  enjoyed  in  the  territory  by  its 
own  nationals  in  respect  to  entry  into  and  residence 
within  the  territory,  and  in  respect  to  the  acquisition  of 
property  and  the  exercise  of  a  profession  or  trade. 

Further,  the  Mandatory  Power  should  not  attempt  to 
obtain  special  privileges  for  its  own  citizens,  and  should 
undertake  to  insure  to  all  citizens  of  states  members  of 
the  League  freedom  of  transit  and  occupation  and  com- 


442     WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

plete  economic,  commercial,  and  industrial  equality. 
And  again,  that  concessions  for  the  development  of  the 
natural  resources  of  the  territory  should  be  granted 
without  discrimination  between  citizens  of  states  mem- 
bers of  the  League. 

The  London  commission  never  finished  its  labors  for 
the  reason  that  the  Turkish  treaty  had  not  been  pre- 
pared or  signed,  and  it  was  the  fragments  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  as  well  as  the  German  colonies  which  were  to 
come  under  the  mandates. 

Mandate  B  was  prepared  for  those  communities  not 
so  far  advanced  in  government  and  civilization  as  those 
which  were  to  come  under  Mandate  A,  but  the  provi- 
sions were  very  much  the  same,  except  that  it  gave 
greater  protection  to  the  natives,  who  would  presumably 
be  more  ignorant  than  those  coming  under  Mandate  A. 
Particular  care  was  given  to  the  safeguarding  of  their 
lands,  and  they  were  to  be  protected  against  usury, 
against  traffic  in  liquor,  drugs,  and  slaves.  Another  im- 
portant provision  was  that  in  case  of  disputes  between 
the  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  relating  to  the 
application  or  interpretation  of  the  mandate  which 
could  not  be  settled  by  negotiations,  the  dispute  must 
be  submitted  to  the  permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice  which  was  to  be  established. 

Mandate  C  was  framed  for  those  countries  in  South- 
west Africa  and  the  Pacific  Islands  **  which  owing  to  the 
sparseness  of  their  populations,  or  their  small  size,  or 
their  remoteness  from  the  centres  of  civilization,  or  their 
contiguity  to  the  Mandatory  can  be  best  administered 
under  the  laws  of  the  Mandatory  as  integral  portions  of 
its  territory." 

Here,  again,  even  greater  care  was  used  to  protect  the 


THE   VERSAILLES   PEACE  443 

natives  than  was  given  to  those  in  A  and  B,  because  of 
their  ignorance  and  helplessness.  Therefore,  taking  it 
altogether,  the  acceptance  by  the  members  of  the  League 
of  Nations  of  this  new  principle  in  the  question  of  con- 
trol of  backward  countries  is  a  long  step  forward.  A 
Mandatory  Power  now  accepts  a  trusteeship  not  for  the 
benefit  of  itself  but  for  the  benefit  of  the  natives,  and 
incidentally  it  must  permit  other  countries  to  share  in 
the  development  of  the  state  over  which  it  exercises  the 
mandate. 

The  fact  that  hereafter  each  Power  holding  such  a 
mandate  will  be  under  close  observation  must  have  a 
tendency  to  promote  the  best  administration  possible. 
The  report  which  must  be  given  each  year  to  the  council 
of  the  League  will  in  itself  stimulate  rivalry,  and  the 
Power  giving  the  best  account  of  its  stewardship  will  be 
the  one  to  hold  the  highest  place  in  the  esteem  of  the 
world. 

Although  the  council,  during  its  November  meeting  at 
Geneva,  withheld  some  of  the  terms  of  the  different 
grades  of  mandates,  yet  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that 
the  essence  of  what  the  London  commission  prepared 
will  form  the  basis  of  the  agreement  made  at  Geneva. 

One  of  the  arguments  used  by  those  Americans  who 
favor  the  acceptance  of  a  mandate  by  the  United  States 
is  that  it  will  give  us  an  opportunity  to  set  the  pace  in 
giving  to  some  community,  struggling  to  advance,  an 
administration  of  law  and  order  which  will  serve  as  a 
model  for  other  Mandatory  Powers,  and  which  will  result 
in  adding  to  the  sum  of  human  progress. 

The  world  at  large  gave  prompt  and  generous  praise 
to  our  diplomatic,  mihtary,  and  naval  efforts.     But  we 


444    WHAT  REALLY   HAPPENED  AT  PARIS 

were  not  content  to  let  their  righteous  judgments  go 
unchallenged;  in  public  and  in  private  we  have  told  of 
our  shortcomings  in  terms  so  convincing  that  others 
have  come  to  see  us  as  we  seem  to  see  ourselves.  The 
object  of  this  book  is  to  tell  something  of  the  American 
purposes  at  the  Conference,  and  let  our  people  form  a 
more  deliberate  opinion  as  to  "What  Really  Happened 
at  Paris.'* 


APPENDIX 

STENOGRAPHIC    NOTES    OF    QUESTIONS    ASKED    AND    ANSWERS    GIVEN 
AFTER   THE  LECTURES   IN  THE  ACADEMY  OF  MUSIC,   PHILADELPHIA 


Ill 

THE  NEW  BOUNDARIES  OF  GERMANY 

December  30,  1920 

QUESTIONS  ANSWERED  BY  CHARLES  HOMER  HASKINS,  CHIEF  OF  THE 
DIVISION  OF  WESTERN  EUROPE,  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PEACE  COM- 
MISSION 

Question:  What  part  do  the  iron^nes  play  m  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
question  ? 

Answer:  A  very  considerable  part.  The  frontier  line  was  drawn 
in  1 87 1  by  the  German  geologists,  with  the  understanding  that  they 
had  included  all  the  iron-mines  which  could  be  worked  profitably, 
but  after  the  application  of  the  new  processes  to  the  phosphoric  ore 
the  portion  west  of  the  French  boundary  became  more  valuable  than 
the  part  east  of  the  border.  Thenceforth  the  German  poHcy  was  to 
get  the  rest  of  the  iron  district.  They  have  now  lost  it  all.  Some 
kind  of  an  adjustment  by  which  France  shall  agree  to  furnish  iron 
ore  to  Germany  in  return  for  a  supply  of  coal  is  one  of  those  neces- 
sary economic  bargains  which  ought  to  be  worked  out  by  inter- 
national agreement  as  soon  as  the  countries  can  get  together. 

Question:  In  your  opinion,  was  the  question  of  the  German  Jrontier 
wisely  and  fairly  settled  by  the  Conference? 

Answer:  Yes,  for  reasons  I  have  given  in  the  lecture. 

Question:  It  has  been  said  by  some  that  the  President  freely  con- 
sulted his  experts  and  by  others  that  he  ignored  them.  From  your  ex- 
perience, which  is  true?     (Laughter.) 

Answer:  From  my  experience  the  first  statement  is  more  nearly 
true.  So  far  as  I  could  see,  the  President  was  anxious  to  have  the 
exact  facts  before  him  in  every  situation.  Doubtless,  there  were  a 
number  of  occasions  when  he  could  not  consult  with  experts  at  a  par- 
ticular moment,  but,  in  general,  the  President  sought  such  advice, 
although  he  naturally  had  to  use  his  own  judgment  whether  that 
advice  was  to  be  adopted  in  any  particular  case. 

Question:  Before  the  war  were  the  Lorraine  iron-mines  owned  by 
private  German  owners?  And  has  the  title  changed  to  French  public  or 
private  ownership  now? 

Answer:  Before  the  war  they  were  owned  by  private  owners, 
principally  German.     In   Alsace-Lorraine  the   French   reserve  the 

447 


448  APPENDIX 

right  to  liquidate  enterprises  owned  in  Germany;  they  have  an 
"alien  property  custodian"  also.     (Laughter.) 

Question:  How  do  you  justify  the  giving  of  the  Saar  mines  to  France 
U7ider  that  one  oj  the  ''Fourteen  Points"  which  says  "no  indemnities" ? 

Answer:  The  Saar  mines  are  not  an  indemnity  such  as  the  Ger- 
mans secured  from  France  in  1871;  they  constitute  reparation  and 
restoration  for  property  destroyed  by  the  Germans  in  France. 

Question:  Is  it  not  true  that  in  five  years'  time  the  French  mines 
will  again  be  producing,  and  France  will  then  have  both  her  own  and 
Germany's  coal? 

Answer:  The  French  mines  will  be  producing  again  in  five  years, 
but  it  is  not  so  clear  that  they  will  be  producing  at  their  pre-war 
productivity,  for  those  mines  were  flooded  and  dynamited  in  a  way 
that  makes  it  very  difficult  to  get  them  into  good  working  condition 
again.  Of  course,  the  French  will  get  coal  from  their  mines  before 
the  fifteen-year  period  is  up;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  the  French  were  deprived  of  the  coal  of  these  mines 
during  the  five  years  of  the  war.  Any  surplus  above  the  losses  in 
coal  is  credited  to  Germany  on  her  further  account  in  the  way  of 
compensation  for  the  destruction  of  other  property.  For  all  this, 
the  coal-mines  were  an  easily  available  asset. 

Question:  Is  any  part  of  the  German  public  debt  now  a  liability 
oJ  the  Lorraine  and  Saar  districts? 

Answer:  No  part  of  the  German  public  debt  Is  a  liability  of  Lor- 
raine, nor  for  fifteen  years  In  the  Saar.  If  any  part  of  the  Saar  or 
the  whole  of  it  votes  to  return  to  Germany,  it  goes  back  with  all  the 
rights  and  IlablHtles  thereto  appertaining. 

Question:  You  spoke  oj  Mr.  Keynes.  He  injers  in  his  book,  "The 
Economic  Consequences  oj  the  Peace,"  that  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George 
bamboozled  the  President — in  your  opinion,  is  this  true? 

Answer:  Mr.  Keynes  says  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  "found  it 
harder  to  debamboozle  the  old  Presbyterian  than  It  had  been  to  bam- 
boozle him."  If  Mr.  Keynes  knew  as  much  about  Scotch  Presby- 
terians as  we  do  In  Pennsylvania,  he  would  have  chosen  some  one 
else  as  an  example  of  bamboozling;  and  if  he  knew  more  about  men 
in  general,  he  would  know  that  such  a  formula  is  much  too  simple 


APPENDIX  449 

for  any  personality.  The  President  has  in  his  make-up  much  of  the 
stiffness  and  firmness  of  the  Scotch  Calvinist,  but  also  something 
of  the  canniness.  Mr.  Keynes  also  calls  President  Wilson  "slow 
and  unresourceful,"  and  that  is  certainly  untrue.  At  Paris  Presi- 
dent Wilson  showed  himself  to  be  quick  and  intelhgent  in  grasping 
and  assimilating  facts,  and  quick  to  use  them  in  debate.  I  think 
I  have  seen  more  of  him  than  Mr.  Keynes,  both  in  Paris  and  earher. 
Mr.  Keynes's  book,  "The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace," 
is  in  its  latter  part  an  able  and,  in  some  respects,  a  sound  piece  of 
economic  analysis;  but  economic  analysis  is  not  what  most  people 
like  to  read,  and  in  order  to  get  the  book  read,  he  wrote  some  pre- 
liminary matter  which  purported  to  describe  the  setting  and  the 
personalities  of  the  Peace  Conference.  On  this  he  could  not  speak 
as  an  authority  from  his  own  observation;  and  the  result  was  a  highly 
imaginative  and,  in  some  respects,  a  distorted  picture  of  men  and 
motives. 

Question:  Do  you  feel  that  the  United  States  really  lost  out  at  the 
Peace  Conference? 

Answer:  No.  The  United  States,  in  a  territorial  or  in  an  eco- 
nomic sense,  had  practically  nothing  to  gain  or  lose  at  the  Peace 
Conference.  She  was  the  great  disinterested  Power  at  Paris.  If 
the  United  States  had  lost  out  at  all,  it  would  have  been  through 
failure  to  realize  her  programme,  as  laid  down  in  the  Fourteen  Points 
and  other  principles  submitted  by  President  Wilson.  It  seems  to 
me  that  the  most  fundamental  points,  the  major  portion  of  the  Amer- 
ican programme,  were  reahzed;  but  of  course  there  were  some  com- 
promises and  adjustments.  On  the  whole  I  do  not  think  it  can  be 
said  that  the  United  States  lost  out  at  the  Peace  Conference. 


IV 
POLAND 

December  17,  1920 

QUESTIONS   ANSWERED    BY    ROBERT   H.    LORD,    CHIEF   OF   THE   POLISH 
DIVISION   OF   THE   AMERICAN    PEACE    COMMISSION 

Question:  Personally  do  you  believe  that  the  settlement  oj  the  Polish 
question  was  the  fairest  to  Poland  that  could  have  been  reached? 

Answer:  I  am  going  to  speak  very  frankly  and  say  no.    Personally 
I  feel  that  the  Danzig  problem  was  a  very  grave  one  and  of  the  most 


450  APPENDIX 

vital  Interest  to  Poland.  The  new  arrangement  about  Danzig  has 
now  been  reduced  to  the  form  of  a  definite  treaty,  w  hich  was  signed 
just  the  other  day,  and  it  is  a  treaty  that  whittles  aw^ay  some  of  the 
rights  which  the  Peace  Treaty  seemed  to  have  assured  to  Poland. 
It  leaves  the  control  of  the  port  of  Danzig  in  the  hands  of  a  mixed 
commission,  made  up  of  two  Poles,  two  Danzigers,  and  one  neutral; 
so  that  Poland  will  not  have  secure  and  effective  control  over  her 
one  and  only  port.  How  badly  she  needs  secure  control  was  shown 
last  summer  when  I  was  in  Danzig.  At  that  moment  Poland  was 
fighting  for  her  life  against  the  Bolsheviks.  The  only  means  by  which 
war  supplies  from  the  outside  world  could  come  in  to  her  was  through 
Danzig;  but  owing  to  the  hostility  of  the  Danzig  Germans,  and  I 
might  add  of  the  British  High  Commissioner,  the  port  of  Danzig 
was  closed  to  Polish  munitions  in  the  very  heat  of  the  struggle.  If 
matters  had  not  been  settled  by  General  Weygand's  splendid  victory 
near  Warsaw,  that  situation  at  Danzig  might  have  cost  Poland  her 
very  existence.  Furthermore,  the  feeling  shown  by  the  Danzigers 
at  present  is  just  as  bad  as  can  be  imagined.  The  Poles  in  the  city 
are  mobbed  not  infrequently.  In  short,  I  think  the  new  arrange- 
ment is  working  very  badly. 

Question:  You  said  that  taking  territory  from  Germany  is  very 
serious  business.     What  do  you  mean  by  that? 

Answer:  There  is  a  popular  impression  in  Germany,  although 
it  is  not  exactly  an  accurate  one,  that  Prussia  has  never  definitely 
lost  any  territory  that  she  has  once  possessed;  that  whenever  any- 
thing has  been  taken  away  from  her,  there  has  always  been  a  come- 
back, and  she  has  invariably  regained  whatever  territory  she  had 
lost  and  taken  some  more  into  the  bargain.  One  of  the  most  mod- 
erate among  present-day  German  politicians.  Professor  Delbriick 
of  the  University  of  Berlin,  declared  some  years  ago  that,  "all  Ger- 
many would  have  to  be  hewn  in  pieces  before  we  should  allow  Posen 
to  be  taken  away  from  us."  Among  all  the  provinces  in  the  east, 
Posen  is  the  most  overwhelmingly  and  indisputably  Polish  in  all 
respects,  the  one  province  that  Germany  would  most  surely  have  to 
give  up  if  she  were  going  to  renounce  anything.  The  trouble  is  that 
the  Germans  cannot  bear  the  thought  of  renouncing  anything  that 
once  belonged  to  them;  I  fear  it  will  be  a  very  long  time  before  they 
come  to  regard  their  new  frontiers  as  definitive,  and  that  means  a 
permanent  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  That  is  why  I  said  it 
was  "serious  business"  to  take  territory  away  from  Germany. 


APPENDIX  451 

Question:  How  valuable  were  Mr.  PaderewskVs  services  to  Poland? 

Answer:  Mr.  Paderewski  accomplished  a  wonderful  service  at 
the  start  by  ending  a  serious  internal  crisis,  a  dispute  between  Polish 
parties  as  to  the  control  of  the  government.  He  founded  the  first 
government  of  the  new  state  that  was  accepted  by  every  one  at  home 
and  recognized  by  all  the  powers.  He  had  so  many  tasks  on 
his  hands,  particularly  in  regard  to  foreign  policy  and  the  great  de- 
cisions pending  at  Paris,  that  I  fear  he  did  not  find  time  to  devote 
himself  sufficiently  to  the  internal  organization  of  the  new  state; 
and  some  unfortunate  conditions  developed  at  home  which  he  would 
doubtless  have  desired  to  avoid  had  he  been  able.  But  he  held  the 
country  together  successfully  during  the  first  and  most  trying  year 
of  its  new  existence.  He  is  an  orator  of  the  first  rank.  He  has  many 
times  spoken  most  eff'ectively  before  the  Paris  Conference  and  at 
the  League  of  Nations  meeting  at  Geneva,  and  in  his  speeches  be- 
fore the  Polish  Diet  he  was  often  able  to  sweep  that  assembly  off 
its  feet  by  his  eloquence.  Mr.  Paderewski  is  so  obviously  a  thor- 
oughly high-minded  and  disinterested  patriot  that  he  commands 
confidence.  He  was  able  to  win  even  the  warm  friendship  of  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  who  was  not  on  very  friendly  terms  with  the  other 
Poles;  and  through  the  confidence  of  the  British  prime  minister  and 
President  Wilson  and  M.  Clemenceau  I  think  he  gained  a  great  many 
things  for  Poland  that  a  statesman  who  was  less  trusted  could  never 
have  secured.  In  general,  Mr.  Paderewski's  services  have  been  of  in- 
estimable vah-ie  to  his  country,  and  in  his  handling  of  negotiations  with 
the  other  powers  I  think  he  did  what  no  other  Pole  could  have  done. 

Question:  To  what  extent  does  Bolshevism  prevail  in  Poland  at 
the  present  time? 

Answer:  It  does  not  prevail  at  all.  It  scarcely  exists.  TTiere  is 
practically  no  Bolshevism  among  the  Catholic  population,  which 
is  overwhelmingly  in  the  majority.  The  Poles  are  rather  ardent 
Catholics,  and  that  in  itself  is  a  strong  safeguard  against  Bolshevism. 

Question:  Will  the  Danzig  corridor  become  a  second  Alsace-Lor- 
raine as  jar  as  Germany  is  concerned? 

Answer:  The  Germans  in  Germany  doubtless  think  so,  but  I 
do  not  believe  this  comparison  would  be  fair.  For,  as  it  was  finally 
marked  out,  the  Polish  corridor  to  the  Baltic  contains  a  majority 
of  Poles  and  not  of  Germans.  It  is  not  a  case  of  the  majority  of  the 
population  being  held  under  a  foreign  rule  against  their  will,  as  was 
the  case  in  Alsace-Lorraine. 


452  APPENDIX  '      . 

Question  :  What  can  you  say  oj  the  frequent  statement  that  the  pres~ 
ent  aims  of  the  Polish  Government  are  imperialistic? 

Answer:  I  should  say  that  the  statement  in  the  main  is  based 
on  inaccurate  knowledge  of  the  ethnographic  situation.  As  heard 
to-day,  this  charge  is  usually  made  with  regard  to  the  claims  of  the 
Polish  Government  to  certain  territories  on  the  east.  In  that  quar- 
ter the  Poles  have  claimed  a  good  deal  of  territory  which,  according 
to  the  statistics  of  the  old  Russian  Government,  does  not  have  a 
Pohsh  majority.  But  these  statistics  of  the  old  Russian  Govern- 
ment, like  those  of  the  Turks,  were  in  large  part  simply  fabricated 
for  political  reasons.  Take,  for  example,  the  case  of  the  district  of 
Vilna,  which  is  so  much  in  dispute  to-day.  The  Russian  census  of 
1897  affirms  that  the  Poles  made  up  only  20  per  cent  of  the  popula- 
tion there.  In  1909  the  Russian  estimates  admitted  that  the  Poles 
were  43  per  cent  of  the  population.  In  19 16  the  Germans,  who  were 
then  occupying  this  region,  took  a  census  and  found  that  80  per 
cent  of  the  population  were  Polish.  Last  winter  the  Poles  themselves 
took  a  census  which  agrees  pretty  well  with  the  German  one.  This 
case  may  illustrate  how  unrehable  the  Russian  figures  often  are.  Un- 
fortunately the  Russian  statistics,  particularly  those  of  1897,  are  al- 
most the  only  data  with  which  the  rest  of  the  world  has  hitherto 
been  familiar;  almost  all  the  current  ethnographic  maps  of  eastern 
Europe  are  based  solely  upon  them,  and  therefore  the  rest  of  the 
world  gets  a  very  false  idea  of  the  ethnographic  character  of  much 
of  the  territory  which  the  Poles  are  laying  claim  to. 


V 

THE  END  OF  AN  EMPIRE  :  REMNANTS  OF 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

January  14,  1921 

QUESTIONS    ANSWERED     BY     CHARLES    SEYMOUR,    CHIEF    OF    AUSTRO- 
HUNGARIAN   DIVISION   OF   THE   AMERICAN    PEACE   COMMISSION 

Question:  Do  you  think  that  President  Wilson  promised  Premier 
Bratiano  oJ  Rumania  to  send  United  States  troops  to  protect  the  new 
frontiers? 

Answer:  The  evidence  against  it  is  overwhelming.  The  steno- 
graphic notes  taken  during  the  session  indicate  that  nothing  said 
by  President  Wilson  could  be  construed  into  a  promise  to  send  United 


APPENDIX  453 

States  troops  abroad  to  protect  frontiers.  The  allegation  is  based 
upon  the  report  of  the  interpreter  Mantoux  and  a  book  by  a  journal- 
ist, Doctor  E.  W.  Dillon,  called  "The  Inside  Story  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference." M.  Mantoux,  though  a  brilliant  and  cultivated  interpreter 
whose  work  enormously  facilitated  the  progress  of  the  Conference, 
did  not  take  stenographic  notes  and  his  interpretations  sometimes 
failed  to  give  the  exact  meaning  of  the  original.  Doctor  Dillon's  evi- 
dence is  subject  to  suspicion,  since  his  book  is  based  upon  gossip 
and  replete  with  errors  of  fact.  The  stenographic  report,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  worthy  of  trust.  I  have  heard  the  President  on  more 
than  one  occasion  explain  to  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George  that  if 
troops  were  necessary  to  protect  any  troubled  area,  they  must  not 
look  to  the  United  States  for  assistance,  for  pubhc  opinion  in  this 
country  would  not  permit  the  use  of  American  forces. 

Question:  What  is  the  history  of  the  clause  forbidding  the  union 
of  Germany  and  Austria?     Who  opposed  this  union  and  why? 

Answer:  From  the  beginning  of  the  Peace  Conference  the  French 
were  inalterably  opposed  to  the  granting  of  any  new  territory  to 
Germany.  They  refused  to  consider  the  possibility  of  joining  the 
German  portions  of  Bohemia  to  Germany,  and  were  emphatic  in 
their  denunciation  of  the  plan  to  join  Austria  (that  is,  German  Aus- 
tria) to  Germany.  They  made  their  feeling  so  plain  that  there  was 
not,  I  believe,  any  serious  discussion  of  yielding  to  the  demand  of 
the  Austrians  for  annexation,  although  many  if  not  all  of  the  Amer- 
ican Delegation  approved  such  annexation.  The  prohibition  was  in- 
direct and  secured  by  the  insertion  of  a  clause  in  the  German  Treaty 
to  the  effect  that  Germany  recognized  the  absolute  independence 
of  Austria.  It  is  not  difficult  to  understand  the  French  point  of  view 
which  was  based  on  the  belief  that  Germany,  weakened  by  the  loss 
of  Alsace  and  Pohsh  territory  might  become  dangerous  if  compen- 
sated by  the  annexation  of  German  Austria. 

Question:  Do  the  Austrians  want  to  be  united  with  Germany?  Do 
you  think  it  will  be  a  good  thing  to  have  the  union? 

Answer:  At  the  close  of  the  war  probably  the  majority  of  the 
German  Austrians  would  have  preferred  independence.  This  was 
particularly  true  of  the  moneyed  classes,  who  feared  lest  they  should 
be  caught  in  the  financial  burdens  that  reparations  would  impose 
upon  Germany,  The  Socialists,  on  the  other  hand,  advocated  union, 
beheving  that  Sociahsm  would  triumph  in  Germany  and  they  wished 
to  share  that  triumph.    As  the  months  passed,  and  the  German  Aus- 


454  APPENDIX 

trians  realized  how  narrow  would  be  their  boundaries,  and  that  there 
was  no  chance  of  a  Danubian  Federation,  the  movement  for  annexa- 
tion gathered  strength.  At  the  present  moment,  doubtless  the  vast 
majority  favor  union,  believing  that  in  it  lies  Austria's  sole  chance 
of  escape  from  economic  disaster.  Personally  I  have  always  ad- 
vocated union  if  a  Danubian  Confederation  did  not  enter  the  circle 
of  practical  possibilities.  It  would  assist  the  economic  renaissance 
of  German  Austria  and  thus  favor  the  chance  of  pohtical  tranquillity. 
I  do  not  believe  that  the  addition  of  six  and  a  half  million  German 
Austrians  would  render  Germany  redoubtable.  On  the  contrary, 
I  believe  that  they  would  tend  to  counterbalance  the  Prussian  in- 
fluence in  the  German  state.  Personally  they  are  the  most  attrac- 
tive of  Teutons,  and  hold  an  enviable  record  in  the  history  of  civiliza- 
tion. With  the  exception  of  certain  aristocratic  types  they  represent 
liberal  ideas  and  peaceful  industry. 

Question:  How  do  you  reconcile  the  landlocking  of  Austria  and 
Hungary  with  President  Wilson's  pronouncement  that  small  nations 
should  have  free  access  to  the  sea? 

Answer:  My  impression  is  that  the  President  merely  stated  that 
each  nation  should  be  guaranteed  conditions  insuring  the  possibility 
of  economic  existence.  On  the  other  hand,  he  also  stipulated  in  the 
Fourteen  Points  that  there  should  be  a  readjustment  of  Italian  fron- 
tiers on  the  lines  of  nationality,  and  he  also  constantly  emphasized  the 
principle  of  self-determination.  In  the  case  of  Austro-Hungarian 
boundaries  as  elsewhere  a  conflict  of  principles  was  inevitable.  Aus- 
tria could  not  touch  the  sea  without  encroaching  on  Italian  and  Jugo- 
slav territory;  Hungary  is  shut  off"  from  the  sea  by  a  broad  band 
of  Jugo-SIav  territory.  It  would  have  been  intolerable  that  Austria 
and  Hungary,  in  order  to  touch  the  sea,  should  retain  sovereignty 
over  many  thousand  Italians  and  Jugo-SIavs.  But  the  isolation  of 
Austria  and  Hungary  from  the  sea,  although  unfortunate,  can  be 
remedied  by  stipulations  permitting  them  freedom  of  transit. 

Question:  Did  not  strategy  and  economic  considerations  have  more 
weight  in  decisions  than  religion,  nationality,  and  selj-determination? 

Answer:  It  is  difficult  to  strike  a  balance,  but  I  should  say  that 
the  answer  is  in  the  negative.  Except  in  the  case  of  the  Italian  fron- 
tier strategy  did  not  count  very  seriously.  There  it  is  true  many 
German  Austrians  and  Jugo-SIavs  were  granted  to  Italy,  in  order 
to  off^er  to  Italy  an  easily  defensible  frontier.  Economic  considera- 
tions, of  course,  played  a  role  of  enormous  importance.    No  frontier 


APPENDIX  455 

which  produced  or  perpetuated  intolerable  economic  conditions 
could  be  regarded  as  permanent.  The  economic  welfare  of  the  in- 
habitants must  always  be  taken  into  account.  For  this  reason,  as 
I  have  tried  to  show,  Czechoslovakia  and  Rumania  include  a  large 
alien  population.  But  after  all  the  basis  of  the  frontiers  was  always 
nationahty  and  the  free  desires  of  the  populations  concerned.  It 
was  from  the  principle  of  self-determination  that  the  territorial  com- 
missions started  to  study  frontier  problems,  and  the  burden  of  proof 
was  always  on  the  delegate  who  wished  to  depart  from  national  lines. 
Rehgion,  of  course,  did  not  count  except  as  it  forms  an  element  in 
nationality. 

Question  :  What  justification  did  President  Wilson  have  for  expect- 
ing the  Allies  to  abrogate  the  secret  treaties  for  the  sole  reason  that  they 
had  been  made  previous  to  our  entering  the  war? 

Answer:  He  may  not  have  been  justified  in  expecting  complete 
abrogation,  if  he  did  expect  it,  but  he  was  surely  justified  in  expect- 
ing that  they  would  abrogate  those  portions  of  such  treaties  which 
conflicted  with  the  Fourteen  Points  and  Wilson's  later  speeches. 
For  the  Allies  had  agreed  in  the  autumn  of  191 8  to  accept  the  Four- 
teen Points  as  the  basis  of  the  peace,  and  it  was  fair  to  assume  that 
such  public  acceptance  implied  an  abrogation  of  any  previous  con- 
flicting agreements.  It  might  have  been  wiser  to  demand  the  abro- 
gation of  the  secret  treaties  at  the  time  we  entered  the  war,  but  such 
a  demand  would  have  been  ungenerous  and  probably  mistaken  states- 
manship; we  had  not  yet  begun  to  fight,  and  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  formulate  at  that  time  our  terms  of  peace.  The  question 
of  the  abrogation  of  the  secret  treaties  was  confused  by  reason  of 
the  fact  that  the  armistice  with  Austria  was  concluded  without  the 
clear  understanding  on  all  sides  that  the  peace  with  Austria  should 
be  based  upon  the  Fourteen  Points.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  two 
secret  treaties  that  concerned  the  Hapsburg  territories  were  vir- 
tually abrogated,  for  neither  Rumania  nor  Italy  received  the  boun- 
daries they  had  been  promised,  although  the  latter  Power  did  not 
come  off  badly. 

Question:  How  did  the  Council  oj  Ten  become  the  Council  of  Four? 

Answer:  There  has  been  much  gossip  and  many  myths  with  re- 
gard to  this  interesting  development.  It  has  been  alleged  that  it 
was  the  work  of  reactionary  interests  at  Paris  desiring  to  isolate 
President  Wilson  and  weaken  his  resolution.  A  study  of  the  facts 
shows  that  it  was  a  perfectly  natural  development.     President  Wil- 


456  APPENDIX 

son  left  Paris  in  February,  sailing  for  the  United  States  with  the 
draft  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  intrusting  practical 
control  of  negotiations  from  the  American  point  of  view  to  Colonel 
House.  The  latter  did  not  hke  the  organization  of  the  Council  of 
Ten.  He  felt  that  it  was  too  large  to  accomplish  work  effectively 
and  that  too  many  onlookers  and  assistants  attended  its  sessions. 
In  the  autumn  of  191 8,  when  he  represented  the  United  States  on 
the  Armistice  Commission,  he  had  found  it  possible  to  accomphsh 
a  tremendous  amount  of  work  by  meeting  informally  with  Clemen- 
ceau  and  Lloyd  George,  for  in  such  small  meetings  there  were  no 
speeches  and  work  could  proceed  rapidly.  At  Paris  during  the  early 
weeks  of  the  conference,  matters  lagged.  With  Colonel  House  dis- 
hking  the  methods  of  the  Council  of  Ten,  Lloyd  George  was  unwill- 
ing to  go  in  to  the  meetings.  Clemenceau  was  confined  to  his  house 
by  the  wound  inflicted  by  a  would-be  assassin.  It  resulted  natu- 
rally that  the  informal  conferences  of  the  three  should  be  revived. 
Decisions  began  to  be  arrived  at  quickly.  When  President  Wilson 
returned  to  Paris  in  March,  he  realized  that  the  small  informal  com- 
mittee could  work  more  effectively  than  the  larger  council,  and  he 
followed  Colonel  House's  example.  Orlando,  as  representative  of 
Italy,  was  naturally  invited  to  meet  with  the  other  three,  and  thus 
the  Council  of  Four  was  formed.  I  do  not  think  that  the  halo  of 
secrecy  which  surrounded  the  work  of  the  Four  was  necessary  or 
that  Colonel  House  approved  of  it.  It  might  have  been  possible  to 
secure  the  benefits  of  the  small  committee,  and  at  the  same  time 
give  greater  publicity  to  the  matters  under  discussion  and  the  de- 
cisions reached. 

Question:  Can  you  suggest  any  more  effective  way  in  which  Presi- 
dent Wilson  might  have  gathered  expert  information  on  boundaries  and 
ethnology? 

Answer:  I  think  that  the  principles  of  the  system  which  he  used 
were  sound:  he  had  organized  a  staff  of  men  each  one  of  whom  was 
responsible  for  information  on  a  particular  area  or  topic.  Colonel 
House  had  seen  to  it  that  these  men  began  their  investigations  in 
time,  that  is  in  19 17.  Of  course,  I  am  hardly  fitted  to  pass  on  the 
quahfications  of  the  experts  chosen.  A  great  deal  of  material  was 
gathered,  and  on  the  whole  was  so  organized  that  the  questions  of 
the  President  could  be  answered  quickly  and  comprehensively.  He 
asked  a  great  many  questions  and  onmost  points  at  issue  was  sur- 
prisingly well  informed.  I  doubt  if  he  would  have  gained  by  troub- 
ling himself  with  more  detailed  knowledge  than  he  possessed.     In 


APPENDIX  457 

contradistinction  to  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau  the  President 
made  constant  use  of  his  experts,  and  with  few  exceptions  his  de- 
cisions were  based  on  the  facts  they  furnished. 

Question:  Do  you  believe  that  Austria  should  be  ruled  by  the  Allied 
Reparation  Commission,  as  suggested? 

Answer:  As  I  have  said,  I  believe  complete  union  with  Germany 
to  be  the  best  solution  to  the  problem.  If  that  is  not  permitted, 
and  it  seems  unhkely,  it  is  possible  that  some  form  of  economic  union 
with  Germany  might  help  to  meet  the  crisis.  If  that  is  forbidden  it 
seems  clear  that  the  Alhes  must  take  some  steps  toward  aiding  Aus- 
tria if  they  do  not  wish  to  see  the  reign  of  anarchy  along  the  Danube. 
I  think  that  the  responsibility  of  government  should  always  rest 
upon  the  Austrians  themselves.  I  do  not  think  that  political  con- 
trol should  be  assumed  by  any  Allied  Commission.  The  Austrians 
must  be  made  to  feel  that  the  problem  is  their  problem,  and  that 
they  must  work  in  order  to  meet  it.  But  it  is  necessary  that  the 
prospect  of  a  hvelihood  should  be  offered  them,  and  such  a  prospect 
can  come  only  through  union  with  Germany,  through  a  Danubian 
Federation,  or  through  assistance  from  the  Allies.  It  may  well  be 
that  the  Reparation  Commission  is  the  proper  body  to  take  control 
of  such  assistance,  possibly  even  administering  the  finances  of  the 
Austrian  state. 

VI 
FIUME   AND   THE   ADRIATIC   PROBLEM 

January  7,  192 1 

QUESTIONS  ANSWERED  BY  DOUGLAS  WILSON  JOHNSON,  CHIEF  OF  THE 
DIVISION  OF  BOUNDARY  GEOGRAPHY,  AMERICAN  PEACE  COM- 
MISSION 

Question:  In  describing  the  Italian  boundary  did  I  understand 
you  to  say  that  the  line  finally  marked  out  left  Italy  a  very  good  boundary 
as  it  ran  up  beyond  Trieste? 

Answer:  The  hne  recommended  by  the  American  experts  and 
offered  to  Italy,  the  so-called  "American  hne,"  was,  in  the  critical 
region  of  the  Pear  Tree  Pass,  carefully  drawn  in  such  manner  as  to 
place  under  Italian  control  the  whole  of  the  Birnbaum  Plateau  com- 
manding the  pass  from  the  north,  and  other  important  highlands 
commanding  the  pass  from  the  south.  This  assured  to  Italy  such 
effective  control  of  the  approaches  to  the  pass  that  any  invasion  of 
Italy  through  this  historic  gateway  was  rendered  practically  impos- 


458  APPENDIX 

sible.  So  far  as  an  invasion  from  the  Flume  region  is  concerned,  the 
frontier,  by  following  the  high  mountain  backbone  of  the  Istrian 
Peninsula,  dominated  the  Fiume  basin,  and  offered  Italy  ample  pro- 
tection against  any  possible  enemy  efforts  to  enter  Italy  in  that  region. 
Thus  points  of  peculiar  tactical  strength  were  assured  to  Italy  in 
order  that  she  might  feel  safe  from  any  threat  from  the  east.  Taking 
into  account  the  remarkably  strong  frontier  granted  to  Italy  on  the 
north,  one  can  justly  say  that  the  whole  frontier  offered  to  Italy 
was  strategically  and  tactically  exceedingly  strong.     (Applause.) 

Question:  Why  was  the  American  view  about  Fiume  so  rigid  when 
it  seemed  more  generous  about  Shantung  or  the  Germans  of  Bohemia? 

Answer:  I  am  not  sure  that  I  should  agree  with  the  assumption 
that  the  American  view  regarding  Fiume  was  more  rigid  than  re- 
garding the  other  cases  mentioned.  There  was  a  fundamental  differ- 
ence between  the  Fiume  problem  and  the  Shantung  problem,  or  the 
problem  of  the  Germans  of  Bohemia.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  Shantung  agreement  was  based  on  a  Japanese  promise  to  evacuate 
Shantung  after  receiving  certain  economic  privileges  similar  to  those 
which  other  nations  had  enjoyed  in  China.  The  Italians  made  no 
such  offer  respecting  Fiume.  At  no  time  was  there  any  suggestion 
that  if  this  territory  were  given  to  the  Italians  by  the  treaty,  they 
would  later  turn  it  over  to  Jugo-SIavia.  On  the  contrary,  the  ar- 
rangements suggested  looked  definitely  toward  the  future  annexa- 
tion of  additional  areas  to  Italy.  As  for  the  Germans  of  Bohemia, 
the  Conference  decided  to  adhere  to  the  historic  frontier,  although 
the  experts  had  recommended  the  elimination  from  Czechoslovakia 
of  certain  German  areas,  and  the  inclusion  of  others  which  belonged 
within  the  natural  limits  of  the  new  Czechoslovak  state.  Bohemia 
constitutes  one  of  the  most  striking  geographical  units  in  all  Eu- 
rope, the  geographical  frontier  following  in  general  the  crest  of  moun- 
tain ranges  surrounding  the  central  basin.  Unfortunately,  the  Ger- 
mans extend  in  large  numbers  across  the  mountain  crest  and  down 
the  inner  slopes  of  the  barrier  to  the  margin  of  the  central  plain.  The 
economic  and  other  relations  of  the  Germans  within  the  basin  are 
largely  bound  up  with  the  Czechoslovaks  in  the  basin.  I  can  see 
no  resemblance  between  the  grounds  upon  which  the  Bohemian  case 
was  decided  and  the  arguments  advanced  by  Italy  in  support  of 
her  claim  to  a  frontier  which  was  geographically,  economically,  and 
historically  unsound. 

Question:  Is  it  true  that  the  Italians  aimed  to  make  an  Italian  lake 
oj  the  Adriatic? 


APPENDIX  459 

Answer:  That  question  asks  me  to  assign  motives;  and  this  I 
must  decline  to  do.  It  was  not  our  province  to  inquire  into  motives, 
but  to  study  the  problem  on  its  merits  just  as  it  came  to  us.  I  can 
say,  however,  that  the  inevitable  effect  of  assigning  to  Italy  the  ter- 
ritories on  the  eastern  Adriatic  coast  claimed  by  her,  whatever  the 
intention  or  aim,  would  have  been  to  turn  the  Adriatic  into  an  Ital- 
ian lake. 

Question:  What  was  the  extent  of  the  President's  personal  knowl- 
edge of  the  Adriatic  problem? 

Answer:  In  answer  to  that  question  I  will  say  that  the  President 
kept  in  constant  touch  with  the  experts  on  the  Adriatic  problern, 
not  only  through  the  memoranda  furnished  by  the  experts  but  in 
other  ways.  I  can  assure  you  that  there  was  sent  to  him  a  volumi- 
nous quantity  of  material,  and  I  want  to  say  that  when  we  had  per- 
sonal discussions  with  him  upon  the  question  it  immediately  be- 
came apparent  that  he  had  studied  these  memoranda  most  carefully. 
It  is  only  fair  to  say  that  of  the  details  and  intricacies  of  this  most 
difficult  problem  the  President  possessed  a  most  astonishing  com- 
mand. (Applause.)  I  have  shown  you  something  of  the  ramifica- 
tions of  this  problem.  They  were  endless  and  exceedingly  comph- 
cated.  In  order  to  make  it  easier  for  the  President  to  grasp  them, 
I  set  up  in  his  study  relief  models  of  the  eastern  Adriatic  coast,  models 
made  on  a  large  scale  which  showed  in  proper  position  and  propor- 
tion every  river,  mountain,  valley,  town,  and  railroad.  Thus  the 
President  had  the  actual  form  of  the  region  before  him  in  miniature. 
On  the  models  were  marked  off  the  strategic,  ethnological,  and  other 
frontiers,  and  the  President  used  these  models  in  conferences  with 
his  experts  and  with  the  representatives  of  other  governments. 
Whenever  we,  in  our  capacity  as  specialists,  thought  we  had  found 
something  that  the  President  ought  to  know  about,  and  believed 
we  could  not  get  it  across  effectively  in  any  other  manner,  we  could 
ask  for  a  personal  conference  with  him.  He  was,  of  course,  a  very 
busy  man,  because,  unlike  the  experts  who  usually  had  only  one 
problem  to  consider,  he  had  to  do  not  only  with  all  the  territorial 
problems,  but  in  addition  with  all  the  problems  bearing  on  the  League 
of  Nations,  the  economic  problems,  and  many  other  aspects  of  the 
peace.  Despite  this  fact  I  wish  to  state  that  while  I  repeatedly  asked 
for  personal  conferences  with  the  President  on  this  and  certain  other 
problems,  he  never  failed  to  respond  immediately  with  an  appoint- 
ment. He  had  a  private  wire,  and  on  occasion  he  would  call  us  at 
the  Crillon  to  make  appointments  on  his  own  initiative,  or  to  secure 
papers,  maps,  or  other  documents  that  he  needed  in  his  studies.    I 


46o  APPENDIX 

will  not  forget  that  in  one  instance  he  called  me  on  the  telephone 
late  at  night  in  my  bedroom,  asking  for  some  papers  which  I  had 
promised  to  supply  him,  and  which  had  not  reached  him  with  suf- 
ficient promptness.  You  can  judge  from  this  that  he  kept  closely 
in  touch  with  the  problems  he  was  called  upon  to  consider. 

Question:  Will  the  principle  of  self-determination,  in  your  judg- 
ment, make  for  peace  in  this  region  any  more  than  it  would  in  Poland? 

Answer:  I  am  not  an  expert  on  the  Polish  question,  so  that  I 
would  not  like  to  pass  on  that  comparison.  Briefly  considering  the 
question  in  relation  to  the  Adriatic  problem,  I  do  not  think  that  the 
determination  of  the  frontier  line  on  the  basis  of  self-determination 
alone  would  make  for  peace.  I  am  of  the  opinion,  and  I  think  that 
was  the  opinion  of  all  the  American  delegation,  that  it  was  wise  to 
violate  the  principle  of  self-determination  and  the  principle  of  na- 
tionality in  estabhshing  Italy's  boundary-lines,  in  order  to  get  good 
geographic  and  good  economic  frontiers,  and  frontiers  showing 
reasonable  consideration  for  Italy's  strategic  security.  To  have 
given  her  a  frontier  along  the  base  of  the  mountains,  along  the  racial 
Hne,  would  have  been  to  breed  trouble,  and  to  create  economic  dif- 
ficulties which  would  not  have  proved  favorable  to  the  maintenance 
of  peace.  I  think  that  a  frontier  on  the  natural  geographic  and  eco- 
nomic divide  would  have  much  more  of  a  peace-preserving  char- 
acter than  would  one  following  the  racial  boundary. 

Question:  What  impression  did  Orlando  and  the  Italian  delegation 
make  upon  you? 

Answer  :  I  must  say  that  they  made  a  most  delightful  impression. 
Both  Orlando  and  Sonnino  impressed  me  as  very  delightful  men  to 
meet  and  with  whom  to  discuss  questions.  In  the  discussions  they 
were  always  most  amicable.  There  were  problems  that  were  acute, 
and  which  touched  deeply  upon  Italian  sensibihties;  yet  in  talking 
with  Orlando  I  had  at  all  times  a  great  appreciation  of  his  genial, 
kindly,  and  sympathetic  manner.  Of  course,  at  the  same  time,  he 
maintained  a  very  rigid  and  unbending  attitude,  as  regarded  the 
demands  of  his  government.  If  you  ask  my  impression  as  to  his 
wisdom  as  a  statesman,  I  will  have  to  say  that  I  believe  it  would 
have  been  possible  for  him,  with  a  broader  view  of  the  destiny  of 
Italy,  to  take  a  great  moral  leadership  in  Mediterranean  aflFairs,  to 
make  friends,  economically  and  in  every  other  way,  with  the  Jugo- 
slavs. The  occasion  offered  an  opportunity  for  a  fine,  strong  states- 
manship which,  it  seems  to  me,  was  an  opportunity  that  was  lost. 
Sonnino  speaks  excellent  English;    he  is  perfectly  charming,  and  I 


APPENDIX  461 

never  saw  him  in  any  discussion  with  the  other  members  of  the  Su- 
preme Council,  or  with  the  President,  but  that  I  felt  sorry,  when 
he  got  the  worst  of  an  argument,  because  he  took  it  so  genially.  I 
felt  that  he  ought  to  have  had  the  best  of  it,  just  because  of  the  way 
he  went  at  it. 

Question:  Is  Fiume  a  necessary  economic  outlet  for  Hungary  and 
Jugo-Slavia  and  if  so,  could  not  Italy  be  relied  upon  to  deal  J  airly  with 
these  natio7is? 

Answer:  In  answer  to  the  first  question,  "Is  Fiume  economically 
necessary?"  I  say,  yes.  I  think  that  geographic  and  physical  con- 
ditions make  it  absolutely  essential  for  the  economic  development 
of  the  Jugo-SIav  people.  I  have  tried  to  point  out  the  pecuhar  phys- 
ical condition  which  makes  it  so.  I  do  not  beheve  that  there  is  any 
place  on  the  whole  Mediterranean  coast  where  one  little  location  is 
as  important  as  this.  If  I  had  the  same  condition,  in  a  region  ad- 
jacent to  the  United  States,  I  should  regret  to  see  the  United  States 
have  control  of  its  only  practicable  outlet,  no  matter  how  good  the 
American  people  are;  and  I  have  a  very  high  opinion  of  the  idealism 
of  the  American  people.  Looking  at  this  problem  from  the  economic 
view-point:  if  I  come  to  you  and  ask  you  to  put  some  millions  of 
dollars  into  the  development  of  Fiume,  and  you,  as  Jugo-SIavs,  are 
the  people  primarily  interested,  you  will  say  to  me:  "Why,  yes,  I 
think  it  is  necessary  for  our  people  and  our  country,  and  we  would 
like  to  invest  our  money  and  support  it.  But  what  can  we  do,  if 
there  is  any  possibihty  of  Fiume's  some  day  being  put  under  another 
sovereignty?"  You  cannot  expect  one  people  to  tax  themselves  and 
put  their  money  into  the  development  of  a  port,  if  that  port  is  going 
to  be  under  the  control  of  a  foreign  nation,  however  high-minded 
and  good  that  foreign  nation  may  be.    It  is  not  good  business  policy. 

VII 
CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE   BALKANS 

December  23,  1920 

QUESTIONS    ANSWERED    BY    ISAIAH    BOWMAN,    CHIEF  TERRITORIAL    AD- 
VISER  OF  THE   AMERICAN    PEACE   COMMISSION 

Question:  What  was  really  the  atmosphere  surrounding  the  rela- 
tions oj  the  Big  Three  and  also  their  relations  to  General  Foch? 

Answer:  As  far  as  the  relations  of  the  Big  Three  are  concerned — • 
at  least  in  the  meetings  with  which  I  had  to  do — they  were  extremely 
cordial.     Between  Americans  and  the  French  and  between  British 


462  APPENDIX 

and  Americans  there  was  displayed  only  the  very  finest  spirit  in  all 
the  commission  meetings.  Perhaps  I  may  answer  the  question  best 
by  relating  several  circumstances  of  a  somewhat  more  concrete  na- 
ture. Any  one  arriving  at  the  Peace  Conference  unaware  of  the  past 
history  of  the  leaders  could  not  have  been  in  the  atmosphere  of  the 
place  very  long  before  finding  out  that  there  were  some  interesting 
undercurrents  at  work.  One  of  these  undercurrents  that  perhaps 
I  may  speak  of  frankly  is  that  some  of  the  AIHed  leaders  had  as  much 
to  say  of  other  Allied  leaders  as  they  had  of  quite  ordinary  people. 
I  might  refer  to  one  incident  which  got  on  the  record  but  it  got  on 
the  record  in  a  very  interesting  way,  and  it  did  not  happen  in  the 
way  in  which  it  is  recorded.  There  was  before  the  Conference  the 
question  of  getting  Haller's  army  to  Poland.  A  British  representa- 
tive asked  me  if  I  would  put  the  question  of  transport  to  General 
Weygand,  the  French  Chief-of-Staff,  who,  when  I  saw  him,  assured 
me  that  by  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  Supreme  War 
Council  met,  he  would  have  his  answer  ready.  General  Foch,  usually 
a  man  of  few  words,  yet  who  could  become  very  loquacious  when 
he  wanted  to  tire  out  the  opposition,  spoke  at  such  length  and  with 
such  obvious  circumlocution  that  Lloyd  George  quite  lost  patience. 
You  must  remember  that  Foch  is  said  not  to  understand  a  word  of 
English,  but  perhaps  he  found  this  rather  a  convenience  than  a  hand- 
icap. I  suppose  that  he  does  know  a  few  words  like  "damn,"  for 
instance,  but  he  does  not  know  many;  he  is  said  not  to  understand 
a  whole  sentence.  Finally  Lloyd  George,  impatient  over  the  delay, 
said:  "If  Foch  means  this,  I  understand  him;  if  Foch  means  that, 
I  understand  him,  but  if  he  means  neither,  then  upon  my  honor  / 
don't  know  what  be  means!"  It  would  have  been  natural  for  the 
Marshal  to  leave  the  room  and  resign  as  Generalissimo  of  the  Allied 
armies.  On  the  contrary  he  did  not  leave  the  room;  he  didn't  know 
what  the  fuss  was  all  about.  Lloyd  George  was  not  taken  to  task. 
Then  the  official  interpreter,  M.  Mantoux,  an  unclassified  but  real 
diplomat  of  sorts,  translated  as  follows:  "The  British  Premier  begs 
to  observe  that  if  the  Marshal  means  this  he  can  understand  him; 
if  he  means  that  he  can  understand  him;  if  he  means  neither  the 
Premier  is  at  a  loss  to  know  just  what  the  Marshal  means." 

Perhaps  you  will  permit  me  to  mention  one  other  occasion. 

It  was  the  practice  of  the  Peace  Conference  to  have  the  leading 
generals  and  admirals  and  some  of  their  staffs  meet  with  the  Supreme 
War  Council,  when  they  had  to  do  with  matters  in  the  Peace  Treaty 
bearing  on  military  and  naval  matters.  After  that  portion  of  the 
business  was  transacted  the  President  of  the  Councilj  M.  Cleraenceau, 


APPENDIX  463 

would  say:  "Now  that  the  business  of  the  Supreme  War  Council 
has  ended,  the  military  men  and  naval  experts  will  please  retire." 
When  they  had  retired  only  a  civil  organization  was  left,  the  one 
dealing  with  the  Peace  Treaty.  On  this  particular  occasion  there 
was  discussed  the  western  boundary  of  Poland.  Foch  refused  to 
leave  the  room.  Presently  Clemenceau  repeated  the  suggestion, 
there  being  no  other  mihtary  man  or  naval  man  in  the  room  but 
Foch.  Again  Foch  refused  to  leave — he  simply  disregarded  the  sug- 
gestion, as  if  not  hearing  it.  Finally  Clemenceau,  having  in  mind 
that  Foch  did  not  understand  Enghsh,  rose  from  his  chair,  went  over 
to  President  Wilson,  and  said,  "I  don't  know  what  to  do;  he  won't 
leave,"  and  then,  perplexed,  sat  down.  Presently  he  again  rose  and 
went  over  to  President  Wilson  and  Premier  Lloyd  George,  saying 
that  as  an  agreement  had  been  made  that  the  generals  were  to  be 
there  only  if  there  was  something  in  dispute  which  required  their 
presence,  and  as  Foch  did  not  appear  to  pay  any  attention  he  was 
at  a  loss  to  know  what  next  to  do  without  offending  him.  Finally 
Balfour,  who  always  could  be  depended  upon  in  such  emergencies, 
remarked:  "I  suggest  we  have  tea."  Tea  was  served  but  still  Foch 
stayed  on.  At  last  Clemenceau  spoke  to  Foch.  I  don't  know  what 
it  was  but  it  was  effective  and  Marshal  Foch  got  up,  abruptly,  and 
left  the  room. 

Question  :  Can  you  express  an  opinion  of  the  future  in  store  Jor  the 
Greeks  in  recalling  King  Constantine? 

Answer:  I  have  just  heard  an  opinion  that  is  rather  illuminating. 
It  came  from  a  man  of  great  intelligence,  accustomed  to  observing 
events  in  foreign  countries.  He  told  me  that  the  only  reason  why 
Venizelos  was  cast  out  and  Constantine  recalled  was  because  he 
thought  the  Greek  people  were  in  about  the  same  state  of  mind  as 
the  American  people  at  the  recent  election  in  this  country.  Venizelos 
had  gone  ahead  and  done  a  lot  of  things  which  redounded  to  the 
credit  of  Greece,  but  the  people  were  tired  of  fighting.  There  is  a 
peasant  class  which  has  been  used  to  the  idea  of  a  king  and  a  court, 
and  of  having  the  country  run  in  the  old  manner.  And,  of  course, 
you  know  that  during  the  war  Venizelos  created  a  host  of  enemies 
by  the  efficient  way  in  which  he  ran  the  country  I  What  Constantine 
will  do  or  how  he  will  be  treated  by  the  Allies  is  a  matter  not  of  record 
but  of  prophecy. 

Question:  You  say  that  the  American  standpoint  on  Bulgarian 
territory  was  unsuccessful  and  that  our  recommendation  to  give  Danzig 


464  APPENDIX 

to  the  Poles  was  also  lost.     Why  did  the  Americans  have  to  make  those 
concessions  if  they  were  i7i  the  right? 

Answer:  The  Americans  did  not  make  any  concessions.  They 
entered  upon  the  records  not  only  protests  but  also  the  specific  state- 
ment that  the  Bulgarian  settlement  invites  war.  I  ask  you  to  con- 
sider the  helplessness  of  the  American  delegation  at  that  time  in 
holding  out  against  the  AHied  solution  of  the  Bulgarian  question. 
We  had  not  ratified  the  German  Treaty,  yet  there  we  were  at  Paris 
telling  the  other  Allies  how  to  make  peace  with  Bulgaria.  The  Amer- 
icans were  discredited  by  the  Senate  delay.  I  think  that  the  answer 
that  Clemenceau  made  on  one  occasion  will  illuminate  that  ques- 
tion. Mr.  Polk  commissioned  me  to  secure  the  opinion  of  Premier 
Clemenceau  on  the  Fiume  question  which  was  then  leading  up  to 
one  of  its  most  critical  phases.  It  was  late  in  1919.  We  had  not 
ratified  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  the  Conference  was  nearing  its  end. 
The  apparently  vacillating  policy  of  our  colleagues,  toward  the 
Italians,  was  embarrassing.  We  wanted  to  find  out  where  they  stood 
on  the  matter  of  signing  the  memorandum  of  December  9.  I  ap- 
pealed to  Tardieu,  who  reported  his  chief's  answer  to  be:  "The  Amer- 
icans are  charming,  but  they  are  far  away.  When  they  have  gone 
the  Italians  remain  and  as  our  neighbors!" 

Question:  Was  there  not  a  time  when  it  looked  as  if  the  Peace  Con- 
ference might  break  up  because  oj  the  extreme  policy  oj  one  of  the  Allies? 

Answer:  Yes,  there  were  a  number  of  occasions  when  the  Peace 
Conference  might  have  broken  up.  Almost  anything  might  have 
happened  with  so  many  nations  represented,  so  many  personahties 
and  so  many  experts — perhaps  half  a  thousand  in  all !  Owing  to 
the  fact  that  President  Wilson  has  been  charged  on  the  one  hand 
with  outrageous  concessions  to  the  AUies  and  on  the  other  hand 
that  he  had  always  been  soft  with  the  Germans,  particularly  with 
Bulgaria,  let  us  see  just  how  soft  he  was !  On  a  certain  day  three 
of  us  were  asked  to  call  at  the  President's  house,  and  on  the  follow- 
ing morning  at  eleven  o'clock  we  arrived.  President  Wilson  wel- 
comed us  in  a  very  cordial  manner.  I  cannot  understand  how  people 
get  the  idea  that  he  is  cold.  He  does  not  make  a  fuss  over  you,  but 
when  you  leave  him  you  feel  that  you  have  met  a  very  courteous 
gentleman.  You  have  the  feeling  that  he  is  frank  and  altogether 
sincere.  He  remarked:  "Gentlemen,  I  am  in  trouble  and  I  have 
sent  for  you  to  help  me  out.  The  matter  is  this:  the  French  want 
the  whole  Left  Bank  of  the  Rhine.  I  told  M.  Clemenceau  that  I 
could  not  consent  to  such  a  solution  of  the  problem.     He  became 


APPENDIX  465 

very  much  excited  and  then  demanded  ownership  of  the  Saar  Basin. 
I  told  him  I  could  not  agree  to  that  either  because  it  would  mean 
giving  300,000  Germans  to  France."  Whereupon  President  Wilson 
further  said:  "I  do  not  know  whether  I  shall  see  M.  Clemenceau 
again.  I  do  not  know  whether  he  will  return  to  the  meeting  this 
afternoon.  In  fact,  I  do  not  know  whether  the  Peace  Conference 
will  continue.  M.  Clemenceau  called  me  a  pro-German  and  ab- 
ruptly left  the  room.  I  want  you  to  assist  me  in  working  out  a  solu- 
tion true  to  the  principles  we  are  standing  for  and  to  do  justice  to 
France,  and  I  can  only  hope  that  France  will  ultimately  accept  a 
reasonable  solution.  I  want  to  be  fair  to  M.  Clemenceau  and  to 
France,  but  I  cannot  consent  to  the  outright  transference  to  France 
of  300,000  Germans."  A  solution  was  finally  found — the  one  that 
stands  in  the  Treaty  to-day. 


VIII 

THE  ARMENIAN  PROBLEM  AND  THE  DISRUPTION 
OF  TURKEY 

January  28,  1921 

QUESTIONS  ANSWERED  BY  WILLIAM  LINN  WESTERMANN,  CHIEF 
OF  THE  NEAR-EASTERN  DIVISION  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PEACE 
COMMISSION 

Question:  Apparently  you  believe  that  the  United  States  should 
have  accepted  a  mandate  for  Armenia  and  sent  her  soldiers  there.  Yet, 
you  say  we  would  now  be  in  trouble  had  we  done  so.  Do  you  still  ad- 
vocate such  a  course? 

Answer:  It  is  impossible  now  for  the  United  States  to  do  for  Ar- 
menia what  it  could  have  done  at  the  time  of  the  Peace  Conference. 
Had  we  then  sent  10,000  or  20,000  troops  with  500  American  officers, 
and  we  could  have  gotten  them  in,  we  could  have  restored  the  Ar- 
menian refugees  and  maintained  order  in  Turkish  Armenia  without 
great  difficulty.  The  Near-East  Relief  was  at  that  time,  as  since, 
feeding  both  Turks  and  Armenians,  men,  women,  and  children,  and 
the  Turks  were  very  appreciative  of  that  fact.  We  had  a  moral  stand- 
ing in  the  Near  East  such  as  nobody  else  had,  which  would  have 
carried  us  far.  The  population  of  Turkish  Armenia,  Turk  and  Kurd, 
would  have  welcomed  us,  and  there  would  have  been  no  trouble  with 
Russia.  Now  the  time  is  past  for  a  successful  political  activity  on 
our  part. 


466  APPENDIX 

Question:  You  seem  to  support  the  Zionist  cause.  Is  not  Palestine 
Arab  in  population,  and  is  not  Palestinian  Zionism  contrary  to  the 
idea  oj  self-determination? 

Answer:  In  Palestine  there  are  six  Arabs  to  every  Jew,  and  the 
special  privilege  granted  to  the  Jews  there  is  contrary  to  the  policy 
of  self-determination.  The  justification  for  it  lies,  in  my  mind,  in 
the  fact  that  the  Jewish  problem  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  local  prob- 
lem. It  is  a  world  problem  and  the  problem  of  a  very  powerful  people 
— powerful  far  beyond  their  numbers.  It  must  be  treated  as  a  world 
problem.  It  offers  to  the  Jewish  people  an  opportunity  to  carry 
out  their  idealistic  aspirations,  necessary  for  the  Jews  of  the  world, 
and  bound  to  be  helpful,  rather  than  harmful,  in  the  tangled  situa- 
tion in  the  Near  East. 

Question:  What  do  you  think  will  be  the  outcome  of  the  proposed 
Near-East  conference  in  London  the  end  of  next  month,  and  in  what 
way  do  you  think  the  treaty  of  Sevres  will  be  revised? 

Answer:  The  French  papers  insist  that  it  will  not  be  "revised," 
but  that  it  will  be  "modified" — a  fine  diplomatic  distinction.  The 
French  would  give  anything  if  they  could  get  out  of  that  muddle 
which  they  got  into  by  putting  Smyrna  even  under  Greek  adminis- 
trative control  and  attempting,  in  the  Tripartite  Agreement,  to  en- 
force their  Sykes-Picot  claim  in  central  Anatolia.  No  real  solution 
of  this  entire  Near-East  problem  will  ever  be  found  until  all  the  ap- 
plications of  the  Secret  Treaties  are  thrown  out.  The  French  papers 
are  now  urging  that  the  French  drop  their  Cilician  adventure  and 
give  up  that  Anatolian  territory  which  they  got  out  of  the  Tripartite 
Agreement.  In  December  they  suffered  a  defeat  in  the  territory 
which  is  under  their  mandate.  In  order  to  make  peace  with  the  Turk- 
ish Nationalists  they  will  be  willing  to  modify  the  arrangement  by 
which  the  Greeks  control  the  Smyrna  district.  The  Greeks  will  ob- 
ject to  this;  but  they  ought  to  be  glad  if  they  should  lose  Smyrna. 
It  is  costing  the  Greeks  1,500,000  drachmas  a  day,  which  they  can 
ill  afford,  and  they  are  not  getting  anywhere  with  it. 

Question:  Can  you  tell  us  approximately  the  cost  to  France  of  its 
occupation?    Is  it  succeeding? 

Answer:  I  judge  that  means  the  occupation  of  Syria.  General 
Gouraud,  who  has  been  in  command  there,  made  a  statement,  in 
December  last,  before  the  combined  French  Senatorial  Committees 
on  Foreign  Affairs  and  Finance  in  answer  to  a  similar  question.  He 
said  that  it  had  cost  one  billion  francs  last  year.    I  doubt  that  the 


APPENDIX  467 

French  mandate  in  Syria  will  eventually  succeed.  The  difficulty 
is  that  they  can  only  send  in  French  Colonial  troops.  These  are 
Mohammedan;  and  that  is  dangerous,  and  they  know  it  is  danger- 
ous. Yet  the  Government  seems  utterly  incapable  of  the  thought 
of  giving  it  up.  I  am  very  much  afraid  of  the  outcome  of  the  Syrian 
mandate,  from  the  French  point  of  view. 

Question:  Why  do  you  make  the  distinction  between  Syria  and 
Palestine? 

Answer:  There  is  no  real  geographic  distinction  between  Syria 
and  Palestine,  and  the  imphed  criticism  is  a  correct  one.  Syria  in- 
cludes Palestine,  and  has  a  geographical  and  an  ethnological  unity. 
There  is  an  historical  distinction,  because  of  the  occupation  of  Pales- 
tine by  the  Jews  in  the  past  and  the  present  Zionist  movement. 
This  was  accentuated  at  the  Peace  Conference  because  of  the  British 
desire  to  have  a  buffer  state  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Suez  Canal. 
As  Syria  was  to  be  given  to  France,  historical  Jewish  Palestine  be- 
came the  natural  unit  for  this  political  purpose. 

Question:  In  your  opinion  is  the  Zionist  state  a  wise  policy  and 
saje  for  the  peace  oj  the  Near  East? 

Answer:  The  Balfour  declaration  speaks  only  of  a  Jewish  Home- 
land— not  of  a  Zionist  state.  The  Zionist  movement  and  the  inde- 
pendent state  of  Armenia  were  the  two  which  promised  the  greatest 
good  in  the  Near-Eastern  situation.  The  Zionists  have  made  great 
irrigation  plans  for  the  development  of  Palestine.  Their  influence 
and  example  will  be  of  advantage  to  all  the  Near  East. 

Question:  What  will  be  the  effect  of  Bolshevist  control  in  Russian 
Armenia?    Are  the  Armenians  Bolshevists? 

Answer:  No,  absolutely  not !  The  Armenian  people,  as  well  as 
the  Turkish  people,  though  they  differ  from  each  other,  have  nothing 
in  common  with  the  Russian  temperament,  and  especially  not  with 
the  Russian  Bolshevists.  The  Armenians  are  extremely  individual- 
istic, and  therefore  non-Bolshevist. 

Question:  Is  there  any  connection  between  the  return  of  King  Con- 
stantine  and  the  proposed  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Sevres  ?  How  do  you 
explain  that  Venizelos  was  summoned  to  Paris  to  discuss  the  Shres 
treaty? 

Answer  :  They  could  not  keep  Venizelos  away.  You  cannot  keep 
that  man  away,  where  Greek  interests  are  concerned. 

Yes,  there  is  a  connection  between  the  return  of  Constantine  and 


468  APPENDIX 

the  proposed  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Sevres.  Greek  political  leader- 
ship has  changed.  France  and  Great  Britain  can  now  say  that  they 
granted  Smyrna  to  Greece  because  of  their  confidence  in  Venizelos. 
They  will  probably  assert  that  what  they  granted  to  Venizelos  they 
are  not  bound  to  maintain  for  a  leader  whom  they  stigmatize  as  a 
pro-German  brother-in-law  of  the  ex-Kaiser. 

Question:  What  is  hack  oj  the  project  provided  for  in  the  Turkish 
treaty  for  a  possible  independent  state  of  Kurdistan,  which  appears  on 
your  map? 

Answer:  In  the  Turkish  treaty  there  is  a  territory  south  of 
Turkish  Armenia  still  included  in  Turkey,  which  is  set  off  as  the  dis- 
trict of  Kurdistan.  There  is  a  provision  in  the  treaty  that  after  a 
year,  if  the  Kurds  desire  to  form  an  independent  state  and  so  ex- 
press themselves,  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Al- 
lied Powers  will  consider  the  matter.  Undoubtedly  the  provision 
is  connected  with  the  British  defensive  pohcy  for  India.  The  mili- 
tary Hne  of  defense  runs  across  Persia  and  up  to  the  Armenian  moun- 
tains. An  independent  Kurdistan  would  give  them  a  much  better 
defensive  Hne  and  strengthen  the  British  control  over  Mesopotamia. 
I  judge  that  is  the  essential  reason. 

Question:  What  is  your  personal  opinion  oj  the  merits  of  Presi- 
dent Wilsons  recent  note,  referring  the  Armenian  problem  back  to  the 
League  oj  Nations  on  the  ground  that  it  has  become  part  and  parcel  oj 
the  Russian  problem? 

Answer:  President  Wilson  is  quite  right.  The  history  of  the 
Russian  advance  over  Trans-Caucasia  in  the  nineteenth  century 
and  the  geographic  position  of  Armenia  marks  it  as  a  legitimate 
sphere  of  Russian  influence.  Turkish  Armenia  Hes  in  the  pathway 
of  Slavic  Russian  expansion.  Soviet  Russia  now  controls  Russian 
Armenia.  I  hold  no  brief  for  Bolshevism;  but  we  might  as  well  be 
honest  and  face  facts.  Bolshevist  Russia  has  done  that  thing  which 
we  have  refused  to  do — gone  in  and  protected  the  Armenians.  It 
seems  obvious  to  me  that  the  Armenian  question  must  be  looked 
at  primarily  in  connection  with  the  Russian  problem. 

Question:  Did  the  Turks  Jire  Jirst  upon  the  Greek  troops  at  Smyrna 
or  did  the  Greeks  start  the  massacre  without  provocation?  How  many 
hundred  thousand  Greeks  and  Armenians  were  butchered  by  the  Turks? 

Answer:  The  massacre  at  Smyrna  was  seen  by  hundreds  of  Eu- 
ropeans and  Americans  stationed  upon  the  AIHed  and  American 
ships  in  the  harbor  of  Smyrna,  but  nobody  could  tell  who  fired  the 


APPENDIX  469 

first  shot.  An  Allied  Commission  sent  out  to  inquire  and  report 
upon  the  entire  situation  could  not  settle  the  question  as  to  who 
began  the  firing. 

There  is  no  doubt  about  the  terrible  massacres  of  Armenians  by 
the  Turks  and  Kurds.  There  were  also  massacres  and  deportations 
of  Greeks  in  Asia  Minor.  That,  however,  does  not  affect  the  situa- 
tion. We  are  not  asking  whether  the  Greeks  have  a  right  to  our 
sympathy  because  of  the  sufferings  they  endured.  The  question  is 
whether  they  can  successfully  rule  over  a  greater  number  of  Turks 
in  the  Smyrna  district.  The  Smyrna  massacre  makes  the  answer 
extremely  doubtfuL  There  are  about  6,000,000  Turks  in  Anatoha, 
who  will  exert  continual  pressure  to  regain  control  of  Smyrna,  and 
about  5,000,000  Bulgarians,  who  will  press  down  upon  the  thin  Greek 
coastal  area  of  Thrace.  It  is  not  pohtical  wisdom  to  subject  the 
Greek  kingdom  to  the  dangers  of  this  combined  pressure,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  Smyrna  massacres  have  aroused  bitter  anger 
among  the  Turks  against  the  AUied  pro-Greek  policy. 

Question:  You  intimate  that  it  was  a  mistake  that  the  United  States 
did  not  declare  war  on  Turkey.  Why?  What  advantage  would  have 
been  gained? 

Answer:  We  should  not  have  lost  anything  by  declaring  war, 
and  would  have  been  in  a  stronger  position  on  the  whole  Near-East- 
ern question  at  the  Peace  Conference.  When  Turkish  questions 
came  up  we  continually  met  this  assertion:  "After  all,  you  are  not 
interested  in  this,  because  you  were  not  at  war  with  Turkey."  Above 
all,  had  we  been  at  war  with  Turkey,  we  could  have  sent  troops  into 
Armenia  immediately  after  the  Armistice  and  could  have  done  a 
great  deal  to  help  the  situation  there,  because  the  Turks  would  gladly 
have  accepted  us  at  that  time,  either  temporarily  or  in  a  mandatory 
capacity. 

IX 

THE  PROTECTION  OF  MINORITIES  AND  NATIVES  IN 
TRANSFERRED  TERRITORIES 

February  4,  192 1 

QUESTIONS    ANSWERED    BY    MANLEY    O.    HUDSON,    LEGAL    ADVISER    TO 
AMERICAN   PEACE    COMMISSION 

Question:  Have  you  any  comments  to  make  upon  the  Shantung 
settlement? 

Answer:  The  disposition  of  Germany's  interests  outside  of  Eu- 
rope has,  of  course,  greatly  changed  the  situation  in  the  Far  East. 


470  APPENDIX 

The  enforced  surrender  to  China  of  the  German  concessions  at  Tsin 
Tsin  and  at  Hankow  was  altogether  in  line  with  the  Allied  effort  to 
restore  control  to  the  peoples  concerned.  But  the  transfer  of  Ger- 
man interests  in  Shantung  to  another  foreign  Power  has  been  widely 
condemned  as  a  departure  from  the  general  principles  of  nationality 
and  self-determination.  To  the  Chinese  it  was  a  flat  contradiction 
of  the  principles  which  the  AUies  were  professing  to  apply  to  Europe; 
to  the  Japanese  it  was  but  a  continuance  of  the  poHcy  which  so 
many  states  had  been  following  in  the  Far  East  for  a  score  of  years. 
If  this  part  of  the  settlement  is  not  to  be  defended,  it  can  be  ex- 
plained and  understood.  The  seizure  of  Tsingtao  had  been  effected 
by  Japan  in  19 14,  and  at  the  time  of  the  Peace  Conference  Japanese 
troops  were  occupying  the  Shantung  peninsula.  Perhaps  the  basic 
parts  of  President  Wilson's  programme  had  not  been  popularized  in 
the  Far  East  as  in  the  West.  At  any  rate,  after  the  failure  of  their 
attempt  to  get  a  provision  on  racial  equality  embodied  in  the  Cov- 
enant of  the  League,  Japan's  representatives  seem  to  have  attached 
more  importance  to  their  desire  that  the  Treaty  should  not  call  upon 
Japan  to  withdraw  from  Shantung,  but  should  recognize  her  succes- 
sion to  Germany's  position.  Both  France  and  Great  Britain  had 
agreed,  at  a  time  when  their  conduct  of  the  war  needed  naval  co- 
operation, to  support  Japan's  claim  at  the  Peace  Conference.  As 
the  time  approached  for  submitting  the  conditions  of  peace  to  the 
Germans,  it  was  becoming  more  difficult  to  withhold  satisfaction  to 
Japan's  demands,  and  when  the  dissolution  of  the  Conference  was 
threatened  by  the  disaffection  of  the  Belgians  and  the  actual  with- 
drawal of  the  Italians,  the  Japanese  insistence  succeeded.  A  prom- 
ise was  given  to  President  Wilson  and  Mr.  Balfour  that  Shantung 
would  be  completely  restored  to  China  within  a  reasonable  time,  and 
the  well-known  agreement  between  Japan  and  China  in  191 5  had 
stipulated  for  conditional  restoration.  With  the  recent  election  of 
China  to  a  place  on  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  her  gov- 
ernment is  certainly  in  a  better  position  to  Insist  on  the  redemption 
of  that  promise.  Indeed,  It  would  seem  to  be  another  situation  like 
the  enforcement  of  the  minority  treaties  and  the  supervision  over 
the  mandates — where  if  the  League  did  not  exist  it  would  have  to 
be  created. 

Question:  Will  the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  ratify  the  minori- 
ties treaties  which  you  have  enumerated  with  Poland,  Czecho-Slovakia, 
Roumania,  Jugo-Slavia,  and  Greece  mean  the  failure  of  this  part  of 
the  work  of  the  Peace  Conference? 


APPENDIX  471 

Answer:  I  think  It  will  not  mean  the  failure  of  that  part  of  the 
work.  I  think  it  will  go  on  if  the  League  of  Nations  lives,  whether 
the  United  States  ratifies  these  treaties  or  not.  It  seems  to  me  that 
this  is  a  part  of  the  American  responsibihty  which  we  have  not  fully 
appreciated  in  this  country.  It  was  an  American  President  who 
introduced  it,  and  it  was  the  hope  of  America  that  brought  about 
the  nationalistic  revolt  in  southeastern  Europe.  I  think,  therefore, 
that  we  have  a  very  distinct  obligation  to  the  minorities  in  relation 
to  race  and  religion  in  each  of  these  countries,  whose  political  future 
we  have  attempted  to  fashion.  The  Peace  Conference  itself  did  not 
have  the  decision  as  to  Austria-Hungary,  which  was  taken  long 
before.  We  dealt  with  their  future  by  prosecuting  the  war  as  we 
prosecuted  it  during  191 7  and  191 8,  and  we  battled  for  the  support 
of  the  dissatisfied  nationahties  in  old  Austria-Hungary,  giving  them 
help  to  achieve  their  freedom.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  have  a  dis- 
tinct responsibihty,  therefore,  to  see  that  the  provisions  of  these 
minorities  treaties  are  not  permitted  altogether  to  go  by  the  board. 

What  is  the  United  States  going  to  do?  I  do  not  doubt  at  all 
that  some  future  American  Secretary  of  State  will  have  to  appeal  to 
the  governments  that  are  signatories  and  that  have  ratified  those 
treaties,  as  John  Hay  appealed  to  the  signatories  in  another  treaty 
with  Poland  when  he  sought  to  protect  the  Jews  in  1902. 

Question  :  Do  you  consider  adequate  the  provisions  for  enforcement 
0/  the  minority  treaties  by  the  Council  and  Court  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions? Why  shouldn't  an  aggrieved  minority  be  permitted  to  prosecute 
its  appeal  directly?  Why  was  it  not  made  possible  Jor  any  member  oj 
the  League  to  file  a  complaint? 

Answer:  It  seems  to  me  that  this  question  is  based  upon  a  very 
sound  criticism  of  the  scope  of  these  treaties.  I  have  felt  all  along 
that  it  ought  to  have  been  made  possible  for  any  member  of  the 
League  of  Nations  and  not  simply  a  state  represented  on  the  Coun- 
cil to  espouse  the  cause  of  the  Jews  in  Poland  on  terms  like  those 
employed  on  behalf  of  Jugo-SIavia.  The  American  delegation  stood 
out  for  enabling  any  member  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  make  that 
appeal,  but  it  was  necessary  to  yield  many  things,  and  that  was  one 
that  was  yielded. 

Question:  Why  were  mandates  superimposed  on  people,  Jor  in- 
stance on  Syria? 

Answer:  The  first  part  of  the  question  attacks  the  whole  man- 
date system.     I  suppose  the  person  who  asked  it  would  not  suggest 


472  APPENDIX 

that  the  natives  of  Southwest  Africa  should  be  permitted  to  govern 
themselves,  I  think  one  might  as  well  have  suggested  that  the 
American  Indians  should  have  been  given  the  government  of  our 
continent.  A  great  deal  is  to  be  said  for  that,  but  with  the  compe- 
tition in  economic  spheres  of  all  sorts  I  think  it  is  quite  impossible 
for  the  outside  world  to  keep  its  finger  out  of  the  German  South- 
western part  of  Africa.  It  is  a  very  rich  country  and  the  foreigners 
who  go  there  are  bound  to  get  into  trouble  with  the  natives.  For 
territories  of  that  kind  I  think  the  mandate  system  was  inevitable. 
I  do  not  intend  to  defend  the  expansion  of  a  system  of  this  sort  to 
countries  like  Syria,  except  that  the  protection  of  the  people  de- 
mands some  scheme  of  this  sort  to  prevent  their  exploitation  by 
foreigners. 

Question:  The  Declaration  oj  Independence  declares  governments 
derive  "their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed."  Does  this 
statement  differ  from  President  Wilson's  principle  of  "self-determina- 
tion"? 

Answer:  We  think  President  Wilson's  principle  is  looking  in  the 
same  direction.  I  am  sure  we  should  have  as  many  opinions  as  we 
have  people  here.  Self-determination  is  not  a  cure-all  for  map- 
making.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  merely  a  method.  One  must  decide 
that  he  is  going  somewhere  before  he  needs  decide  how  he  is  going 
to  travel.  It  seems  to  me  that  self-determination  does  not  tell  you 
where  you  are  going,  although  it  may  help  along  the  way.  The 
United  States  decided  for  Austria-Hungary  in  the  early  part  of  191 8 
as  to  where  they  were  going,  and  self-determination  was  the  coach 
in  which  they  travelled.  Personally  I  find  it  exceedingly  difficult  to 
get  any  help  from  such  statements  as  that  of  the  Declaration  of  our 
Independence. 

Question:  Under  what  class  oJ  mandate  was  Smyrna  given  over  to 
Greece  ? 

Answer:  Not  under  any  mandate.  I  am  not  at  all  sure  that  her 
case  docs  not  constitute  a  departure  from  the  text  of  Article  twenty- 
two  (xxii)  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Does  that 
Article  go  so  far  as  to  apply  to  what  was  formerly  all  of  the  Turkish 
territory?  I  think  this  construction  of  the  terms  used  in  that  article 
is  not  unsound.  Then  why  is  not  the  mandate  applied  in  the  case  of 
Greece?  I  do  not  know,  but  I  should  be  inclined  to  befieve  that  it 
was  more  due  to  Mr.  Venizelos's  silver  tongue  than  to  anything  else. 

Question:  What  is  the  present  status  oJ  any  mandate  for  Armenia? 


APPENDIX  473 

Answer:  A  number  of  Powers  were  asked  to  take  the  mandate 
for  Armenia  and  they  all  refused.  The  United  States  was  asked 
and  the  United  States  refused.  Persons  who  called  themselves  the 
representatives  of  the  Armenian  Government  were  permitted  to  sign 
the  treaty  of  peace  with  Turkey.  I  will  leave  it  to  my  learned  col- 
league whether  that  constitutes  making  it  an  independent  state. 

Question:  Will  you  tell  us  something  oj  the  action  and  reaction  oj 
personalities  on  this  subject  of  protection  of  minorities?  What  was 
Clemenceau's  attitude,  for  example? 

Answer:  As  to  M.  Clemenceau's  attitude,  I  was  never  able  to 
discover  that  he  had  any.  M.  Clemenceau,  in  my  observations  of 
him,  was  capable  of  having  decided  attitudes;  he  was  also  capable  of 
as  decided  neutrality.  On  the  subject  of  minorities  he  "sat,"  and 
that  was  all,  but  if  any  one  is  interested  in  the  reaction  of  personali- 
ties I  think  it  ought  to  be  said  that  it  was  President  Wilson's  interest 
and  it  was  his  desire  to  protect  the  Jews  of  Europe,  as  the  American 
Jews  here  demand  that  they  should  be  protected,  which  made  the 
whole  thing  possible.  It  was  an  American  proposition  first  that 
something  be  done  for  the  protection  of  the  minorities,  and  that 
proposal  had  the  strong  support  of  certain  persons  in  the  British 
delegation,  and  it  had  the  very  strong  support  of  a  few  people  in  the 
Italian  delegation,  who  had  spent  a  great  deal  of  time  in  the  Balkans. 
But  in  the  main  it  was  the  kind  of  thing  which  might  have  been  per- 
mitted to  go  by  the  board  in  the  Conference  like  many  other  mat- 
ters that  came  before  the  Paris  Conference.  There  were  many  ques- 
tions which  were  permitted  to  fall  over  to  one  side.  I  think  that 
this  was  not  permitted  to  do  so  owing  to  the  insistence  of  the  Ameri- 
can Jews  of  whom  I  was  speaking,  and  the  insistence  of  President 
Wilson  himself.  But,  in  that  connection  another  personality  is  to 
be  mentioned — Lord  Robert  Cecil.  His  father  sat  in  the  Congress 
of  Berhn,  and  it  was  he  who  had  been  responsible  for  the  promise 
exacted  from  Montenegro,  Serbia,  Rumania,  and  Bulgaria,  requir- 
ing all  those  states  to  protect  rehgious  minorities.  Lord  Robert 
Cecil  took  for  that  reason,  as  for  many  others,  a  live  interest  in  that 
part  of  the  Conference  and  did  much  to  forward  the  work.  He 
would  have  gone  so  far  as  to  have  allowed  an  appeal  to  the  League 
of  Nations  by  any  committee  of  Jews  or  by  any  individual  Jew  or 
any  individual  member  of  any  minority. 

Question:  How  about  Ireland? 

Answer:  It  seems  to  me  that  Ireland  is  a  place  where  we  have 


474  APPENDIX 

needed  for  many  years  the  kind  of  religious  toleration  which  was 
aimed  at  by  the  Paris  Conference  in  these  minorities  treaties.  If  I 
know  anything  of  the  conditions  in  Ireland  my  opinion  is  that  they 
have  been  more  than  a  httle  due  to  the  struggle  between  the  rehgious 
groups,  and  I  wonder  whether  the  extension  of  the  principle  of  reli- 
gious toleration  which  we  have  attempted  to  envisage  in  those  trea- 
ties should  not  be  remedial;  I  wonder  whether  that  principle  would 
not  contribute  something  to  peace  within  the  island  for  Ireland 
itself.  As  soon  as  we  talk  about  the  self-government  of  nationalities 
trouble  arises  from  the  opposition  of  those  who  would  like  to  see 
Ireland  united  and  independent.  I  know  of  no  place  where  the 
practical  hnes  of  the  doctrine  of  self-determination  or  the  doctrine 
of  nationalities  are  more  obvious  than  on  the  island  of  Ireland  itself. 

Question:  Was  it  actually  proposed  to  the  Italians  and  French  that 
they  give  guarantees  Jor  the  German  minorities  in  the  Trentino  and 
Alsace-Lorraine  respectively,  and  did  they  rejuse  to  give  them? 

Answer;  As  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  no  such  proposal  was  made. 
The  Alsace-Lorraine  question  came  to  the  Peace  Conference  a  ques- 
tion settled  by  the  arbitrament  of  arms.  No  proposal  was  made, 
and  I  doubt  whether  one  would  say  that  any  provision  Hke  those 
which  I  have  described  for  protecting  rehgious  and  racial  minorities 
would  be  necessary;  as  to  the  linguistic  minorities,  I  doubt  whether 
any  special  provision  was  necessary  in  Alsace-Lorraine.  Instead  of 
the  Germans  enforcing  their  demands,  and  in  spite  of  the  German 
rule,  I  understand  that  most  of  the  French  population  have  con- 
tinued to  speak  French.  As  to  the  Trentino,  the  suggestion  was 
made  to  the  Itahan  delegation  that  guarantees  of  this  sort  ought  to 
be  given  for  the  400,000  Germans  who  are  transferred  to  Italy. 
The  Itahan  delegation  felt  that  it  was  entirely  inconsistent  with  its 
position  as  a  principal  power  to  have  any  such  suggestion  made. 

Question:  Does  not  the  maintenance  of  their  own  schools  by  the 
various  nationals  produce  in  the  new  European  states  poor  standards 
of  liberal  education — will  not  such  separate  schools  become  the  centre  oj 
secession  agitation? 

Answer:  In  this  country  the  suggestion  that  we  have  separate 
schools  has  always  been  met,  I  think,  by  the  criticism  that  they 
would  mean  inferior  standards  in  those  schools.  Surely  that  could 
not  be  true  among  the  Germans  who  are  transferred  to  Poland; 
the  Germans  surely  would  maintain  as  efficient  schools  as  the  Poles. 
Among  the  Jews  in  Poland  one  may  very  well  say  that  their  schools 
would  probably  be  less  efficient. 


APPENDIX  475 

X 

THE  TRIAL  OF  THE  KAISER 

January  21,  1921 

QUESTIONS    ANSWERED    BY   JAMES    BROWN    SCOTT,    LEGAL  ADVISER   TO 
AMERICAN    PEACE   COMMISSION 

Question:  In  your  opinion,  what  amount  oj  actual  sincerity  was 
there  back  of  the  demand  Jor  the  Kaiser's  delivery? 

Answer:  Mr.  Lloyd  George  evidently  was  in  earnest,  for  in 
December,  1919,  just  before  the  opening  of  the  Conference,  he  went 
before  the  country,  in  England,  I  understand,  with  the  cry  of  "Hang 
the  Kaiser  and  make  Germany  pay  for  the  war."  Mr.  Clemenceau 
appeared  to  have  been  in  earnest  inasmuch  as  France  had  suffered 
extremely.  Beyond  these  two  Powers,  there  was,  I  think,  little  de- 
sire to  see  the  Kaiser  tried.  Italy  was  more  lukewarm,  as  far  as  I 
could  judge,  but  was  unwilhng  to  disassociate  itself  from  its  Allies. 
Japan  positively  refused  to  be  a  party  to  it  and  filed  a  dissenting 
opinion  repudiating  any  law  or  custom  by  which  a  sovereign  could 
be  tried  or  should  be  tried.  The  United  States  stood  like  a  rock 
against  the  trial  of  the  Kaiser  for  a  criminal  offense.  As  to  the  reso- 
lution of  compromise,  in  regard  to  which  I  made  a  statement,  an 
agreement  was  had  to  request  the  extradition  of  the  Kaiser,  to  place 
him  before  a  so-called  political  court  to  be  tried  for  an  offense  against 
morality  and  to  be  punished  according  to  the  principles  of  high  polit- 
ical policy.  That  was  quite  late  in  the  Conference  and  by  that  time, 
I  think,  they  had  taken  the  measure  of  Holland  and  had  ascertained 
that  no  amount  of  persuasion  would  force  that  devoted  little  coun- 
try to  violate  the  principles  of  international  law  concerning  hos- 
tility or  its  own  traditions,  and  that  if  force  were  used  Holland 
would  stand  against  any  amount  of  force  that  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments might  care  to  bring  against  it.  Now,  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
at  the  end  it  was  simply  an  attempt  to  get  out  of  an  embarrassing 
situation  by,  may  I  use  a  Washington  phrase,  "passing  the  buck" 
from  the  Allies  and  Associated  countries  over  to  Holland,  where 
the  "buck"  appears  to  be  at  present. 

Question:  Did  Japan  s  stand  with  the  United  States  mean  that 
she  disapproved  oj  the  Kaiser  s  trial  on  the  same  grounds  as  those  of 
the  Americans? 

Answer:  The  American  opinion  was  more  elaborately  reasoned. 


476 


APPENDIX 


The  Japanese  dissenting  opinion  was  very  brief  but  extremely  to 
the  point,  saying  that  "it  did  not  beheve  that  there  was  any  criminal 
law  or  statute  or  custom  by  which  the  Kaiser  could  be  tried  for  the 
commission  of  a  criminal  offense,  and  that  Japan  was  averse  on  prin- 
ciple to  the  trial  of  the  Heads  of  States." 

Question:  Did  not  Mr.  Lansing  propose  an  indictment  oj  the 
Kaiser?    Why  was  not  this  adopted? 

Answer:  I  think  the  answer  I  shall  give  you  is  correct,  because 
I  have  the  text  here  of  Mr.  Lansing's  proposal,  and  if  it  be  your  plea- 
sure, to  lay  it  before  this  meeting,  I  wish  to  read  it.  It  has  not  been 
published. 

RESOLUTION   SUGGESTED   BY   MR.   LANSING   AT  THE    MEETING 
OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  RESPONSIBILITIES,  MARCH  12,  19191 

It  is  recommended  that  the  Conference  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Govern- 
ments issue  at  the  time  of  the  signature  of  a  Treaty  of  Peace  with  an  enemy  Power, 
and  annex  the  same  to  such  Treaty,  the  following  declaration: 

Declaration  by  the  Representatives  of  (name  of  countries)  in  Conference  As- 
sembled. 

The  moral  right  to  wage  war  only  exists  when  there  is  an  imperative  neces- 
sity to  employ  force  in  the  protection  of  national  life,  in  the  maintenance  of  na- 
tional right  or  in  the  defense  of  liberty  and  humanity. 

War  inspired  by  any  other  motive  is  wanton,  needless  and  violate  of  inter- 
national morality  and  justice.     It  cannot  be  justified. 

Judged  by  this  standard  the  war  which  was  begun  in  1914  was  unrighteous 
and  indefensible.  It  was  a  war  of  aggression.  The  masters  of  the  Central  Powers, 
inflamed  by  the  passion  to  possess  the  territory  and  sovereignty  of  others,  en- 
tered upon  a  war  of  conquest,  a  war  which  in  magnitude,  in  waste  of  life  and 
property,  in  merciless  cruelties  and  in  intolerable  woes,  surpasses  all  wars  of 
modern  times.  The  evidence  of  this  moral  crime  against  mankind  is  convinc- 
ing and  conclusive. 

Restrained  by  reverence  for  law  which  is  inseparable  from  that  high  sense  of 
justice  which  is  essential  to  social  order,  the  nations  which  have  suffered  so  griev- 
ously may  be  unable  to  mete  out  through  judicial  channels  retribution  to  the 
guilty.  But  the  authors  of  this  atrocious  war  ought  not  to  pass  unscathed  into 
history.  They  should  be  summoned  before  the  bar  of  universal  public  opinion 
to  listen  to  the  verdict  which  mankind  passes  upon  the  perpetrators  of  this  great- 
est crime  against  the  world. 

Therefore,  in  the  name  of  those  who  sacrificed  their  lives  that  liberty  might 
live,  in  the  name  of  the  helpless  who  endured  unspeakable  atrocities,  in  the  name 
of  those  whose  ruined  and  plundered  lands  bear  witness  to  the  wickedness  of  the 
accused,  in  the  name  of  humanity,  of  righteousness  and  of  civilization,  an  out- 
raged world  denounces  as  infamous  and  demands  the  judgment  of  the  ages  against 
William  of  Hohenzollern,  once  German  Emperor  and  King  of  Prussia,  etc.,  etc. 

1  Minutes  of  the  meetings  of  the  Commission  on  the  Responsibility  of  the  Au- 
thors of  the  War,  p.  37. 


APPENDIX  477 

MR.  LANSING'S  SUGGESTION  OF  APPOINTMENT  OF  A  COMMISSION 
OF  INQUIRY  AS  TO  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  OF  THE  KAISER.  AT 
THE  MEETING  OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  RESPONSIBILITIES, 
MARCH  12,  19191 

In  view  of  the  official  and  personal  influence  which  the  ex-Kaiser  possessed 
and  exercised  upon  the  course  and  conduct  of  the  war,  and  in  view  of  the  im- 
munity from  suit  and  prosecution  which  a  Monarch  and  Chief  of  State  enjoys 
according  to  the  municipal  law  of  every  civilized  country  and  also  according  to 
the  Common  Law  of  Nations,  and  lest  because  of  this  immunity  from  judicial 
process  the  ex-Kaiser  escape  the  condemnation  which  his  misdeeds  require,  the 
third  Sub-Commission  recommends  that,  instead  of  attempting  to  hale  the  ex- 
Kaiser  before  a  Court  of  Justice  for  which  there  is  no  precedent  in  the  accepted 
Law  of  Nations,  an  International  Commission  of  Inquiry  be  instituted  to  investi- 
gate and  to  report  upon  the  extent  of  the  responsibility  of  the  ex-Kaiser  from  the 
political,  legal  and  moral  point  of  view  for  the  acts  of  the  German  authorities, 
civil  and  military,  in  violation  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  committed  during 
the  course  of  the  war  from  the  ist  day  of  August,  1914,  to  the  nth  day  of  No- 
vember, 191 8. 

The  International  Commission  of  Inquiry  to  be  instituted  for  this  purpose 
should  be  composed  of  ,  .  .  Representatives  of  the  United  States,  the  British 
Empire,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  and  one  Representative  of  each  of  the  other 
countries  at  war  with  Germany.  It  should  be  appointed  during  the  sessions  of 
the  Conference;  the  archives  of  the  German  Government  should  be  placed  at 
its  disposal,  and  the  report  of  the  Commission  based  upon  a  careful  examination 
of  the  evidence  at  its  disposal  should  be  presented  by  the  members  of  the  Com- 
mission to  their  respective  Governments  on  the  nth  day  of  November,  191 9, 
and  immediately  made  public  by  each  of  them,  in  order  that  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world  thus  enlightened  and  instructed  may  anticipate  the  verdict  of  his- 
tory and  render  the  judgment  of  posterity. 

MR.  LANSING'S  SUBSEQUENT  SUGGESTION  FOR  A  COMMISSION 
OF  INQUIRY.  AT  THE  MEETING  OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  RE- 
SPONSIBILITIES, MARCH  13,  19192 

The  Commission  on  Responsibilities  recommends  that — 

1.  A  Commission  of  Inquiry  be  established  to  consider  generally  the  relative 
culpability  of  the  authors  of  the  war  and  also  the  question  of  their  culpability 
as  to  the  violations  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  committed  during  its  course. 

2.  The  Commission  of  Inquiry  consist  of  two  members  of  the  five  following 
Powers:  United  States,  British  Empire,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan;  and  one  mem- 
ber each,  of  the  five  following  Powers:  Belgium,  Greece,  Portugal,  Roumania, 
and  Serbia. 

3.  The  enemy  be  required  to  place  their  archives  at  the  disposal  of  the  Com- 
mission which  shall  forthwith  enter  upon  its  duties  and  report  jointly  and  sepa- 
rately to  their  respective  Governments  on  the  eleventh  day  of  November,  nine- 

^  Minutes  of  the  meetings  of  the  Commission  on  Responsibility  of  the  Authors 
of  the  War,  pp.  37-38. 

2  Minutes  of  the  meetings  of  the  Commission  on  the  Responsibility  of  the  Au- 
thors of  the  War,  pp.  57-58. 


478  APPENDIX 

teen  hundred  and  nineteen  (November  n,  1919),  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  prac- 
ticable. 

That  was  submitted  by  Mr.  Lansing.  He  was  Chairman  of  the 
Commission  of  Responsibility,  and  this  was  read  at  a  full  meeting 
of  that  Commission.  It  was  received  with  a  certain  amount  of  good- 
will, but  when  it  was  understood  that  it  was  to  stand  alone  and  was 
not  to  be  accompanied  with  a  spectacular  trial — the  trial  of  the  Kaiser 
for  a  criminal  offense  for  violating  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  and 
the  laws  of  humanity — the  members  of  the  Commission  lost  all  in- 
terest in  it  and  would  have  none  of  it.  A  trial  they  wanted,  and  were 
satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  a  trial,  and  the  members  would  not 
be  satisfied  until  their  Chiefs-of-Staff  suggested  that  they  withdraw 
from  their  position.  I  think,  if  I  may  say  so,  two  other  propositions 
were  presented  to  the  Commission  from  the  American  members, 
which  provided  for  the  appointment  of  a  Commission  of  Inquiry, 
to  be  appointed  by  the  Conference,  to  meet  and  to  examine  the  evi- 
dence, and  to  reach  a  judgment,  and  then  to  present  this  as  a  report 
to  the  world  at  large  through  the  public  press  in  order  that  the  opinion 
expressed  in  the  report  should  be  examined  or  tested  by  public  opin- 
ion. But  as  that  did  not  involve  a  trial  of  the  Kaiser,  it  shared  the 
fate  of  the  Resolution  already  referred  to. 

Question:  Did  President  Wilson  ever  express  himself  as  to  any 
Jorm  oj  punishment  for  the  Kaiser? 

Answer:  It  is  my  understanding  that  President  Wilson  regarded 
the  trial  of  the  Kaiser  for  a  criminal  offense  as  entirely  out  of  place 
and  as  unjustifiable,  and  that  he  refused  to  be  a  party  to  it.  Be- 
cause of  his  refusal  the  Supreme  Council  rejected  the  majority  re- 
port of  the  Commission  of  Responsibility,  and  as  a  compromise 
agreed  upon  an  article  according  to  which  the  Kaiser,  if  the  Allies 
could  get  their  claws  upon  him,  should  be  arraigned  for  an  offense 
against  international  morality.  President  Wilson  thought,  as  I  be- 
lieve, that  this  was  the  most  that  could  be  permitted,  and  that  it 
would  not  be  a  legal  but  a  political  offense  and  that  the  punishment 
should  not  be  a  criminal  but  a  political  punishment. 

Question:  //  the  Kaiser  should  6y  any  chance  leave  Holland  in  the 
course  of  succeeding  years,  are  the  Allies  bound  by  the  Treaty  to  try  him 
then  ? 

Answer:  I  would  say  to  that,  that  the  Allies  are  not  bound  by 
the  Treaty  to  try  him  now  or  at  any  time.  They  reserved  to  them- 
selves the  right  to  try  him  if  they  could  get  their  hands  upon  him. 


APPENDIX  479 

and  if  when  he  seemed  to  be  nearing  the  goal  they  then  wish  to  try 
him,  it  is  a  right  which  they  reserve,  but  it  is  not  a  duty  which  they 
have  imposed  upon  themselves. 

Question:  Why  did  Lloyd  George  object  to  the  inclusion  oj  President 
Wilson's  express  denial  that  the  Kaiser's  offense  ivas  criminal? 

Answer:  Well,  of  course,  I  am  not  here  this  evening  as  the  of- 
ficial mouthpiece  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  Our  views  would  differ  some- 
what in  this  matter.  I  should  imagine,  however,  that  inasmuch  as 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  denounced  the  Kaiser  as  a  criminal  and  had 
made  some  pointed  remarks  upon  the  hustings  about  the  Kaiser's 
liability  that  he  could  not  at  Paris  deny  the  validity  of  his  own  state- 
ments. The  South  African  delegates  were  bitterly  opposed  to  a 
criminal  trial.  It  is  well  known  that  General  Botha  stood  Hke  a  rock. 
He  knew,  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  Boer  forces,  what  defeat  was 
and,  I  understand,  he  did  not  intend  to  be  a  party  to  the  signing  of 
a  document  to  try  the  Kaiser,  It  is  supposed  that  this  rather  led 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  put  up  with  less  than  he  had  hoped  to  get;  it 
was  feared  that  there  would  be  a  protest  on  the  part  of  the  South 
African  delegates. 

Question:  Do  you  regard  it  as  inexpedient  that  the  bead  of  a  State 
should  ever  be  tried  by  an  international  court  Jor  moral  crimes  against 
other  nations? 

Answer:  That  question  asks  my  personal  opinion,  and  I  am  not 
willing  to  give  it.  I  think,  however,  it  is  best  for  nations  themselves 
to  take  care  of  their  chief  executives.  We  do  so  by  apt  provision  in 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  we  always  adjust  our 
own  mistakes  with  our  own  punishment.  It  would  be  exceedingly 
disagreeable,  and  Mr.  Lansing  said  so  in  the  Commission,  if  our  own 
Chief  Executive  were  tried  by  an  international  court;  because  the 
United  States  could  not  submit  that  any  sovereignty  other  than  the 
sovereignty  of  the  United  States  should  try  its  own  chief  executive. 
If,  however,  nations  should  agree  that  in  certain  cases  in  the  future, 
if  offenses  be  committed  in  the  future,  the  chief  of  the  State  should 
be  tried,  then,  of  course,  they  have  agreed  to  it.  Personally,  I  think 
that  would  be  unfortunate,  and  I  hope  it  will  never  be  attempted. 

Question:  Did  feeling  run  high  within  the  Commission  because  of 
the  disagreement  over  the  question  oJ  the  trials,  and  what  was  the  "per- 
sonal" situation? 

Answer:  I  see  Mrs.  Scott  smile  at  the  question,  "Did  feeling 


48o  APPENDIX 

run  high?"  Feeling  ran  about  as  high  as  feeling  can  run.  It  ran 
especially  high  in  the  British  membership,  and  it  ran  especially  high 
in  the  French  members.  It  ran  so  high  that  relations  were  some- 
what suspended,  but  I  imagine  they  are  over  that  feehng  because 
last  summer  when  I  had  the  pleasure  of  being  in  Europe  and  meeting 
some  of  those  gentlemen  whose  feehng  was  a  Httle  high  at  that  time, 
they  seemed  to  be  glad  to  see  me  and  had  apparently  forgotten  all 
about  it.  When  I  ventured  to  suggest  "the  Kaiser"  they  laughed 
and  said:    "Oh,  well,  you  know  that  is  all  past." 

Question:  What  practical  effects  oj  the  Two  Hague  Conferences 
were  manijest  during  the  World  War? 

Answer:  The  Hague  Conferences  or  bodies  called  no  meeting 
periodically;  they  were  not  self-starters.  They  have  to  be  sum- 
moned, the  programme  prepared  in  advance  before  the  members 
meet  and  deliberate.  The  Powers  at  war  were  unwilhng  to  have 
conferences  at  such  time  or  before  any  time  until  victory  had  been 
determined  one  way  or  the  other.  The  machinery  was  there  before 
the  war  and  in  some  periods  of  the  war  perhaps  it  might  have  been 
apphed,  but  there  was  no  request  on  the  part  of  the  Powers  to  make 
use  of  this  machinery.  It  was  just  exactly  as  if  you  had  your  auto- 
mobile out  in  front  of  your  house  ready  to  start  and  there  was  no 
starter. 

Question:  Could  the  International  Court,  recently  held  at  The 
Hague,  Junction,  in  part  or  in  whole,  as  a  League  oj  Nations? 

Answer:  The  Court  was  framed  as  it  has  been  outlined  and 
drafted  by  the  Committee  at  The  Hague  last  Summer,  and  depends 
for  its  constitution  upon  the  concurrent  and  independent  separate 
action  of  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  of  the  Council 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  therefore  it  presupposes  the  existence 
of  the  League  of  Nations.  But  if  the  League  of  Nations  should  not 
succeed,  it  would  still  be  possible  to  use  that  method.  Why?  Be- 
cause, in  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations,  every  State  is  rep- 
resented upon  an  equahty;  in  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations 
the  large  Powers  have  a  preponderance.  Therefore,  if  the  League 
of  Nations  were  not  to  continue  to  function,  it  would  be  very  easy 
for  the  Powers,  if  they  so  desire,  to  have  their  diplomatic  agent 
credited  to  The  Hague  with  the  functions,  in  so  far  as  the  Court  is 
concerned,  of  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations;  they  might 
organize  an  Executive  Committee  of  the  diplomatic  agents,  to  be 
composed,  if  they  so  chose,  in  the  same  fashion  as  the  Council,  with 


APPENDIX  481 

the  functions  of  the  Council,  as  far  as  the  Court  is  concerned.  The 
project  in  that  way  could  be  put  into  execution  without  change, — . 
"without  the  crossing  of  a  t  or  the  dotting  of  an  i." 


XI 
REPARATIONS 

February  25,  1921 

QUESTIONS   ANSWERED   BY   THOMAS   W.    LAMONT,    ECONOMIC   ADVISER 
TO   AMERICAN   PEACE   COMMISSION 

Question  :  Is  there  any  way  of  figuring  accurately  Germany's  capac- 
ity to  pay? 

Answer:  There  is  no  absolutely  accurate  way  of  determining 
Germany's  capacity  to  pay.  You  have  to  take  a  great  many  differ- 
ent factors  into  consideration;  you  have  to  take  the  material  wealth 
that  she  has,  described  to  us  by  her  own  finance  minister  in  such 
glowing  language  prior  to  the  war,  and  you  have  to  recognize  what 
diminution  has  come  to  that  as  a  result  of  the  war;  you  have  to 
figure  on  the  earning  capacity  of  her  average  citizen,  and  very  for- 
tunately her  own  statisticians — and  they  are  not  excelled  in  the 
world — gave  us  very  good  figures  as  to  her  pre-war  capacity;  you 
have  to  take  the  question  of  exports  and  imports,  of  course,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  as  to  that.  And  after  all  is  said  and  done,  if  you 
have  figured  on  a  certain  amount  each  year  and  have  been  consider- 
ing the  figures  of  something  like  $500,000,000  a  year  to  be  paid  to 
Belgium,  you  will  have  to  take  into  consideration  all  these  intangible 
moral  considerations  that  I  was  attempting  to  describe  a  little  while 
ago;  you  have  also  to  remember  that  Germans  are  an  industrious 
people,  accustomed  to  work. 

Question:  7s  there  any  political  party  or  group  in  Germany  which 
Javors  as  prompt  a  payment  as  possible  of  the  indemnities? 

Answer:  I  don't  know  whether  there  is  any  political  party  of 
that  kind  or  not.  I  am  not  sufficiently  informed  as  to  the  internal 
pohtical  situation  in  Germany.  I  can  only  say  that  the  German 
financiers  who  came  to  Paris — not  to  Paris  itself,  but  to  Versailles — 
the  German  financial  men  were  all  in  one  accord  with  the  idea  that 
the  sooner  Germany  knew  what  she  had  to  pay  the  sooner  she  would 
adapt  herself  to  the  situation  and  the  sooner  they  would  be  likely 
to  pay  it.     I  have  no  doubt  that  even  to-night  they  are  figuring  on 


482  APPENDIX 

what  kind  of  proposition  they  should  make  to  Great  Britain  and 
France  on  the  subject  as  it  has  been  presented  during  the  past  week, 
and  there  is  a  great,  growing  number  in  Germany  that  wants  the 
thing  settled  and  settled  promptly. 

Question:  Did  the  Allies  plan  to  destroy  or  to  maintain  Germany's 
economic  life? 

Answer:  While,  of  course,  the  Allies  made  no  plans  to  destroy 
Germany's  economic  life,  there  were  enough  men  in  France  who  had 
ample  justification  for  wanting  to  wipe  Germany  off  the  map;  there 
were  enough  men  there  who  wanted  to  see  Germany  destroyed. 
They  knew  somebody  had  to  pay  for  the  terrible  damage  that  had 
been  caused,  and  they  wanted  Germany  to  pay  for  it  instead  of 
themselves.  That  was  not  unnatural.  But  in  the  course  of  the 
Peace  Conference,  in  the  clauses  finally  drawn  very  carefully,  word- 
ing was  admitted  indicating  the  care  and  foresight  with  which  the 
Allies  were  looking  on  this  question  of  Germany's  maintenance  of 
industrial  life.  I  have  quoted  one  or  two  things  on  this  point.  One 
is:  "The  Reparation  Commission  is  instructed  to  give  due  consid- 
eration to  such  domestic  requirements  of  Germany  as  it  deems  essen- 
tial for  the  maintenance  of  Germany's  economic  life."  I  think  that 
answers  the  question. 

Question:  What  has  Germany  paid  up  to  the  present  time? 

Answer:  The  exact  amount  I  do  not  know.  What  the  Repara- 
tion Commission  has  figured  I  do  not  know.  Germany's  merchant 
fleet  has  been  turned  over,  its  fishing  fleet  and  machinery  have  been 
turned  over;  of  the  initial  payment  that  was  to  be  made,  approxi- 
mating $5,000,000,000,  therefore,  I  presume  $2,000,000,000  or  $3,- 
000,000,000  would  be  a  fair  figure;  nobody  knows  but  the  Reparation 
Commission,  but  a  very  substantial  sum  has  been  paid  in. 

Question  :  Has  more  live  stock  been  demanded  from  Germany  than 
she  took  Jrom  her  opponents? 

Answer:  Not  so  much,  according  to  the  figures  furnished  to  us 
by  the  experts.  Everybody  has  figured  that  if  the  Belgians  had 
demanded  from  Germany  as  much  as  she  had  taken  from  them, 
and  demanded  the  prompt  return  of  it,  it  would  probably  interfere 
so  much  with  Germany's  agricultural  life  that  she  would  be  crippled 
agriculturally.  As  to  the  reparations  demand  on  the  return  of  cat- 
tle, I  regard  that  demand  as  reasonable  or  even  moderate. 

Question:  Was  any  attempt  made  to  estimate  the  damage  done  in 


APPENDIX  '  483 

France  hy  Allied  as  distinguished  from  German  military  operations? 
Did  the  Germans  contend  that  they  should  pay  for  only  the  damage  they 
caused? 

Answer:  In  answering  the  last  question:  first,  no,  I  don't  think 
so.  When  the  Germans  considered  our  proposals  in  May,  19 19,  they 
did,  as  I  remember  it,  set  up  some  contention  that  there  ought  to  be 
a  careful  discrimination  made,  as  to  whether  it  was  an  Allied  shell 
or  a  German  shell  that  destroyed  a  certain  pig-sty;  however,  they 
never  made  much  of  a  contention  about  it.  Speaking  by  and  large, 
there  has  been  no  attempt  to  discriminate  on  that  point  in  the 
actually  devastated  districts.  Germany  swooped  through  Belgium 
like  a  cloud  of  locusts,  and  did  the  real  damage,  while  a  very  frac- 
tional part  of  the  damage  might  be  caused  by  the  retreating  Belgian 
army  blowing  up  a  few  bridges.  Perhaps  ungenerously  we  have  not 
given  quite  enough  credit  to  Germany  for  that. 

Question:  Will  not  the  greater  thrift,  industry,  efficiency,  self-denial, 
required  for  the  payment  of  indemnities,  meaji  a  greater,  stronger  Ger- 
many when  the  burden  passes? 

Answer:  I  should  think  so.  I  should  decidedly  think  so.  That 
is  a  thing  that  the  AIHes  had  to  fix;  that  is  a  thing  that  they  had  to 
contemplate.  We  discussed  that  a  good  many  times,  and  certain  of 
the  delegates,  especially  the  French,  feared  that  they  might  push 
the  thing  so  that  they  would  build  up  a  gigantic  machine  over  there 
in  Germany,  a  Frankenstein  that  would  ultimately  overwhelm  them, 
because  of  their  increased  efficiency,  but  they  were  willing  to  take 
the  chance. 

Question:  What  is  your  opinion  of  requiring  Germany  to  pay 
12^  per  cent  in  exports? 

Answer:  I  think  it  is  12  rather  than  12^  per  cent;  however,  the 
difference  is  trifling.  I  will  answer  that  in  this  way:  When  I  first 
saw  that  scheme  proposed,  that  is,  saw  the  schedule  of  payments  as 
set  forth,  placing  an  extra  tax  of  12  per  cent  on  all  of  Germany's 
exports,  I  did  not  think  well  of  it.  I  wish,  however,  to  say  that  it 
was  an  attempt  to  get  some  benefits  from  Germany's  future  increased 
prosperity,  and  so  they  wanted  to  gauge  it — just  as  at  Paris  we  tried 
to  work  on  a  basis  of  a  maximum  or  a  minimum;  if  Germany  should 
become  tremendously  prosperous,  France  wanted  to  receive  more 
damage  than  if  she  remained  in  the  doldrums.  I  did  not  think  very 
well  of  that  tax,  however,  because  it  seemed  to  me  it  would  require 
German  exporters  to  put  an  additional  12  per  cent  to  cover  that 


484  APPENDIX 

tax,  which  would  mean  higher  prices  to  the  importers  throughout 
the  world,  including  the  Americans,  which  would  create  a  sentiment 
and  have  some  effect  against  the  Allies,  throughout  the  markets  of 
the  world.  One  of  the  French  ministers  cabled  to  me  an  explanation 
referring  to  the  term  "exports,"  claiming  that  that  term  was  a  mis- 
nomer. They  were  trying  to  find  another  basis  for  figuring  repara- 
tion. All  they  cared  for  was  the  total  of  Germany's  exports  as  a 
basis,  and  figuring  on  an  additional  12  per  cent.  There  was  no  rea- 
son why  the  German  exporter  should  jack  up  his  prices  if  German 
exports  were  $10,000,000  in  a  given  year,  and  then  an  additional 
tax  of  12  per  cent  were  laid  on.  On  the  whole,  it  did  not  strike  me 
as  a  very  feasible  thing  to  do. 

Question:  Has  Great  Britain  ever  asked  that  her  own  debt  to  the 
United  States  Government  be  cancelled? 

Answer:  Not  to  my  knowledge.  Mr.  Austen  Chamberlain, 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  was  reported  the  other  day  in  the 
papers  as  saying  that  they  had  sounded  out  the  United  States  Trea- 
sury on  the  question  of  certain  cancellation  of  war  debts.  Of  course 
I  have  no  connection  with  the  United  States  Treasury  and  do  not 
know  what  conversations  took  place  there  in  that  department  of 
this  government.  However,  at  Paris  there  was  very  frequently  a 
suggestion,  perfectly  philosophical  and  practical  and  not  in  an  en- 
treating tone,  that  the  world  would  be  better  off  if  some  of  these 
complicated  international  balances  were  cleared  up;  and  some  of  the 
British  delegates  would  inquire  whether  it  would  be  wise  for  them 
to  write  off  all  the  sums  owing  to  Great  Britain  from  these  lesser 
Allies,  amounting  to  $4,000,000,000.  At  that  time  we  always  felt 
that  that  was  a  question  beyond  our  competence;  that  we  could  not 
discuss  any  question  of  cancellation  of  war  debts  or  of  refunding 
debts  or  anything  of  that  kind;  that  would  have  to  be  left  over  until 
a  later  day  for  the  people  of  America,  through  their  Congress,  to 
determine  in  their  wisdom.  On  the  general  question  I  may  say, 
with  the  utmost  emphasis,  that  Great  Britain  never  once  proposed 
that  we  should  do  anything  that  she  would  not  precede  us  in  doing 
in  the  way  of  debt  cancellation. 

Question:  How  did  the  question  oj  providing  food  in  return  Jor 
German  ships  bear  upon  the  work  oJ  the  Conference? 

Answer:  Well,  that  was  quite  a  moot  question  at  one  time,  the 
question  of  providing  food  in  return  for  German  ships.  Along  in 
the  early  part  of  the  Conference  that  was  very  much  discussed  and 
very  heatedly.     You  will  remember  that  before  the  armistice  the 


APPENDIX  485 

Allies  put  in  one  specific  promise,  stating  that  they  would  try  to  see 
that  Germany  was  kept  from  starving;  they  did  not  promise  to  ship 
in  so  many  tons  of  food,  but  the  plan  was  for  Germany  to  sign  the 
armistice,  and  then  an  effort  would  be  made  to  keep  the  infants  and 
the  children  and  the  people  of  Germany  from  starving.  I  was  on 
the  Civilian  Armistice  Commission.  We  wanted  to  undertake  to 
carry  out  that  imphed  purpose  in  good  faith.  It  was  a  very  compli- 
cated situation,  because  Germany  had  to  have  food,  but  she  had  to 
pay  for  that  food,  and  the  only  thing  she  could  pay  for  it  immedi- 
ately with  was  gold.  She  had  quite  a  lot  of  gold  in  the  Reichsbank. 
However,  the  French  did  not  want  her  to  pay  out  that  gold.  They 
did  not  believe  that  she  was  starving.  They  wanted  her  to  hold 
on  to  that  gold  and  turn  it  over  to  the  Alhes  for  reparation  in  due 
course  of  time.  One  solution  was  that  Germany  should  turn  over 
a  certain  amount  of  ships  in  return  for  food.  Some  of  us,  I  think 
Mr.  George  McFadden  of  your  city  and  mj^self,  went  on  a  very 
interesting  mission,  first  to  Spa  and  then  to  Brussels,  trying  to  have 
the  Germans  turn  over  their  ships  in  payment  for  food,  but  the  first 
negotiations  on  the  subject  came  to  naught. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  because  of  this  contention  on  the  part  of  some 
of  the  Allies  that  German  gold  should  not  be  turned  over,  that  led 
to  a  verj'^  dramatic  scene  when  we  came  back  from  Spa  and  reported 
that  we  had  been  unable  to  carry  out  this  plan  because  one  or  two 
of  the  AHies  objected  to  the  gold  going  out.  M.  Clemenceau,  Lloyd 
George,  and  Colonel  House  asked  me  to  go  into  the  next  room  and 
work  out  some  formula — some  statement.  So  we  went  into  another 
room;  they  locked  us  in  and  we  worked  out  a  formula  by  which  a 
certain  amount  of  gold  was  to  be  sent  with  the  ships.  It  was  handed 
around  and  Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  and  Colonel  House  signed  it, 
and  it  was  done. 

XIII 
THE  LABOR  CLAUSES  OF  THE  TREATY 

February  11,  1921 

QUESTIONS  ANSWERED  BY  SAMUEL  GOMPERS,   CHAIRMAN  OF  THE  COM- 
MISSION   ON    INTERNATIONAL    LABOR    LEGISLATION 

Question:  Could  the  Labor  Charter  be  inimical  to  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  or  the  working  people  of  the  United  States? 

Answer:  No.  One  of  the  particular  features  upon  which,  with 
my  associates,  I  insisted  was  that  no  conference  or  recommendation 


486  APPENDIX 

or  convention  should  recommend  to  any  country  or  state  any  con- 
dition of  labor  lower  than  the  standard  which  already  existed  in 
that  country.  It  was  the  protocol  to  Article  XIX  of  the  report 
which  the  Labor  Legislation  Commission  presented  to  the  Peace 
Conference.  Without  that  protecting  provision  the  American  dele- 
gation to  the  Peace  Conference  would  have  refused  to  sign  it,  and 
w^ould  have  submitted  a  minority  report.  The  labor  provision  of 
the  Treaty  is  an  absolute  protection  to  the  conditions  of  labor  in  all 
form  and  against  any  attempt  to  enforce  or  propose  lower  standards. 

Question;  Is  legislation  controlling  woman  and  child  labor  eco- 
nomically possible  in  Central  Europe  under  present  conditions? 

Answer:  Until  the  conditions  of  Central  Europe  shall  become  a 
bit  more  normal  than  they  are  now,  it  is  doubtful  whether  all  the 
provisions  of  the  Labor  Charter  can  be  enforced.  As  soon  as  prac- 
ticable I  think  that  they  will  be  enforced.  There  are  forty-one  na- 
tions in  the  League,  forty-one  nations  who  are  a  part  of  Interna- 
tional Labor.  There  are  five  nations  which  are  not  a  part  of  the 
League  and  of  the  Labor  Organization  or  the  Labor  Office:  Russia, 
Turkey,  Mexico,  Germany,  and  the  United  States.  We  are  in 
splendid  company. 

Question:  How  would  international  agreements  on  labor  standards 
affect  employers'  interests? 

Answer:  They  would  help  to  standardize  minimum  conditions. 
We  know  that  in  many  countries  the  labor  of  human  beings  is  now 
regarded  as  a  commodity;  that  the  human  beings  performing  that 
labor  are  regarded  as  so  much  machinery;  that  the  human  side  has 
been  totally  ignored.  When  the  workers  in  those  backward  coun- 
tries shall  have  been  raised  to  a  higher  standard  of  economic  and 
social  and  human  fife,  they  will  take  their  part  in  the  world's  affairs, 
and  the  establishment  of  a  minimum  of  standards  amongst  the  low- 
est paid  and  poorest  conditioned  workers  of  the  world  will  help  more 
thoroughly  to  stabilize  standards  of  life  and  encourage  industry  and 
commerce  in  every  country. 

Question:  Would  the  Labor  Charter  act  in  the  direction  oj  inhibit- 
ing or  restricting  Bolshevism  in  Europe? 

Answer:  Everything  that  tends  toward  constructive  organization 
is  an  obstacle  to  absolute  radicalism  of  all  sorts.  Every  effort  made 
by  the  constructive  labor  movement  of  the  United  States  makes 
for  the  perpetuity  of  the  American  Republic.     Every  attempt  sue- 


APPENDIX  487 

cessfully  made  to  weaken  or  In  part  to  destroy  this  conservative 
constructive  force  in  our  American  life  makes  for  Bolshevism. 

Question:  Does  the  word  "merely"  in  the  declaration  "Labor  is 
not  a  commodity"  depreciate  the  value  oj  the  declaration? 

Answer:  It  does  not.  I  am  free  to  say  that  when  there  was  pub- 
lished in  the  newspapers  the  report  that  the  word  "merely"  had 
been  prefixed  to  the  declaration  that  the  labor  of  human  beings  is 
not  an  article  of  commerce,  I  was  much  perplexed.  The  newspapers 
did  not  pubhsh  the  whole  preamble  nor  the  entire  declaration,  but 
only  that  the  word  "merely"  had  been  added  as  a  prefix,  and  that, 
more  than  anything  else,  prompted  me  to  request  that  a  message  be 
sent  to  the  President  at  Paris,  and  the  reply  which  the  President 
returned  and  the  comparison  with  the  text  that  we  have  in  the 
United  States  convinced  me  that  the  use  of  the  word  "merely"  had 
no  effect  other  than  to  strengthen  the  declaration.  For  instance,  if 
I  were  to  say,  "A  man  is  entitled  to  his  rights  as  a  citizen,"  and  then 
added  this  declaration,  "A  man  is  not  merely  entitled  to  his  rights 
as  a  citizen,  but  they  must  be  guaranteed  to  him,"  that  does  not 
weaken  the  first  declaration,  but  strengthens  it. 

Question:  What  was  the  attitude  of  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  com^ 
missioners  concerning  the  labor  provisions — particularly  that  calling  for 
a  Jorty-eight-bour  week  and  a  weekly  day  oj  rest? 

Answer:  The  Japanese  commissioners  abstained  from  voting. 
They  declared  they  had  no  instructions  from  their  government  either 
one  way  or  the  other.  I  don't  think  the  Chinese  were  represented 
in  our  commxission. 

Question:  What  is  a  "proper  standard  of  living"?  Is  it  the  same 
for  any  one  who  works  hard  as  for  one  who  loajs? 

Answer:  Individually,  I  should  think  that  the  questioner  might 
answer  for  himself.  Speaking  as  for  the  people,  I  should  say  that 
a  proper  standard  of  living  should  conform  to  the  American  concept 
of  comfort,  to  the  time  and  civihzation  in  which  we  live;  that  changes 
with  every  day,  with  every  year,  with  every  decade,  and  the  stand- 
ard of  life  as  among  America's  workers  to-day  compared  to  the 
standard  of  life  of  ten  years  ago,  will  show  quite  a  transformation. 
There  are  contributions  to  our  comfort  and  convenience,  to  the 
standards  of  life,  which  are  now  of  every-day  use  and  which  were 
practically  unknown  in  the  homes  of  the  working  people  in  our  coun- 
try a  decade  or  two  ago.     It  is  a  condition  of  constant  transition. 


488  APPENDIX 

and  I  hope  that  the  standards  will  continue  to  increase  and  improve, 
and  that  America  shall  go  onward  and  forward  as  the  leader  in  the 
civilization  of  the  world. 

Question:  What  was  the  attitude  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  M. 
Clemenceau  toward  the  labor  provisions? 

Answer:  Lloyd  George  and  M.  Clemenceau  were  ardent  sup- 
porters not  only  of  the  Treaty  but  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  of 
the  Labor  Charter. 

Question:  Is  it  likely  that  the  provisions  of  the  Labor  Charter  will 
be  applied  in  the  countries  under  mandatories? 

Answer:  We  have  every  hope  and  belief  that  they  will  at  the 
earliest  possible  practical  opportunity. 

Question:  0/  what  practical  use  is  " Labor* s  Bill  of  Rights"  to 
American  labor? 

Answer:  It  is  the  enunciation  of  purposes  and  principles.  One 
might  just  as  well  ask:  "What  is  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
worth  to  the  people  of  the  United  States?"  It  has  done  much  to 
inspire  the  American  people,  and  it  has  done  more — it  has  helped  to 
spread  the  Gospel  of  Freedom  and  Justice  throughout  the  world.  It 
may  be  questioned  whether  the  provision  in  the  Labor  Treaty  will 
have  any  practical  result  upon  the  people  of  the  United  States 
directly.  As  I  have  already  indicated,  its  greatest  value  is  to  help 
the  people  of  those  most  backward  countries  that  they  may  take 
their  stand  in  their  own  battles,  and  voice  the  hopes  and  ideals  for 
self-achievement  in  their  own  lives  and  in  their  own  country.  You 
cannot  improve  the  standards  of  life  among  a  people  in  any  other 
country  but  what  it  will  react  advantageously  upon  the  people  of  our 
own  country. 

Question:  Why  was  not  the  United  States  represented  by  delegates 
at  the  first  International  Labor  Conference  held  in  Washington  in  Octo- 
ber, 1919? 

Answer:  For  the  very  good  reason  that  we  had  not  ratified  the 
Treaty,  the  League  of  Nations,  nor  the  Labor  Treaty.  We  were  no 
party  to  it  and  not  entitled  to  delegates.  We  were  in  this  anom- 
alous position:  The  government  of  the  United  States  invited  other 
governments  to  send  delegates  to  Washington  to  attend  the  Inter- 
national Labor  Conference  in  October,  1919,  and  here  we  were  hosts 
of  guests  and  yet  had  not  the  right  to  say  a  word  or  participate  in 


APPENDIX  489 

the  conference.  I  was  invited  to  participate  in  the  conference,  I 
suppose,  as  the  executive  officer  of  the  labor  movement  of  our  coun- 
try and  as  President  of  the  International  Labor  Commission,  and 
I  was  given  the  right  to  speak  but  not  the  right  to  vote.  I  at- 
tended one  of  the  meetings  of  that  conference  at  Washington,  and 
upon  one  of  those  subjects  under  discussion  I  availed  myself  of  my 
right  to  speak,  and  did  speak,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  my  address, 
the  question  was  put  to  a  vote  and  thoughtlessly  I  raised  my  hand. 
Then  it  suddenly  occurred  to  me  that  I  was  trespassing  far  beyond 
my  rights  in  that  meeting.  The  indignity  of  it  all  was  too  appalling 
for  me  to  remain  or  attend  another  conference. 

The  reason  that  we  were  not  represented  there  was  because  we 
had  no  right  to  be  represented,  because  we  did  not  ratify  the  Treaty, 
and  may  I  say  this:  I  am  deeply  impressed  by  the  keen  attention 
which  you  have  given  to  my  address,  as  well  as  to  the  answers  which 
I  have  tried  to  give  to  the  questions  propounded.  I  think  there  is  a 
great  service  to  be  performed  by  the  organization  which  is  conducting 
these  lectures.  There  ought  to  be  a  better  understanding  among 
the  people  of  the  United  States  of  what  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  mean.  I  decline  to  accept  as  final  the  declaration  that 
the  votes  cast  last  November  formed  a  declaration  on  the  Treaty  of 
Peace.  (Prolonged  applause.)  Men  have  said  that  the  United 
States  is  so  far  away  from  the  other  countries.  Is  she?  One  hun- 
dred and  fifty  years  ago  we  were  far  away  from  Europe.  We  now 
travel  to  Europe  from  the  United  States  in  six  days.  That,  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years  ago,  took  over  seven  weeks.  We  have  seen 
that  the  United  States  transferred  2,000,000  of  our  American  boys, 
with  all  the  accoutrements  and  necessities  of  war,  across  the  seas 
within  a  year.  We  know  that  we  can  communicate  with  the  other 
lands  and  with  the  remotest  parts  of  the  world  in  a  few  minutes  by 
cable  and  wireless.  All  our  industry,  all  our  commerce,  all  our 
social,  political,  and  industrial  lives  are  now  so  intermingled  with 
the  world  that  we  can  no  longer  regard  ourselves  as  absolutely  apart 
from  the  struggles,  the  progress,  and  the  travail  of  the  world.  In- 
stead of  the  world's  aff"airs  being  decided  without  our  people,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  being  unrepresented,  we  ought  to 
have  a  vote  and  a  voice  and  influence,  and  would  have,  if  the  people 
had  but  the  sense  and  determination  to  say  that  the  Treaty  shall  be 
ratified  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 


490  APPENDIX 

XV 

THE  ATLANTIC  FLEET  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR 
March  4,  1921 

QUESTIONS  ANSWERED  BY  ADMIRAL  HENRY  T.  MAYO,  COMMANDER-IN- 
CHIEF   OF   THE   ATLANTIC    FLEET 

Question:  Why  were  the  British  at  first  doubtful  regarding  the  North 
Sea  Mine  Barrage  project? 

Answer:  The  particular  objection  was  at  first  advanced  in  the 
Grand  Fleet.  The  commander-in-chief  did  not  like  the  idea  of  put- 
ting a  mine  barrage  across  the  North  Sea  on  account  of  interference 
with  shipping.  He  thought  it  might  be  quite  as  dangerous  to  the 
friend  as  to  the  foe.  In  the  Admiralty  they  were  a  little  doubtful 
of  success  because  it  was  a  new  invention.  I  think  they  were  some- 
what doubtful  of  our  abihty  to  produce  the  mines  in  sufficient  num- 
ber. Undoubtedly,  having  never  heard  of  mine  operations  by  the 
United  States,  I  think  they  were  rather  doubtful  of  our  ability  to 
lay  these  mines  successfully. 

Question:  Was  there  any  reason  for  not  rushing  naval  vessels  to 
Europe  as  soon  as  the  United  States  entered  the  war? 

Answer:  To  answer  that  question,  I  think  it  is  necessary  to  refer 
to  the  condition  that  existed  before  the  war  began.  The  whole  de- 
sire of  the  Administration  and,  no  doubt,  the  country,  was  to  avoid 
being  drawn  into  the  war.  Naturally,  there  was  a  reluctance  on  the 
part  of  the  Administration  to  take  any  steps  which  would  indicate 
fear  on  their  part  that  they  were  going  to  be  drawn  into  the  war. 
Some  of  us  in  the  Navy  were  rather  disappointed  that  the  conditions 
were  as  they  then  existed,  but  we  were  restricted.  We  would  have 
been  glad  to  have  had  an  opportunity  to  have  gone  into  it  sooner. 
They  did  a  lot  of  things  that  we  did  not  know  anything  about. 
However,  preparations  were  not  made,  except  such  as  could  be 
made  in  the  Navy  Department  by  the  various  Bureaus  without 
attracting  attention.  A  good  many  things  were  done  in  Washing- 
ton of  which  the  Department  of  the  Navy  was  not  cognizant,  for  all 
of  which  we  are  very  thankful.  After  the  war  began  it  was  the 
belief  of  the  Navy  Department  that  the  United  States  fleet  was  the 
only  reserve  force  which  could  be  depended  upon  to  face  the  Ger- 
mans with  in  case  of  disaster  to  the  British  Grand  Fleet,  which  might 


APPENDIX  491 

take  place  at  any  time,  although,  of  course,  it  was  highly  improbable. 
For  this  reason,  up  to  the  time  when  we  went  into  the  war,  and 
for  some  time  afterward,  the  desire  was  to  keep  our  fleet  intact  until 
it  could  be  determined  just  what  the  course  of  events  would  be. 
The  German  submarines  were  being  most  successfully  operated.  I 
think  April  was  the  big  month,  in  19 18,  of  the  submarine  operation. 
There  was  a  natural  fear  abroad,  which  extended  to  the  United 
States,  that  they  were  going  to  be  even  more  successful,  and  there 
was  a  fear  that  after  a  while  supplies  of  material  would  fail.  There 
was  a  feehng  that  they  did  not  want  a  single  ship  over  there  which 
would  be  dependent  upon  their  resources.  That  was  another  factor 
in  preventing  us  from  rushing  ships  over  there.  When  I  visited 
Europe  in  191 7  I  found,  especially  over  in  France,  that  there  was 
very  great  fear  that  we  would  rush  men  over  there  without  accom- 
panying them  with  supplies  to  maintain  them.  One  French  official 
said  to  me:  "You  must  maintain  your  own  men;  you  must  not  send 
them  over  faster  than  you  can  send  supplies."  There  was  one  ex- 
ception, and  that  exception  was  General  Foch,  who  said;  "What  we 
want  is  men,  men,  men";  but  he  was  different. 

Question:  How  did  the  British  trace  the  German  submarines  from 
the  German  ports? 

Answer:  By  excellent  radio  work  and  by  the  excellent  men 
assigned  to  do  that  work.  The  German  submarines  had  the  habit 
of  reporting  at  least  once  a  day,  often  twice,  and  they  supposed 
that  it  was  impossible  for  anybody  to  decipher  their  code.  But  the 
British  were  very  successful  in  deciphering  their  code;  no  matter 
how  many  times  they  changed  it,  it  would  only  be  a  few  days  before 
they  had  it.  So  expert  were  the  British  radio  operators  they  would 
even  recognize  the  operators  on  the  German  submarines,  and  deter- 
mine what  submarine  they  were  attached  to.  I  heard  one  of  those 
fellows  talking,  and  he  said,  when  he  touched  the  radio:  "That  is 
U-151,"  or  "That  is  U-boat  No.  63."  After  a  time  their  direction 
finders  became  so  acute  that  they  would  determine  the  direction 
from  which  the  signals  were  sent,  and  got  cross-bearings  with  which 
to  fix  the  position  of  the  German  submarine  absolutely. 

Question:  Was  the  disappearance  oj  the  "Cyclops"  ever  cleared  up? 
Answer:  No,  not  to  my  knowledge.     Nothing  has  been  heard  of 
the  Cyclops. 

Question:  Is  it  true  that  President  Wilson  originated  the  convoy 
system? 


492  APPENDIX 

Answer:  Possibly.  The  convoy  system  had  been  advocated  by 
many,  and  had  been  opposed  by  a  great  many,  especially  in  England. 
The  United  States  Navy  Department  was  not  impressed  with  the 
idea  at  first,  seeing  the  many  difficulties.  It  was  reahzed  by  them 
that  going  in  convoy,  the  convoy  would  have  to  go  at  the  slowest 
speed  of  the  slowest  ship,  and  it  was  a  disadvantage  to  those  who 
had  faster  boats.  They  also  thought  that  it  was  very  difficult  to 
get  the  number  of  officers  to  do  the  extra  work,  but  these  ideas 
nearly  all  disappeared  when  the  convoy  system  was  tried.  Admiral 
Sims  was  very  insistent  on  it  in  his  recommendation;  so  we  tried  it 
and  it  was  finally  adopted  within  a  month  after  the  first  convoy 
started.     However,  I  don't  know  that  President  Wilson  ordered  it. 

Question:  What  effect  is  the  airplane  going  to  have  on  the  battleship? 

Answer:  If  an  airplane  has  a  big  enough  bomb  and  drops  it  on 
a  battleship  it  is  going  to  make  it  very  interesting  for  the  battleship; 
but  I  don't  beheve  that  we  have  got  to  the  point  where  a  bomb 
dropped  from  an  airplane  will  destroy  a  battleship  or  damage  her 
very  much,  because  the  bombs  will  not  go  through  her  decks  and 
will  not  disturb  the  turret.  There  is  not  one  built  that  can  go 
through  a  turret  of  a  ship.  One  must  drop  these  bombs  from  a 
place  where  they  cannot  be  fired  at  from  the  battleship.  General 
Mitchell,  Chief  of  the  Army  Aviation  Forces,  says  his  planes  can 
drop  bombs  on  battleships  without  any  trouble  at  all.  Possibly 
they  can,  but  I  think  it  would  be  a  very  difficult  thing.  In  spite  of 
the  fact  that  he  says  that  an  airplane  is  a  very  hard  thing  to  hit,  I 
think  he  would  find  it  very  different  if  they  ran  up  against  a  barrage 
which  has  an  accepted  method  of  deahng  with  an  airplane  attack, 
or  if  they  were  disturbed  by  airplanes  on  the  other  side.  It  is  a  very 
difficult  matter  to  drop  a  bomb  from  an  airplane  at  a  great  height 
that  will  strike  an  object  even  as  large  as  a  super-dreadnaught. 
There  are  some  computations  that  I  heard  of  a  short  time  ago  which 
were  to  the  effect  that  a  plane  at  a  height  of  6,000  feet  would  have 
one-half  a  second  of  time  in  which  the  operator  must  decide  in  his 
mind  whether  or  not  he  is  at  the  proper  point  where  he  must  release 
the  bomb  in  order  to  make  a  hit.  I  do  not  think  that  there  is  any 
disposition  to  attempt  to  underestimate  the  dangers  from  an  aviation 
force;  on  the  contrary,  their  possibifities  are  reahzed,  and  I  think  it 
is  the  purpose  in  Congress  and  elsewhere  to  give  it  every  possible 
chance  to  develop,  and  do  everything  necessary  to  be  done  to  get 
what  is  possible  out  of  aircraft  of  all  kinds.  But  I  am  one  of  the 
conservative  old  cranks  who  think  the  battleships  are  not  dead  yet. 


APPENDIX  493 

Question:  How  Jar  do  you  believe  it  wise  Jor  the  United  States  to 
go  in  a  policy  oj  disarmament? 

Answer:  If  there  could  be  a  condition  of  the  Iamb  and  the  lion 
lying  down  together  so  that  we  do  without  armies  entirely,  we  would 
arrive  at  an  ideal  condition.  If  nations  could  be  as  safe  without 
any  armament  as  you  are  in  the  streets  of  Philadelphia  without  a 
gun,  I  feel  then  that  it  might  be,  and  that  it  would  be  a  desirable 
condition.  But  it  is  impossible.  Nations,  like  individuals,  are  self- 
ish. They  don't  trust  each  other.  And  until  the  day  comes  when 
they  do  trust  each  other  completely,  armament  must  continue. 
This  idea  of  disarmament  is  not  new;  it  has  been  considered  for  over 
one  hundred  years.  At  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  in  1815,  the  subject 
was  brought  up  and  strenuous  efforts  were  made  to  arrive  at  an 
agreement  on  disarmament,  or  for  limitations  of  arms.  However, 
no  conclusion  could  be  reached.  No  nation  wants  to  give  up  any- 
thing. All  through  the  nineteenth  century  there  were  frequent 
international  conferences  which  succeeded  in  accomplishing  a  great 
deal  in  ameliorating  war  troubles  and  in  arriving  at  international 
agreements  to  prohibit  the  weapons  of  war,  but  never  any  agreement 
as  to  the  limitations  of  armament.  In  1899,  at  the  instance  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  the  first  Hague  Conference  was  called,  with  the 
express  idea  of  arriving  at  some  international  agreement  for  limita- 
tion of  armament  or  for  the  limitation  of  budgets  to  be  expended 
for  armament.  I  have  recently  gone  pretty  carefully  over  the 
reports  of  the  proceedings  of  that  conference,  and  the  discussions 
were  very  illuminating.  They  show  that  nobody  wanted  to  give  up 
anything  that  they  had.  They  were  perfectly  willing  to  let  the 
other  fellow  cut  down,  but  they  wanted  to  hold  everything  they  had 
which  would  give  them  an  advantage.  They  arrived  finally  at  the 
conclusion  "That  the  various  nations  should  seriously  consider  the 
subject  of  International  hmitations  of  armament,  to  be  brought  up 
at  some  future  time."  In  1907,  at  the  second  Hague  Conference, 
this  subject  was  brought  up  again  by  the  representatives  of  Great 
Britain,  seconded  by  the  United  States  and  France;  the  only  result 
was  the  adoption  again  of  a  resolution,  saying,  "that  in  view  of  the 
material  increase  in  mihtary  forces  in  the  various  nations,  and  es- 
pecially in  the  expenditures  for  mihtary  purposes,"  the}^  again  recom- 
mended that  the  government  seriously  consider  this  subject.  I  don't 
think  there  has  ever  been  any  limitation  of  armament  by  agreement, 
except  in  one  case:  You  remember  that  history  tells  us  that  there 
was  a  limitation  of  the  army  of  Prussia  in  1807,  at  the  treaty  with 
Napoleon,  when   Prussia  was  to  hmit  her  army  to  42,000  men. 


494  APPENDIX 

Nevertheless,  in  1813  Prussia  uncovered  a  trained  army  which  was 
established  in  spite  of  the  previous  agreement.  Men  had  been  put  in 
under  short  enlistment  service  under  which  they  were  trained  by  the 
thousands.  In  1902  there  was  an  agreement  Hmiting  the  naval  arma- 
ment between  Chili  and  the  Argentine.  This  lasted  for  five  years. 
At  the  expiration  of  that  period  it  was  not  renewed,  and  they  pro- 
ceeded to  spend  as  much  money  as  they  could  to  get  hold  of  and  to 
continue  naval  armament.  In  19 13  the  subject  of  a  naval  holiday 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  was  broached  in  Parliament  by 
Winston  Churchill,  and,  as  shown  by  his  speeches  in  Parliament,  he 
was  perfectly  willing  to  have  a  naval  hohday,  providing  England 
could  retain  all  the  advantages  she  had;  it  was  never  taken  up  of- 
ficially. It  is  a  grand  idea,  if  it  were  possible  for  nations  to  get  to- 
gether and  agree  that  none  of  them  would  carry  a  gun.  It  would  be 
a  splendid  thing  to  do,  but  they  won't  agree.  If  they  said  that  there 
should  be  a  limitation  of  armament,  when  they  get  together  to  act 
on  the  details  of  it,  they  strike  so  many  snags  that  there  is  no  con- 
clusion arrived  at. 

Question:  What  part  did  the  French  naiA/-  perform  in  the  war? 

Answer:  The  French,  in  conjunction  with  the  Italian  forces,  had 
practically  charge  of  the  German  and  Austrian  operations  in  the 
Mediterranean.  On  the  Atlantic  and  on  the  North  Sea,  of  course, 
the  British  predominated.  The  French  also  took  part  in  the  con- 
voy operations  with  their  cruisers,  and  in  the  patrol  of  the  Atlantic 
on  their  own  coast,  and  of  course  engaged  there  in  mine-sweeping 
operations.  I  think  the  French  did  everything  they  could  have 
been  expected  to  do  and  they  are  entitled  to  the  very  greatest  com- 
mendation. They  worked  their  cruisers  until  they  were  ready  to 
fall  apart.  They  ran  very  little  to  torpedo  boats,  and  it  was  for 
that  reason  that  they  made  their  first  call  on  us  to  help  them  out 
in  that  line.  Incidentally,  I  would  hke  to  tell  you  something  in 
regard  to  that.  Admiral  Grasset  called  for  small  craft  and  asked 
that  they  be  rushed.  In  answering  this  request  our  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  was  conservative;  he  would  not  definitely  say  what  we  could 
send  and  when.  He  did  promise,  however,  that  we  would  do  the 
best  we  could.  In  the  fall  of  19 18  I  met  Admiral  Grasset,  and  in 
talking  to  him  about  naval  issues  at  a  lunch  one  day  I  said  to  him: 
"Admiral,  do  you  remember  your  request  and  what  you  told  us  in 
regard  to  rushing  small  craft  over  when  the  war  first  began,  and  we 
sent  them?  Tell  me  how  you  think  it  turned  out."  The  Admiral 
said:    "You  did  far  more  than  we  had  any  idea  was  possible." 


APPENDIX  495 


XVI 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  DISARMAMENT 

December  lo,  1920 

QUESTIONS  ANSWERED  BY  GENERAL  TASKER  HOWARD  BLISS,  REP- 
RESENTATIVE OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  ON  THE  SUPREME  WAR 
COUNCIL   AND   COMMISSIONER    PLENIPOTENTIARY 

Question:  General,  did  you  say  that  each  nation  will  maintain  its 
navy?  Do  you  mea7i  that  the  United  States  should  maintain  what  it 
has  and  stop  building? 

Answer:  No,  what  I  mean  is  this.  If  an  international  Confer- 
ence should  be  held  and  the  American  representatives  should  be 
asked  to  make  a  proposition,  I  think  that  it  would  not  be  wise  for 
them  to  propose  something  at  the  outset  that  would  almost  cer- 
tainly be  rejected.  I,  therefore,  should  think  it  better  for  them  to 
pass  over,  or  defer  to  the  last,  any  proposition  relating  to  fortifica- 
tions and  navies,  because  those  elements  in  international  armaments 
are  not  the  most  dangerous  menace  to  international  peace.  Hereto- 
fore, nations  have  not  been  able  to  accomplish  anything  in  the  way 
of  a  limitation  of  armaments  because  some  one  of  them  has  always 
proposed,  and  insisted  upon,  at  the  very  beginning,  something  that 
the  others  wull  not  accept.  I  think  that  in  this  matter  the  nations 
must  proceed  step  by  step,  and  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  find  out 
something  that  is  practicable  that  they  will  all  agree  to.  They  have 
all  maintained  that  the  system  of  the  "Nation  in  Arms,"  which 
was  inaugurated  by  Germany,  has  been  the  cause  of  all  the  excessive 
armaments;  and  that  the  last  war  was  fought  in  order  to  destroy 
that  system.  Because,  they  held,  that  until  it  was  destroyed  in  Ger- 
many it  could  not  be  destroyed  elsewhere.  If  they  are  now  agreed 
upon  anything  it  is  to  do  something  in  the  way  of  limiting  the  ex- 
cessive land  armaments.  This,  therefore,  is  the  first  step  that  it 
seems  to  me  ought  to  be  proposed.  If,  as  a  result  of  that,  the  con- 
stant threat  of  world  war  can  be  minimized,  then,  it  is  possible,  the 
nations  will  of  their  own  accord  take  measures  to  reduce  their  ex- 
penses in  maintaining  the  other  elements  of  national  armaments. 
I  do  not  think  that  for  an  indefinite  time  to  come  we  need  concern 
ourselves  with  the  question  of  land  fortifications.  That  is  purely 
a  domestic  question.  Land  fortifications  will  not  hurt  any  one  un- 
less some  one  runs  up  against  them.  The  fear  that  now  exists,  in 
some  countries,  of  invasion  by  the  army  of  some  other  country  is 


496  APPENDIX 

due  to  the  existence  of  great  military  establishments  on  land.  It 
is  this  which  largely  causes  some  of  the  nations  to  maintain  great 
navies.  They  are  afraid  that  an  enemy's  navy  may  convoy  trans- 
ports carrying  a  great  army  to  attack  them.  If  this  latter  fear  can 
be  removed  or  minimized  the  question  of  the  navies  will  take  care 
of  itself.  Nations  will  not  long  maintain  navies  of  excessive  strength 
if  they  are  once  reheved  of  the  fear  of  attack  by  great  foreign  armies* 
To  sum  it  all  up,  there  are  three  things  which  constitute  the  elements 
of  national  armaments: 

I  St.  Land  fortifications. 

2nd.  Navies. 

3rd.  The  land  military  establishments  resulting  from  the  doc- 
trine of  the  "Nation  in  Arms." 

The  first  two  of  these  are  the  cheapest  and  constitute  the  least 
menace  to  international  peace.  These  questions,  therefore,  in  an 
international  Conference  to  discuss  the  limitation  of  armaments 
could  well  be  discussed  last,  or  left  to  take  care  of  themselves.  But 
if  we  cannot  come  to  some  reasonable  agreement  in  respect  to  the 
overweening  land  military  establishments,  there  is  little  hope  of 
accomplishing  anything. 

Question:  In  your  opinion  do  you  consider  the  submarine  was  an 
effective  means  oj  warfare  during  the  late  World  War? 

Answer:  In  the  last  war,  I  should  say,  the  effect  of  the  submarine 
was  like  that  of  a  two-edged  sword, — cutting  both  ways.  It  was 
very  effective  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Central  Powers  in  that 
it  destroyed  millions  of  tons  of  shipping  that  could  otherwise  have 
been  used  in  the  transportation  of  troops,  food-supphes  and  mihtary 
supphes  of  all  kinds  for  the  AHies.  Its  effect  was  against  the  Central 
Powers  in  that  its  ruthless  use  stimulated  the  passions  of  the  AHies 
for  a  more  bitter  and  prolonged  war  and,  ultimately,  by  creating  at 
least  one  more  active  enemy  in  causing  the  United  States  to  declare 
war.  In  every  war  new  agencies  of  destruction  are  introduced.  Some 
of  these  agencies  prove  at  once  so  effective  that  they  are  immediately 
adopted  by  both  sides  in  the  war.  Some  of  them  prove  to  be  ineffec- 
tive, adding  merely  to  the  bitterness  of  the  struggle,  but  really  ac- 
complishing nothing  in  deciding  the  war.  Some  of  them  prove  to 
be  not  very  effective  while,  at  the  same  time,  experts  in  such  things 
are  satisfied  that  by  further  improvement  they  may  become  very 
effective  in  the  next  war.  These  latter  agencies  are,  therefore,  likely 
to  be  legalized  and  developed  and  their  use  become  habitual  in  suc- 
ceeding wars.     Even  those  who  think  that  the  submarine  was  not 


APPENDIX 


497 


very  effective  in  the  last  war  know  that  it  developed  possibilities 
of  effectiveness,  after  further  improvement,  in  future  wars  and  that, 
therefore,  the  submarine  has  come  to  stay.  In  the  same  way,  air- 
planes and  tanks  developed  an  increasing  effectiveness  which  has 
caused  them  to  be  recognized  as  necessary  parts  of  national  arma- 
ments for  the  future.  Limiting  your  question  to  the  submarine,  I 
have  no  doubt  that  this  weapon  will  be  an  enormously  powerful 
agency  of  defense  for  use  by  the  United  States  in  protecting  our  coast 
and  harbors  against  attack. 

Question:  With  new  developments,  coming  out  of  this  war,  such 
as  the  submarine  and  airplane,  will  their  use  make  it  more  difficult  or 
less  difficult,  if  we  were  not  prepared  in  the  United  States  to  defend  our- 
selves against  an  aggressive  nation  which  is  better  prepared? 

Answer:  If  your  question  means  this:  Can  the  United  States 
safely  neglect  preparation  in  time  of  peace  and,  in  case  of  sudden 
attack  by  a  powerful,  aggressive  and  prepared  enemy,  find  some 
safe  agency  of  defense  developed  by  the  recent  war?  I  think  that 
the  question  should  be  answered  in  the  negative.  So  long  as  war  is 
possible  or  probable,  safety  in  defense  will  consist  in  being  equally 
well  prepared  with  the  possible  aggressor.  At  the  same  time,  I  think 
that  the  last  war  developed  certain  agencies  for  defense  that  may 
enable  an  unprepared  nation  to  more  quickly  prepare  itself  to  meet 
an  emergency,  but  these  agencies  are,  for  the  most  part,  those  that 
will  be  developed  in  a  great  industrial  nation.  All  of  the  chemical 
agencies  that  are  used  in  modern  war  can  be  prepared  relatively 
quickly  in  establishments  that  are  engaged  in  peaceful  productions. 
If  such  establishments  exist  in  great  numbers  in  one  country  and 
not  in  another,  they  give  the  former  a  great  relative  advantage  over 
the  latter.  In  the  same  way  a  nation  which,  in  time  of  peace,  should 
develop  the  use  of  airplanes  for  commercial  purposes  would  find  it- 
self on  the  approach  of  war  already  provided  with  a  very  powerful 
agency  for  defense.  One  of  the  great  advantages  of  Germany  in 
the  recent  war  was  the  fact  that  so  many  of  her  peaceful  establish- 
ments could  be  rapidly  diverted  to  the  production  of  material  for 
war.  From  this  point  of  view,  your  question  would  be  answered  in 
the  affirmative,  provided  the  United  States  developed  in  time  of 
peace  the  industries  which  could  rapidly  supply  in  large  numbers 
such  things  as  submarines,  airplanes,  tanks,  and  chemical  products 
for  our  defense.  Even  in  that  case  our  safety  would  have  to  depend 
upon  our  relative  isolation,  which  might  give  us  time  to  divert  these 
industries  to  the  manufacture  of  material  for  war.    But  if  war  is  to 


498  APPENDIX 

come,  the  only  real  assurance  of  defense  is  to  be  prepared  for  it  in 
advance. 

Question:  How  Jar  or  by  what  means  do  you  think  we  must  clear 
the  ground  of  Bolshevism,  before  we  can  go  on  to  a  realization  of  peace? 

Answer:  If  Bolshevism  were  to  be  limited  to  a  governmental 
theory  and  were  to  be  confined  to  Russia,  I  think  we  could  clear  the 
ground  right  away.  Bolshevism  is  a  theory  which  is  propagated  in 
two  ways:  first,  by  written  and  spoken  propaganda  and,  second, 
by  force  of  arms.  When  it  is  propagated  in  the  first  way,  it  can  be 
kept  out  of  a  country  only  by  fighting  it  with  a  similar  propaganda, 
— by  convincing  the  people  that  it  is  not  a  good  thing  and  that  some- 
thing else  is  better.  It  is  when  Bolshevism  is  propagated  in  the  second 
way  that  it  becomes  a  menace  to  international  peace.  If  the  Bolshe- 
viks of  Russia  attack  another  country  in  order  to  spread  its  doctrines, 
or  for  any  other  purpose,  that  other  country  must  be  prepared  to 
resist  it  by  force.  And  I  recognize  this  as  one  of  the  unfortunate 
things  that  may  delay  a  general  Hmitation  of  armaments.  But  there 
is  no  use  of  talking  about  stopping  by  force  of  arms  what  you  might 
call  a  peaceful  propaganda  of  Bolshevism  as  it  comes  out  of  Russia. 
Armies  cannot  keep  the  theory  of  Bolshevism  from  penetrating  the 
United  States  or  England  or  France  or  from  any  other  country  to 
which  the  adherents  of  that  theory  want  to  carry  it.  At  one  time 
during  the  Peace  Conference  there  was  some  talk  of  establishing  a 
military  sanitary  cordon  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea  to  stop 
the  progress  of  Bolshevism.  Of  course,  every  one  knew  that  that 
would  not  stop  the  progress  of  the  idea  of  Bolshevism  although  it 
might  stop  the  progress  of  Bolsheviks.  When  this  idea  of  Bolshevism 
penetrates  any  country  and  the  result  of  this  penetration  is  to  bring 
on  internal  disorder,  perhaps  even  revolution,  the  government  of 
that  country  may  have  to  fight  it  by  force.  In  the  course  of  my  dis- 
cussion I  have  recognized  this  possibility  as  one  of  the  things  that 
will  require  each  country  to  maintain  a  mihtary  force  for  the  preser- 
vation of  order  within  its  own  boundaries.  No  government  can  be 
expected  to  contemplate  the  possibility  of  its  own  destruction.  It 
must  have  power  to  maintain  itself,  but  that  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  having  the  excessive  armament  necessary  for  international 
aggression  and  war.  So  far  as  the  general  question  is  concerned, 
our  main  hope  Hes  in  the  destruction  of  Bolshevism  from  its  own 
internal  forces  tending  to  disrupt  it. 

Question:  Do  you  not  think.  General,  that  treaty  arrangements  be- 
tween great  powers  will  be  more  efficacious  in  maintaining  peace  than 


APPENDIX  499 

disarmament?  That  is,  an  alliance  such  as  existed  before  1914?  // 
England  had  united  with  France  and  Russia  at  the  outset,  would  not 
that  have  6een  more  efficacious  than  disarmament? 

Answer:  If  all  of  the  great  Powers  entered  into  an  alliance  for 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  peace,  it  would  doubtless  be  effective 
so  long  as  the  alhance  continued,  but  who  can  possibly  maintain 
that,  as  long  as  such  an  alliance  existed,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
support  the  present  excessive  military  establishments?  As  a  matter 
of  fact  such  an  alliance  has  never  existed,  and  there  is  no  reason  in 
history  for  beheving  that  it  can  exist.  These  great  armaments  ex- 
isted because  of  certain  national  pohcies  which  caused  the  great 
Powers  to  be  afraid  of  each  other.  If  these  policies  can  be  modified, 
armaments  would  undoubtedly  be  reduced,  because  no  nation  will 
bear  the  burden  longer  than  it  thinks  absolutely  necessary.  So  long 
as  nations  have  mutually  antagonistic  policies  they  cannot  be  united 
in  a  common  alliance,  but  they  almost  certainly  will  be  united  in  two 
groups  of  alliances  and  that  is  the  thing  which  I  have  pointed  out 
as  the  primary  cause  of  the  last  war.  The  nations  whose  policies 
were,  for  the  time  at  least,  the  more  sympathetic  with  each  other 
united  together.  And  that  brought  them  into  two  groups  whose 
policies  were  more  or  less  antagonistic  to  each  other.  But  assume 
that  such  an  alliance  as  your  question  presupposes  were  in  existence. 
It  is  perfectly  evident  that  as  those  nations  differ  in  wealth  and  in 
population  some  of  them — if  they  are  all  armed  to  the  extent  of 
their  abihty — will  have  bigger  armies  and  navies  than  the  others. 
When  any  important  question  comes  up  which  they  must  settle 
among  themselves,  how  can  there  be  any  possibihty  of  peaceful  dis- 
cussion of  it  so  long  as  they  are  armed  to  the  teeth?  We  all  know 
very  well  that  in  the  recent  history  of  Europe  the  time  came  more 
than  once  when,  in  the  so-called  peaceful  discussion  of  some  ques- 
tion of  common  interest  and  affecting  the  common  peace,  Germany 
placed  her  sword  in  the  balance  and  weighed  down  the  scales  of  jus- 
tice in  her  favor.  Or,  take  a  more  famihar  illustration  and  suppose 
that  I  and  a  half  dozen  other  gentlemen  here  were  to  assemble  about 
this  table  to  discuss  some  very  important  questions  affecting  all  of 
us.  All  of  us  know  that  in  a  fair  discussion  each  one  must  be  pre- 
pared to  give  and  take,  but  suppose  that  as  we  sit  down  at  the 
table  you  see  the  handle  of  a  pistol  sticking  out  of  my  hip-pocket 
and  I  see  the  handle  of  a  butcher  knife  sticking  out  of  yours,  is  it 
not  evident  that  the  first  question  that  will  be  asked  will  be;  "What 
are  we  going  to  do  with  these  arms?  will  you  lay  your  knife  down  if 
I  put  my  pistol  down?"    If  either  of  us  says  "No,"  is  it  not  evident 


500  APPENDIX 

that  there  is  an  end  to  our  discussion?  Is  it  not  evident  that  in  an 
alliance  of  the  great  Powers  the  first  question  will  be:  "How  can  we 
limit  our  armaments  to  such  a  point  that  we  will  have  no  special 
fear  of  each  other?"  It  may  be  that  we  will  still  have  our  scraps 
but  no  one  of  us  would  endure  that  situation  very  long  so  long  as 
any  one  of  us  had  the  power  to  lay  his  pistol  on  the  table  and  say: 
"Gentlemen,  there  is  my  final  argument."  Suppose  that  Germany 
and  the  Central  Powers  were  in  such  an  alhance  just  before  the  be- 
ginning of  the  recent  war.  What  would  prevent  them  from  saying, 
if  they  so  desired:  "This  alliance  will  not  agree  to  our  doing  certain 
things  that  we  want  to  do;  we  are  armed  to  the  teeth;  we  beheve 
that  we  are  stronger  than  the  rest  of  the  alhance  and  can  whip  it, 
and  we  intend  to  do  so."  That  is  exactly  what  they  did  do  and  they, 
or  any  other  nations,  will  continue  to  do  the  same  thing  as  long  as 
they  feel  that  they  are  able  to  enforce  their  will. 

Question:  General  Bliss,  was  any  effort  made  at  any  of  the  different 
peace  conferences  at  Paris  to  recognize  the  reduction  oj  national  arma- 
ment to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national  sajety? 

Answer:  It  was  recognized  in  Article  VIII,  second  chapter  of 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Again  it  was  recognized 
in  the  Preamble  to  the  mihtary  terms  of  peace  with  Germany. 

Question:  //  one  Nation  should  refuse  to  disarm,  how  could  you 
compel  it? 

Answer:  It  has  not  been  suggested  that  the  United  States  should 
absolutely  disarm,  but  should  only  limit  its  armament  within  reason- 
able limits.  In  answer  to  your  question  I  should  say  that  this  ques- 
tion of  hmitation  of  armaments  is  of  serious  concern  to  the  great 
Powers  alone,  which  are  small  in  number.  The  hope  of  getting  the 
consent  of  these  to  some  reasonable  hmitation  hes  in  their  utter  ex- 
haustion from  the  last  war  and  the  universal  dread  of  a  similar  one 
in  the  future.  If  any  one  of  these  great  Powers  should  positively 
refuse  to  consider  the  question  of  any  hmitation  of  its  armament, 
it  would  be  equivalent  to  a  declaration  that  it  proposes  to  carry  out 
its  national  pohcies  by  force  of  arms,  if  necessary.  There  would 
at  least  be  one  good  result  from  an  international  Conference  on  this 
subject,  even  if  it  did  nothing  more  than  to  ehcit  such  a  declaration 
from  one  of  the  great  Powers,  and  that  is  this:  we  would  then  know 
which  one  is  to  be  the  next  Germany,  and  we  would  the  more  cheer- 
fully pay  our  taxes  to  be  ready  to  destroy  it.  In  short,  I  see  no  hope 
except  from  a  common  agreement  among  the  five  great  powers.     I 


APPENDIX  501 

have  no  specific  proposition  to  advance  as  to  any  particular  scheme 
for  a  limitation  of  armaments.  The  main  thing  that  I  want  to  im- 
press upon  you  is  the  necessity  of  promptly  holding  an  international 
Conference  on  this  subject,  composed  of  the  most  far-seeing  states- 
men. There  is  no  doubt  that  such  statesmen  want  to  do  something 
and  our  main  hope  is  in  getting  them  together  while  that  spirit  is 
strong  in  them. 

Question  :  Is  not  the  practical  result  of  your  proposition  likely  to 
lead  to  the  control  of  the  world  by  England  and  America  through  their 
navies  ? 

Answer:  If  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  wanted  to  enter 
into  a  formal  alHance  for  the  control  of  the  world,  they  doubtless 
could  accomphsh  a  great  deal  in  that  direction.  Ultimately,  it  would 
be  the  ruin  of  both  of  them.  If  they  have  the  shghtest  intention  of 
doing  what  your  question  implies,  you  can  be  sure  that  they  will 
not  put  any  limitation  on  their  armaments.  It  is  for  you,  as  an 
American,  to  say  what  our  attitude  on  that  question  shall  be.  If 
in  the  last  resort  it  is  our  wicked  purpose  to  control  the  world,  there 
would  be  at  least  some  financial  advantage  in  doing  it  with  navies 
alone  rather  than  with  the  superadded  cost  of  armies.  But,  speak- 
ing seriously,  I  do  not  think  that  there  is  any  danger  of  navies  alone, 
to  whomsoever  they  may  belong,  dominating  the  world.  No  navy 
alone  has  conquered  any  territory.  It  has  to  be  supported  by  mili- 
tary forces  to  do  this.  The  English  Navy  by  itself  has  not  interfered 
with  the  lawful  trade  of  any  other  country.  Nor  has  the  American 
Navy  done  so;  nor  will  it  do  so.  And,  if  there  is  any  one  lesson  to 
be  learned  from  the  recent  world  war,  it  is  this :  the  world  as  a  whole 
will  not  endure  its  domination  by  any  one  Power  or  combination  of 
them.  The  world  will  fight  to  prevent  it  and  destroy  that  combina- 
tion just  as  certainly  as  we  destroyed  the  combination  of  the  Central 
Powers  whose  object,  also,  was  world-domination.  As  I  have  al- 
ready said  so  often,  in  one  form  of  words  or  another,  if  the 
great  Powers  still  intend  to  pursue  the  phantom  of  world-domina- 
tion, there  is  no  hope  of  limiting  the  armaments  that  they  think 
necessary  for  that  purpose.  The  world  will  then  have  to  continue 
the  system  which  has  already  brought  it  to  the  verge  of  ruin  and 
we  can  do  nothing  more  than  pray  God  that  our  civilization  will 
continue  to  stand  the  strain. 

Question:  General,  do  you  think  such  a  preposition  would  be  re- 
ceived cordially  by  Europe? 


502  APPENDIX 

Answer:  I  do  not  know  how  the  national  leaders,  who  are  in- 
fluenced by  their  secret  knowledge  of  their  national  policies,  would 
receive  it,  but  I  am  sure  that  the  vast  mass  of  the  peoples  would 
receive  it  cordially. 

Question:  In  your  opinion,  don^t  you  think  the  time  will  be  hast- 
ened toward  disarmament  ij  the  United  States  should  get  into  this  agree- 
ment with  the  nations? 

Answer:  I  am  not  quite  sure  what  you  mean  by  "getting  into 
this  agreement  with  the  nations."  If  you  mean  getting  into  an  agree- 
ment with  the  nations  in  respect  to  a  limitation  of  their  armaments, 
of  course  I  beheve  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  will  be  hastened. 
None  of  the  great  Powers  will  agree  to  do  anything  unless  they  all 
agree  to  do  it.  If  the  United  States  does  not  enter  into  an  agreement 
with  the  other  Powers  on  this  subject,  there  will  be  no  limitation  of 
armaments.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  United  States  makes  such 
a  proposition  and  demands  its  fair  consideration,  I  believe  that  all 
will  accede  to  it  as  far  as  it  is  possible.  In  fact,  I  beheve  the  solu- 
tion is  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  United  States.  We  will  hasten 
it  by  making  the  first  step  toward  the  agreement.  The  United  States 
should  take  advantage  of  its  influence,  which  is  enormous  at  this 
moment,  to  demand  that  the  nations  sit  down  and  talk  the  matter 
over.  We,  and  the  other  great  Powers,  have  been  spending  since 
the  armistice  more  money  on  our  military  estabhshments  than  ever 
before  in  time  of  peace.  What  are  we  and  they  doing  this  for?  We 
are  doing  it  because  we  still  profess  to  be  afraid  of  each  other.  If 
this  fear  is  not,  in  its  entirety,  well-founded  neither  we  nor  they  want 
to  spend  so  much  money  for  this  purpose;  if  we  find  that  it  is  well- 
founded,  we  want  to  go  ahead  with  our  preparations  and  spend  even 
more  money.  If  we  can  have  a  fair  Conference  on  this  subject  we 
and  they  may  find  out  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  spend  so  much  for 
such  a  purpose,  and  we  may  rest  assured  that  as  soon  as  the  common 
people  should  beheve  that  it  is  not  necessary  the  money  will  not  be 
forthcoming  for  this  purpose.  I  beheve  that  it  will  be  possible  for 
wise  statesmen  of  the  United  States  to  make  some  proposition  which, 
when  known  and  understood  by  the  common  peoples  of  the  great 
Powers,  will  result  in  its  acceptance  and  in  a  material  rehef  from 
present  burdens  as  well  as  a  materially  increased  assurance  of  future 
peace.    The  United  States  can  materially  hasten  this  movement. 

Question:  In  view  oj  Germany's  constant  effort  to  evade  the  pro- 
visions oj  the  treaty  in  Jurnishing  coal  and  rolling-stock,  etc.,  how  can 
you  rely  on  her  professions  and  on  her  promises? 


APPENDIX  503 

Answer:  In  answering  that  question  I  shall  state,  first  of  all,  that 
I  am  not  prepared  to  accept  the  extreme  view  that  there  is  a  constant 
effort  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  avoid  the  provisions  of  the  treaty, 
— at  least  in  so  far  as  those  provisions  concern  the  subject  that  we 
are  talking  about  to-night.  The  despatches  in  the  daily  press,  com- 
ing from  all  kinds  of  sources,  are  enough  to  show  that,  even  outside 
of  Germany,  there  is  no  unanimity  of  behef  that  all  of  these  pro- 
visions canibe  complied  with  at  the  time  contemplated  by  the  treaty. 
Nevertheless,  in  regard  to  the  provisions  that  at  this  moment  con- 
cern us,  I  am  satisfied,  from  inquiries  of  all  those  who  are  in  a  posi- 
tion to  know,  that  the  provisions  relating  to  disarmament  have  been 
carried  out  as  rapidly  as  could  reasonably  be  expected  and,  of  course, 
that  is  the  thing  of  the  greatest  importance.  No  one  supposes  that 
Germany  or  any  other  beaten  enemy  will  cheerfully  and  gladly  com- 
ply with  onerous  conditions  of  peace.  The  main  thing  is  to  be  as- 
sured that  she  cannot  fight  in  order  to  avoid  compHance  with  the 
treaty,  and  her  inabihty  to  fight  depends  entirely  upon  the  success 
of  her  disarmament.  The  recent  official  report  made  by  the  French 
Prime  Minister  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  shows  that  this  dis- 
armament has  been  very  satisfactorily  completed.  When  you  think 
of  the  amount  of  armament  that  the  Germans  surrendered  at  the 
time  of  the  armistice,  the  still  greater  amount  that  was  abandoned 
by  them  in  the  disorganization  of  their  army  immediately  following 
the  armistice,  and  the  vast  amounts  now  officially  reported  to  have 
been  surrendered  for  destruction  in  compliance  with  the  terms  of 
the  treaty,  and  when  you  think  that  all  German  arms-factories  are 
under  observation  of  inter-allied  military  commissions,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  believe  that  there  is  the  material  necessary  to  equip  a  Ger- 
man army  for  an  international  war.  The  French  Prime  Minister 
has  reported  that  the  disarmament  has  proceeded  in  a  satisfactory 
manner  and  as  rapidly  as  could  be  expected.  Much  of  that  material 
was  scattered  all  over  Germany  and  it  has  been  a  long  process,  nat- 
urally, to  get  possession  of  it  in  order  to  destroy  it.  Large  inter- 
alHed  military  commissions  are  and  have  been  travelhng  all  over 
Germany,  and  it  is  impossible  that  anything  really  worth  speaking 
of  has  escaped  their  attention.  Of  course,  I  am  not  now  speaking 
of  Germany's  failure  to  comply  with  any  provision  relating  to  repara- 
tion or  anything  of  that  sort.  I  am  speaking  only  of  her  abifity  to 
evade  compliance  with  "her  professions  and  her  promises"  by  force 
of  arms,  and  I  think  this  ability  has  become  a  negfigible  quantity. 
Of  course,  Germany  is  not  doing  anything  in  the  way  of  comphance 
with  the  treaty  because  she  likes  it;   I  don't  know  of  any  defeated 


504  APPENDIX 

nation  that  has  ever  done  so.  I  am  amazed  that  they  have  made 
the  progress  which  they  have  in  accompHshing  the  reahzation  of 
the  mihtary  conditions  that  we  imposed  on  her.  It  would  take  a 
long  time  merely  to  read  to  you  what  those  conditions  are.  I  do 
not  think  that  the  average  audience  has  a  realization  of  what  it  is 
that  Germany  is  required  to  do;  and  I  think  that  in  realizing  the 
particular  conditions  which  make  it  impossible  for  her  to  engage, 
with  any  hope  of  success,  in  an  international  war  she  has  done  very 
well  thus  far.  If  the  Allies  are  determined  to  impose  their  will  upon 
Germany  in  respect  to  the  other  provisions  of  the  treaty — those 
relating  to  reparations,  etc., — they  have  the  full  power  necessary 
to  do  so.  As  I  have  already  pointed  out  to  you,  while  there  now 
may  be  millions  of  trained  soldiers  in  Germany  she  will  have  no  arms 
to  put  in  their  hands;  while  the  Allies,  also  with  millions  of  trained 
soldiers,  have  a  great  abundance  of  all  the  material  necessary  for 
war. 

XVII 
THE  MAKING  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

March  ii,  1921 

QUESTIONS  ANSWERED  BY  DAVID  HUNTER  MILLER,  LEGAL  ADVISER  TO 
AMERICAN   PEACE   COMMISSION 

Question:  Was  Clemenceau  in  favor  of  the  League  of  Nations  or 
not? 

Answer:  I  would  say  that  Clemenceau  was  in  favor  of  the  League, 
but  without  much  confidence  in  it.  He  believed  in  the  balance  of 
power;  but  I  cannot  conceive  of  a  balance  of  power  unless  there  be 
power  on  each  side,  and  one  does  not  like  to  think  of  the  existence 
of  a  balance  of  power  at  the  present  time. 

Question:  Do  you  think  that  the  League  of  Nations  has  a  real 
existence  without  the  United  States  as  a  part? 

Answer:  Well,  we  are  writing  notes  to  it  about  Yap!  Whether 
the  League  could  finally  succeed  if  the  United  States  continued  to 
stay  out,  I  think  nobody  could  answer  with  certitude.  My  personal 
opinion  is  in  the  affirmative;  I  think  it  is  going  to  last,  for  the  reason 
that  the  League  of  Nations  at  the  present  time  holds  a  place  in  the 
scheme  of  things  in  the  world  in  regard  to  which  this  may  certainly 
be  said :  that  place  must  be  held  either  by  the  League  of  Nations  or 


APPENDIX 


505 


by  something  else  for  which  we  have  no  precedent  whatever,  and 
no  basis  for  believing  in  its  possibility. 

Question:  What  do  you  say  to  the  criticism  that  the  League  oj 
Nations  is  political  rather  than  legal? 

Answer:  Well,  I  take  it  that  that  question  relates  to  the  Inter- 
national Court.  The  Court  is  a  part  of  the  League.  I  do  not  see 
how  in  any  international  structure  a  court  can  fill  the  whole  place. 
I  think  the  court  fills  a  great  place  in  the  world,  but  there  are  many 
disputes  and  questions  between  countries  which  are  political,  and 
for  the  adjustment  of  which  there  must  be  some  political  machinery; 
so  I  shall  answer  the  question  in  the  language  of  Senator  Root,  who, 
in  speaking  of  the  "political"  side  of  the  League,  said:  *  "It  would 
be  a  sad  thing  if  this  opportunity  for  the  establishment  of  such  a 
safeguard  against  future  wars  should  be  lost." 

Question:  Would  the  present  occupation  of  Germany  be  necessary 
ij  the  United  States  had  signed  the  Peace  Treaty? 

Answer:  In  my  opinion.  No.  I  do  not  think  that  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  has  ever  really  been  tried.  It  was  drafted  with  the  theory 
that  the  United  States  would  ratify  it,  and,  if  they  had,  I  think  the 
situation  in  Europe  and  the  situation  here  would  be  very  different. 

Question:  Is  the  League,  in  your  opinion^  stronger  or  weaker  to-day 
than  when  it  first  met  last  Jail? 

Answer  :  The  meeting  of  the  Assembly  last  fall  did  not  end  until 
about  the  middle  of  December.  I  do  not  think  that  the  period 
which  has  elapsed  has  made  very  much  difference.  The  next  phase 
of  the  League,  it  seems  to  me,  will  come  along  two  lines — its  discus- 
sions with  the  United  States  of  the  questions  regarding  Mesopotamia 
and  Yap,  and  the  situation  developed  at  the  second  meeting  of  the 
Assembly  next  September. 

Question:  Is  it  true  that  the  French  did  not  want  Article  X  in  the 
Treaty? 

Answer:  I  have  tried  to  describe  what  France  did  want  in  the 
Covenant.  In  the  discussions  of  the  League  of  Nations  Commis- 
sion, the  French  certainly  never  at  all  opposed  Article  X,  but  rather 
favored  it,  and  the  final  clause  of  Article  X,  as  it  now  reads,  was 
proposed  and  adopted  on  account  of  the  views  of  the  French  and 
with  their  approbation. 

'Letter  of  Senator  Root  of  March  29,  1919. 


5o6  APPENDIX 

Question:  How  much  influence  had  General  Smuts  in  the  formation 
oj  ideas  Jor  drafting  the  League  of  Nations? 

Answer:  Undoubtedly  he  had  considerable  influence,  but  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  weigh  that  influence.  You  have  the  general 
idea  of  a  League  of  Nations  which  goes  back  through  a  great  many 
minds,  and  it  is  almost  impossible  to  say  just  where  any  particular 
idea  originated  and  in  whose  mind. 

Question:  7s  it  true  that  President  Wilson  stood  in  the  way  of  sign- 
ing the  Peace  Treaty  with  Germany  by  Christmas,  191 8? 

Answer:  I  might  answer  that  question  No,  but  it  is  fair  to  go  a 
little  farther — whether  or  not  a  peace  treaty  could  have  been  brought 
about  with  Germany  by  Christmas,  191 8,  is  very  doubtful.  Colonel 
House  wanted  to  try  it  and  the  President  did  not  put  any  stone  in 
his  way  at  all;  but  one  great  drawback  was  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
would  not  stay  in  Paris  because  the  elections  in  Great  Britain  were 
going  on;  there  are  diff"erent  views  as  to  whether  it  could  have  been 
done  or  not  if  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  stayed,  but  it  certainly  could 
not  have  been  done  without  him. 

Question:  What  part  will  the  League  of  Nations  play  in  settling 
the  present  trouble  over  Germany^ s  refusal  to  agree  to  the  indemnity? 

Answer:  None,  I  think;  it  is  a  question  of  reparations,  and  lies 
between  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and  Germany. 

Question:  Is  there  any  way  by  which  the  United  States  can  now 
join  the  League  of  Nations  without  the  Senate's  ratifying  both  Covenant 
and  Treaty  with  Germany?  Can  the  United  States  adhere  to  the  Cov- 
enant separately  and  be  admitted  to  the  League? 

Answer:  If  the  other  states  would  consent  to  a  separate  ad- 
herence it  would  be  possible;  I  think  the  French  would,  perhaps, 
object,  as  they  have  been  feeling  very  strongly  in  regard  to  the 
integrity  of  the  Treaty. 

Question:  Was  there  any  objection  in  the  discussions  as  to  the 
multiple  votes  of  the  British  Empire  in  the  Assembly? 

Answer:  None  at  all.  Every  one  at  Paris  recognized  that  the 
giving  of  votes  to  the  British  Dominions  was  a  diminution  of  the 
influence  of  London,  and  there  was  not  the  slightest  objection  on  the 
part  of  anybody. 

Question:  Is,  in  your  opinion,  the  Covenant  of  the  League  chiefly 
English,  French,  or  American  in  origin? 


APPENDIX  507 

Answer:  Certainly  not  French,  because  while  the  French  did 
make  general  proposals  of  principles,  they  did  not  make  detailed 
proposals  or  drafts  such  as  both  the  Americans  and  the  British  did. 
Referring  to  the  text,  I  should  say  that  perhaps  in  volume  and,  I 
think,  perhaps  in  importance  as  well,  the  larger  part  of  it  was  Ameri- 
can in  its  origin;  but  any  answer  to  such  a  question  is  difficult  and 
unsatisfactory,  for  even  before  the  Conference  many  men  in  various 
countries  had  been  working  along  very  similar  lines,  and  had  reached 
more  or  less  similar  results. 

Question:  Will  you  explain  the  difference  between  the  first  and  the 
final  draft  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  section,  and  what  the  French  objec- 
tion to  it  was? 

Answer:  There  was  not  any  first  or  final  draft  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  Article  because  it  was  maintained  substantially  as  at  first 
proposed;  the  objections  of  the  French,  which  always  seemed  to  me 
rather  obscure,  appeared  to  be  based  upon  a  fear  that  the  Article 
meant  a  policy  of  isolation  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 

Question:  Do  you  believe  that  President  Wilson  Jailed  in  Paris? 

Answer:  How  could  I  believe  that  such  a  man  failed?  A  man 
who  showed  to  the  world  the  moral  grandeur  of  America,  and  who 
went  out  of  office  broken  in  health,  but  with  a  place  in  history,  as 
I  believe,  that  few  have  equalled  and  none  surpassed. 


INDEX 


Abdul  Hamid,  i8o 

Adatci,  Mr.,  211 

Adige  River,  watershed  of,  113,  114 

Adrianople,  174 

Adriatic  Sea,  Slavonic  population  of 
east  coast  of,  122;  three  keys  to  naval 
domination  of,  126;  military  value  of 
eastern  coast  of,  129,  130;  three  mili- 
tary bridge-heads  of,  130-133;  report 
of  American  specialists  on  Italy's 
claims  in,  132;  settlement  of  Italian 
claims  in,  137,  139;  Italian  and  Ser- 
bian struggle  for  control  in,  158 

Africa,  data  concerning,  collected  by 
the  United  States,  4;  British  occupa- 
tion in,  153;  opposition  to  German 
control  in,  224;  mandates  for,  226, 
227 

Ahad,  the,  Arab  secret  society,  180,  181 

Aharonian,  Avetis,  188 

Albania,  130,  131,  169,  171;  claims  of, 
to  national  independence,  18,  19; 
control  over,  desired  by  Italy,  127, 
129;  mandate  for,  offered  to  Italy, 
137;  Greek  claims  in,  173,  191,  194; 
economic  and  political  conditions  in, 
174;  independence  of,  recognized, 
175;  terms  of  Treaty  of  London  re- 
garding, 175 

Allenby,  General,  185,  197,  198 

Allenstein,  District  of,  78,  81 

Alliances  of  nations,  374  ff. 

Alsace  -  Lorraine,  self  -  determination, 
German  plea  for  retention  of,  40,  46; 
return  of,  to  France,  45-48;  Ger- 
man propaganda  in,  47;  religious 
freedom  guarantee  not  required  of, 
212 

American  Army  engineers,  estimate  by, 
of  war  damages,  275,  309 

American  Commission  to  Negotiate 
Peace,  294 

American  delegates  at  Peace  Confer- 
ence, on  frontiers  committee,  96,  97; 
attitude  of,  regarding  Bulgaria,  164, 


166,  170 _^.;  errors  pointed  out  by,  to 
commission  on  responsibility  for  the 
war,  248;  memorandum  of,  to  Com- 
mission on  Responsibilities,  250; 
fixed  sum  as  amount  of  Germany's 
indebtedness  urged  by,  263;  attitude 
of,  toward  costs  of  war  and  repara- 
tions, 270;  suggestion  of,  as  to 
amount  Germany  could  pay,  276; 
a  moderating  influence,  285;  share  of, 
in  framing  of  Treaty,  293^.;  on  eco- 
nomic commission,  307 ;  large  amount 
of  information  gathered  by,  308;  on 
labor  commission,  319,  321,  323; 
Labor's  Bill  of  Rights  proposed  by, 

329.  331-333 

American  Federation  of  Labor,  in- 
dorsement of  League  of  Nations  by, 
330 

American  Geographical  Society,  i 

American  labor,  standards  of,  323,  334; 
influences  of,  in  Treaty,  327 

Anatolia,  189,  203;  importance  of 
Smyrna  to,  192;  Ottoman  rule  in,  193 

Andersonville  prison,  249 

Antilles,  sinking  of,  357 

Anti-submarine  craft,   United  States, 

354 

Arab  revival,  the,  180 

Arabs,  freed  from  Turkish  domination, 
176;  secret  societies  of,  180,  181; 
plans  for  liberation  of,  181;  con- 
federation of,  in  Syrian  desert,  183; 
revolt  of,  from  Turkey,  184,  185; 
delegation  of,  at  Peace  Conference, 
188;  camel  corps  of,  in  Palestine,  185, 
197;  desire  of,  for  independence,  197; 
mandatory  control  of,  200 

Arbitration,  compulsory,  420 

Armaments,  problem  of  limitation  of, 
before  the  Peace  Conference,  370  jf.; 
the  accumulation  of,  377;  limitation 
of  German,  386-390;  a  concrete  ex- 
pression of  national  policies,  390; 
conference  of  Powers,  first  step  to- 


5C9 


510 


INDEX 


ward  reduction  of,  391  ff.;  three  com- 
ponent parts  of,  392;  equality  in 
limited,  impossible,  393;  proposals 
concerning  reduction  of,  394;  desir- 
ability of  reduction  of,  433-435 

Armenia,  the  frontiers  question  of,  22; 
failure  to  liberate,  178;  refusal  of 
United  States  to  accept  mandate  for, 
178-180,  187,  188;  Soviet  Republic 
of,  178,  202,  203;  Russian  advance 
into,  182;  Russian  sovereignty  over 
four  vilayets  of,  182;  delegations 
from,  at  Peace  Conference,  188,  202; 
starvation  in,  190,  191;  betrayed  by 
civilized  world,  195,  203;  efforts  of, 
for  independence,  202;  boundaries  of, 
fixed  by  President  Wilson,  203;  guar- 
antee to  aliens  in,  212;  no  mandate 
taken  for,  227 

Armistice,  the,  negotiations  concern- 
ing, 8  ff.;  Colonel  House's  description 
of  situation  during,  12;  economic 
administration  during,  336  ff. 

Asia  Minor,  islands  off  coast  of,  re- 
united with  Greece,  176;  spheres  of 
influence  promised  Italy  in,  185; 
Greek  claim  in,  191,  192,  194;  Ital- 
ian claim  in,  191,  192;  the  peasantry 
"of,  192,  193;  American  attitude  to- 
ward, 193,  194;  Greek  troops  in,  194- 
197 

Atlantic  Fleet,  gun's  crews  supplied 
merchant  vessels  by,  349;  size  of,  in 
1917.  349;  movements  of,  349;  de- 
stroyers and  patrol  vessels  of,  351- 
353;  training  of  men  by,  352;  battle- 
ships sent  to.  British  grand  fleet, 
354.  357;  the  troop  convoys,  355- 
357;  work  of  the  destroyers,  357,  358; 
mine  force  of,  359-361;  mine-laying 
by,  360;  overseas  transportation  ser- 
vice of,  361;  aviation  service,  361; 
the  railway  batteries,  363;  the  sub- 
marines, 366;  the  subchasers,  367; 
the  marine  corps  of,  367,  368 

Australia,  German  possessions  seized 
by,  224;  mandate  held  by,  226 

Austria-Hungary,  armistice  conditions 
imposed  upon,  8,  9;  food  and  succor 
promised  to,  9;  dangers  coincident 
with  disintegration  of,  87;  revolution 


in,  88-90;  secret  treaties  concerning 
frontiers  of,  91;  boundary  disputes 
in,  92;  the  drafting  of  new  bound- 
aries in,  95  ff.;  factors  considered  in 
fixing  boundaries  in,  98,  99;  request 
of,  concerning  Brenner  frontier,  102; 
possible  dangers  from  division  of 
empire  into  states,  107  ff.\  strategic 
designs  of,  against  Italy,  112;  sur- 
render of,  to  Italy,  120;  strategic  ad- 
vantages of,  on  Italian  frontier,  124; 
ship  tonnage  of,  in  the  Straits,  152; 
uncertainty  in,  as  to  political  future, 
207;  assassination  of  heir  to  throne 
of  I  233;  responsibility  of,  for  world 
war,  233,  236;  declaration  of  war 
against  Serbia  by,  235,  236 

Austria,  lesser,  boundary  settlement  of, 
106;  economic  conditions  in,  108; 
advantages  of  union  of,  with  Ger- 
many, 108;  injustice  in  reparations 
imposed  on,  109;  lack  of  seaports  a 
danger  to,  no;  protection  of  minor- 
ities in,  215,  218,  222;  customs  pro- 
vision concerning,  316 

Austrian  Tyrol,  boundary  settlement 
in,  loi,  102 

Aviation  service.  United  States  Navy, 
361,  362 

Azerbaijan  Tartars,  at  Peace  Confer- 
ence, 189 

Balfour,  Rt.  Hon.  Arthur  James,  11, 
25,  93,  159.  280;  French  plan  for 
defense  of  Rhine  opposed  by,  52; 
declaration  of,  concerning  Palestine, 
185,  200 

Balkan  War,  the  first,  157,  169,  174; 
cause  of  the  second,  170 

Balkans,  the,  I55#.;  Italian  desire  for 
control  in,  129;  expansion  in,  planned 
by  Italy,  130-132;  map  forgeries  in, 
142;  industrial  development  in,  155, 
156;  boundary  settlements  of,  158 
ff.\  intermigration  of  dissatisfied 
peoples  in,  222,  223 

Baltimore,  the,  360 

Banat  of  Temesvar,  the,  division  of, 
105,  106 

Barnes,  Mr.,  27 


INDEX 


511 


Baruch,  Bernard  M.,  260,  307;  "The 
Making  of  the  Reparation  and 
Economic  Clauses  of  the  Treaty " 
by,  270 

Battleships,  United  States,  in  Atlantic 
Fleet,  349;  sent  to  join  British  grand 
fleet,  354,  357;  at  Bantry  Bay  and 
Halifax,  357 

Beer,  George  L.,  7,  440 

Belgium,  settlement  of  boundary  ques- 
tion of,  43,  44;  mandate  held  by, 
227;  violation  of  neutrality  of,  235, 
236;  priority  on  German  reparation 
for,  279-281;  German  prior  lien 
bonds  for,  281,  282;  economic  dele- 
gates from,  307;  on  Council  of 
League  of  Nations,  417 

Benes,  Dr.  Edward,  94,  159,  215 

Berlin,  Treaty  of,  209,  220 

Berthelot,  M.,  211 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  von,  253 

Bill  of  Rights.  See  Labor's  Bill  of 
Rights 

Bismarck,  trial  of  Napoleon  III,  pro- 
posed by,  247 

Bitlis,  178,  182,  203 

Black  Book,  the,  6 

Black  Sea,  ship  tonnage  in,  152 

Bliss,  Dr.  Tasker  Howard,  197,  198; 
on  the  Problem  of  Disarmament, 
370  Jf. 

Blockade,  of  enemy  areas  during  armi- 
stice, 340;  relaxation  of,  on  import  of 
food,  343,  344;  the  ruthless,  of 
modern  war,  379,  380 

Bohemia,  97;  boundaries  of,  103; 
attempt  to  impose  Czech  language 
on  German,  207 

Bolshevist  propaganda  in  Europe,  341 

Bonds,  German,  for  Belgian  obliga- 
tions, 281,  282;  given  as  pledge  of 
good  faith,  283,  284 

Bonsai,  Colonel,  409 

Borden,  Sir  Robert,  411 

Bosporus,  the,  150,  153,  154 

Boundaries,  data  gathered  concerning 
revised,  5,  6;  difficulty  of  fixing,  21- 
23,  98,  99,  205,  206;  the  principles  of 
nationality  in  settlement  of,  68,  106, 
107;  territorial  commissions  formed 
to  determine,  95  ff.;  American  point 


of  view  in  settlement  of,  97;  deter- 
mined by  territorial  commissions, 
159,  160;  economic  barriers  created 
by  new,  315;  and  the  League  of 
Nations,  411;  and  self-determina- 
tion, 429  ff. 

Bourgeois,  Leon,  27,  410,  414 

Bowman,  Dr.  Isaiah,  7;  on  Constanti- 
nople and  the  Balkans,  140  ff.; 
"The  New  World"  by,  140  n. 

Bratiano,  Mr.,  94,  212-214 

Brazil,  economic  delegates  from,  307; 
chosen  for  Council  of  League  of  Na- 
tions, 417 

Brenner  Pass,  the,  Italy's  claim  to 
frontier  on,  102,  113-115,  117 

Brest-Litovsk,  treaty  of,  41 

Briand,  M.,  58,  286 

Browne,  Ralph  C,  submersible  gun  in- 
vented by,  359 

Browning,  Rear- Admiral,  350,  351 

Bulgaria,  armistice  conditions  imposed 
upon,  9;  foreign  trade  of,  152;  cut 
ofT  from  the  ^gean,  154;  small 
peasant  proprietors  of,  156;  fixing 
the  boundaries  of,  158^.,  430;  cere- 
mony of  signing  of  treaty  by,  163; 
America's  position  regarding,  164, 
166,  170  ff.;  territory  lost  by,  166, 
168,  170-173;  influence  of,  in  Mace- 
donia, 1 68- 1 7a;  secret  treaty  with 
Serbia,  169;  gains  of,  in  Thrace,  169; 
American  protest  against  territorial 
losses  of,  171;  outrages  of,  upon 
Serbians,  172;  effect  on,  of  terri- 
torial losses,  172,  173;  ethnic  purity 
of,  173;  Kavala,  ceded  to,  173; 
the  frontier  at  Adrianople  and  Kirk- 
Kilisse,  174;  not  represented  at 
Peace  Conference,  191;  religious 
freedom  in,  209;  protection  of  mi- 
norities in,  215,  218,  222;  intermi- 
gration  treaty  of,  with  Greece,  223; 
responsibility  of,  for  world  w.ir,  233 

Bulgarians,  Slavic  element  in,  156 

Bulow,  Prince  von,  204,  253 

Busch,  Moritz,  his  "  Bismarck  "  quoted, 
247 

Cadorna,  115 

Cambon,  Jules,  71,  95,  160 


512 


INDEX 


Cameroons,  tlie,  manrlate  for,  226 

Caperton,  Admiral,  353 

Caporetto,  disaster,  the,  1 16,  119 

Carr,  Mr.,  211 

Cassin,  the,  358 

Castoldi,  Colonel,  211 

Caucasus,  the,  British  activities  in,  151 

Cecil,  Lord  Robert,  27,  440;  on  League 
of  Nations  Commission,  403-405, 
408,  415;  draft  of  Covenant  made 
by,  403;   characteristics  of,  403 

Central  Alps,  the,  116 

Central  Rhine  Commission,  the,  48 

Chauncey,  the,  358 

Chiesa,  M.,  259 

China,  chosen  for  Council  of  League, 
418 

Chinda,  Viscount,  440 

Cilicia,  183,  189,  202,  203 

Civilization,  modern  war  a  menace  to, 
376,  381,  384,  437 

Clemenceau,  Premier,  10,  1 1,  55,  171, 
259,  273,  274,  277,  281,  413;  presid- 
ing officer  at  Peace  Conference,  18, 
25,  93;  on  the  Council  of  Four,  31, 
32,  35,  100;  shooting  of,  159;  re- 
quest of,  that  American  delegation 
postpone  departure,  165;  fixed  sum 
as  amount  of  German  indebtedness, 
opposed  by,  262,  264-268;  the  power 
of,  265,  266;  attitude  of,  at  Confer- 
ence, 298 

Coal   situation  during  the  armistice, 

340 
Colonial  expansion  before  the  war,  223 
Commercial  clauses  of  the  Treaty,  303 
Commercial  interests  of  nations  and 

modern  war,  378 
Commercial  treaties,  European,  313 
Commission  of  the  Straits,  202 
Commission    on   Reparations,   27,   28, 

259  #•;   proposal  for  permanent,  277 
Commission  on  Responsibility  of  the 

Authors  of  the  War,  232  ff. ;    errors 

of,  248;   American  memorandum  to, 

250 
Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations, 

27,  407-409,  421     ^ 
Commissions,   established  by  Council 

of  Ten,  25  ff.;    the  sessions  of,  28, 


29,  95-97;  reports  of,  the  basis  of 
treaties,  29,  30,  34,  99 

Committee  on  New  States  and  the 
Protection  of  Minorities,  211 

Communication  service.  United  States 
naval,  364 

Congress  of  Oppressed  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Nationalities,  119 

Conscription  in  Germany,  abolition 
of,  388 

Constantinople,  143-155;  a  prize  of 
war,  144;  economic  and  political 
importance  of ,  144-146;  under  Allied 
control,  144,  150-155;  German  con- 
trol in,  145;  foreign  trade  of,  145, 
146;  the  Turk  in,  146-150;  centre 
of  Mohammedan  world,  147-149; 
base  of  British  and  French  activi- 
ties, 151 ;  maintenance  of  the  Sultan 
at,  177,  201,  202 

Convoys  for  American  transports,  355- 

357 

Coolidge,  Professor  A.  C,  211 

Corfu,  the  Pact  of,  157 

Cornwall,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  159 

Costs,  war,  385;  controversy  over,  260- 
262;  and  damage  to  civilian  popu- 
lation, 268-270 

Council  of  Ambassadors,  the,  82 

Council  of  Five,  the,  32,  33 

Council  of  Four,  the,  306,  407;  Peace 
Conference  in  control  of,  31-33,  100; 
the  sessions  of,  33,  loi;  secret  ses- 
sions of,  33,  34;  terms  of  treaties  not 
determined  by,  33-35;  treaty  with 
Germany  decided  upon  by,  35;  per- 
sonalities of  members  of,  35,  36; 
friendliness  of  discussion  by,  65;  or- 
ganization of,  161;  part  taken  by,  in 
making  of  Treaty,  291  ff.;  functions 
and  methods  of,  296 

Council  of  Ten,  the,  17/.,  407;  meeting- 
place  of,  18;  character  of  business  of, 
18;  weakness  of,  20-26,  30,  31;  ad- 
ministrative duties  imposed  upon, 
21;  two  kinds  of  problems  confront- 
ing, 21 ;  the  frontiers  question  before, 
21-23;  not  qualified  to  investigate 
facts,  23,  25;  special  commissions  es- 
tablished by,  25  ff.;  superseded  by 
Council  of  Four,  31 ;  becomes  a  Coun- 


INDEX 


513 


cil  of  Five,  32,  33;  number  of  sessions 
held  by,  33;  inability  of,  to  settle 
Austrian  boundary  disputes,  92 

Council  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
choice  of  four  smaller  Powers  to  sit 
on,  417;  provision  made  for  increase 
in,  418;  eligibility  of  British  do- 
minions to,  422 

Covington,  sinking  of,  357 

Credits  extended  to  liberated  nations, 

339,  340 

Crespi,  Signor,  259 

Crillon  Hotel,  27,  159 

Crimes,  war,  fixing  responsibility  for, 
232/. 

Croatia,  Fiume  reserved  to,  by  treaty, 
121,  127 

Croats,  the,  157 

Cross-channel  transport  force,  the,  368 

Crowe,  Sir  Eyre,  96 

Cunliffe,  Lord,  259,  275,  276 

Curzon,  Lord,  85 

Czechlers,  protection  to,  in  minority 
treaty,  219 

Czecho-Slovakia,  independence  of,  rec- 
ognized, 88-90,  94;  work  of  Edward 
Benes  for,  94;  railway  connection  be- 
tween Rumania  and,  97,  98;  the 
northern  frontier  of,  100;  settlement 
of  boundaries  of,  103,  105;  different 
nationalities  in,  105,  107;  economic- 
ally independent,  109,  no;  seaports 
given  to,  no;  protection  to  aliens  in, 
211,  212,  215,  218,  219;  customs  pro- 
vision concerning,  316 

Czechs,  desertion  of,  from  Hapsburg 
armies,  88 

Dalmatia,  143;  Italian  claims  in,  124, 
127-129,  131,  132,  138 

Danzig,  annexation  of,  to  Poland  pro- 
posed, 78;  made  a  free  city,  under 
the  League,  79,  160-162;  mobbing 
of  Poles  in,  82;  treaty  with  Poland, 
82 

Davis,  Norman,  260,  280,  307 

Day,  Dr,  Clive,  7;  on  the  Atmosphere 
and  Organization  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, 15  ff. 

Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856,  438 

Dedeagatch,  173 


Denmark,  settlement  of  boundary  be- 
tween Germany  and,  42,  43 

Destroyers,  United  States,  351-353; 
the  work  of,  357,  358 

Deutschland,  the,  voyages  of,  364 

Diaz,  General,  9 

Dinaric  Alps,  the,  133 

Diplomacy,  and  justice,  154;  and  secret 
agreements,  186 

Djemal  Pasha,  cruelty  of,  184 

Dmowski,  27,  94,  158 

Dobrudja,  Bulgarians  in,  173 

Dodecanese,  the,  reunited  with  Greece, 
176;  sovereignty  over,  promised 
Italy,  181 

Drummond,  Sir  Eric,  421 

Dulles,  Allen  W.,  211 

Dulles,  John  Foster,  277;  arguments  of, 
against  inclusion  of  war  costs  in  rep- 
arations, 270 

East  Africa,  German  control  in,  224, 
225;  mandates  for,  226,  227 

East  Prussia,  77,  78 

Economic  barriers,  removal  of,  312  _^.; 
conditions,  during  the  armistice,  336 
ff.;  priorities,  proposals  for  world 
system  of,  310-312;  systems,  Eu- 
ropean, 316 

Economic  clauses  of  the  Treaty,  291 
ff.,  427-429;  President  Wilson's  part 
in  framing  of,  292,  296;  influence  of 
American  principles  on,  293  ff.; 
criticism  of,  294  ff.,  304-306 

Economic  commission,  the  delegates 
on,  306  ff.;  the  Supreme  Economic 
Council,  308;  priorities  proposal  of, 
310-312 

Economic  Conference,  at  Paris,  309 

Economic  Council,  Supreme,  308 

Egypt,  plan  for  Turkish  advance  into, 
184 

England.     See  Great  Britain 

Erzerum,  178,  182,  203 

Esperey,  Franchet  d',  150 

Eupen,  Germans  in,  212 

Europe,  base  maps  constructed  for,  5, 
162;  economic  solidarity  of,  299; 
economic  systems  in,  316;  tariff  sys- 
tem of,  313;  commercial  system  of, 
313;  natural  political  map  of,  430 


514 


INDEX 


Executive,  chief,  exempt  from  trial  by 
international  tribunal,  238,  247 

Famine  at  close  of  war,  336 

Farmers,  price  pledges  given  to,  338, 343 

Faroki,  184 

Feisal,  Emir,  184,  185,  188,  190,  197, 
200,  201,  432 

Fettah,  the,  Arab  secret  society,  180 

Financial  questions,  work  of  the  com- 
mission on,  27,  28 

Fiume,  112  jf.;  Italian  claim  to,  120  ff., 
127^.;  reserved  to  Croatia  by  treaty, 
121,  127;  Italians  and  Jugo-Slavs  in, 
121,  122;  only  practicable  port  for 
Jugo-Slavia,  127,  128,  134;  "Tardieu 
project"  for  free  state  of,  131,  133; 
Italian  plans  concerning,  131 ;  advan- 
tageous situation  of,  133;  majority 
of  population  Jugo-Slav,  135;  free 
expression  of  public  opinion  in, 
stifled,  136;  annexation  of,  to  Italy 
proclaimed  by  Italian  National  Coun- 
cil, 136;  reasons  for  rejection  of 
Italy's  demands  for,  134-137;  Ameri- 
can attitude  toward,  137;  effect  on, 
of  Rapallo  Treaty,  139 

Foch,  Marshal,  10,  58,  386,  413;  at- 
titude of,  toward  an  armistice,  12, 
13;  before  the  Council  of  Ten,  20; 
attitude  toward  fortification  of 
Rhine,  52,  54 

Food,  hoarding  of,  337;  supplied  to 
Europe  by  the  United  States,  338 
ff.;  prices  of,  343 

Ford,  Henry,  Eagle  boats  constructed 
by,  354       _ 

Fourteen  Points,  President  Wilson's, 
90,  142,  171,  204,  224,  230,  297;  the 
basis  of,  2 ;  accepted  as  basis  of  peace 
with  Germany,  13,  14,  120,  186,  187, 
399;  and  the  Saar  settlement,  63;  and 
the  Polish  question,  72;  and  Italian 
boundaries,  120,  123;  clause  on  re- 
moval of  economic  barriers,  312 

France,  close  relations  of,  with  other 
countries,  2,  3;  desire  of,  for  military 
guarantee  on  Left  Bank  of  Rhine, 
49~53;  offer  of  Great  Britain  and 
United  States  to  aid  if  attacked  by 
Germany  without  provocation,   54, 


55;  claims  of,  on  the  Saar,  56-58; 
attitude  of,  toward  Poland,  69,  70; 
attitude  of,  concerning  Czecho- 
slovakia, 97;  union  of  Austria  with 
Germany  opposed  by,  108;  attitude 
of,  toward  Italy's  Adriatic  claims, 
132;  spheres  of  interest  for,  defined 
by  Sykes-Picot  Treaty,  182-184; 
the  Tripartite  Agreement,  183;  at- 
titude of,  toward  Syria,  189,  190; 
opposition  of,  to  Syrian  commission, 
198;  Syrian  mandate  given  to,  200; 
attempt  of,  to  occupy  Cilicia,  203; 
mandate  for  Syria  and  Lebanon  held 
by,  227;  declaration  of  war  aganist, 
by  Germany,  235,  236;  trial  of 
kaiser  desired  by,  246;  control  of  the 
Ukraine  desired  by,  151;  ship  ton- 
nage of,  in  the  Straits,  152;  attitude 
of,  toward  fixing  German  indemnity, 
262  ff. ;  opposition  of,  to  fixed  sum  as 
German  indebtedness,  263;  conten- 
tion of,  for  inclusion  of  war  costs  in 
reparations,  269;  estimate  of  amount 
Germany  should  pay,  277;  coal  sup- 
plied to,  by  Germany,  282,  283;  de- 
livery of  horses  and  cattle  to,  283; 
indemnity  paid  Germany  by,  288; 
supremacy  in  Europe  desired  for, 
299;  suicidal  economic  policy  of  pro- 
posals of,  299-302;  political  situa- 
tion in,  300;  economic  conditions  in, 
301;  attitude  toward  war  costs  and 
military  pensions,  303;  delegates 
from,  on  economic  commission,  307; 
the  Paris  economic  conference,  309; 
economic  priorities  proposed  by, 
310;  tariff  system  of,  313;  conference 
of  naval  representatives  from,  350, 
351;  need  of  alliance  in  case  of  an- 
other war,  376,  377;  proposals  of,  for 
international  military  force,  410, 414; 
attitude  of,  toward  League  of  Na- 
tions, 412;  Monroe  Doctrine  article 
opposed  by,  416;  demand  of,  that 
Germany  pay  entire  war  cost,  427 

Frazier,  Mr.,  409 

Freedom  of  the  seas,  438-440 

French  attitude  at  Peace  Conference, 
298/. 

Fromageot,  M.,  30 


INDEX 


515 


Galicia,  Eastern,  decision  concerning, 
83 

Ganem,  Chukri,  189,  190 

Gases,  use  of,  in  war,  381 

Geneva,  chosen  as  seat  of  League  of 
Nations,  417 

Geographical  Journal,  London,  149 

Geological  Survey,  United  States,  308 

Georgians,  delegation  of,  at  Peace  Con- 
ference, 189 

German  bonds  given  as  pledge  of  good 
faith,  283,  284 

German  language,  value  of,  to  Ger- 
mans, 207,  208 

Germany,  close  relations  of,  with  other 
countries,  2,  3;  peace  negotiations  re- 
quested by,  9,  10;  uncertainty  as  to 
attitude  of,  toward  armistice  terms, 
II,  12;  armistice  terms  concerning, 
13,  14;  supremacy  of  Prussia  in,  38; 
problems  of  western  frontiers  of,  37 
ff.,  41  Jf.;  moderation  of  conditions 
imposed  upon,  41 ;  denunciation  by, 
of  Saar  settlement,  61 ;  two  considera- 
tions in  settlement  of  boundaries  of, 
65;  Poland's  chief  enemy,  77;  dis- 
satisfaction of,  with  Polish  settle- 
ment, 80;  territory  and  population 
ceded  to  Poland  by,  81 ;  trade  of,  with 
Constantinople,  145;  ship  tonnage  of, 
in  the  Straits,  152;  fixing  the  eastern 
boundary  of,  160;  failure  of,  to  en- 
list sympathy  of  eastern  Europe,  204; 
guarantees  in  treaty  with,  211;  Af- 
rican possessions  of,  224,  225;  re- 
sponsibility of,  for  world  war,  233- 
236,  288;  declaration  of  war  against 
France  and  Russia,  235,  236;  neu- 
trality violation  by,  235,  236;  trial  of 
subjects  of,  guilty  of  war  crimes,  248 
ff.;  refusal  of,  to  surrender  persons 
guilty  of  war  crimes,  255;  offer  of,  to 
try  guilty  subjects,  255,  256;  details 
of  charges  against  subjects  presented 
to,  256;  controversy  as  to  capacity 
of,  to  pay  war  costs,  260-262;  ques- 
tion of  fixing  reparation  payment  of, 
262  jf.;  fixed  sum  as  reparation  urged 
by  United  States,  263,  429;  amount 
of  reparation  to  be  paid  by,   275- 


'277,  286,  302;  capacity  of,  to  pay, 
275-277,  287;  clauses  of  peace  treaty 
regarding  reparations  by,  278;  rec- 
ognition by,  of  obligation  to  Bel- 
gium, 281;  prior  lien  bonds  of,  for 
Belgian  debts,  281,  282;  surrender 
of  merchant  marine  of,  282;  delivery 
by,  of  coal  to  France  and  Italy,  282, 
283;  delivery  of  horses  and  cattle  by, 
283;  bonds  given  as  pledge  of  good 
faith,  283,  284 ;  ability  of,  to  pay  large 
amounts,  287;  commercial  clauses  in 
Treaty  concerning,  303;  tariff  system 
of.  313;  commercial  relations  with, 
315  n.;  labor  section  of  treaty  with, 
325;  agreement  with,  regarding  food 
supplies,  345;  the  feeding  of,  346; 
unrestricted  submarine  campaign  of, 
350.  355;  merchant  ships  of,  in 
United  States  ports,  355;  submarines 
sent  by,  to  American  coast,  364-366; 
pledge  of,  to  limit  armaments,  372, 
390;  preliminary  treaty  of  peace 
with,  386;  limitation  of  armaments 
of,  386^.;  abolition  of  conscription 
in,  388;  size  of  army  allowed  for,  388; 
accumulation  of  munitions  prohib- 
ited, 388;  reduction  of  navy  of,  389; 
plan  of,  for  league  of  nations,  399; 
not  admitted  to  League  of  Nations, 
418;  belief  that  entire  cost  of  war 
could  be  paid  by,  427 

Germans,  in  territory  taken  from  Ger- 
many, protection  of,  211 

Giornale  d' Italia,  quoted,  131,  133 

Gleaves,  Rear-Admiral,  353 

Gompers,  Samuel,  27;  on  the  Labor 
Clauses  of  the  Treaty,  319  #.;  tele- 
gram sent  President  Wilson  by,  330; 
Wilson's  reply  to,  331-333 

Gourand,  General,  proclamation  of, 
200 

Grasset,  Rear-Admiral,  350 

Great  Britain,  close  relations  of,  with 
other  countries,  2,  3;  offer  of,  to  aid 
France,  54,  55;  attitude  toward 
French  claims  on  the  Saar,  58,  60; 
attitude  of,  toward  Poland,  70;  atti- 
tude of,  concerning  Czecho-Slovakia, 
97;  spheres  of  interest  for,  defined  by 
Sykes-Picot  Treaty,   182-184;  nego- 


5i6 


INDEX 


tiations  with  Arabs,  184;  interest  of, 
in  Suez  Canal  and  Egypt,  184;  man- 
dates over  Mesopotamia  and  Pales- 
tine given  to,  200,  227;  reply  of, 
concerning  Roumanian  Jews,  221; 
mandates  for  German  East  Africa 
and  island  of  Nauru  held  by,  226; 
entrance  of,  into  World  War,  236; 
trial  of  kaiser  desired  by,  246; 
argument  of,  for  inclusion  of  war 
costs  in  reparations,  268-270;  atti- 
tude of,  toward  Italy's  Adriatic 
claims,  132;  control  of  the  Baltic  and 
of  the  Caucasus  desired  by,  151; 
primacy  of  shipping  of,  in  region  of 
the  Straits,  152;  advantages  to,  of 
control  of  the  Straits,  153;  military 
control  in  Africa,  153;  motives  not 
disinterested,  153,  154,  163;  attitude 
of,  toward  fixing  German  indemnity, 
263  ff. ;  estimate  by,  of  amount  Ger- 
many should  pay,  277;  delegates 
from,  on  economic  commission,  306; 
representation  of  Dominions  of,  in 
League,  334, 403, 408, 422 ;  conference 
of  naval  representatives  from,  350, 
351 ;  draft  of  League  of  Nations  sub- 
mitted by,  403;  demand  of,  that  Ger- 
many pay  entire  war  cost,  427;  atti- 
tude of,  toward  freedom  of  the  seas, 

438,  439 

Greece,  services  of,  to  be  paid  for,  143; 
annexation  of  Thrace  by,  154;  land 
tenure  in,  156;  influence  of,  in 
Macedonia,  168;  Macedonia  divided 
between  Serbia  and,  170;  American 
attitude  toward  claims  of,  173,  192, 
194;  treaty  of,  with  Italy,  176;  islands 
off  Asia  Minor  reunited  with,  176; 
Bulgarian  Thrace  promised  to,  186; 
delegations  from,  at  Peace  Confer- 
ence, 188;  claims  of,  presented,  191; 
control  of  Smyrna  given  to,  193-196; 
massacre  of  Turks  by,  195;  religious 
freedom  guaranteed  Ionian  Islands 
by,  209;  protection  to  aliens  in,  212, 
215,  218,  219;  special  protection  to 
Jews  in,  218,  219;  intermigration 
treaty  with  Bulgaria,  223;  chosen 
for  Council  of  League,  418 

Greek  islands,   reunited  with   Greece, 


176;      Italy    promised    sovereignty 

over,  181 
Greek  territorial  commission,  191,  192, 

194 
Grey,  Lord,  influence  of,  401 

Hampton  Roads,  naval  conference  at, 
350,  351 

Haskins,  Dr.  Charles  Homer,  7,  48, 
59,  159;  on  the  New  Boundaries  of 
Germany,  37  ff. 

Hay,  Secretary  John,  protest  of,  to 
Roumania,  220,  221;  on  religious 
toleration  229 

Headlam-Morley,  Mr.,  48,  59,  159, 
161,  162,  211 

Hedjaz,  the,  king  of,  147,  177;  inde- 
pendence of,  recognized,  177;  en- 
trance of,  into  war,  184;  revolt  of, 
from  Turkey,  185;  population  homo- 
geneous, 212 

Herreros,  the,  German  treatment  of, 
224 

Hindenburg,  253 

Hofer,  Andreas,  102 

Holland,  refusal  of,  to  surrender  the 
kaiser,  240-245;  suggestion  of,  re- 
garding international  jurisdiction, 
244 

Hoover,  Herbert,  before  the  Council 
of  Ten,  20;  member  of  Supreme  Eco- 
nomic Council,  308;  on  the  Economic 
Administration  during  the  Armistice, 
336/. 

Hornbeck,  Capt.  S.  K.,  7 

House,  Colonel  Edward  M.,  95,  144, 
159,  210,  270;  The  Inquiry  organ- 
ized by,  I  ff.;  representative  of  the 
United  States  in  armistice  negotia- 
tions, S  ff.,  10;  description  of  the 
armistice  situation  by,  12;  plan  for 
Belgian  priority  suggested  by,  280; 
work  of,  on  League  of  Nations  com- 
mission, 404-409,  415,  421;  on  the 
Versailles  Peace  in  Retrospect,  425 
ff. ;  member  of  mandates  commission, 
440 

Hudson,  Manley  0.,  211 ;  on  Protection 
of  Minorities  and  Natives  in  Trans- 
ferred  Territories,   204  ff. 


INDEX 


517 


Hudson,  Supreme  Court  decision  con- 
cerning, 249 

Hughes,  Premier,  412;  argument  of, 
for  inclusion  of  war  costs  in  repara- 
tions, 268-270 

Hungary,  lesser,  principle  of  nation- 
ality in  boundary  settlement,  106; 
economic  conditions  in,  109;  lack  of 
seaports  a  danger  to,  no;  protection 
of  minorities  in,  215,  218;  customs 
provision  concerning,  316 

Hurst,  Mr.,  draft  of  League  of  Nations 
Covenant  by,  405 

Hussein  Ibn  Ali,  Cherif  of  Mecca,  177; 
British  negotiations  with,  184 

Hymans,  M.,  280,  408 

India,  protest  from  Moslems  of,  201 
Inquiry,  The,  organization  and  work  of, 
I  ff.,  28;  report  of,  2;  valuable  data 
gathered  by,  5,  308;  maps  prepared 
by    5,    162;  the  personnel  of,  6-8; 
three  types  of  problems  dealt  with 
by,  8;  representatives  for  boundaries 
commission    from,    96;     Constanti- 
nople memorandum  of,  144 
International  jurisdiction,  244,  257 
International  Justice,  Permanent  Court 

of,  221 
International  Labor  Conference,  322 
International  Labor  Legislation  Com- 
mission, 320  ff. 
International    military    force,    French 

proposal  of,  410,  414 
Ionian   Islands,   religious  freedom  in, 

209 
Istria,  Italy's  desire  to  annex,  131 
Italy,  3;  problems  concerning  bound- 
aries of,  21,  22;  attitude  of,  toward 
Poland,  71;  treaties  faxing  frontiers 
of,  91;  attitude  of,  toward  Austrian 
boundary  settlements,  98;  acquisi- 
tions promised  to,  in  Treaty  of 
London,  98,  113,  117;  annexation  of 
Brenner  frontier  by,  102;  territorial 
claims  discussed  by  supreme  council 
only,  102;  aliens  in,  107;  defenseless 
frontiers  of,  before  the  war,  112; 
Austria's  designs  against,  112;  rea- 
sons   of,    for    entering    war,     113; 


territory  claimed  by,  on  north,  113- 
115,    117;    strategic    importance    of 
northern  frontier  of,  115,  116;  deci- 
sion concerning  northern  frontier  of, 
117,   118;  territory  claimed  by,  on 
the  east,  118,  120,  121;  settlement  of 
eastern  boundary  question,  118,^.; 
agreement     of,     with     Jugo-Slavia, 
119,  120;  Fourteen  Points  accepted 
by,  120;  Austrian  surrender  to,  120; 
Fiume  claimed  by,  120  jf.,  127;  in- 
creased territorial  demands  of,  120, 
121,  124,  127^.;  principle  of  nation- 
ality applied  to  claims  of,  121 ;  self-de- 
termination applied  to  claims  of ,  1 22 ; 
geographic  and  economic  grounds  for 
claims  of,  122,  123;  strategic  argu- 
ments justifying  eastern  claims  of, 
124-126,  129,  130;  new  frontiers  of, 
in  alien  territory,  126;  supremacy  in 
Adriatic  assured  to,  126,  175;  Adri- 
atic claims  of,  129-132,  157;  desire 
of,  to  obtain  control  in  Balkans,  129- 
132;  report  of  American  specialists 
on  Adriatic  claims  of,  132;  decision 
against    Fiume    claim    of,    I34~i37; 
territory  offered  to,  in  settlement  of 
Adriatic    problem,     137;    terms    of 
treaty  with  Jugo-Slavia,  138;  Ameri- 
can attitude  toward  claims  of,  139; 
price  for  entering  war,  fixed  in  ad- 
vance, 143,  181;  forces  driven  back 
bytheSenussi,  148,  149;  ship  tonnage 
of,  in  the  Straits,  152;  Croats  and 
Slovenes  allies  of,  157;  struggle  for 
control  in  Adriatic,  158;  driven  from 
Valona,  175;  treaty  of,  with  Greece, 
176;  terms  of  London  Pact  concern- 
ing, 181;  spheres  of  influence  in  Asia 
Minor  promised  to,  185,  191;  opposi- 
tion of,  to  Greek  claims,  192,  194; 
guarantees  of  religious  freedom  not 
required  of,  212;  delegates  from,  on 
economic  commission,  307 

Jacob  Jones,  the,  358 

Japan,  admitted  to  Peace  Conference, 
17,  24,  28;  opposed  to  trial  of  kaiser, 
241;  German  islands  seized  by,  224; 
mandate  held  by,  226;  proposals  of, 
for  racial  equality,  411,  414,  4^5 


5i8 


INDEX 


Japanese  delegates  at  Peace  Confer- 
ence, 71,  94,  408,  411 

Jefferson,  Professor  Mark,  7 

Jews,  Palestine  a  homeland  for,  176, 
177,  182,  185,  219;  question  of  pro- 
tecting, 210;  classified  as  aliens  in 
Roumania,  216,  220;  special  protec- 
tion to,  in  Poland,  Roumania,  and 
Greece,  218,  219 

Johnson,  Major  Douglas  Wilson,  7,  59, 
159;  on  Fiume  and  the  Adriatic 
Problem,  112^. 

Jugo-Slavia,  representatives  from,  at 
Peace  Conference,  95;  claim  of,  to 
Klagenfurt  basin,  100;  nationalities 
in,  107;  importance  to,  of  territory 
claimed  by  Italy,  128;  recognition  of 
independence  of,  132 ;  value  of  Fiume 
to,  134;  terms  of  treaty  with  Italy, 
138;  land  tenure  in,  156;  lack  of 
political  unity  in,  157;  gains  on 
eastern  frontier  of,  158;  Bulgarian 
territory  claimed  by,  166;  racial  ele- 
ments in,  166;  America's  protest 
against  territorial  gains  of,  171; 
protection  to  aliens  in,  212,  218,  219; 
opposition  of,  to  protection  of  mi- 
norities, 213-215;  intermigration  not 
favored  by,  223;  fixing  boundaries  of, 
430 

Jugo-Slavs,  desire  of,  for  independence 
and  union  with  Serbia,  89,  90;  right 
of  self-rule  recognized  by  America, 
118;  agreement  of,  with  Italians,  119, 
120;  in  Fiume,  121;  opposition  of,  to 
Italian  rule,  122;  elements  of,    156, 

157 
Justice,  international,  and  the  League 
of  Nations,  155 

Kaiser.     See  William  II 

Kammerrer,  M.,  211 

Kautsky,  Karl,  his  "Guilt  of  William 

Hohenzollern "  quoted,  234,  235 
Kavala,  173 
Kehl,  the  port  of,  48 
Keynes,  J.  M.,  259;  misrepresentations 

of,  65  n. 
Kionga,  mandate  for,  227 
Kirk-Kilisse,  174 


Kitchener,  Lord,  267 
Klagenfurt  basin,  the,  lOO 
Klotz,  M.,  259,  280 
Koo,  Wellington,  408 
Kramarz,  M.,  213,  408 
Kurds,  the,  188 

Labor,  amendment  to  Treaty  con- 
cerning, 323,  324;  standards  of  Amer- 
ican, 323,  327,  334 

Labor  clauses  of  the  Treaty,  319  ff., 

325/- 

Labor  Conference,  International,  con- 
troversy over  composition  of,  322; 
method  of  procedure  of,  325;  mis- 
conceptions regarding,  325 

Labor  Legislation  Commission,  27,  320; 
the  Socialists  on,  320,  322;  sessions 
of,  321;  two  parts  of,  322 

Labor's  Bill  of  Rights,  321,  323,  326; 
the  preamble  to,  327;  full  text  of, 
328;  the  American  draft  of,  329,  331- 
333;  amendment  of,  330 

Lagosta  islands,  138 

Lamont,  Thomas  William,  307;  on 
Reparations,  259^. 

Languages,  attempts  to  extend  use  of, 
207,  208;  provision  concerning,  in 
minority  treaties,  216,  217 

Lansing,  Secretary,  25,  406 

Larnaude,  Professor,  410,  423 

Lawrence,  Colonel  T.  E.,  184,  185, 
432 

League  of  Nations,  government  of  the 
Saar  population  under,  60-65;  Dan- 
zig a  free  city  under,  79;  need  of,  for 
southeastern  Europe,  1 1 1 ;  mandate 
system  under,  155,  225  jf.;  minority 
treaties  under  guarantee  of,  221,  222, 
230;  report  of,  on  international  penal 
law,  257;  treaty  obligations  left  to 
discretion  of,  303;  and  equality  of 
trade,  314;  labor  section  of  treaty 
concerning,  325;  resolution  concern- 
ing, adopted  at  Peace  Conference, 
398;  votes  to  British  Dominions  un- 
der, 334,  403,  408,  422;  Geneva 
chosen  as  seat  of,  417;  choice  of  four 
smaller  Powers  to  sit  on  Council  of, 
417;  countries  invited  to  join,  418; 


INDEX 


519 


outstanding    feature   of    Paris   con- 
gress, 436;  opposers  of,  436 
League  of  Nations  Commission,  mem- 
bers of,   27,  407-409;   meetings  of, 
407,  409;  translation  of  speeches  and 
documents,  409;  matters  of  interna- 
tional concern  before,  421;  delega- 
tion of  women  heard  by,  421 
League  of  Nations  Covenant,  335;  the 
commission    which    formulated,    27, 
407-409,  421;   labor  clause  in,  319; 
indorsement  of,  by  American  Feder- 
ation of  Labor,  330;  Treaty  not  de- 
layed by  writing  of,  399;  commission 
appointed  to  prepare  agreement  of, 
400;    President   Wilson's   drafts   of, 
402,  403;  adoption  of  draft  of,  402- 
410;    the    Hurst-Miller    draft,    405; 
clause    regarding   religious   equality 
dropped   from,   406,   411;   provision 
regarding    the    Council,    410;    pro- 
vision of,  for  advisory  military  com- 
mission, 410;  Article  X  of,  410,  411; 
and  boundary  changes,  411;  Article 
XXII  of,  411,  440;  public  discussion 
of,  412;  French  attitude  toward,  412; 
additions    and    changes    suggested, 
414^.;  recognition  of  Monroe  Doc- 
trine  in,   415-417;    the   withdrawal 
clause,   418;   amendments  proposed 
by  United  States,  418-420;  and  do- 
mestic   questions,    419,    420;    Mr. 
Taft's  amendment   to  Article  XV, 
420;    no    provision    for    compulsory 
arbitration,    420;    clearing-house    of 
international    action,    421;    French 
translation  of,  423;  critics  of,  423; 
accepted  by  nearly  every  country, 
424 

Lebanese,  starving  of,  184 

Lebanon,  mandate  for,  227 

Left  Bank  of  Rhine,  demilitarization 
o^  54.  55;  inter-Allied  occupation  of, 
54.  55 

Leipzig,  trial  at,  of  Germans  accused  of 
war  crimes,  253-256 

Lens  coal-fields,  282 

Leviathan,  the,  356 

Lichnowsky,  Prince,  401;  quoted,  on 
the  Polish  question,  67 


Linguistic    minorities,    protection    of, 

216-218 
Lippmann,  Walter,  secretary  of  The 

Inquiry,  i 
Lissa  island,  126,  137,  138 
Lithuania,  Vilna  claimed  by,  85 
Little  Entente,  the,  98 
Lloyd  George,  Rt.  Hon.  David,  10,  ir, 
13,  60,  70,  93,  154,  237,  240,  273, 
274,  277,  281,   282,  286,  301,  403; 
member  of  Council  of  Four,  31,  32, 
36,   100;  defense  of  Rhine  opposed 
by,  52;  attitude  of,  in  Polish  settle- 
ment, 78-80;  proposal  of,  concerning 
Danzig,  79;  opposition  of,  to  Polish 
annexation  of  Danzig,  160-162;  op- 
posed to  fixing  sum  of  German  in- 
debtedness, 262,  264-268;  the  power 
of,  265-267;  argument  of,  for  inclu- 
sion of  pensions  in  reparations,  271; 
estimate  as  to  what  Germany  could 
pay,  275 
Lodge,     Senator,     League     Covenant 

reservations  of,  424 
London,  the  Conference  of,  209;  repara- 
tions proposals  at,  301,  303 
London,  secret  treaty  of,  91,  98,  102, 
113,  117,  118,  121,  127,  132,  137, 138, 
143.   171.   175.   181,   185,    191;  con- 
sidered obsolete  by  American  gov- 
ernment,   118;    contents    of,    made 
public,  119 
Lord,  Dr.  Robert  Howard,  7;  on  the 

reconstruction  of  Poland,  67  ff. 
Loucheur,  M.,  259,  276 
Lowell,  James  Russell,  246 
Ludendorflf,  General  von,  253;  "War 

Memories  of,  "  41 
Lunt,  Dr.  W.  E.,  7 
Lusitania,  sinking  of,  348 
Lussin  islands,  137 

Luxemburg,  settlement  of  question  of 
customs  frontier  of,  44,  45;  violation 
of  neutrality  of,  235,  236 

McCormick,  Vance,  260,  275,  307 
Macedonia,  population  of,  168;  Serbian 
and  Greek  influence  in,  168;  Rou- 
manian influence  in,  169;  end  of 
Bulgarization  of,  168-170;  divided 
between  Serbia  and  Greece,  170;  Bui- 


520 


INDEX 


garians  in,  173;  political  autonomy 
in,  proposed  by  Italy,  219 
Mack,  Judge  Julian  W,,  210 
Malmedy,  Germans  in,  212 
Mandates,    system    of,    proposed    by 
General  Smuts,  225;  three  types  of, 
225,  226;  selection  of  states  as  man- 
datories, 226;  the  formulation  of,  227; 
Japanese  and   French   reservations, 
227;  permanent  committee  for  super- 
vision of,  227;  value  of  system  of, 
228-230;  article  on,  in  League  Cove- 
nant,   411;   commission   to   prepare 
terms  of,  440;  provisions  protecting 
natives    under    Mandatory    Power, 
441-443;  three  classes  of,  441-443 
Mantoux,  Captain  Paul,  65  n.;  letter 

of,  quoted,  12 
Maps,    prepared    by  The   Inquiry,   5, 

162;  use  of  perverted,  142 
Marconi,  Guglielmo,  440 
Marienwerder,  District  of,  78,  79,  81 
Marine  corps,  United  States,  part  taken 

by,  in  war,  367,  368 
Maritsa  River,  the,  172 
Marshall,  Louis,  210 
Martino,  Mr.  de,  211 
Masaryk,  President,  94 
Maximilian,   Prince,   of  Baden,  peace 

negotiations  requested  by,  9,  10 
Mayo,  Rear-Admiral  Henry  Thomas, 
on  the  Atlantic  Fleet  in  the  Great 
War,  348  ff. 
Merchant  vessels,  surrender  of  German, 
282;    training    of    gun's    crews   for 
United  States,  349,  351;  taking  over 
and  repair  of   German,   by  United 
States  navy,  355 
Mesopotamia,  the  Arabs  of,  176;  Brit- 
ish control  in,  183;  promise  to  assist 
establishment  of  native  government 
in,  197,  198;  mandate  over,  given  to 
Great  Britain,  200,  226,  227 
Mezes,  Dr.  Sidney  Edward,  7;  on  Prep- 
arations for  Peace,  i  jf. 
Miller,  David  Hunter,   i,  7,  59,  211; 
on  the  Making  of  the  League,  398 
ff.\  draft  of  League  of  Nations  Cove- 
nant by,  405 
Milner,  Lord,  11,  440 


Mine  barrage  in  North  Sea,  354,  359- 
361 

Mine-laying  force,  United  States,  353, 
359-361 

Minnesota,  the,  365 

Minorities,  guarantees  to  religious,  209, 
210;  first  proposal  for  protecting, 
made  by  President  Wilson,  210; 
committee  on  protection  of,  211; 
opposition  to  guarantees  to,  2 1 3-2 1 5 ; 
President  Wilson's  speech  in  regard 
to,  214;  signing  of  treaties  guaran- 
teeing protection  of,  215;  provisions 
of  treaties  protecting,  215  ^. 

Minority  treaties,  provisions  of,  215 
ff.\  criticism  of,  217;  under  guaran- 
tee of  League  of  Nations,  221,  222; 
method  of  enforcement  of,  222 

Mittel  Europa,  data  concerning,  col- 
lected by  The  Inquiry,  5;  discussion 
of  tentative  boundaries  for,  6 

Mobilization  and  preparedness,  373 

Mohammedanism,  Constantinople  the 
focus  of,  147;  the  confraternities  of, 
147-149;  change  in  aspects  of,  148 

Monroe  Doctrine,  recognition  of,  in 
League  Covenant,  406,  415-417 

Montagu,  E.  S.,  201,  259 

Montenegro,  religious  freedom  in,  209 

Moravia,  the  boundaries  of,  103 

Mori,  M.,  259 

Most-favored-nation  clauses  of  Euro- 
pean treaties,  313 

Mt.  Athos,  special  protection  to  monks 
of,  219 

Mount  Vernon,  the,  357 

Mussulmans,  the,  209;  special  protec- 
tion to,  in  minority  treaties,  219 

Mustapha  Kemal  Pasha,  178,  196,  203 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  114, 115,  239,  246 

Napoleon  III,  247 

Nation   in  arms,  doctrine  of  the,  373 

/..  377  ff. 
Nationalism,    impetus    given    to,    by 

Allied  success,  207 
Nationality,  principle  of,  and  boundary 

settlements,   106,   107;  provision  in 

minority  treaties  concerning,  216 
Nations,  Alliances  of,  374  ff. 
Naval  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  359,  363 


INDEX 


521 


Navy,  United  States,  increase  in,  348, 
352;  conference  with  British  and 
French  Admirals,  350,  351 ;  organiza- 
tion of  patrol  force  by,  350,  351,  353; 
destroyers  sent  to  British  waters, 
351-353;  command  of  forces  of,  in 
European  waters,  352;  demand  for 
trained  men  in,  352;  anti-submarine 
craft  built  by,  354;  battleships  of, 
sent  to  join  British  Grand  fleet,  354, 
357;  taking  over  and  repair  of  Ger- 
man merchant  ships  by,  355;  the 
troop  convoy  system,  355-357;  work 
of  the  destroyers,  357,  358;  mine 
force  of,  359-361;  mine-laying  by, 
360;  overseas  transportation  by,  361 ; 
development  of  th^  aviation  service, 
361,  362;  the  railway  batteries,  363; 
transatlantic  communication  for 
army  secured  by,  364;  vessels  de- 
stroyed by  German  submarines,  365; 
operations  of  submarines  of,  366; 
the  sub-chasers,  367;  part  taken  in 
war  by  marines,  367,  368;  numerous 
activities  of,  368,  369;  hospital  facili- 
ties of,  368;  the  cross-channel  trans- 
port force,  368 

Near  East,  secret  treaties  concerning, 
1 81-186,  190,  200,  203;  delegations 
from,  at  Peace  Conference,  188 

Neuilly,  Treaty  of,  163,  166,  172 

New  States  and  Protection  of  Minori- 
ties, Committee  on,  211 

New  Zealand,  mandate  held  by,  226 

North  Sea,  mine  barrage  in,  354,  359- 
361 

Norway,  coast  mined  by,  359 

Nubar  Pasha,  188 

Odessa,  withdrawal  of  French  from,  151 

Olympia,  the,  369 

Olympic,  the,  356 

Orlando,  Premier,  10,  11,  24,  94,  191, 
194,  262;  in  the  Council  of  Four,  31, 
32,  35,  100;  on  League  of  Nations 
Commission,  407 

Osmanli,  the,  176;  see  also  Turks 

Ossoinack,  speech  of,  135 

Ottoman  foreign  debt,  the,  146 

Overseas  Transportation  Service,  Na- 
val, 361 


Pachitch,  Serbian  delegate,  94 
Pacific  Fleet,  South  Atlantic  patrolled 

by,  353 

Pact  of  Rome,  the,  119,  120 

Paderewski,  94,  14c,  213 

Palestine,  a  homeland  for  the  Jews, 
176,  177,  182,  185,  219;  campaigns 
in,  185;  opposition  to  separation  of, 
190;  mandate  for,  200,  226,  227 

Panyeko,  151 

Paris  Economic  Conference,  309 

Patrol  vessels.  United  States,  350,  351, 
353 

Peace  Conference,  the,  personnel  of, 
10,  11;  atmosphere  and  organiz.a(ion 
of,  15  #•;  public  demand  for  the 
spectacular  at,  15,  16,  19;  Japan  ad- 
mitted to,  17,  24,  28;  the  Council  of 
Ten,  17  jf.;  character  of  business  of, 
18,  19;  meeting-place  of,  18;  diffi- 
culty of  settling  frontiers  questions 
at,  21-23;  special  commissions  estab- 
lished at,  25_^.;  direction  of,  assumed 
by  Council  of  Four,  31-33,  100,  296; 
the  Council  of  Five,  32,  33;  number 
of  sessions  held  by  different  councils 
at,  33;  compared  with  similar  bodies 
in  the  past,  36;  settlement  of  ques- 
tions of  new  frontiers  of  Germany 
by,  37  ff-,  42  ff.;  settlement  of  fron- 
tiers questions  of  Poland  by,  6j  ff.; 
determination  by,  of  frontiers  in 
Austria-Hungary,  91  ff.;  the  mem- 
bers of,  at  the  hearings,  93,  94;  the 
American  representatives  on  frontiers 
committee,  96,  97;  decision  of,  re- 
garding Italian  boundaries,  117; 
idealistic  principles  brought  to,  141; 
confusion  at,  concerning  objects  of 
war,  141;  recitals  of  claims  of  minor 
nationalities  at,  158,  159,  431;  the 
first  two  months  of,  "159;  the  Amer- 
ican delegation  at,  165  ff.;  Near  East 
delegations  at,  188;  withdrawal  of 
United  States  from,  198;  protection 
of  minorities  and  natives  in  trans- 
ferred territories,  205,  208,  210  jf.; 
responsibilities  of,  208;  Commission 
on  Responsibilities  created  by,  232 
ff. ;  reparations  most  difficult  question 
before,  259^.;  qualities  of,  296;  state 


522 


INDEX 


of  mind  at,  297;  French  attitude  at, 
298  Jf.;  interests  of  Allied  Powers  at, 
305;  economic  delegates  at,  306  jf.; 
idealism  and  determination  at,  335; 
character  of  the  problems  before,  370; 
resolution  of,  concerning  League  of 
Nations,  398;  accomplishments  of, 
425;  delay  in  convening  and  in  deal- 
ing with  Germany,  426;  failure  of,  to 
adjust  international  finances,  428; 
avoidance  by,  of  armaments  reduc- 
tion question,  433;  lack  of  publicity 
at,  435;  League  of  Nations  outstand- 
ing feature  of,  436 

Peace  without  victory,  425 

Pelagosa  islands,  137 

Pensions,  inclusion  of,  in  reparations, 
271,  272 

Pershing,  General,  253 

Persian  Gulf,  ship  tonnage  in,  152 

Pessoa,  President,  of  Brazil,  408 

Pichon,  M.,  25,  70;  palace  of,  on  the 
Quai  d'Orsay,  18,  19,  23,  93 

Plenary  Assembly,  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, 17 

Pola,  126 

Poland,  39;  settlement  of  boundary 
questions  of,  67^.;  attitude  of  Allies 
toward,  69  ff.;  French  attitude  to- 
ward, 70;  England's  attitude  to- 
ward, 70;  American  attitude  toward, 
71;  Italian  attitude  toward,  71;  an 
independent  state,  71;  fixing  the 
frontiers  of,  71  #.,  83-85;  Germans 
in,  73;  national  feeling  in,  74;  prov- 
inces proposed  for  cession  to,  75,  76; 
free  access  to  the  sea  promised  to,  77; 
Germany,  chief  enemy  of,  77;  terri- 
tory and  population  ceded  by  Ger- 
many to,  81;  treaty  with  Danzig,  82; 
Austrian,  82;  Russian,  83-85;  the 
eastern  boundaries  of,  83-85;  claim 
of,  to  Vilna,  85;  size  and  population 
of  new  state  of,  86;  representatives 
of,  at  the  Peace  Conference,  94; 
Ruthenians  under  control  of,  107; 
Danzig  not  given  to,  160-163;  Pro- 
tection of  minorities  in,  210,  218,  222; 
guarantee  of  protection  to  Germans 
in,  211;  opposition  of,  to  guarantees 
to  minorities,  213-215;  special  pro- 


tection to  Jews  in,  218,  219;  cus- 
toms provision  concerning,  316 

Polish  territorial  commission,  report  of, 
160 

Polk,  Frank  L.,  165,  166,  215,  330, 
333 

Portugal,  mandate  held  by,  227 

Posen,  74,  75 

Powers,  World,  conference  of,  proposed, 
for  consideration  of  armaments 
limitation,  391  ff. 

Preparedness,  373,  377;  a  guarantee 
against  war,  383 

President  Lincoln,  sinking  of,  357 

Pressburg,  Czecho-Slovak  claim  to,  no 

Priorities,  economic,  310-312 

Prussia,  military  supremacy  of,  38; 
division  of,  not  desired  by  the  Allies, 
39;  strategic  importance  of  West,  74, 
75;  East,  77,  78 

Publicity,  lack  of,  at  Paris  Conference, 
435 

Racial  minorities,  protection  of,  215  Jf. 

Radio  stations,  United  States  control 
of,  364 

Raggi,  Marquis  Salvago,  96 

Railway  batteries.  United  States  naval, 
363 

Rapallo,  Treaty  of,  138,  172 

Rappard,  Professor,  415 

Red  Book,  the,  6 

Red  Cross  article  in  League  Covenant, 
421 

Red  Sea,  ship  tonnage  in,  152 

Reis,  M.,  410 

Religious,  equality,  clause  regarding, 
dropped  from  League  Covenant,  406, 
411;  minorities,  guarantees  to,  209, 
210,  216;  toleration,  basis  of  inter- 
national action,  229 

Reparations,  work  of  the  commission 
on,  27,  28;  members  of  commission 
on,  259;  sub-commissions,  260;  ac- 
tual war  costs  excluded  from,  260, 
268-270,  428;  Germany's  capacity  to 
pay,  260-262,  275-277,  287;  fixed 
sum  as,  urged  by  United  States,  263, 
429;  limited  to  material  damage, 
271;  inclusion  of  pensions  in,  271; 


INDEX 


523 


total  amount  to  be  paid,  275-277, 
286,  302;  surrender  of  German  mer- 
chant marine,  282;  delivery  by  Ger- 
many of  coal,  cattle,  and  other  items, 
282,  283;  permanent  commission  on, 
277,  284  ff. ;  clauses  of  peace  treaty 
dealing  with,  278;  German  bonds  for 
Belgium,  281;  bonds  as  pledge  of 
Germany's  good  faith,  283,  284;  dele- 
gates to  permanent  commission,  284, 
285;  United  States  not  represented 
on  permanent  commission,  285,  289; 
new  proposals  of,  at  London  con- 
ference, 301,  303;  impossibility  of 
fixing  maximum  sum,  301 

"Report  of  the  Commission  of  Re- 
sponsibilities of  the  Conference  of 
Paris,"  234  n,,  235  n. 

Responsibility  of  the  Authors  of  the 
War,  Commission  on,  232  ff. 

Revolution,  separation  of  states  from 
old  empires  through,  336,  337 

Rhine,  the.  Left  Bank  of,  extent  and 
character  of  the  region,  49;  defense 
of,  desired  by  France,  49-53;  demili- 
tarization and  inter-AUied  occupa- 
tion of,  54,  55 

Riga,  Treaty  of,  85 

Root,  Senator,  member  of  Interna- 
tional Court  Committee,  421 

Roumania,  treaties  fixing  frontiers  of, 
91;  the  new  boundaries  of,  95,  105, 
430;  railway  connection  between 
Czecho-Slovakia  and,  97,  98;  claim 
of,  to  the  Banat  of  Temesvar,  105, 
106;  aliens  in,  107;  increase  in  com- 
merce of,  154;  land  tenure  in,  156; 
influence  of,  in  Macedonia,  169; 
Bulgaria's  foreign  trade  menaced  by, 
172;  religious  freedom  in,  209,  210; 
Jews  classified  as  aliens  in,  216,  220; 
minority  races  protected  in,  212,  218, 
219;  opposition  of,  to  guarantees  to 
minorities,  213-215;  special  protec- 
tion to  Jews  in,  218,  219;  Secretary 
Hay's  protest  to,  220 

Rupprecht  of  Bavaria,  Ex-Crown 
Prince,  253 

Russia,  data  concerning,  collected  by 
the  United  States,  4;  secret  agree- 


ment with,  concerning  Left  Bank  of 
Rhine,  49,  52,  58;  and  Polish  eastern 
boundaries,  83-85;  services  of,  to  be 
paid  for,  143;  economic  change  in 
Ukrainian  district  of,  144;  ship  ton- 
nage of,  in  the  Straits,  152;  Arme- 
nian Soviet  Republic  in  Transcau- 
casia, 178,  202,  203;  terms  of 
Sazonof-Paleologue  treaty  concern- 
ing, 181;  advance  into  Turkish  Ar- 
menia, 182;  sovereignty  over  Ar- 
menian vilayets  promised  to,  182; 
overthrow  of,  186;  Bolshevism  in, 
189;  Constantinople  promised  to, 
201;  representation  on  Commission 
of  Straits  provided  for,  202 ;  declara- 
tion of  war  against,  235,  236 
Ruthenians,  political  autonomy  given 
to,  219 

Saar  Valley,  the,  description  of,  56; 
French  claims  in,  56-58;  coal-mines 
of,  56,  259,  283;  government  of,  un- 
der League  of  Nations,  60-65;  criti- 
cism of  settlement  concerning,  62,  63 ; 
extent  of,  and  form  of  government 
in,  64 

Saint  Jean  de  Maurienne  Agreement, 
the,  185,  191,  194 

Saloniki,  169;  foreign  trade  of,  146; 
capture  of,  by  Greeks,  157;  Greek 
claim  to,  173 

Samoan  Islands,  German,  mandate  for, 
226 

San  Diego,  the,  365 

San  Remo,  conference  at,  200,  227 

Sassens,  island  of,  175 

Saxons,  special  protection  to,  in  minor- 
ity treaty,  219 

Sazonof-Paleologue  Agreement,  the, 
181,  187,  2oi,  203 

Schleswig,  division  of,  between  Ger- 
many and  Denmark,  42,  43;  the 
Germans  in,  212 

Scotland,  fuel-oil  pipe-line  across,  368 

Scott,  Dr.  James  Brown,  7,  402,  406; 
on  the  Trial  of  the  Kaiser,  231  ff. 

Seas,  freedom  of  the,  438-440 

Secret  treaties,  91,  181-186,  190,  200, 
203 


524 


INDEX 


Self-determination,  President  Wilson 
quoted  on,  68;  limitations  of,  205; 
and  fixing  of  boundaries,  429-433 

Senussi,  the,  Mohammedan  society, 
148,  149 

Serajevo,  the  assassinations  at,  233 

Serbia,  delegates  from,  at  Peace  Con- 
ference, 94;  claim  of,  to  the  Banatof 
Temesvar,  106;  deprived  of  access  to 
the  sea,  129,  157,  158,  169;  struggle 
of,  for  control  in  Adriatic,  158;  ter- 
ritory ceded  to,  166,  168,  170;  in- 
fluence of,  in  Macedonia,  168,  170; 
secret  treaty  of,  with  Bulgaria,  169; 
Bulgarian  outrages  in,  172;  religious 
freedom  in,  209;  opposition  of,  to 
guarantees  to  minorities,  213;  Au- 
strian ultimatum  to,  234;  war 
against,  declared  by  Austria,  235,  236 

Serbs,  the,  156,  157 

Sevres,  Treaty  of,  144,  150,  172,  176^., 
190,  195,  196,  202,  203 

Sexten  valley,  the,  118,  137 

Seymour,  Dr.  Charles,  7,  159;  on  the 
End  of  an  Empire,  87  ff. 

Shaw,  the,  358 

Shipping,  in  region  of  the  Straits,  152; 
tension  upon,  during  armistice,  339 

Shotwell,  Dr.  James  T.,  7 

Silesia,  103;  Upper,  74,  75,  80-82 

Simon,  M.,  440 

Sims,  Rear-Admiral  W.  S.,  352 

Siwa,  the  Senussi  driven  out  of,  149 

Slavs,  two  groups  of,  156  ff. 

Slovenes,  the,  156,  157 

Smuts,  General  Jan,  27,  402-404,  408; 
proposal  of  mandate  system  made 
by,  225;  argument  of,  for  inclusion 
of  pensions  in  reparation  bill,  271 

Smyrna,  foreign  trade  of,  146;  impor- 
tance of,  to  Anatolia,  192;  control  of, 
given  to  Greece,  193,  194,  196;  occu- 
pation of,  by  Greek  troops,  194; 
massacre  of  Turks  in,  195,  196;  pro- 
visional arrangement  concerning, 
196 

Socialists  on  labor  legislation  commis- 
sion, 320,  322 

Sofia,  166,  170 

Solf,  269,  270 

Sonnino,  Baron,  11,  24,  94,  131 


South  African  Union,  the,  224,  226 

South  America,  detailed  data  concern- 
ing, collected  by  United  States,  3,  4 

Southwest  Africa,  German  control  in, 
224;  mandate  for,  226 

Sovereigns,   immunity   of,   238,   247 

Spain,  chosen  for  Council  of  League  of 
Nations,  417 

Spalato,  port  of,  claimed  by  Italy,  127 

Stambouliski,  163 

States'  rights,  protection  of,  in  labor 
clauses  of  treaty,  326 

Stowell,  Lord,  quoted,  231 

Straits  of  Constantinople,  zone  of,  144; 
shipping  in  region  of,  152;  advantages 
to  Great  Britain  of  control  of,  153; 
commission  of,  established,  202 

Strasburg,  the  port  of,  48 

Strauss,  Rear-Admiral,  353,  361 

Strikes,  shipping  and  port,  339 

Strumitsa,  166,  168,  170 

Subchasers,  United  States,  367 

Submarine  warfare,  German,  350,  355, 
364-366 

Submarines,  movements  of  German, 
kept  track  of,  356;  destruction  to 
German,  by  mine  barrage,  360;  Ger- 
man, on  American  coast,  364-366; 
operations  of  United  States,  366 

Suez  Canal,  British  interest  in,  182,  184 

Sultan,  the,  maintenance  of,  in  Con- 
stantinople, 201,  202 

Sumner,  Lord,  259,  268 

Supreme  Court,  United  States,  deci- 
sion of,  in  Hudson  case,  249 

Supreme  Economic  Council,  the,  308, 

341 
Supreme  Inter-allied  War  Council,  the, 

Switzerland,  206;  refusal  to  recognize 
neutrality  of,  in  League  Covenant, 

415 

Sydorenko,  151 

Sykes-Picot  Treaty,  the,  182-184,  189, 
198,  203 

Syria,  British  occupation  of,  153; 
French  occupation  of,  153,  200;  the 
Arabs  of,  176;  Arab  confederation 
established  in,  183;  Turkish  cruelties 
in,  184;  French  mandate  over,  189, 
190,  226,  227;  promise  to  assist  estab- 


INDEX 


525 


lishment  of  native  government  in, 
197,  198;  American  commission  sent 
into,    198;    proclaimed   independent 
state,  200 
Szoegeny,  Count,  234 

Taft,  William  H.,  amendment  to  Ar- 
ticle XV  of  Covenant  by,  420 

Tardieu,  Andr6,  26,  33,  48,  53,  59,  96, 
165;  project  of,  for  free  state  of 
Fiume,  131,  133 

Tariff  Commission,  United  States,  309 

Tariff  system,  European,  313 

Tariffs  and  equality  of  trade,  314 

Tarvis  basin,  the,  137 

Tashkilat  Milli,  the,  178,  196 

Tatsumi,  M.,  259 

Taussig,  commanding  Destroyer  Divi- 
sion, 351 

Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  "The  History  of 
the  Peace  Conference"  by,  61,  278 

Territorial  and  Economic  Section  of 
the  American  Commission  to  Nego- 
tiate Peace,  2,  6 

Territorial  commissions,  establishment 
of,  28;  reports  of,  29,  34,  99,  100; 
the  Polish,  71  jf.,  160;  to  draft  new 
boundaries  in  Austria  -  Hungary, 
95  S- ;  the  American  representatives 
on,  96,  97;  new  boundaries  deter- 
mined by,  159,  160;  the  Greek,  191, 
192,  194 

Teschen,  the  dispute  over,  69,  92;  divi- 
sion of,  82,  83 

Thrace,  Greek  annexation  of,  154; 
Bulgarian  gains  in,  169;  Greek  claim 
to,  173,  186,  191,  194;  Bulgarian 
population  of,  173 

Ticonderoga,  the,  365 

Times,  London,  list  of  accused  Germans 
in,  253 

Togoland,  mandate  for,  226 

Tower,  Sir  Reginald,  162,  163 

Trade  conditions,  equality  of,  312-315; 
economic  barriers  created  by  trea- 
ties, 315    _ 

Transcaucasian  Russia,  British  occu- 
pation of,  151,  153;  Armenian  Soviet 
Republic  in,  178,  202,  203 

Transferred  territories,  protection  of 
peoples  in,  223  Jf. 


Transport,  overseas,  of  United  States 
troops,  355,  361 ;  cross-channel,  368 

Transylvania,  105,  207 

Treaties,  secret,  91,  181-186,  190,  200, 
203 

Trebizond,  182,  203 

Trentino,  the,  116;  Italy's  claim  to, 
102,  113-I15;  distribution  of  races 
in,  114;  Germans  in,  212 

Tripartite  Agreement,  the,  183,  190, 
200,  203 

Trumbitch,  Mr.,  94,  213 

Turkey,  foreign  debt  of,  146;  Constan- 
tinople focus  of  trade  and  political 
life  of,  146;  limitation  of  armaments 
in,  150;  ship  tonnage  of,  in  the 
Straits,  152;  results  of  treaty  with, 
176  ff.;  Turkizing  policy  in,  180; 
international  compacts  disposing  of 
territory  of,  1 81;  revolt  of  Arab  offi- 
cers in  army  of,  181;  advance  of, 
into  Egypt  planned,  184;  revolt  of 
Hedjaz  from,  185;  provisions  of 
Fourteen  Points  concerning,  187; 
not  represented  at  Peace  Conference, 
191;  Cilicia  and  central  Anatolia 
left  with,  203;  protection  of  minori- 
ties in,  215,  218;  protection  to  Chris- 
tians in,  219;  intermigration  arrange- 
ment with  Greece,  223;  responsibility 
of,  for  world  war,  233 

Turks,  the,  position  of,  at  Constanti- 
nople, 146-150;  under  control  of 
Sultan,  176;  revolt  of  Young  Turk 
party,  180,  196;  of  Asia  Minor,  192, 
193;  treatment  of  Anatolians  by 
Young,  193;  massacre  of,  by  Greeks, 

^95.  196 
Tyrell,  Sir  William,  159 
Tyrol,  Austrian,  Italy's  claim  to,  102, 

113 
Tyrolese,  annexed  by  Italy,  429 

t^-53,  the,  364,  365 

f/-i5i,  the,  365 

Ukraine,  the,  French  activities  in,  151 

United  States,  lack  of  information  con- 
cerning other  countries,  1-3;  in- 
fluence of,  at  Peace  Conference,  41; 
French   plan   for   defense  of   Rhine 


526 


INDEX 


opposed  by,  52;  offer  of,  to  aid 
France,  54,  55;  secret  treaties  op- 
posed by,  91;  the  representatives 
from,  on  frontiers  commission,  96, 
97;  refusal  of,  to  recognize  Treaty  of 
London,  118;  refusal  of,  to  accept 
Armenian  mandate,  178-180,  187, 
188,  443;  expected  to  replace  Russia 
in  settlement  of  Turkish  problems, 
187;  attitude  of,  toward  Greek 
claims,  192;  withdrawal  of,  from 
Peace  Conference,  198;  representa- 
tion on  Commission  of  Straits  pro- 
vided for,  202;  interest  of,  in  Rou- 
manian conditions,  220;  opposed  to 
trial  of  kaiser,  241,  245;  no  delegate 
from,  on  Reparations  committee, 
285,  289;  no  pledge  as  to  war  debt 
given  by,  289;  food  supplied  to  Allies 
by,  338;  solution  by,  of  economic 
problems  during  armistice,  342  ff.; 
insistence  by,  on  removal  of  food 
blockade,  343;  refusal  of,  to  furnish 
supplies  to  enemy  on  credit,  344; 
assistance  given  Europe  by,  during 
the  armistice,  346;  assistance  of,  in 
event  of  another  European  war,  376, 
377;  amendments  to  League  Cove- 
nant favored  by,  418-420;  refusal  of, 
to  accept  and  support  Treaty  of 
Versailles,  426;  interest  of,  in  adjust- 
ing world  finance,  427;  foreign  loan 
of,  428;  failure  of,  to  join  League  of 
Nations,  437;  attitude  of,  toward 
freedom  of  the  seas,  438;  argument 
for  acceptance  of  mandate  by,  443 
Upper  Silesia,  74,  75;  mineral  wealth 
of,  80;  plebiscite  in,  80-82 

Valona,  126,  130,  174,  175 

Van,  178,  182,  203 

Vandervelde,  27 

Venizelos,  Eleutherios,  11,  27,  159,  188, 
213,  418;  quoted,  11 1;  promise  ob- 
tained by,  186;  Greek  claims  pre- 
sented by,  191,  192,  194;  Smyrna 
claim  of,  194;  Greek  troops  sent  to 
Smyrna  by,  194,  195;  downfall  of, 
196,  197;  protection  of  minorities  ap- 
proved by,  215;  intermigration  in 
the  Balkans  suggested  by,  222,  223; 


Article  XV  of  League  Covenant  by, 
408 

Versailles  Conference,  the,  10  ff.;  per- 
sonnel of,  10,  II 

Versailles,  treaty  of,  founded  on  re- 
ports of  Commissions,  29,  34,  99; 
provision  regarding  trial  of  the 
kaiser,  232,  237^.;  the  preamble  of, 
236,  237;  draft  of  Article  227  pre- 
pared by  President  Wilson,  237; 
provisions  concerning  trial  of  Ger- 
man subjects,  251,  252;  clauses  deal- 
ing with  reparation  and  finance,  278; 
clause  concerning  German  bonds, 
281;  the  economic  provisions  of,  291 
ff.,  427-429;  President  Wilson's  part 
in  making,  292  ff.\  American  prin- 
ciples and  economic  clauses  of,  293; 
reparations  clauses  of,  302;  com- 
mercial clauses  of,  303;  a  hard  and 
exacting  document,  304;  criticism  of 
economic  clauses  of,  304-306;  in- 
terests of  Powers  determining  terms 
of,  305;  the  labor  clauses  of,  319  #., 
325  ff-\  labor  amendments  to,  323, 
324;  preamble  to  military  peace 
terms  of,  372;  not  delayed  by  League 
of  Nations,  399;  accomplishments  of, 

425 

Vesnitch,  M.,  94,  408 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  430 

Vilna,  the  dispute  concerning,  85; 
population  of,  85  n. 

Vlachs,  special  protection  to,  in  minor- 
ity treaty,  219 

von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  253 

von  Billow,  General,  204,  253 

von  Capelle,  Admiral,  253 

von  der  Goltz,  General,  181 

von  Falkenhayn,  General,  253 

von  Kluck,  General,  253 

von  Lersner,  Baron,  254,  255 

von  Ludendorff,  General,  253;  "War 
Memories"  of,  41 

von  Mackensen,  Field- Marshal,  253 

von  Sanders,  General  Liman,  145,  253 

von  Tirpitz,  Admiral,  253 

von  Wiesner,  Herr,  233 

War,  breaches  of  the  laws  and  customs 

of,  247  ff. 


INDEX 


527 


War,  modern,  characteristics  of,  373 
Jf-i  381  #.;  national  alliances  in,  374- 
377 ;  alliances  of  commercial  interests, 
378;  a  menace  to  civilization,  376, 
377)  381,  384,  437;  accumulation  of 
armaments  for,  377;  the  extreme 
blockade,  379,  380;  suddenness  of, 
380;  the  non-combatants,  380;  facts 
concerning,  381-383;  ruthless  de- 
struction of  life  in,  381 ;  preparedness 
a  guarantee  against,  383 

War,  World,  confusion  concerning 
objects  of,  141;  change  in  objects  of, 
143;  a  crusade  for  liberation  of  op- 
pressed peoples,  205;  rivalries  en- 
gendered by,  224;  commission  to  fix 
responsibility  for  crimes  of,  232  ff.; 
causes  of,  233-236;  Germany's  neu- 
trality violation,  235,  236;  cost  of, 
260-262,  268-270,  288,  385,  427; 
amount  of  actual  material  damage 
and  pensions,  275;  responsibility  for, 
288;  no  American  pledge  as  to  Allied 
debt,  289;  national  alliances  preced- 
ing, 375;  summary  of,  383;  number 
killed  and  wounded  in,  384,  385; 
diplomatic  telegrams  preceding,  401 

Warsaw,  renounced  by  Russia,  83,  84 

Waugh,  Mr.,  64 

Weizmann,  Dr.  Chaim,  188 

West  Prussia,  74;  strategic  importance 
of,  75 

Westermann,  Dr.  William  Linn,  7; 
on  the  Armenian  Problem  and  the 
Disruption  of  Turkey,  176  ff. 

William  II,  Emperor,  provision  in 
Versailles  treaty  concerning  trial  of, 
232,  237  ff.;  flight  of,  into  Holland, 
239;  Holland's  refusal  to  surrender, 
240-245 ;  punishment  in  present  con- 
dition of,  246 

Wilson,  Admiral,  353 

Wilson,  President,  93,  143,  188;  reply 
of,  to  Germany's  request  for  peace 
negotiations,  9,  10;  trip  to  America 
and  return  to  France,  31;  in  the 
Council  of  Four,  31,  32,  36,  100; 
attitude  toward  French  claims  on 
the  Saar,  58,  60;  on  self-determina- 


tion, 68;  on  the  Polish  question,  69; 
value  of  services  of,  at  Peace  Con- 
ference, 36,  165;  reply  of,  to  Austria's 
request  for  an  armistice,  90;  opposi- 
tion of,  to  secret  treaties,  91,  186; 
territorial  commissions  approved  by, 
in  Austrian  boundaries  settlement, 
95;  keen  interest  of,  in  boundary 
settlements,  loi;  decision  of,  con- 
cerning Brenner  frontier,  102;  view 
of,  concerning  Italian  frontiers,  118; 
Italian  supremacy  in  Adriatic  ap- 
proved by,  126;  terms  of  Adriatic 
settlement  ameliorated  by,  139;  sug- 
gestion of,  concerning  Constanti- 
nople, 144;  agreement  with  Lloyd 
George  on  the  Danzig  question,  161, 
162;  not  responsible  for  refusal  to 
accept  Armenian  mandate,  179;  ap- 
proval by,  of  Palestine  agreement, 
186;  American  commission  sent  into 
Syria  by,  198;  Armenian  boundaries 
fixed  by,  203;  new  meaning  given  to 
war  by,  204;  insistence  of,  on  impar- 
tial justice,  208;  protection  to  minori- 
ties advocated  by,  210,  215;  speech 
of,  on  rights  of  minorities,  214;  draft 
of  Article  227  prepared  by,  237; 
opposed  to  trial  of  kaiser,  237; 
Premier  Hughes's  attack  on,  269; 
on  inclusion  of  war  costs  in  repara- 
tions, 270;  inclusion  of  pensions 
approved  by,  272;  generous  attitude 
of,  at  Peace  Conference,  272-274; 
on  reciprocal  tariff  for  Germany,  274; 
no  pledge  as  to  war  debt  made  by, 
289;  share  of,  in  framing  economic 
clauses  of  the  treaty,  292,  296;  Gom- 
pers's  telegram  to,  330;  reply  of,  to 
Gompers,  331-333;  equality  of  trade 
conditions  proposed  by,  312,  314; 
on  removal  of  economic  barriers, 
312;  phrase  "association  of  nations" 
used  by,  399;  drafts  of  League  of 
Nations  prepared  by,  402,  403;  ac- 
ceptance by,  of  Hurst-Miller  draft 
of  Covenant,  405;  D.  H.  Miller's 
criticism  of  Covenant  draft  of,  406; 
success  of  first  visit  to  Paris,  413, 
414;    support    of    Monroe    Doctrine 


528 


INDEX 


article  by,  416,  417;  address  of,  con- 
cerning reparations,  427 ;  influence  of, 
in  making  League  Covenant,  436 

VVirz,  Henry,  trial  of,  249 

Women,  delegation  of,  heard  by  League 
of  Nations  Commission,  421 

Wiirtemberg,  Duke  of,  253 

Yap,  island  of,  226,  227 
Young,  Dr.  AUyn  Abbott,  7;  on  the 
Economic  Settlement,  291  jf. 


Young  Turks,  revolt  of,  180,  196;  treat- 
ment of  Anatolians  by,  193 

Zara,  Italian  claim  to,  121,  127,  128, 
131;  given  to  Italy,  138 

Zholger,  Jugo-Slav  representative,  95 

Zionists,  delegation  of,  at  Peace  Con- 
ference, 188;  opposition  to  move- 
ment of,  for  separation  of  Palestine, 
190 

Zone  of  the  Straits,  144;  see  also  Straits 
of  Constantinople 


AA    000  832  656    3 


UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 

University  of  California,  San  Diego 


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